113 Wash. 583 | Wash. | 1921
While these were separate actions, and separate judgments were rendered therein, they were, by consent of all the parties, tried together in the superior court for King county, sitting without a jury. The plaintiff's, Koch and Nakamura., each sought recovery of damages, alleged to have been suffered at the same time, as a result of the negligent operation of one of the city’s street cars. The trial resulted in findings and judgments awarding damages to each of the plaintiffs, from which the city has appealed in each case to this court. The appeals, by stipulation of all the parties, are presented to us together, upon a transcript of the pleadings and judgments in each case, and one statement of facts applicable to both cases.
The principal contention here, made in behalf of the city, is that the evidence does not warrant the rendering of judgments awarding recovery to either Koch or Nakamura, in that it fails to show any negligence on the part of the city’s servant operating its street car; and, also, in that as to Koch, the evidence shows that he, or rather his servant, was guilty of such contributory negligence that it became the proximate cause of the damages.
The controlling facts, as we think the trial court was warranted, and did, view them, may be summarized as follows: The damages in question, consisting of the injuries to the automobiles belonging to Koch and Nakamura, occurred on the west side of the roadway of Fourteenth avenue northeast, about one hundred feet south of Forty-seventh street, in Seattle. Fourteenth avenue runs north and south, while Forty-seventh street crosses the avenue at right angles. The city maintains and operates on Fourteenth avenue a double track street railway, the south-bound cars running upon the west track and the north-bound cars running
A short distance south from the south end of this temporary walk, there was standing near the west curb an automobile; and a short distance further south there was standing the automobile belonging to Nakamura, in front of his grocery store, which is about one hundred feet south of Forty-seventh street. These automobiles were both parked in the usual proper manner, parallel with and close to the curb, and are not shown to have been there in violation of any- traffic rules or regulations. The body of the street car, such as the one here in question, overhangs the rails of the track on each side about twenty inches. It is thus apparent that, while the space between the temporary walk and the west track would enable an automobile to be driven therein, the space between the two automobiles standing at the curb to the south of the temporary walk, and a street car upon the west track, would not be sufficient to easily drive an automobile therein, without the probability of coming in contact with the automobiles, or such situated street car.
On the day in question, one Jones, a boy between sixteen and eighteen years of age, the employee of Koch, was driving the automobile belonging to Koch, delivering goods for him. Jones was evidently an experienced driver, though young. Just before the accident, Jones
As the street car came from the north, it was evidently running at an excessive and unlawful rate of
There was introduced in behalf of the city an ordinance providing that, “No minor under eighteen years of age shall drive or operate a motor vehicle without first obtaining a permit therefor from the department of public utilities of the city of Seattle.” The evidence is not very satisfactory as to whether or not Jones actually had a permit from the city in compliance with this ordinance at the time the accident occurred. I does appear, however, that he had applied for such permit, or rather Koch had made such application for him, before the accident happened; and that he received the permit, that is, the written evidence of it, a week or so thereafter. Whether or not it was actually issued by the city before the time of the accident is not very clear; but it does seem that the information acquired by the city as to Jones’ qualifications to receive such permit was received by the city officers and that they decided to issue the permit before the time of the accident. However this may be, it seems quite apparent to us, as it must have to the trial court, that the fact of Jones being under eighteen years old, in view of his actual qualifications as an automobile driver, in no way contributed as a proximate cause of the damage; and that, therefore, such fact does not stand in the way of recovery by Koch. Switzer v. Sherwood, 80 Wash. 19, 141 Pac. 181, Ann. Cas. 1917A 216; Johnnsson v. American Tug Boat Co., 85 Wash. 212, 147 Pac. 1147. It is equally apparent that such fact
Holcomb, C. J., Fullerton, Bridges, and Mackintosh, JJ., concur.