231 Mo. 645 | Mo. | 1910
Ejectment for a small strip, of land in lot 5, block 57, of the County Addition to the city of Rolla. The material facts are as follows:
David W. Malcolm in 1870 owned 58 feet of lot, 5 fronting Seventh street. In 1881 Edward Luster, the grandfather of the defendants, the Joneses, while they • were minors, bought for them a part of that 58 feet, the extent and description of which is the point in dispute in this ease. In 1884 Luster bought for himself 30 feet of the 58 lying east of the lot he had previously bought for his grandchildren. Measuring 30 feet off the east left 28 feet of the 58. That 28 feet is claimed by the defendants. In 1886 Luster sold the 30-foot lot to one Sears, and it is now owned by the plaintiff, it having been conveyed to him by deed April 2d, 1903.
Shortly before this suit was begun, the plaintiff, intending to build on his lot, had it surveyed, and then discovered (or thought he did) that the east wall of defendants’ house encroached on his territory. • He spoke to Mr. Jones about it, and made him a proposition to which hé said he would consent subject to the approval of his sister, his cotenant. But when the contract was sent to the lady to sign she declined to do so and the negotiation ended; then the suit was brought.
The defendants Gordon and Hammer are tenants of the other defendants, Thomas E. Jones and Jesse-mine Cassell, nee Jones. In their answer they admit possession and deny all allegations and plead adverse possession for more than ten years. The cause was tried by the court, jury waived, the finding and judgment were for the defendants and plaintiff appealed.
' There were instructions asked, some of which were given and some refused, but we do not consider it necessary to 'cumber the record with them in detail; the only question in the case is, did the evidence show that the defendants had been in adverse possession for a period long enough to give them title to the thirteen-inch strip in dispute ?
In 1881 when Luster bought the west twenty-eight feet for his grandchildren, the Joneses, the title to the thirty feet lying east of it was owned by Mrs. Burke. But in 1884, before the house was built, Mrs. Burke sold the lot to Luster, and while he owned it he built the house for his grandchildren, and if it lapped over
■The following diagram may aid in understanding the point in dispute.
The line AB is 2& feet; BD is 30 feet; CD is 26 feet; D being the southeast corner of the lot, is the starting point to find the point of beginning called for in the deed; going west from D 26 feet we come to 0, the point of beginning; thence north along the dotted line 26 feet; thence west 26 feet or to and intersecting the northeast corner of the lot formerly owned by Andrew Malcolm, thence south‘along the east line of the Malcolm lot to Seventh street, ‘ ‘ to the place of beginning. ’ ’ Appellant construes the words last quoted as being-equivalent to saying, “to 7th street, the place of beginning. ’ ’ But to place that construction on the words used would be to stop the description at A, giving the north, the west, and the south courses, but not giving the east course, and not in fact reaching the place of beginning. A is in the north line of Seventh street, but it is not the place of beginning; 0, also in the north line of Seventh street, is the place of beginning.
The confusion in the plaintiff’s mind arises from' the omission of the word ‘ ‘ thence ’ ’ between the words “Seventh street” and the words “to the place of beginning. ” If it was intended to say to ‘ ‘ Seventh street, the place of beginning” not only would it be a contradiction of an evident fact, but the word “to” would have to be stricken out, because “to,” as a preposition, indicates motion in the direction of place. [Webster.] Following the description around the lot on three sides and arriving at A, the words “to the place of beginning” mean thence to the place of beginning-. Plaintiff contends that it was the intention of the grantor to convey the west twenty-six feet of the fifty-eight-foot lot, and that that intention is shown by the monuments called for in the deed which correct the metes and bounds. When real monuments are called for in the description in a deed they are ordinarily given precedence over distances called for. [Myers v. St. Louis,
From the fact that Luster in 1886 sold the thirty-foot lot to Sears, it is plausibly argued that when he built the house for- his grandchildren and located the
Appellant relies on the fact that when he had the survey made, a short while before bringing this suit, he spoke to Mr. Jones on the subject and offered to have the wall torn down, and rebuilt at his own expense, on what he claimed was £he true line, “fix up the butcher shop” and give Jones the use of the wall as % long as the butcher shop remained as it then was. Jones agreed to it subject to the agreement of Mrs. Cassell;.the agreement was written, signed by Jones, and sent to Mrs. Cassell for her approval and signature, but she refused to sign it, and so the matter ended. Appellant contends that that action on the part of Jones showed that the possession was not adverse, and he asked an instruction to that effect which the court refused.
In the first place there was no such agreement consummated. Jones could not agree to dispose of his sister’s land, and he only agreed to execute the contract, even as to his own interest, on the condition that his sister would sign it. He testified that he agreed to it as a compromise, by which we infer he meant to avoid a lawsuit. The wall which Jones and his sister owned jointly could not be destroyed without the consent of both. Plaintiff seeks to draw from the fact of Jones’s
Plaintiff introduced in evidence tax receipts showing that he and those under whom he claims had paid taxes on “The undivided east frac. Lot 5, Block 57,” from 1892 down to 1905 inclusive. But that description is indefinite. How large the fraction on which the taxes were paid is not shown in the abstract.
The trial court took the correct view of the law.
The judgment is affirmed.