31 Cal. 82 | Cal. | 1866
At the general election held in Plumas County on the 6th of September, 1865, Stephen J. Clark and James H. Yeates were candidates for the office of Sheriff of said county. The Board of Canvassers of the county held and declared Yeates duly elected to said office by a majority of five votes. Thereafter, on the 21st of October, William H. Knowles, an elector of the same county, presented to the County Court his petition contesting the election of Yeates and praying that Clark might be declared elected and entitled to the office. Yeates, the respondent, appeared, and answered the petition of Knowles, the contestant. - Upon the trial of the issues joined between the parties, the Court rendered judgment for respondent, from which the contestant has appealed to this Court.
The respondent’s counsel has made an objection challenging the jurisdiction of this Court in the premises, which it is necessary to consider and dispose of before we can look into the merits of the controversy. The question is one of great importance, and were we without authority on the subject, we should view it as exceedingly embarrassing. In Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 252, which was an action of divorce, an objection was taken that the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution in the case—no question of property being involved in its determination. The fourth
Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The fourth section of the Sixth Article of the Constitution, as amended, reads as follows: “ The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, or in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars; also, in all cases arising in Probate Courts; and also in all criminal cases amounting to felony on questions of law alone.”
On the part of the respondent it is insisted that this section as amended is a more distinct and exact limitation of the
, The learned Judge, in the case referred to, seems to have had in mind the rules of interpretation defined by Rutherforth, as rational and mixed. Rational interpretation is when' the words of an instrument do not express the author’s intention perfectly,, but either exceed or fall short of it, so that the intention is to be collected from probable or rational conjectures only; and mixed interpretation, that is, an interpretation partly literal and partly rational, is when the author’s words, though they do express his intention when rightly understood, are in themselves of doubtful meaning, rendering it necessary to have recourse to the like conjectures to find out in what sense the words were used; in which case the intention is collected from the words, but not without the help of other conjectures. (Rutherfortli’s Institutes, B. 2, Ch. 7, Sec. 3.) By means of these rules of interpretation the spirit of the text is saved from sacrifice to its strict letter. When the provisions of a statute or of the organic law are clear and precisé, and attended with no difficulty in the application, there is no room for any interpretation or comment. The intention of the lawgiver is what must be adhered to. But if the language of the instrument is indeterminate, vague or susceptible of a more or less extensive sense, we must presume the intention according to the laws of reason and equity; and for this purpose it is necessary to pay attention to the nature of the things to which the question relates. In this connection Vat-tel says: “ There are certain things of which equity admits the extension rather than the restriction; that is to say, that
The Constitution of this State was created and adopted by a free people in order to secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of liberty. In the declaration of rights the great fundamental truths that “ all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness,” are distinctly announced; and it is declared that all political power is inherent in the people; that government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The Constitution secures to the citizen the right of suffrage, without which he could not exert his political power, and without which he would be impotent to secure to himself the full enjoyment of life, liberty and property.
For the accomplishment of the objects and ends of the government of the State, its powers are divided into three departments, to each of which is assigned its appropriate functions.
Contemporaneous interpretation of a Constitution.
In aid of the interpretation which we give to the section of the Constitution under consideration we may refer to the exposition and practice of the judicial department of the State Government since its organization. The highest Courts of original jurisdiction have been in the practice, from the begin
We do not mean to be understood as holding that, notwithstanding contemporaneous exposition on the part of the judicial tribunals and Legislatures of the State may be cogent evidence in aid of a particular interpretation or construction of the Constitution, that such interpretation or construction, even though sanctioned by long usage, should be upheld, if the same be clearly repugnant to the express and unequivocal terms of the instrument. It is to the words of the Constitution we must have recourse in the first place to ascertain what may be intended by any of its provisions. Its spirit and intent must be collected chiefly from its words, and what its words mean in their relations to each other and to the subject matter of its provisions, it is oftentimes the office of interpretation to discover.
The provision of the Constitution which the Court in Conant v. Conant was called upon to expound was regarded as failing to clearly define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in relation to the subject matter of that case, and others of like nature. It was considered as falling short of expressing the entire extent of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and hence we may presume recourse was had to other provisions of the Constitution and to a consideration of its grand aims and pur
Having disposed of the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent, we now come to the consideration of the case upon the merits.
Election precincts were duly established for Plumas County for the general election held in 1865, and officers of election were appointed by the Board of Supervisors for each of the precincts so established. The following, to wit: Granite Basin, Cascade, (Sullivan’s,) Rush Creek, and Grizzly Valley, were of the number of the precincts so established, and officers of election were appointed for each of them. No election was held at either of the places named. Instead of holding the election at Granite Basin the Inspector and Judges appointed for that place opened the polls and held the election at Buckeye House, six miles distant from Granite Basin. The Board of County Canvassers opened and canvassed the votes given at Buckeye House as votes cast at Granite Basin, and it appearing that of the votes so given, the respondent received five and Clark two, they were so counted and allowed. Polls were opened and an election held at a certain Warehouse near a place called Diamond Spring House. The Warehouse stood on the line dividing the Counties of Plumas and Yuba, at a distance of three miles from “ Cascade, (Sullivan’s.)” The conduct of those who managed the election at the polls opened at the Warehouse, was, to say the least of it, grossly irregular. The persons who acted as Inspectors and Judges there, made returns of the votes cast at the Warehouse, and they were opened and counted by the County Canvassers as votes cast at Cascade Precinct. The. votes so given were fifteen in num
Instead of opening the polls and holding the election at Grizzly Valley, the election was held at the house of A. J. McPike, situated on Grizzly Creek, a mile distant from the valley. McPike’s house was a mile from Grizzly Valley, the place designated and appointed by the proper authority as the place where the election should be held. The Court found that no polls were opened or held in Grizzly Valley on the day of the election ; that the vote cast at the house of McPike was returned as the votes of Grizzly Valley, and that of the twenty-two votes so returned, sixteen of them were for the respondent, for the office of Sheriff, and six for Clark, for the same office, and were so counted and allowed by the Board of Canvassers.
The officers appointed to open the polls and hold the election at Bush Creek, instead of attending at the place designated and established for the purpose, opened the polls and held the election at Bull Frog Quartz Mill, situated about one mile distant from Bush Creek. So the Court found from the evidence, and further found, that the votes cast at the mill were opened and counted by the Board of County Canvassers as election returns from Bush Creek Precinct. Thirty-one votes were cast there, of which five were for the respondent for the office of Sheriff, and twenty-six for Clark for the same office;
The contestant charges in his petition that the conduct of the persons acting in the capacity of officers of election at three of the places named, to wit: at the Buckeye House, the Warehouse, and McPike’s house, where elections were held, was wrongful and fraudulent, and that the returns made .by them were counterfeit and false as representing the votes given at these places respectively, as given at other and different places • corresponding to the places and precincts established by the Board of Supervisors. The respondent, on his part, by answer, makes like charges as to the conduct of the persons acting in the capacity of officers of election at Bull Frog Quartz Mill. A copy of the proclamation of the Governor designating the offices to be filled at the general election for the year 1865, was posted upon the Warehouse near Diamond Spring House, as required by the sixth section of the Act. to regulate elections, to be posted at each place of holding elections; but no such copy was posted at the Buckeye House, nor at the Bull Frog Quartz Mill.
Malconduct of an Election Board.
It is evident from the finding of the County Court there was no pretense on the trial that the Board of Supervisors 'designated the Warehouse as the place for holding the election in the Cascade Precinct. The testimony is conclusive that it was not. Sullivan’s house, which was three miles from the Warehouse, was the place designated by the Board of Supervisors, and the fact that a copy of the proclamation was posted upon the Warehouse is not sufficient to overcome the direct and positive evidence that Sullivan’s house was the place designated. The conduct of the persons acting as officers of the election in opening the polls and holding the election at a distance of three miles from the place appointed by the proper authority was without any just excuse, and unauthorized, and in that respect was in the sense of the
We are aware that Courts have been very indulgent respecting the omissions, inadvertencies and mistakes of officers of elections, lest by exacting of them a technical compliance with the requirements of the law the citizen might be deprived of a sacred right. We are not disposed to be less indulgent in respect to the observance of forms and methods than have been the Courts to which counsel have referred; but we deem it of the highest importance to the protection of the elective franchise that the law should be complied with in substance, and that those intrusted with the discharge of the duties pertaining to elections should be required so to perform them as to preserve the ballot box pure. Others besides those who may lose their votes by the malconduct of officers of elections are concerned; and while seeking upon just principles to save to the elector his vote offered and given in good faith, we are not to forget that he himself, as well as all honest people, are vitally interested in the protection of the right of suffrage against the fraudulent machinations and devices of men whose partisan moral code bears upon its title page the infamous maxim, “ All is fair in polities.” These observations are made to show the importance of so far adhering to the -substantial requirements of the law as to protect and preserve elections from abuses subversive of the inherent and constitutional rights of the people. We are of the opinion that the election held at the Warehouse was invalid, and that the votes polled there should have been rejected and disallowed.
The elections held at McPike’s house and at the Bull Frog Quartz Mill are respectively in the same condition and predicament as that held at the Buckeye House, and must in like manner be declared invalid.
Rejecting the votes cast at the Warehouse, at the Buckeye House, at McPike’s house and at the quartz mill, S. J. Clark appears to have been elected Sheriff by a majority of two votes. Therefore the judgment appealed from declaring James H. Yeates elected.and entitled to the office of Sheriff of Plumas County must be and is hereby reversed ; and it is hereby adjudged and decreed that S. J. Clark was elected .to said . office at the general election held in 1865, and that he is therefore entitled to have, hold and exercise said office of Sheriff in and for said County of Plumas.