146 Ga. 146 | Ga. | 1916
Tbe action was on an administrator’s bond, by a judgment creditor of the administrator’s intestate. The alleged breach of the bond was, the payment by the administrator of debts of the intestate, largely in excess of and inferior in dignity to that of the plaintiff, with knowledge by the administrator that the plaintiff’s debt was entitled to priority of payment; and that in this way the administrator had squandered the assets belonging to the estate of his intestate. It was alleged that the administrator had been granted a discharge from the administration of the estate, but that he “procured and obtained his discharge by falsely and fraudulently representing to the ordinary that he had fully discharged his duties as administrator, when in fact and in truth he had not fully and completely and fairly administered the estate of the deceased, but on the contrary had failed and refused to pay the indebtedness of plaintiff, and the defendant had funds to pay said indebtedness but failed and refused to pay the same, and in this way secured said discharge and procured it by fraud on ordinary of said county.” The defendants demurred on the ground that no cause of action was set out, and that no specific acts of fraud were alleged as a basis for disregarding the judgment discharging the administrator. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.
The plaintiff recognized that he was concluded by the judgment of the ordinary discharging the administrator from his trust, and undertook to escape that consequence by attacking the judgment of discharge as having been fraudulently obtained. The general rule is that a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction procured by fraud may be set aside in a direct proceeding, but is- not subject to collateral attack. Porter v. Rountree, 111 Ga. 369 (36 S. E. 761) ; Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Hill, 139 Ga. 224, 228 (76 S. E. 1001, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 996). Certain exceptions have been recognized by statute. The Civil Code (1910), § 4091, permits a discharge obtained by an administrator by means of fraud practiced on the heirs or the ordinary to 'be collaterally attacked. Pass v. Pass, 98 Ga. 791 (25 S. E. 752). An administrator’s discharge obtained by practicing fraud upon the ordinary is no bar to an action against him and the surety on his bond. Pollock v. Cox, 108 Ga. 430 (34 S. E. 213). But where the plaintiff in his petition alleges the discharge
Judgment affirmed.