12 Cal. 212 | Cal. | 1859
delivered the opinion of the Court—Terry, C. J., concurring.
We must reprehend the practice, which is too common, of stuffing a transcript with irrelevant and unnecessary matter. The present case affords a remarkable illustration. The transcript contains some two hundred and thirty-three pages, when everything essential to a review of the case might easily have been given in fifty. Besides the delays, unnecessary expense and labor thus created, the points are hid
This case is a bill in equity to restrain the defendants from prosecuting certain suits, depending in the Courts of San Francisco, and from leasing and conveying certain real estate herein situate. The ground upon which the bill proceeds is, that there has been a long course of vexatious litigation, and that the right has been determined in favor of the appellants; that sundry actions are still prosecuted and threatened, to harass and vex the appellants.
The case was referred to a referee, who, in his report, gives the history of the litigation, which, for variety and extent, is unexampled, considering the small value involved. This history, indeed, might afford an. illustrative appendix to Scott’s account of the celebrated suit of Peter Peebles v. Plainstaines, or Dickens’ report of the case of" Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. Indeed, it would appear that the only use to which the parties designed to put this lot was to make it a foundation of a lawsuit, which they have erected upon it; an edifice divided, from cellar to garret, into all manner of secret chambers, involved passages and dark entries. The real parties to the controversy seem to have
We cannot take time to review this protracted controversy, and to follow its mazes through all their ramifications; nor is it necessary, for a simple point is conclusive. We regret that we have no power to put a step to this comprehensive and embarrassing litigation, and that we must turn a deaf ear to the pathetic appeal of the appellants’ counsel, not “ to suffer his clients to be lawed to deathbut, though “ it is the interest of the Republic that there should be an end of litigation,” and not less the interest of these parties, yet the rules of law forbid our putting an end to it in this way.
It seems that the title of the lot was tried only in the case of Knowles v. Calderwood and Chittlebury. In that case there was judgment for Knowles ; but Calderwood appealed from the judgment, and the appeal is, or.was, at the time of the referee’s report, pending in this Court. It is charged that, in that case, Forrest, who had a mortgage on the premises given by Knowles, was one of the principal witnesses for Knowles; that he swore, on his voir dire, that he was not interested, and that the verdict was mainly, or at least in part, gained on his testimony. The referee finds—and there certainly seems to be some evidence to support the finding—that the case was not satisfactorily and fairly tried. This judgment, suspended by appeal, cannot be consid
Besides, there was no trial on the merits in any action to which Inches, who claims to be interested through Calderwood, or Van Yalkenburg, who is lessee- of Calderwood, or holds under his title, or to which action Sanborn and Forrest, who were of the opposite faction, were parties. It is true that these parties, as the referee finds, are, except Van Yalkenburg, mere accommodation grantees, and fictitious depositories of title ; but they have a right to be heard at law in their own defense, before the Courts can pronounce definitely on their claims, however false they may appear in a controversy inter alias.
Chancery will not interfere in cases like this, until after a trial at law adjudicating the title ; and this means a trial in an action in which all the claimants to the title are parties. Otherwise, it would follow, that Chancery might assume jurisdiction, in the first instance, of all actions of ejectment. The remedy, by bill of peace, is provided in instances of this sort, for cases of vexatious litigation, after the real merits of the controversy have been settled at law.
If the appellants are in possession, it is easy to frame a bill to quiet title upon the ground of superior right; but this bill is not framed for that purpose.
The judgment of the Court below is affirmed.