189 Ind. 578 | Ind. | 1920
Appellant was charged by affidavit in two counts with violating §§4, 15, Acts 1917 p. 15, §8356a et seq. Burns’ Supp. 1918. He was tried in the Grant Circuit Court before a jury,, and convicted of keeping intoxicating liquors with intent to sell, etc., contrary to §4, supra, and sentenced to pay a fine of $100, and to imprisonment in the county jail for a period of thirty days.
Appellant’s motion for a new trial was overruled, and this ruling is the-only error here assigned.
Clause 6, which is the only legislative expression on the subject of the modification of instructions in a criminal case, expressly prohibits the court from orally modifying instructions. In civil actions we have a statute fully covering this subject (§561 Burns 1914, Acts 1907 p. 652), but that statute has been held not to apply to criminal cases. Stephenson v. State (1887), 110 Ind. 358, 373, 11 N. E. 360, 59 Am. Rep. 216; Donovan v. State (1908), 170 Ind. 123, 83 N. E. 744; Guy v. State (1906), 37 Ind. App. 691, 77 N. E. 855.
Since we have no statute on the question as to the authority of the court to modify an instruction as was done in this case, it would seem that the recognized practice in such cases, and the omission of the legislature to act, except as herein pointed .out, must be regarded as exceedingly persuasive of a conclusion sustaining the right of the court to modify special instructions when done in writing, and we so hold. However, in the case of Guy v. State, supra, by reference to the record in that case, it will be observed that this precise question was before the court and the same objection urged as here, but the court sustained the action of the trial court in modifying the instruction. 16 C. J. 1067; Ewbant, Criminal Law §513.
From a consideration of the entire series of instructions given to the jury, we are convinced that it could not have been misled by the questioned modification. Of course, a defendant on trial has a right to insist that the court shall instruct the jury on all legal questions necessary to reach a true verdict. That is all the law guarantees and all that he has a right to expect. Hence if the instructions given by the court on request and those given on its own motion thus informed the jury, no reversible error can be^ predicated on a refusal to give special instructions, although they may announce correct principles of law. Ginn v. State (1903), 161 Ind. 292, 68 N. E. 294; Rains v. State (1894), 137 Ind. 83, 91, 36 N. E. 532.
The certificate of the trial judge in this particular is as follows: “And instruction No. 4, tendered by the defendant and given by the court, and which defendant contends was orally modified as aforesaid, and the instructions given by the court of its own motion as aforesaid, were all the instructions given to the jury in the above entitled cause.” Thus the contention of appellant that the instruction in question was orally modified is made to appear, but this showing is not equivalent to a showing that the instruction was in fact orally modified.
Under this state of the record, the question is not in form to be available. Williams v. Freshour (1894), 136 Ind. 361, 36 N. E. 280; Ferris v. State (1901), 156 Ind. 224, 59 N. E. 475.
Under the testimony at that time adduced, we cannot approve this question, but, in view of the objection made, and the fact that this same Fred Love was a witness for and testified in behalf of appellant, and on cross-examination without objection admitted that he was convicted on a “blind tiger” charge on February 18, 1919, we are not convinced that appellant under these circumstances was harmed by the answer to the question to which he interposed an objection.
Judgment affirmed.