118 Pa. 430 | Pa. | 1888
Opinion,
The original claim of lien in this case was filed on January 30, 1885. The last item in the bill of particulars was for labor done on January 7,1885. The claim was filed against Andrew Knox alone, and contained no averments of any kind as against Marcia J. Knox. A scire facias was issued against Andrew Knox on March 18, 1885, and a trial was had on June 2,1885, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for 1704.37. Judgment was entered on the verdict on June 8, 1885, and a writ of levari facias was issued July 7th, and property advertised
It is almost unnecessary to say that we have repeatedly decided that amendments introducing new parties cannot be made after the statutory period has expired: Russell v. Bell, 44 Pa. 47; Fourth Avenue Baptist Church v. Schreiner, 88 Pa. 124; Dearie v. Martin, 78 Pa. 55. This is conceded by the learned counsel for the defendant in error, but he contends that such an amendment can be made under the provisions of the second section of the act of June 11, 1879, P. L. 122. The words of that section are as follows: “ That in case of any mechanics’ claim or lien, filed according to existing laws, in any county of this commonwealth, the court having jurisdiction in such case is hereby authorized and required, in any stage of the proceedings, to permit amendments conducive to justice and a fair trial upon the merits, including the changing, adding, and striking out the names of claimants, and by adding the names of owners and contractors respectively, whenever it shall appear to such court that the names of the proper parties have been omitted, or that a mistake has been made in the names of such parties, or too many or not enough have been joined in such case.”
There is nothing in this act which in the least degree gives sanction to the idea that the time for filing a lien may be ex
We cannot understand how, under this, or any other act, it is possible for a court, after final judgment, and execution issued, to strike off the judgment perfectly regular on its face,, re-open the entire case, amend the cause of action so as to take in other persons than the original parties, and then proceed to a new trial and judgment as to such other persons. We have not been referred to any case holding such a doctrine, and it seems so entirely inconsistent with all the well established rules of pleading and practice that we have the greatest possible doubts of its correctness. It is not necessary to decide the question in this ease, because the other views we have above expressed dispose of it finally. We reverse the judgment on the first, second, sixth, and seventh assignments, saying nothing as to the others.
Judgment reversed.