Knox v. CoreCivic, Inc.Knox v. CoreCivic, Inc.
Pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 58, “Motion“) Plaintiff Angela Boatwright Knox‘s1 second amended complaint (Doc. No. 57, “Complaint“) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Defendants, CoreCivic, Inc., CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, Vince Vantell, Damon T. Hininger, Shameka Bivens, and Theodore Williams.
Defendants filed a memorandum in support of the Motion (Doc. No. 59), and Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 61, “Response“),2 whereafter Defendant filed a
BACKGROUND3
Below, the Court begins by providing a brief overview of the parties to this action, then provides an overview of the circumstances out of which this action arose, and finally reviews Plaintiff‘s claims in light of Defendants’ Motion.
I. The Parties
Plaintiff “is the mother of [] Moss . . . who died at Hardeman County Correctional Facility (‘HCCF‘), purportedly from a drug overdose.” (Doc. No. 57 at ¶ 3). Plaintiff “appears as next friend of Z.R. and R.S., [Moss‘s] fourteen-year-old son and five-year-old daughter.” (Id.). Plaintiff “asserts claims on behalf of herself individually, Z.R. and R.S. individually, and in Z.R. and R.S.‘s role as survivor and next of kin to [Moss].” (Id.). Moss, the decedent, was thirty-seven years old at the time of his death. (Id.). Defendant CoreCivic, Inc. “is a private prison company that is headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee and is a private, for-profit prison corporation [operating HCCF] . . . CoreCivic, Inc. is a citizen of Tennessee with its principal place of business and corporate headquarters located in Brentwood, Tennessee.” (Id. at ¶ 4). Defendant CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC is “a wholly-owned subsidiary of [Defendant] CoreCivic, Inc., and it operates all
II. Factual Background
The instant action arises out of Moss‘s death on October 20, 2022,5 resulting from an overdose of various drugs. (Doc. No. 57 at ¶¶ 14, 17-18, 23). On October 20, 2022, “[Defendant] Bivens, according to the incident report, was notified around 0921 that [Moss] was unresponsive in his cell.” (Id. at ¶ 14). “[W]hile waiting for EMS6 to arrive,” Defendants “Williams . . . Vantell, and [] Bivens” caused “[HCCF] medical personnel . . . to administer six (6) doses of Narcan,” a drug “used to treat those suspected of a narcotic overdose during emergency situations,” to Moss. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). EMS then “transported [Moss] to Boliver General Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 09207 hours.” (Id. at ¶ 17). On October 21, 2022, an autopsy was conducted on Moss by West Tennessee Regional Forensic Center in Memphis, Tennessee. (Id. at ¶ 19). The autopsy report for Moss “was . . . positive for cocaine, methamphetamine and fentanyl, and the
Despite the “puncture wound” on Moss‘s right arm noted in the autopsy report, “[Defendant] Vantell did not request an investigation into [Moss‘s] death . . . [because] Defendant Warden Vantell who had final decision-making authority did not want an investigation to reveal drug smuggling into the facility which would also expose severe staff shortages, as well as, officers and guards who were unqualified to work at the facility in the first instance.” (Id. at ¶ 23). “It [was] apparent [to] Defendants [and Defendants] knew that [Moss] had a drug problem when staff gave him six (6) doses of Norcan [sic].” (Id. at ¶ 40). Defendants failed to “properly care for [Moss]” by not “provid[ing] drug related relief to cure any drug related issues that [Moss] suffered from.” (Id. at ¶ 41). Allegedly, Moss “could not have overdosed but for the fact that illegal drugs were so widely available at HCCF,” and this prolific drug availability is, among other reasons, attributable to Defendant CoreCivic‘s failure to “adequately screen the applicants that it hires as guards” and failure to “properly train[]” such “otherwise unqualified” guards. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25). Indeed, “the predominantly females [guard staff] at HCCF and other CoreCivic facilities . . . have gang affiliations or romantic relationships with gang members. Upon information and belief, the guards at HCCF have tattoos reflecting their gang affiliations, sometimes they talk about their gang affiliations in the presence of inmates, and sometimes they flash hand signs reflecting gang
Defendant CoreCivic “does not adequately screen guard staff for contraband. As a result, guards are able to bring illegal drugs into its correctional facilities and then unlawfully provide those to inmates,” and such issue is exacerbated by CoreCivic‘s failure to, separately or cumulatively, “not post[] [drug sniffing dogs] at the guard entrance into the facility” and/or “when drug sniffing dogs are placed at entrances into the facility for guards . . . not properly investigate when the dog barks to sound the alarm for drugs.” (Id. at ¶ 26). In fact, Plaintiff states that “it is believed that the facility failed to post drug sniffing canines/guards at the entrance of the facility at or around the time that [Moss] died of the drug overdose. Alternatively, if drug sniffing canines were posted at the entrance, at or around the time [Moss] died, HCCF staff did not properly investigate when the dog barks sounding the alarm for drugs and the drugs were at that point smuggled into the facility and provided to [Moss] and other suspected inmates.” (Id. at ¶ 27).
The “Tennessee Department of Corrections (‘TDOC‘) Annual report [for 2022] shows that there were six (6) deaths by accident at HCCF and six (6) deaths, manner-pending . . . [and] like [Moss‘s] death, some of the other deaths were caused by overdosing in the prison and listed as an accident on the prison incident report.” (Id. at ¶ 28). As illustrated in the following chart prepared by the Court, Plaintiff alleges that nine HCCF inmates died between January 27 and October 19, 2022, that each of those respective deaths was either attributed to drug ingestion (four deaths) or still under investigation (five deaths), and that each of those nine mortal incident involved either no use of Narcan (two incidents) or a specific number of doses of Narcan (seven instances):8
| Number | Date | Number of Narcan Doses Administered by HCCF Staff to Inmate | Asserted Reason for Death |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Jan. 27, 2022 | 4 | “Death Under Investigation.” |
| 2 | Mar. 9, 2022 | 8 | “Death Under Investigation.” |
| 3 | Mar. 24, 2022 | 2 | “Death Under Investigation.” |
| 4 | Mar. 30, 2022 | None | Meth overdose. |
| 5 | Apr. 30, 2022 | None | Meth overdose. |
| 6 | June 12, 2020 | 2 | “Death Under Investigation.” |
| 7 | June 22, 2022 | 2 | “Overdose” fentanyl toxicity |
| 8 | Aug. 27, 2022 | 3 | “accidental,” fentanyl toxicity |
| 9 | Oct. 19, 2022 | 8 | “Death Under Investigation.” |
(Id. at ¶¶ 29-37).9 “[R]ecords show that HCCH [sic] and other facilities owned by Core-Civic, use Narcan at nearly twice the rate as [sic] TDOC facilities and they have been warned that Narcan
III. Plaintiff‘s Claims, Defendants’ Motion
a. Plaintiff‘s Claims10
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff brings five claims—two based on federal law and three based on state law—against Defendants. Two of these claims are asserted solely against Defendant CoreCivic, and the other three are asserted against all Defendants.
In Count II, Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim alleging so-called Monell liability (which the Court discusses below) against Defendant CoreCivic. (Id. at ¶¶ 87-96). Count II is based on allegations that Defendant CoreCivic adopted a “policy and practice of severely understaffing its facilities and placing unqualified guards at posts in its facilities including HCCF, without regard to inmate safety because understaffing is more profitable.” (Id. at ¶ 88). Specifically, via Count II
Plaintiff also asserts Tennessee state law claims13 for “[n]egligence/[g]ross [n]egligence” (Count III) (id. at ¶¶ 97-102) against all Defendants, for loss of consortium (Count IV) (id. at ¶¶ 103-106) against all Defendants, and for violation of the Tennessee Constitution pursuant to
b. Defendants’ Motion
As noted above, via the Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s claims “should be dismissed in their entirety.” (Doc. No. 59 at 26). Defendants assert (among other things) that: (1) with respect to Count I, Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that any Defendant violated the Eighth Amendment with respect to Moss‘s death (id. at 4-9); (2) with respect to Count II, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Moss‘s death was caused by an official policy or a custom of CoreCivic (id. at 14-19); and (3) with respect to Plaintiff‘s remaining claims (i.e., the state-law claims), that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege specific actions supporting a negligence claim as to any Defendant under Tennessee law (id. at 24), cannot establish standing with respect to Plaintiff‘s claim pursuant to
LEGAL STANDARD
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under
In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it may be appropriate to “begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such allegations count toward the plaintiff‘s goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such
The Court next analyzes the arguments that Defendants and Plaintiff advance respectively in connection with the Motion. Specifically, the Court begins by briefly discussing the general nature of Section 1983 claims, then analyzes the parties’ arguments with respect to each individual claim Plaintiff alleges, beginning with Plaintiff‘s federal claims (all of them Section 1983 claims, as noted above) and then turns to Plaintiff‘s remaining claims (i.e., the state-law claims).
I. Section 1983 Claims Generally
Section 1983 authorizes a federal action against any person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted);
II. Plaintiff‘s Federal Claims
The Court next will analyze Plaintiff‘s claims, beginning with Plaintiff‘s federal claims, i.e., Count I and Count II.
a. Count I: Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference and Failure to Protect
Via Count I (as noted above), Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim against all Defendants. (Doc. No. 57 at ¶¶ 69-86). Count I is based on alleged violations of Moss‘s Eighth Amendment rights as a result of the alleged “deliberate indifference” of Defendants through “fail[ing] to prevent unlawful drugs from being smuggled into [HCCF] by guards on the days leading up to the death of [Moss],” (id. at ¶ 72), and “failing to properly hire, train, or otherwise vet correctional officers,”
Although Plaintiff appears to couch Count I as comprising both a deliberate-indifference claim and a failure-to-protect claim (as well as nebulous allegations not clearly rendered in support of either or both of the claims), failure-to-protect claims and deliberate-indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment are governed by the same standard. See Amick v. Ohio Dep‘t of Rehab. & Correction, 521 F. App‘x 354, 361 (6th Cir. 2013) (failure-to-protect claims are “governed by standards substantially similar to those applied to [] claim[s] for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.“); Cook v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-00095, 2025 WL 967544, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2025) (noting that the Sixth Circuit refers to deliberate-indifference claims alternatively as failure-to-protect claims (citing Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 683 (6th Cir. 2024))); Starr v. Wainwright, 686 F. Supp. 637, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2023) (“I apply the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard to failure-to-protect claims.” (citing Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 468 (6th Cir. 2022)))). Accordingly, the Court will apply the same standard to each of Plaintiff‘s purported two separate claims in Count I and will consider them concurrently below as a single claim (which the Court will refer to in terms of deliberate indifference rather than failure to protect).
To state a deliberate-indifference claim, a plaintiff must adequately allege both “an objective component (a substantial risk of harm) and a subjective component (the defendant‘s knowledge of and disregard for that risk).” Cook, 2025 WL 967544, at *4. In Plaintiff‘s case, the first component is that there existed an objectively serious risk to Moss‘s health and safety prior to Moss‘s overdose, and the second component is that the respective Defendants were subjectively
The Court begins by addressing the first (i.e., the objective) component. In addressing this component, the Court finds it useful to review two recent and particularly relevant Sixth Circuit opinions—Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452 (6th Cir. 2022) and Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC, 98 F.4th 679 (6th Cir. 2024).
In Zakora, 44 F.4th at 460-63, the Sixth Circuit considered a failure-to-protect claim brought by the estate of Michael Zakora after Zakora himself overdosed in a Michigan state prison. In Zakora, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court‘s granting of a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit specifically concluded in part that Zakora‘s estate plausibly alleged an objectively serious risk of harm to Zakora himself—that is, satisfied the first component of the standard elucidated just above—based on the “unfettered access to deadly drugs inside [the prison Zakora was incarcerated at].” Id. at 470. The court in Zakora found that Zakora‘s estate had plausibly alleged an objectively serious risk of harm to Zakora based on three key alleged facts: (1) the “widespread presence of drugs” in the prison facility where Zakora was incarcerated, id. at 470, including how the drugs got into that prison facility, id. at 461 (noting that drugs were smuggled inside basketballs thrown over the prison fence); (2) the “two prior overdoses in Zakora‘s [twelve-to-sixteen-inmate housing unit in the prison] in the [two] days immediately preceding [Zakora‘s] death,” id. at 471, 461; and (3) the failure of prison officials employed where Zakora was incarcerated to investigate the two previous overdose deaths in
In Caraway, plaintiff was the mother (and contemporaneously the estate) of an inmate who had died in CoreCivic custody due to a fentanyl overdose. The plaintiff brought Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims based on the aforementioned overdose. Caraway, 98 F.4th at 683. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that CoreCivic‘s staffing shortages led to inadequate screening of prison guards, allowing corrupt employees to smuggle in illicit drugs, which, in turn, resulted in the inmate‘s fatal fentanyl overdose. Id. at 682.
In Caraway, the Sixth Circuit, affirming the district court‘s dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds, rejected the plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims, and held that the plaintiff did not adequately allege the commission of the asserted Eighth Amendment violation by anyone. That is, the court asked whether the plaintiff had “allege[d] facts plausibly showing [the] two components [of the failure-to-protect/deliberate-indifference standard,]” 98 F.4th at 683, and then answered the question in the negative.
First, the Sixth Circuit noted that the (objective) seriousness of the risk of harm was to be measured by the seriousness of the risk itself and not by the seriousness of what happened to the inmate (such as death by overdose) because that risk ultimately happened to be realized. Id. at 685. This is because “[the] relevant constitutional ‘injury’ is the exposure to an objectively excessive risk, not any physical harm that befalls the inmate because of that risk.” Id. The court then noted that “that principle of constitutional injury has implications for § 1983‘s causation requirement in this context.” Id. And, turning to § 1983‘s causation requirement, the court explained that “the
The court held that the plaintiff failed to do so. First, the court took pains to note that the “failure to adequately staff a prison—even a deliberate one—is not itself a constitutional violation.” Id. at 685 (citing Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F. App‘x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012)). The court then explained that although understaffing may correlate with increased drug activity in the prison, a mere correlation does not establish a causal link between CoreCivic‘s staffing decisions and the specific harm that occurred. Id. at 686. The court emphasized that to succeed on a deliberate-indifference (i.e., failure-to-protect) claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that CoreCivic‘s staffing policies directly led to the harm suffered by the inmate, and not merely that a generalized correlation exists between those policies and that harm. Id. As the court explained, a plaintiff must present specific, non-conclusory allegations that directly connect the alleged constitutional violation to the particular constitutional injury, rather than relying on generalized statements about the correlation between staffing levels and prison conditions. See id. at 685-86; id. at 686 (“The allegation that intentional understaffing caused drug proliferation at [the relevant prison] is thus nothing more than a ‘the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,’ which the district court properly rejected.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
Crucially, the court in Caraway also took pains to distinguish Zakora. Indeed, the court noted that the Sixth Circuit‘s conclusion in Zakora (i.e., that there was an objectively serious risk of harm based on the prevalence of drugs in a prison environment) “was a limited one” based on the “egregiousness of Zakora‘s circumstances.” Id. at 684. Furthermore, the court in Caraway
Here, the Defendants’ and the Plaintiff‘s briefing on the first part of the deliberate indifference/failure-to-protect standard focuses extensively on Zakora and Caraway. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff contends that the facts of this case hew closer to Zakora (where the Sixth Circuit found that there was an objectively serious risk to an inmate based on the presence of drugs) so that the Court should find that there existed an objectively serious risk to Moss based on the proliferation of drugs at HCCF. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the facts of this case are more analogous to Caraway (where the Sixth Circuit found that there was not an objectively serious risk to an inmate) so that the Court should not find that there existed an objectively serious risk to Moss based on the proliferation of drugs at HCCF. Below, the Court will apply Zakora and Caraway to the instant case, beginning with an examination of whether the allegations in this action are analogous to the three key facts alleged in Zakora that supported finding an objectively serious risk of harm.
With respect to this first key alleged fact, the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s allegations are analogous to Caraway. Plaintiff does allege with detail just how drugs were introduced into HCCF, specifically that “the predominantly females [guard staff] at HCCF and other CoreCivic facilities . . . have gang affiliations or romantic relationships with gang members . . . [permitting] illegal gangs [to] utilize the gang-affiliated guards and prison staff to smuggle drugs into CoreCivic facilities as what occurred at the HCCF [sic].” (Doc. No. 57 at ¶ 25). However, the Complaint fails to present sufficient allegations to establish that there was a widespread presence of drugs in HCCF in the leadup to Moss‘s overdose. Although Plaintiff purports to rely on the allegations of nine specific HCCF inmate deaths to establish this point, the Court reiterates its point in footnote 9 above that only the four Overdosing Inmates were in fact alleged by Plaintiff to have used drugs—meaning that, at most, Plaintiff has specifically alleged four discrete instances of drug use within
Turning to the second of the key alleged facts relied on by the court in Zakora for finding an objectively serious risk of harm—previous overdoses—Defendants contend the previous overdoses alleged by Plaintiff fail to allege “anything to do with [Moss],” fail to allege “occur[ance] in the same area of HCCF as [Moss‘s] overdose,” and, as such instances occurred over a “ten-month period,” fail to allege facts “show[ing] the requisite temporally-proximate prior overdoses.” (Doc. No. 59 at 6). Defendants emphasize that “[a]s noted in Caraway, ‘[the] mere allegation that inmates have overdosed—even at an increased rate—doesn‘t come close to showing the kind of excessive, one-for-every-eight risk Zakora faced.’ Caraway, 98 F.4th at 684.” (Id. at 6). In response, Plaintiff again refers to the nine specifically alleged “[HCCF inmate] deaths from 2022 alone” and characterizes said deaths as all “drug related overdoses.” (Doc. No. 61 at 14).
As far as this second key alleged fact, the Court finds that the allegations in this action are less analogous to Zakora (where, as a reminder, the Sixth Circuit found an objectively serious risk of harm based on the proliferation of drugs) and instead are much closer to the alleged facts in
As the Court noted in footnote 9 above, Plaintiff alleges (via reference to unspecified HCCF “reports” and documents, and not otherwise on independent grounds) that only four HCCF inmates—the Overdosing Inmates—in fact overdosed (on either methamphetamine or fentanyl) in the seven months prior to Moss‘s overdose. (Doc. No. 57 at ¶¶ 29-37). As to each of the Other Inmates, no specific cause of death is alleged—not even via incorporation of the HCCF “records” and documents. Instead, what Plaintiff alleges (via incorporation of the HCCF “records” and documents) is that the Other Inmates’ deaths are “Under Investigation.” (Id.). Reviewing carefully the paragraphs concerning the Other Inmates, the Court discerns that Plaintiff alleges at most that each such inmate was believed at least initially, by HCCF staff, to have overdosed and therefore was given varying doses of Narcan. (Id.).16 So, Plaintiff‘s allegations concerning the specific
That takes the Court to the last of the key alleged facts relied on by the court in Zakora for finding an objectively serious risk of harm, namely a failure of prison officials to investigate previous inmate overdoses. Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs fail to plead facts to show that HCCF failed to investigate prior overdoses” and that in fact Plaintiff “acknowledge[s] the exact opposite—that HCCF investigated these instances, as the [HCCF] incident reports note ‘death under investigation.‘” (Doc. No. 59 at 6-7). Plaintiff responds that “[Defendant] Warden Vantell did not request an investigation into the death of [Moss]” (Doc. No. 61 at ¶ 15), and “in 2022, prior to [Moss‘s] death . . . HCCF nevertheless continued to cover up the inmates’ deaths that were due to reoccurring overdoses,” (id. at ¶ 31).
With respect to this third key alleged fact, the Court finds that the allegations in this action are less analogous to Zakora and hew closer to Caraway. Here, Plaintiff has made only general allegations that Defendants failed to investigate prior overdoses—namely, the allegation that Defendants failed to investigate through “cover[ing] up the inmates’ deaths that were due to reoccurring overdoses.” (Id.). The only overdose death that, according to Plaintiff‘s allegations, went uninvestigated (in order to “cover up” allegedly unconstitutional conduct, Doc. No. 57 at ¶ 96) is Moss‘s overdose death. But of course Moss‘s own overdose, even if uninvestigated, cannot approximate the third key alleged fact relied on by the court in Zakora: a failure of prison officials to investigate overdoses that occurred prior to that of the decedent Zakora. And Plaintiff does not
So here, Plaintiff‘s allegations with respect to this fact are far from the “specific, close-in time failure,” Caraway, 98 F.4th at 685, of the prison officials in Zakora to investigate inmates’ deaths (deaths, as a reminder, which occurred two days before Zakora‘s own fatal overdose). Zakora, 44 F.4th at 461-62, 470, 472. Instead, just like in Caraway, Plaintiff here “alleged no immediately prior overdoses”17 to Moss‘s own overdose, so “prison officials couldn‘t have failed to investigate them.” Caraway, 98 F.4th at 685. And just like the court in Caraway, the Court concludes that Plaintiff‘s “generalized allegations about the defendants’ failure to respond to the alleged drug problem” are insufficient for the Court to conclude that the problems in the instant action are similar to those in Zakora. Id.
In sum, of the three key alleged facts present in Zakora that allowed the court to conclude that there was an objectively serious risk of harm to the inmate in that action, none are present here. And thus, based on what Caraway said about Zakora at least, the Complaint fails to allege that Moss faced an excessive risk of harm from unfettered access to drugs.18 Cf. Caraway, 98 F.4th at 685 (“Only one of the three key allegations in Zakora is arguably present here. Thus, the
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead an objectively serious risk of harm to Moss, and thus Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claim(s) in Count I (alleging deliberate indifference, also known as failure to protect) fail(s) as to all Defendants. See Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686 (finding that because a “complaint fail[ed] to adequately plead an objectively serious risk of harm[,] [t]hat‘s enough to sink [an] Eighth Amendment [deliberate indifference] claim.“).
b. Count II: Monell Liability
As noted above, via Count II Plaintiff seeks to impose Monell liability on Defendant CoreCivic, Inc. (Doc. No. 57 at ¶¶ 87-96). Like parts of Plaintiff‘s other federal count, Count II concerns alleged policies in place at HCCF. In particular, Count II is based on allegations that Defendant CoreCivic adopted a “policy and practice of severely understaffing its facilities and placing unqualified guards at posts in its facilities including HCCF, without regard to inmate safety because understaffing is more profitable.” (Id. at ¶ 88).
However—and as noted at length above—given that Plaintiff has failed to allege an underlying constitutional violation—as shown by the failure of Plaintiff to state a claim as to the federal Section 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment in Count I—Plaintiff‘s attempt to impose Monell liability on Defendant CoreCivic also fails. See Caraway, 98 F.4th at 687 (“because the complaint doesn‘t allege an underlying constitutional violation, [the Monell] claims fail.“); Cook, 2025 WL 967544, at *6 (”Monell liability is dependent on the existence of an underlying constitutional violation (by someone). If no such violation is plausibly alleged, the corresponding Monell claims necessarily fail“). Cf. Williams v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, No. 25-5377, 2026 WL 323971, at *4, *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (declining to reach the question of
c. Claims III, IV, V: State Law Claims
As noted above, Plaintiff also asserts several state law claims (Count III, Count IV, and Count V) against various combinations of the Defendants.
It is well-settled that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]”
Having determined that Plaintiff‘s federal claims (over which the Court has original jurisdiction) should be dismissed, and because the Court finds that the aforementioned factors weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s state law claims—not least because Plaintiff does not otherwise argue that the Court should continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims in the event the Court determines that her federal claims
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion (Doc. No. 58) in its entirety. The Complaint (Doc. No. 57) will be DISMISSED as follows. Plaintiff‘s federal claims (Count I and Count II) will be dismissed in their entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s state law claims, and these claims (Count III, Count IV, and Count V) will be dismissed in their entirety without prejudice.
An appropriate accompanying order will be entered.
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
Relatedly, the Court cannot discern precisely where (or from what documents) Plaintiff derived the information set forth in the chart‘s column entitled “Asserted Reason for Death.” As best the Court can discern, the majority come from HCCF “records” or documents. (See id. at ¶¶ 29-31, 34-37). Two asserted reasons for death—i.e., those asserted in paragraphs 32 and 33—lack explicit indication tying them to an HCCF “record[]” or document, saying only that “the reasons for death this particular time was, Meth overdose.” (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33). Regardless of their provenance, the Court will construe these allegations as factual allegations regarding the actual cause for the inmate deaths, rather than factual allegations regarding merely what the HCCF “records” or documents list as the cause. This is because Plaintiff does not allege causes of death for the HCCF inmates other than via reference to the aforementioned “records” and documents. These uncertainties are further complicated by Plaintiff‘s vacillation, in the Complaint and the Response, between references to a group of nine and to a group of twelve deceased HCCF inmates from 2022. (Compare Doc. No. 57 at ¶ 74, Doc. No. 60 at ¶¶ 29-37 and pages 18-19, 21, 23 (referencing nine inmates), with Doc. No. 57 at ¶ 28 and page 24, Doc. No. 60 at 3, 24-25 (referencing twelve inmates)). Because Plaintiff alleges with specificity only nine deaths of HCCF inmates in 2022, (see Doc. No. 57 ¶¶ 29-37, Doc. No. 60 at ¶¶ 29-37), the Court will proceed with its analysis herein by reference to a group of nine (or ten, if also counting Moss) deceased HCCF inmates from 2022.