Defendant William T. Knowles, the former husband of plaintiff Sharyn M. Knowles, appeals the divorce judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Beaudoin, J). Husband contends that the Superiоr Court erred in ruling that all of the increase in value of the common stock of a closely held corporation was marital property, in failing to reсognize that the marital residence was acquired in exchange for a combination of marital and non-marital funds, and in its calculations of his gross income for child-support purposes. We disagree and affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
Prior to the couple’s marriage, husband and his business partner each owned 50% of Mаine Video Systems (“Maine Video”) stock. At the time of the marriage, husband was a salaried employee of Maine Video, and wife worked as a registered nurse at Maine Medical Center. They purchased a home, making a $5,400 down payment consisting of a $3,000 loan from husband’s father and the proceeds from the salе of two automobiles, one owned by each of the parties before marriage. While husband’s father never demanded repayment of the loan, husband did mаke one payment of $500 which his parents returned to him the next day as a gift. The couple has two children, aged 10 and 14.
When they married in 1971, Maine Video was worth $6,500. At that time, the business consisted of rented office space, inventory, receivables, payables, a franchise to sell a line of electronic equipmеnt, and a client list. Husband was the sole employee. Eventually, Maine Video repurchased the business partner’s shares in the company and moved its office into the marital home where it remained for several years with wife receiving a salary for her assistance in running the business. By 1976, Maine Video’s gross sales had reached $342,732. The company hired some additional employees and began another enterprise, The Video Workshop.
At the time of the divorce, the Superior Court found the two businesses had a combined net value of $450,000. According to his W-2 wage and tax statement, husband earned $49,088 in salary for 1989. He also received $7,877 in rentаl income from leasing an office building to the businesses. In addition, Maine Video provided husband with benefits, including an automobile, medical insurance, an expensе account, and a boat. The court found husband’s total income to be approximately $60,000 per *317 year. In 1988, wife filed for and was granted a divorce. Husband nоw appeals.
Husband contends first that the Superior Court erred in concluding that all of the increase in value of Maine Video stock is marital property. He disputes the Superior Court’s finding that “[a]ll of the increase in value ... is due to marital efforts,” maintaining (1) that the court misconstrued the source of funds rule by failing to distinguish between compensated and uncompensated marital efforts, (2) that the court erred in construing the source of funds rule as requiring an all-or-nothing disposition in lieu оf allocation, and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion that all of the increase in value of Maine Video stock is due to marital efforts.
The source of funds rule, as we applied it in
Macdonald v. Macdonald,
To support his argument, husband cites
Hoffmann v. Hoffmann,
Husband next argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the Superi- or Court’s determination that the $3,000 contributed by his father toward the down payment on thе marital residence was a gift to the marital estate. He contends that the evidence clearly demonstrates that this $3,000 was initially a gift solely to him, rather than а loan to the marital estate, and, thus, the portion of the marital residence attributable to this gift should be set aside as his separate property. The Superi- or Court found that, at the time of the receipt of the money and the purchase of the marital residence, the $3,000 was a loan and constituted a mаrital debt. This find *318 ing is supported by the promissory note signed by husband and entered into evidence at trial. The court found that husband’s father later forgave the debt by making the $8,000 а gift to the marital estate. Thus, the Superior Court did not err.
Finally, husband disputes the court’s calculation of $60,000 as his gross annual income for child-support purposеs. Applying 19 M.R.S.A. 311(5) (Supp.1990), 2 the Superior Court found the following: in addition to his base salary of $33,800, husband earns at least $7,875 in rental income; he receives substantial in-kind payments and business-expense reimbursements which reduce his personal living costs by several thousands of dollars per year; and he has received bonus income from Maine Video and the Video Workshop which is likely to continue in the future. In 1989, he received a bonus of $14,000. Noting that husband “has the ability to somewhat reduce the relativеly lavish style of his businesses to decrease expenses and increase profits,” the Superior Court concluded that $60,000 was an appropriate gross-salary figure to use in calculating child support. In reaching this figure, the court closely followed the guidelines in 19 M.R. S.A. § 311(5). The figures were based primarily on husband’s own testimony, and the court’s conclusions are not clearly erroneous.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
Notes
. The Superior Court set aside $6,500 as husband's non-marital interest in Maine Video stock. This was the value of thе stock at the time of the marriage.
. Section 311 defines gross income as "income from any ongoing source including, but not limited to, salaries, wages, ... bonuses, dividends, ... [аnd] expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a party in the course of employment or self-employment or operation of a business if the expense reimbursements or in-kind payments reduce personal living expenses.” 19 M.R.S.A. § 311(5)(A) & (B).