4 Ark. 460 | Ark. | 1842
By the Court,
The language in this case, as used in the opinion, must, of course, be construed with reference to the facts before the Court — with reference to the matter under consideration. Any other rule, in the language of an eminent jurist, “would misrepresent one judge, and mislead another.” Wherfi the Court remarks that the judicial powers of the respective judges must be, confined to the limits of their circuit, of course it must be taken in a qualified sense. The exception to the principle is contained in the constitution, which is, unless the Legislature shall authorize a temporary interchange of ridings. The argument upon the re-hearing of the case, although ingenious and forcible, has not been sufficient to satisfy the minds of the Court that the opionion previously expressed is erroneous. The definition of the term “ temporary,” although, in its literal acceptation, it may signify any portion of time less than the full period spoken of, still docs not warrant the conclusion that it is to be taken with such an unqualified meaning, and applied to the grant of the constitution. The word, as it stands in that instrument, must be governed by the meaning and objects of the grant, and its signification restricted by other parts and provisions of the constitution. A law that would authorize a judge to remain all but a small fraction of time out of the circuit for which he was .elected, and to hold but one court during the term of his service within his own district, would, to our minds, be a clear and palpable violation of the constitution. To hold such a law constitutional, would, in effect, break down all separate and distinct jurisdiction, which was the main and leading object of the convention to- establish; and it would virtually abrogate and destroy both the election and commission which constitute the judicial warrants of the judge for the exercise of his authority. And the law now before the court, is, in our estimation, subject to the like objection. There is a constant and uniform alternation and rotation of riding between the respective judges, which may last for all time to come, and therefore cannot be termed, in the constitutional meaning of the word, a temporary interchange of circuits.