241 F.R.D. 185 | S.D.N.Y. | 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Crossroads Exxon gasoline station in Fallston, Maryland, is one of hundreds of thousands of stations across the country that stores its gasoline in underground tanks. Residents and homeowners who live nearby have sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and the owner of the station (“Defendants”) because, according to the allegations, the station’s underground tanks have been leaking gasoline with methyl tertiary butyl ether (“MTBE”).
These individual plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) now move under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the Court to certify two subclasses and to appoint them as representatives.
1. Homeowner Subclass: “This class consists of all persons owning real property in the vicinity of the Crossroads Exxon who have suffered a legally cognizable injury due to the contamination, including (1) those homeowners who have experienced interference with the quiet enjoyment of their property by the actual or threatened presence of MTBE and other gasoline constituents on/in their land and in their water supply wells; (2) those homeowners whose wells have or have had detectable levels of MTBE and other gasoline constituents and whose property requires restoration or remediation; and/or (3) those homeowners whose properties have suffered diminution in market value as a result of MTBE contamination emanating from the Crossroads Exxon.”5
2. Medical Monitoring Subclass: “All persons residing in the area from 1989 until the present (inclusive) who have consumed and/or used groundwater drawn from a supply well in the vicinity of the Crossroads Exxon.”6
For the reasons below, Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of the Homeowner Subclass is granted. The motion for certification of the Medical Monitoring Subclass is denied.
“Each year approximately 9 million gallons of gasoline (the equivalent of a full supertanker) are released to the environment in the United States from leaks and spills, according to an estimate by the Alliance for Proper Gasoline Handling.”
“While the use of MTBE as a fuel additive in gasoline has helped to reduce harmful air emissions, it has also caused widespread and serious contamination of the nation’s drinking water supplies.”
Underground storage tanks, or “USTs,” are among the main sources of MTBE groundwater contamination.
“Leaking USTs have been identified as the likely sources of a number of the more problematic releases of MTBE to the environment, including releases that have closed water supplies in Santa Monica and Glennville, California.”
A threshold issue to address before considering if Plaintiffs’ proposed class should be certified is whether the law of the transferor circuit (ie., Fourth Circuit) or the law of the transferee circuit (ie., Second Circuit) should control. On January 3, 2007, this Court held in another case assigned to this MDL that the law of the' transferor circuit applies when deciding motions for class certification under Rule 23.
A. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Menowitz Does Not Establish Which Circuit’s Law Applies on a Motion for Class Certification
The primary Second Circuit case on which Defendants rely is Menowitz v. Brown,
The second problem with the Defendants’ argument is it ignores the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
However, the Supreme Court made it clear in Lexecon that “[s]uch self-transfers are no longer permitted.”
[A]s a result of Lexecon, several thousands of actions, as opposed to a hundred or so, are remanded on a yearly basis for trial-a fact that significantly undermines the rationale offered by the concurrence in In re Korean Air Lines (and followed by the Second Circuit in Menowitz v. Brown) for why courts should not consider themselves bound by the opinions of the transferor circuits.27
“It is well established that lower courts are bound not only by the specific
B. The Decisions of Other District Courts Are Not Persuasive
Defendants also argue that “[o]ther courts, relying on the same authority [i.e., Menowitz and In re Korean Air Lines ], have expressly applied this rule to issues of class certification.”
Because neither of these decisions control the decisions of this Court, they are inapposite on the question of whether the Second Circuit has already decided this issue. Moreover, while the decisions of other federal courts warrant consideration, these opinions are not persuasive for the simple reason that they pre-date the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexecon and thus suffer from the same infirmities that this Court has already discussed. Finally, the opinions do not provide any significant discussion, much less persuasive reasons, as to why courts are bound by the law of the transferee circuit when considering a Rule 23 motion in a case transferred under the multi-district statute.
B. Summary of Court’s Previous Decisions
Given the extensive discussion that this Court has now provided in two prior opinions, as well as this opinion, on the issue of what circuit’s law is binding in multi-district litigation, a summary of these holdings is useful. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexecon, courts should reconsider which circuit’s law will be binding in an action transferred to it under section 1407 of Title 28 of the United States Code. In Lexecon, the Supreme Court explained that “courts must begin their analysis by looking at the language of a statute” and “do their job of reading the statute as a whole.”
In this case, as in all multi-district litigation, the actions were transferred pursuant to section 1407. This statute states in pertinent part:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and mil promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it*193 was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated____34
“The plain language of the statute does not explicitly resolve the issue of which circuit's law is binding, but it is important that section 1407 only allows cases to be transferred on the condition that such coordination ‘will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.’ ”
“In the context of pre-trial issues such as motions to dismiss or discovery disputes, section 1407 requires the application of the law of the transferee circuit where the motions are being considered.”
without limiting the sources of binding precedent, each motion in multi-district litigation could easily turn into a review of the interpretations of all or most of the circuits, a result at odds with the fundamental purpose of section 1407. This would have a debilitating effect on the court’s ability to resolve motions in a timely and efficient manner.38
Thus, this Court has agreed with those courts that “have held that the law of the transferee circuit controls pretrial issues such as whether the court has subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the action, or whether the cases should be remanded to state court because the cases were not properly removed.”
“However, whether to certify an action on behalf of a class under Rule 23 is not merely a pretrial issue.”
IY. CLASS CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
To maintain an action on behalf of the two subclasses, Plaintiffs must satisfy Rule 23. “Under the Rule, certification of a class action, whether a mass tort action or not, requires that the action meet the re
“[T]he class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action,”
“[bjefore deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action ... a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.... And if some of the considerations under Rule 23(b)(3) ... overlap the merits ... then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.”51
The district court must take a “close look” at the facts relevant to the certification question and, if necessary, make specific findings on the propriety of certification.
“If a lawsuit meets these requirements, certification as a class action serves important public purposes. In addition to promoting judicial economy and efficiency, class actions also ‘afford aggrieved persons a remedy if it is not economically feasible to obtain relief through the traditional framework of multiple individual damage actions.’ ”
Finally, the Fourth Circuit has held that “often an action may qualify under both (b)(1) and (b)(3).”
IY. THE HOMEOWNER SUBCLASS SATISFIES RULE 23
Courts have repeatedly certified class actions involving claims that property was harmed by seepage of contaminants such as oil or chemicals or waste.
Nonetheless, Defendants raise three primary arguments in their opposition to class certification.
A. Ascertainability
Defendants argue that the proposed class is not ascertainable because Plaintiffs concede “the exact shape and size of the affected area has not been delineated at this stage of the litigation.”
Defendants’ argument is flawed because Rule 23 does not require that Plaintiffs identify every member at this stage—it is the class, not each member, that must be ascertained.
The ascertainability of a class depends on whether there will be a definitive membership in the class once judgment is rendered.
B. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”
Plaintiffs submit, and Defendants do not challenge, that “Exxon’s own data, as of October 8, 2004, show that the wells on at least 175 properties in the area have had some level of MTBE.”
C. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.”
Plaintiffs have submitted, and Defendants do not challenge, a number of questions of law and fact that the members of the Homeowner Subclass have in common:
a. Whether Defendants released MTBE and other contaminants into the soil and groundwater of the area surrounding the Crossroads Exxon;
b. Whether MTBE reached, or will reach, the subsurface and/or groundwater beneath the area encompassed by the Homeowners’ Sub-Class;
c. Whether Defendants’ release of MTBE and other contaminants into the soil and groundwater of the area surrounding the Crossroads Exxon was negligent, reckless and/or intentional;
d. Whether Defendants’ release of MTBE- and other contaminants into the soil and groundwater of the area surrounding the Crossroads Exxon constituted an unreasonable interference with the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s use and enjoyment of their property;
e. Whether Defendants’ release of MTBE and other contaminants into the soil and groundwater of the area surrounding the Crossroads Exxon physically invaded the properties of the Homeowners’ Sub-Class, so as to constitute a trespass;
f. Whether Defendants’ release of MTBE and other contaminants into the soil and groundwater of the area surrounding the Crossroads Exxon constituted an unreasonable interference with rights common to the general public, so as to comprise a public nuisance;
g. The costs of sampling, investigating and restoring the groundwater beneath the region encompassed by the Homeowners’ Sub-Class, in order to assess the amount of the Homeowners’ Sub-Class’s claims for restoration damages;
h. Whether medical monitoring is appropriate for the cohort comprising the Medical Monitoring Sub-Class, and, if so, the extent, frequency and duration of such monitoring; the types of tests that are appropriate for the types of exposure experienced by the cohort; and the nature of expected results from a non-exposed cohort;
i. Whether existence of MTBE in groundwater creates acute and chronic health hazards to residents; and
j. Whether contamination of groundwater by MTBE adversely affects or impairs market value of residential property.81
The commonality requirement is therefore satisfied.
D. Typicality
Rule 23 requires the named plaintiffs to show that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”
Each of the named Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same alleged course of conduct (ie., the gasoline leak) that gives rise to the claims of other class members.
E. Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that Plaintiffs demonstrate that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Defendants argue that “acute intraclass conflict makes representation of any ‘class’ impossible.”
As their only example, Defendants point to Gail and Robert Kurtz who “exemplify the problem”
Defendants’ argument fails for three reasons. First, the fact that Defendants believe that Gail and Robert Kurtz may have claims against their neighbors has no bearing on the adequacy of the other named plaintiffs in representing the Homeowner Subclass against Exxon Mobil and the station owner. Second, Gail and Robert Kurtz have not claimed that their neighbors contaminated their property or otherwise harmed them, and conflicts that are merely hypothetical or speculative do not defeat certification.
Finally, with respect to the proposed counsel for the class, Defendants have not objected to counsel that Plaintiffs have selected, the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, PC. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel has handled numerous actions of similar or greater complexity including, for example, representing tens of thousands of plaintiffs in asbestos litigation and the state of Maryland in tobacco litigation.
F. Maintainability
“In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).”
The remaining issue is under which provision of Rule 23(b) should the class be certified. The Fourth Circuit has held that if certification is appropriate under both Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(3), a court must certify the class under the former so that any resulting judgment will have res judicata effect as to the entire class.
However, the Fourth Circuit rejected a similar argument by the defendant in A.H. Robins:
Some courts have gone further and have held that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was not de*200 signed to encompass class suits that seek damages relief. Such a limitation not only is unsupported in the language of the subdivision but also is contrary to the prevailing precedents which construe the various class categories of Rule 23(b). This construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) has been generally rejected or not followed by prevailing precedents.105
Moreover, in Kohl v. Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the District of Maryland reached the same conclusion, relying on A.H. Robins.
Thus, this Court must first consider whether Plaintiffs have satisfied’ Rule 23(b)(1). In this case, the prosecution of separate actions by members of the class would create “a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”
For example, if Plaintiffs pursue their negligence claims individually, there is a risk that one jury will find the Defendants acted reasonably while another jury will find that they breached a duty of reasonable care when the gas tank leaked. There is thus a substantial risk that the Defendants will face incompatible standards of conduct. Moreover, juries might well reach different conclusions on the factual issues that underlie this claim such as where the gasoline spread after it was leaked and which homeowners.were affected.
Similar arguments can be made about Plaintiffs’ claims for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. The only significant issue on which verdicts will vary is the damages that each property owner incurred, but as explained above, this does not defeat certification under Rule 23(b)(1) in the Fourth Circuit.
IY. THE MEDICAL MONITORING SUBCLASS DOES NOT SATISFY RULE 23
Plaintiffs also seek certification of a class consisting of “[a]ll persons residing in the area from 1989 until the present (inclusive) who have consumed and/or used
In Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, the highest state court in Maryland, the Maryland Court of Appeals, first considered “whether a demonstrated need for medical monitoring creates a valid cause of action in Maryland or generates a permissible form of relief under [Maryland’s] more traditional tort actions, although several courts around the country more than a decade and a half ago began to consider this type of claim and permitted it to proceed.”
Thus, this Court must predict how the Maryland Court of Appeals will rule on medical monitoring once it considers the issue.
However, it makes perfect sense to view the costs of medical monitoring as the damages incurred from another tort or statutory violation committed by a defendant. For example, a prisoner might sue a correctional institution under the Federal Tort Claims Act and seek “compensatory damages for pain and suffering and future damages for continued medical monitoring and treatment.”
Y. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of the Homeowner Subclass is granted, while the motion for certification of the Medical Monitoring Subclass is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (Docket No. 1141).
. See First Amended Class Action Complaint ("Compl.") ¶¶ 4-5.
. See id. ¶¶ 44-80. The individual plaintiffs have also brought a claim of “medical monitoring.” See id. ¶¶ 81—95. As explained below, medical monitoring is a type of damages, or remedy, under Maryland law rather than a separate claim. See infra Part IV. Thus, while Plaintiffs will need to present evidence of damages incurred as a result of medical monitoring at summary judgment and trial, they cannot pursue an independent claim for the costs of medical monitoring.
. Compl. ¶ 3.
. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Pl. Mem.”).
. Id. at 2-3.
. Id. at 3.
. Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether (MTBE): Advance Notice of Intent to Initiate Rulemaking Under the Toxic Substances Control Act to Eliminate or Limit the Use of MTBE as a Fuel Additive in Gasoline ("MTBE Advance Notice of Intent”), 65 Fed.Reg. 16,094, 16,095 (Mar. 24, 2000).
. See Application for Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether, Decision of the Administrator, 44 Fed. Reg. 12,242, 12,243. (Mar. 6, 1979). By 2000, about 87% of reformulated gasoline contained MTBE. See MTBE Advance Notice of Intent at 16,097.
. MTBE Advance Notice of Intent at 16,094.
. Id. at 16,096-97.
. Id. at 16,096.
. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 341 F.Supp.2d 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y.2004).
. See MTBE Advance Notice of Intent at 16,-100-01; In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 330 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y.2002) ("A government study conducted over an eight-year period from 1993-2000 concluded that releases from underground gasoline storage systems ['USTs'] are the main source of MTBE groundwater contamination.”); see generally E. Blaine Rawson, Are We Properly Controlling Our LUSTs?: A Review of the Problems With Underground Storage Tank Regulation, 40 Idaho L.Rev. 111 (2003).
. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-01-464, Environmental Protection: Improved Inspections and Enforcement Would Better Ensure the Safety of Underground Storage Tanks at 1 (May 4, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/dO 1464.pdf.
. Id.
. MTBE Advance Notice of Intent at 16,101. "The petroleum industry, however, takes the position that the magnitude of the groundwater contamination caused by MTBE from leaking UST[s] has been exceedingly modest.... The industry notes that MTBE has been found in measurable levels in only 1.9% of the public water supply systems in California since the legislature required monitoring for MTBE.” Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 Harv. Envtl. L.Rev. 281, 286 (2004) (citations omitted).
. MTBE Advance Notice of Intent at 16,101.
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 435, 439-42, 2007 WL 25474, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
. Defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification ("Def.Supp.Mem.”) at 5.
. 991 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1993). This Court was familiar with Menowitz. See In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. at 441-42, 2007 WL 25474, at *4 (discussing Menowitz); In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., No. M21-88, MDL 1358, 2005 WL 106936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.18, 2005) (discussing Menowitz and other circuit cases).
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. at 439, 2007 WL 25474, at *2 (emphasis added).
. Id.
. 523 U.S. 26, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998).
. See In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 106936, at *4.
. Id. (citation and quotation marks removed) (emphasis in original).
. Id. (discussing Lexecon).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Def. Supp. Mem. at 5.
. No. MDL 04-1 600, 2006 WL 1049259, at *2 n. 6 (W.D.Okla. Apr. 19, 2006) (citing In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir.1996)).
. No. MDL 1471, 2006 WL 38937, at *2 (D.NJ. Jan.5, 2006) (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174-76 (D.C.Cir.1987)).
. Id.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 106936, at *5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
. Id.
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. at 439, 2007 WL 25474, at *2.
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 106936, at *5.
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. at 439, 2007 WL 25474, at *2.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 727 (4th Cir.1989).
. Id.
. Id. at 728. Accord Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1348 (4th Cir.1976).
. See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 728.
. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978).
. General Tele. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).
. Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir.2004) (quoting Szabo v. Bridgeport Mach., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.2001)).
. Id. at 365 (internal quotations omitted).
. In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 728.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4)(b). See also Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 189 (4th Cir. 1993).
. Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.02 (3d ed.1999)).
. Id. (quoting In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A court also has broad discretion in determining whether a proposed class complies with Rule 23. See Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir.1993); Roman, 550 F.2d at 1348.
. In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 728 (citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).
. Id. (citations omitted).
. Id. (quoting 3B James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, H 23.31 [3], pp. 236-37 (2d ed.1987)). Accord Lutz v. International Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 196 F.R.D. 447, 453 n. 8 (E.D.Va.2000) (citing A.H. Robins); Kohl v. Association of Trial Lawyers of Am., 183 F.R.D. 475, 486 (D.Md.1998) (discussing A.H. Robins).
. See Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir.2003) (affirming class certification involving allegation that leaking storage tank on factory owner’s property contaminated soil and groundwater beneath class members' homes); Petrovic v. Amoco, 200 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1999) (affirming class certification of a settlement in which plaintiffs “sought injunctive and monetary relief for pollution to their property that allegedly occurred as a result of underground oil seepage originating from an Amoco petroleum refinery”); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming certification of class involving "plaintiffs, who either lived or owned property near defendant’s landfill, brought a class action for personal injuries and property damage resulting from hazardous chemicals leaking from the landfill and contaminating the local water supply”); see also In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. at 446-47, 2007 WL 25474, at *9; Bentley v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 471, 486-87 (S.D.Ohio 2004); Ludwig v. Pilkington North Am., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 1086, 2003 WL 22478842, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 4, 2003); Bates v. Tenco Services, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 160, 163-64 (D.S.C. 1990); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 117 F.R.D. 641, 643 (N.D.Cal.1987).
. See Defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ("Def. Mem.”); Def. Supp. Mem.
. See Def. Mem. at 2-13.
. See id. at 13-17.
. Id. at 4 (quoting Pl. Mem. at 2 n. 1).
. Pl. Mem. at 2 n. 1.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c) ("An order certifying a class action must define the class ....”) (emphasis added); see also Peoples v. Wendover Funding, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 492, 496 (D.Md.1998) ("Though
. Of course, the jury will also need to find that. the gasoline leaked due to Defendants' conduct (e.g., negligence).
. See Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir.1972); see also Twyman v. Rockville Hous. Auth., 99 F.R.D. 314, 320 (D.Md.1983) ("The main concern is 'adequately delineated’ so that ‘at the time of judgment the individual members of the class will be readily identifiable.’ ”) (quoting Hammond, 462 F.2d at 1055); Byrd. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 24, No. 72-848-M, 1977 WL 875, at *6 (D.Md. June 21, 1977) ("The practice in this Circuit in employment discrimination suits is to define the classes, in part, by reference to the specific employment practices which will be challenged on a class basis at trial and after trial by reference to the specific practices on which the court makes a final judgment.”) (citing various Fourth Circuit cases).
. Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 645 (4th Cir.1975) (emphasis added).
. Moreover, the Court is able to determine that the Plaintiffs seeking to represent the class are members of the putative class. See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 728.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1).
. 720 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1983).
. Id.
. See, e.g., Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 551, 556-57 (D.Md.2006) ("Plaintiffs estimate the number most certainly would exceed the 40 members generally accepted to be sufficiently large to make joinder impracticable. In this circumstance the numerosity prong of Rule 23 is satisfied.”); Newsome v. Up-To-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 360-61 (D.Md.2004) ("Generally, fewer than 20 employees will not satisfy numerosity although more than 40 will.”).
. Mitchell-Tracey, 237 F.R.D. at 556 (citing 6 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions % 3:3 (4th ed.2006)).
. Pl. Mem. at 11 (citing Groundwater & Envtl. Servs., Inc., Site Assessment Report at 13 (Oct. 8, 2004), attached as Ex. 4 to Pl. Mem.).
. Accord Compl. ¶ 38 ("Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs aver that the Class is composed of at least 360, and possibly many more, members.”).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2).
. See Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 216-17 (4th Cir.1984).
. See id.; see also Peoples v. Wendover Funding, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 492, 498 (D.Md.1998).
. Compl. ¶ 39; see also Pl. Mem. at 12-13.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3).
. General Tele. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).
. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir.1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accord Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 466-67 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the typicality requirement).
. Compl. ¶ 3, 20.
. See id. ¶¶ 44-80.
. See Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 146 (4th Cir.2001) (holding that " 'a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members’ ”) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4).
. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997).
. Id. at 626 n. 20, 117 S.Ct. 2231.
. Def. Mem. at 14.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 16.
. Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 430 (noting that, to defeat certification, conflicts "must be more than merely speculative or hypothetical"); cf. Broussard, 155 F.3d at 337 (holding "manifest conflicts of interest” among members of class preclude class certification). Of course, Defendants may choose to bring third-party claims against other potential tortfeasors, although they have not done so in the fifteen months since the First
. See Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 548 (4th Cir.1975) (holding that a class representative was adequate because "as one who has allegedly been aggrieved by some of those actions he has demonstrated a sufficient nexus to enable him to represent others who have suffered from different actions motivated by the same policies”).
. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 Duke L.J. 381, 387 (2000) (citing a National Law Journal Article that explained the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos had represented nearly 20,000 asbestos plaintiffs). The law firms of Brower Piven and Engel & Engel, P.A. are also well-qualified to represent the class based on their litigation experience.
. Moreover, “[i]n the absence of proof to the contrary, courts presume that class counsel is competent and sufficiently experienced to prosecute vigorously the action on behalf of the class.” Miller v. Optimum Choice, Inc., No.2003-3653, 2006 WL 2130640, at *1 (D.Md. July 28, 2006).
. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231.
. See supra note 60 (collecting cases).
. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. at 448, 2007 WL 25474, at *5.
. See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 728; see also Lutz, 196 F.R.D. at 453 n. 8 ("However, if an action qualifies for class certification under Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2), as well as (b)(3), then it should be certified under (b)(1) and/or (b)(2), but not under (b)(3).”) (citing In re A.H. Robins ); Peoples, 179 F.R.D. at 492 ("Although Plaintiffs do not address certification under Rule 23(b)(1), the Court must analyze the possibility ... [that] certification is appropriate under both Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(3) ....”) (citing In re A.H. Robins); Atwood v. Burlington Indus. Equity, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 177, 177 (M.D.N.C.1995) ("The parties appear to agree, and the court finds that certification, if done, should be carried out under Rule 23(b)(1). Although the class appears to be certifiable under subsection (b)(1) or (b)(3).... ”); Washington v. Aircap Indus. Corp., No. 2:91-3153, 1992 WL 547993, at *1 (D.S.C. July 8, 1992) (ordering the parties to brief whether certification was proper under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(3)) (citing In re A.H. Robins).
. See Def. Supp. Mem. at 4.
. 880 F.2d at 880 n. 8 (quoting 1 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 4.04, at 276-77) (2d ed.1985); cf. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989) (holding that courts should interpret the Federal Rules according to their plain meaning).
. See 183 F.R.D. at 486 (discussing A.H. Robins). In support of their position, Defendants cite Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir.1986). See Def. Supp. Mem. at 4 n. 19. However, any limitation that Zimmennan placed on class certification based on a request for money damages was ■ specifically rejected by the Fourth Circuit in A.H. Robins, which held that the Zimmennan decision contained only dictum on this point. See 880 F.2d at 730 n. 28; see also Kohl, 183 F.R.D. at 486.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(A).
. There is an open question of whether absent class members may have a constitutional right to opt out of class actions that seek monetary damages on their behalf. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 85, 117 S.Ct. 1028, 137 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after briefing and oral arguments on the merits); Ticor Title Insur. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 122, 114 S.Ct. 1359, 128 L.Ed.2d 33 (1994) (same). However, for the reasons discussed above, see supra Part III, this Court is bound by the decisions of the Fourth Circuit which has decisively held that a mandatory class action asserting monetary damages may be certified and, in fact, should be preferred over opt-out classes.
. Defendants argue that there are multiple sources of MTBE in the area (e.g., other USTs). See, e.g., Def. Mem. at 18. However, this is a class-wide defense that only further supports certifying the class. See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 747 ("Just as the military [contractor] defense was central to the case in Agent Orange, so the question whether Aetna was a joint tortfeasor here was the critical issue common to all the cases against Aetna, and one which, if not established, would dispose of the entire litigation."). The leakage of other USTs in the area, if any, should be decided on a class-wide basis in order to avoid inconsistent findings on the issues of causation or damages.
. The predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are also satisfied for the Homeowner subclass and thus, if the class were not certified under (b)(1), certification under Rule 23(b)(3) would be appropriate. See supra note 60 (collecting cases where courts have certified similar classes).
. Pl. Mem. at 3.
. See Compl. ¶¶ 81-95.
. 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200, 250 (2000).
. Id. at 252.
. See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 528 (4th Cir.1999); see also In re MTBE, 2005 WL 106936, at *13.
. See id.
. Dabney v. Bledsoe, No. 03 Civ. 193, 2006 WL 1376903, at *1 (N.D.W.Va. May 17, 2006). Accord Luckerson v. Goord, No. 00 Civ. 9508, 2002 WL 1628550, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2002) (“[Defendant’s argument] ignores the various remedies plaintiff now seeks that the prison could provide. For example, the Complaint seeks medical monitoring, a remedy that, if warranted, the prison could provide (and, indeed, would be obliged to provide) during the period of plaintiff's continuing incarceration.”) (emphasis added).
. The Homeowner Subclass includes medical monitoring as part of its remedy since the class involves those people “owning real property in the vicinity of the Crossroads Exxon who have suffered a legally cognizable injury due to the contamination.” Pl. Mem. at 2 (emphasis added). A jury could find that the costs incurred because of medical monitoring are part of the injury done to the Homeowner Subclass.