19 Fla. 817 | Fla. | 1883
(after reading the foregoing statement of the case prepared by him) delivered the opinion of the court:
The primary equitable right claimed here by the purchaser is performance by the vendor, the Savings and Trust Company, or Knox, Commissioner of the contract of sale of this lot.
The injunction granted is necessarily based upon the view that the plaintiffs in the ejectment suits are endeavoring to
The possession of Barnett, the tenant of the vendee Spratt, is for the purpose of this proceeding to be treated as the possession of Spratt, (although Spratt, the landlord, does not appear to he a party to the ejectment suits,) Practice Rules, 85; 3 Wait’s Actions at Law, 82 to 86, and we therefore inquire what is the nature of this possession. The bill states that Spratt was the highest bidder at a sale had in March, A. D. 1880, of this lot, his bid being $15,-500 ; that the terms of sale were cash, or at the option of the purchaser, one-fourth cash and the balance in equal installments at six, twelve and eighteen months; that at the sale the vendor company announced that there was some defect in the chain of title which would be removed within thirty days; that said company would make a good and sufficient title to said lot to the purchaser; that the purchaser must make a payment down of $500; that he would at once be let into the possession, and that the balance was to be paid by him when the title was made; that the purchaser, Spratt, announced the wish to pay cash, and that after paying the $500 he was let into the possession of so much of the premises as is the subject of the ejectment suits against his tenant, Barnett. The purchaser thus in possession affirms that he has at all times been willing to pay the balance due upon the acquisition of a good title, or upon the performance by the vendor of his contract to make such title to him. The time for the payments as stipulated has
This is the existing status as to the title proposed to be asserted in the action of ejectment by the commissioner, so far as it appears from the allegations of the bill. What is the relation of the plaintiffs in this bill to Beans, the administrator of Foreman, the plaintiff, in the action of ejectment brought by him against the purchaser’s tenant ? The allegations of the bill upon this subject are as follows: In paragraph number two (2) of the bill plaintiffs allege that the company, Spratt’s vendor, were in possession of lot number 8, claiming a fee simple title therein derived “ by a chain of conveyances mesne and immediate, resting upon a deed executed on the --day of-by one John P. Sanderson, as the administrator cle bonis non of the estate of said Jacob Foreman, in execution of an order of sale, and a sale theretofore made by one Elizabeth Foreman, then deceased, and predecessor in office as administratrix of said estate, and the probate proceedings upon which said sale
In this view we examine the allegations of the bill. The claim of the plaintiffs is that by virtue of certain proceeding looking to the sale of this lot had by Deans, the administrator of Foreman since the contract of sale between the company and Spratt, and by virtue of relations existing between the company’s vendor and the purchasers at said sale and the heirs, and in view of the relief prayed in a cause now pending in chancery between the heirs of Foreman and Deans, the administrator seeking a settlement of his administration, the court may retain this case and upon the rendition of a certain decree in this pending suit by which the vendor will acquire title, may decree performance.
The foundation of this claim arises out of the proceedings in the Probate Court at the suit of Deans, the administrator, looking to the sale of the lot, the title to which occasions this suit. As shown by the record of these proceedings, which is an exhibit to the bill, the administrator filed a petition seeking to sell this lot to pay a debt alleged to be due Augustus E. Bass and Jacob (we presume it
The statute requires also that “ the administrator in such a sale as this, that is of real estate to pay debts where there is no personal property, shall, before receiving the money or the securities resulting from such sale, enter into bond with good security to be approved by the court, conditioned for the faithful application of the money to the payment of the debts and charges,” &e. From this recital of the statute it is apparent that the status of a mere bidder at a sale is very far from being either at law or in equity of such a character as gives him the right by that fact alone to a deed for the property.
The commissioner here is the agent of the court to execute a power and the purchaser acquires no right to a deed for the land until the sale is confirmed. Halleck vs. Guy, 9 Cal., 196 ; Smith vs. Arnold, 5 Mason, 420 ; Mason vs. Osgood, 64 N. C., 468; Blossom vs. Railroad Co., 3 Wall.,
Admitting that jurisdiction to that end exists in the county court until the sale is confirmed, the purchaser could not be compelled to pay the money. Anderson vs. Scotton, 2 Bland., 650, 461;. Wagner and Marshall vs. Cohen, 6 Gill., 97. By his bid he becomes, it is true, a party to the proceeding, and can be heard in the subsequent proceedings, but he gets no title. Plaintiffs allege, however, that their vendor is the assignee of the debt of the creditor, for the payment of which the sale was ordered, the creditor being the bidder, and if we understand the position of Spratt here it is that by virtue of this relation his vendor, the company, is invested with some equity as to the title. It must be evident that no such equity exists as to the assignee of the debt of the creditor. His interest is in the debt for the payment of which the lot is to be sold. As assignee of the debt he has an interest in the purchase money and the matter of its application. He acquires no title. Even had the bid been transferred to him an application to the court and its action directing the deed to be made to him upon compliance with the terms of the statute in other respects is the usual method of proceeding. The rule upon this subject is that such a bidder may make a valid transfer of his bid to a third person before the execution of the deed, and the court upon the application of such assignee may direct the execution of a conveyance immediately to him by the commissioner subject to the equitable rights or liens of other persons as against the original purchaser, which had become vested previous to the assignment of his bid. Proctor vs. Farnam, 5 Paige, 614; Halleck vs. Guy, 9 Cal., 181.
Another position taken in reference to this matter is that these bidders had, before they occupied this relation to this property, “ made a warranty deed of conveyance to the vendor ” (Sanderson) “ from whom the said company had immediately derived title and were thus bound by their said covenants to make good the title of the said company to said lot.” Paragraph 7 of this bill, admitting for the purpose of disposing of this question, “ that conveyance to the grantor subsequent to his deed conveying to another in fee with warranty issues to the benefit of his grantee, and that the grantor is estopped from denying that he had no right at the time of his sale,” (see Sugden on Vendors, 556 bottom page; top page 204, 8 Amer. Ed., where the extent and application of this rule is discussed,) it is not seen here that these bidders have acquired a good title. Nor do we see how it can be maintained that Spratt, the purchaser here, has an equity to compel these bidders to pay the purchase money and acquire the deed, for whatever may be their obligations resulting from their bid, such obligations exist with reference to the administrator, the heirs or the assignees of their debt, and nothing can result to their grantee with warranty until they have acquired the title, legal or equitable.
Until report and confirmation there is neither legal nor equitable title in the bidder. The title here is still in the estate, if it was there before these proceedings in the County Court. Plaintiffs allege the title to have been in the estate before these proceedings. Whether this is so or not we can
And if it be true that the title is now in the' estate we cannot see how Deans, the administrator d. b. n., is under any obligation, legal or equitable, to Spratt as to this title. This bid is treated in two aspects by plaintiffs, first as a bid by A. E. Bass and the heirs of «T. Bass. It is in this view that they claim that the title vested in the grantee of the Basses, and through him in the company. Of this matter we have just disposed. But it is also claimed that the bid here was “in fact for said defendant company.” Row it is very evident that it cannot be both. "We must treat it as one or the other. We have treated it as the record, and the distinct allegation that the company was the assignee of the debt requires, and that is that the Basses were the bidders. This we think is the case made by the bill. If it be that Lockwood, the agent of the company, bid it off in the name of the Basses, expecting that the company would control the matter by virtue of its relation as assignee of the debt, and that this relation authorized the use of the name of the Basses in the matter, his act in the name of the creditors is unauthorized.
The fact as shown by the report of the commissioner is that the bid whether authorized or not was the bid of the Basses. The company may have expected to get a title by crediting their bid with their debt: Even if the bid was their bid, and it was made under that apprehension, we are inclined to the view that the court should not confirm the sale requiring a cash payment against their protest.
This disposes of this ease, except so far as the allegation
Spratt claims an equity by virtue of what he conceives will be the decree of that court in the pending case. To this case he is no party, nor does he occupy any relation to the parties therein, plaintiffs or defendants, by which he can control their action.
Again the relief prayed in the bill is for a decree for an alleged devastavit of the administrator, and the allegation of Spratt here is that the heirs do not by it seek to change the antecedent status of the company as to the title, as set forth in this bill by Spratt. Besides, to this bill neither Spratt nor the company are parties. The contest is between the heirs and the administrator, and whatever may be the result neither Spratt nor Knox are bound, as neither of them are parties. The heirs here may see proper to approve or assail the acts of this administrator in such manner as they choose, but their choice does not bind Spratt or Knox. Spratt has his own equities, and they are set up in this bill, and it is by them that his ease must stand or fall. We cannot see that any effect can be given to this suit except as a Us pendens, which is simply notice of its existence and character.
Looking at the case in view of the allegations of plaintiffs in their bill here it seems to be an effort of the heirs to change an unperfected and pending proceeding in the Probate Court for the sale of real estate to pay debts to a proceeding for a sale for the purposes of distribution, and that upon the ground that no debt was due, and the creditor or his assignee is not a party to the suit. Would a court of equity do this ?
If the administrator here is the attorney of the creditors, he has assumed a position of hostility to the heirs. If he represents the debt it is his duty riot to contest it, which it is his duty to the heir to do, if there is legal ground for so doing, but it is not seen what this has to do with the rights of the vendee, Spratt. It may .be the foundation of proceedings by parties having an actionable interest looking to his removal as administrator or for proceedings in the proper forum upon the ground that there is no debt for which the estate is bound, or it may be ground for action against him in reference to action in his office as an attorney. But such inconsistent relation, if it exists, (and it is not the purpose of this court to say that it does exist, and what is here said is only in reference to the argument made,) can certainly never be urged as a ground upon which any equity in favor of his clients is to be operative to invest them with the legal title to this lot for the benefit of Spratt, the purchaser.
A question which we have not discussed here, because we have deemed it unnecessary, is whether an order of the County Court confirming the sale is not necessary to take it/out of the statute of frauds. Attorney-General vs. Day, 1 Ves. Sr., 221; Browne on the Statute of Frauds, 4 Edition, §265.
The order overruling the motion to dissolve the injunction is reversed, and the case will be remanded' with directions to enter an order dissolving the injunction and for further proceedings.
A petition for rehearing was filed in this case, and the rehearing was denied.