Knott Corporation v. Furman

tax- basis deprive electing installment accrual advantage

payer an extent enjoys to that taxpayer

basis It the Act. purpose of would frustrate the taxpayers accrual basis is not denied that in- profits net computing their excess for their allowed deductions

come have been expenses, expenses, collection operating in which year like

losses and the they were although at- they incurred We do pre-1940 sales. tributable to the statute that the direction compute taxpayer to electing requires the “in accord- basis accrual

his income on the by the prescribed regulations ance approval of the Sec- with the Commissioner regula- aof

retary” authorizes issuance spirit of not observe the

tion that does Con- will of faithfully carry

Act Tax Court

gress. decision

Affirmed.

KNOTT CORPORATION FURMAN.

No. 5589. Appeals,

Circuit Court of Fourth Circuit. June 27, 1947.

ofWrit Certiorari Denied Oct.

See S.Ct. 111.

GRONER, J., dissenting. C. Oast, Jr., Ryan, Jr., W. L.E. John Norfolk, (White Ryan, both of Va. Norfolk, Va., Schlater, F. M. York New Norfolk, Virginia the district of resi- Kellam, of City, Edwin C. defendant, as plaintiff or dence of either Va., brief), appellant. on the statute, provided by applicable venue (Baird, Norfolk, Baird, Va. Edward R. contends U.S.C.A. 112. Plaintiff § D. Hitch- Lanning and Vernon White & defendant, by proper the is because venue Va., brief), Norfolk, on the Jr., ings, all of Virginia, doing within the State of business appellee. for to suit and service of has consented PARKER, Judge, GRON- Circuit Before applicable Virginia statute there under the States ER, United Chief of the Justice and cases instituted venue has waived as Colum- District of Appeals for Court of the against in of that state. the federal courts it special assignment), and (sitting bia doing been Defendant denies that it has DOBIE, Judge. Circuit that, if Virginia says business and also operation of doing what the it was the PARKER, Judge. Circuit the doing hotel constituted business within appeal judgment is an from a for This statute, on meaning of was done the this damages negligence plain- case. The has territory to which the statute Furman, Mary tiff Mrs. Hale a citizen is application. no Massachusetts, of the State of in- who was jured in March 1945 the course a fire defendant, The first contention of damaged which the Chamberlin Hotel on question of basic this is on Military Monroe Fort Reservation at venue, negli on but also Comfort, Virginia. Old Point Defendant considered, gence, was later that it is corporation, having prin- Delaware is a its all, operating hotel at and hence cipal place York, New business and way doing was not as to business in engaged was time at the fire in subject to service of it under operating plaintiff the hotel. The in- was Virginia neg for statute render it liable jured attempting to while lower herself ligence oc in connection with the fire that story from fifth window the hotel to a merely curred. Its contention is that it was rope roof below means of bed giving government in advice to the the op sheets, which broke while was engaged she making eration of the hotel and audit in making the alleges descent. negli- She time to hotel’s accounts from time. gence part on the defendant in con- nothing There is in this contention. The origin fire, nection with the of the de- conclusively evidence shows that defendant lay in fighting it and with giving notice operating was furnishing the hotel and guests therof to the in the hotel. Defend- services, materials, all labor well as and as negligence, ant charges denies contributory supplies required opera articles and for its negligence and denies that is venue manager charge opera tion. The of the ' proper. There judgment was verdict and employed paid by tion defendant plaintiff, appealed. for defendant has persons employed the 293 other were on While argued numerous matters have been premises. moneys The fact that the used us, presented before ap- case as operation, derived from the that a peal principal itself resolves into three pro United States officer onwas hand to questions: (1) proper? Was the venue (2) government is tect interests Was evidence to take the case to the and that sue directives defendant was jury? and (3) properly Was the case sub- paid a for sum while fixed services judge’s mitted under charge? We profits operation govern net towent questions think all of these that should be ment, together of these taken do not —all answered the affirmative. negative either the de important question

The most responsibility fendant or defendant’s before us operation relating to venue. hotel. contract Defendant chal- be lenges defendant tween United the court on States ground that, that, plaintiff clearly before shows since is a citzen of us while the many defendant was restricted in ways Massachusetts and defendant a Delaware corporation, operation hotel, suit in it was the Eastern the de- District government

fendant not the that was It will be that under section noted running nothing in the business. There is three of the statute the of business parol justify evidence which would appointment deemed to afi of the Secre contrary prop- judge conclusion: and the tary process agent Commonwealth as erly jury effect. instructed appointment whether formally has been Question made or not. point that, been raised as We shall later to whether purposes this venue, should not limited to the companies mentioned in Military section but we the Fort Monroe Reservation clear apply intended does it was not differ business else- to foreign corporations generally. Virginia; where in the Eastern District of doing highly and, statute is of a we it clear that such of nature remedial business amounts to to the service under principles, liberally familiar to consent be n construed. Both the process upon of Secretary Com- of the foreign corporations Virginia monwealth and consent to of be 1, foreign section mentioned in insur sued in the federal court of the district as companies, guaranty companies ance etc. well as in the state courts a required in 2 ap mentioned were section of cause action which arisen there. point the of Secretary Commonwealth Virginia, Supp.1946, The Code of section agent process, sepa the service of provisions: 3846a following contains being rate section devoted to insurance com corporation panies, Any foreign guaranty companies, doing busi-

“1. etc. so as to by power ness State shall bring this written of them in under statute whether attorney appoint Secretary corporated of the Com- “company” or not. The word “corporation” monwealth and his its includes of successor office is a word attorney purposes true and lawful for the meaning; broader and it is reasonable to hereinafter stated. company” construe the “such in sec words any tion 3 as intended to embrace of the company, Any foreign insurance “2. para entities preceding in the referred indemnity, security any guaranty, fidelity or graphs required appoint forty-two which company section as defined Secretary of Virginia, before the Commonwealth as hundred of the Code of agent. pur 4 shall written Section that whole doing in this State business shows pose power Secretary provision attorney appoint code to liberalize his successor in bringing foreign the Commonwealth the law with attorney and lawful for the corporations court; office true its into would and there purposes stated. hereinafter giving be no a sense such narrow inter pretation 3 to section as would confine its any company “3. If such shall do busi- provisions companies, guar to the insurance appointed having in this State without ness etc., companies, anty Commonwealth its described section 2. Secretary attorney required herein, application lawful as true So far as of the statute to concerned, the State doing it shall such business at cáse bar is it should be ap- thereby to have Virginia that, deemed be observed since the cause of action Secretary Commonwealth pointed of the sued on arises out of done business within pur- attorney lawful for the state, its true and merely declaratory 3 is section forth. poses hereinafter set apply the rule which the courts would such case if the statute had contained a requirements preceding of the “4. 1; being by doing section the rule that shall section be addi- subsections this foreign corporation, the state a derogation any not in other tion to and as action out of such causes law, except any foreign provisions business, consents to service power corporation which has in effect agent by the statute the state Secretary attorney appointing the appoint. required Simon v. Southern attorney for pur- Commonwealth its Co., 115, 130, be 236 U.S. S.Ct. poses deemed to R. hereinafter stated shall 492; Wayne Life complied requirements Old Ass’n v. Mc of L.Ed. have 8, 22, Donough, 204 U.S. S.Ct. such subsections.” 345; Cox, Corporation, 8 106 U.S. Yoder St. Clair v. In v. Nu-Enamel Cir., Circuit Court 27 L.Ed. F.2d Circuit, speaking Appeals Eighth must be construed Since staute statu- through Johnsen, with a Judge dealt that, by providing as tory as appointment process agent, such corporation Virginia, State of foreign . us, ac- saying: the one “We must before thereby shall appointed be deemed to have 24-1201, that, Neb. cordingly under hold § Secretary Commonwealth as impliedly Comp.St.1929, expressly as process agent, and defendant un since the Supreme Court of construed questionably business in state within did state, corporation foreign where a meaning (assuming at of the statute this state, proc- business in the service of valid stage business within the Fort it, upon ess against the state made Monroe Reservation was the same as auditor, specific appointment without a state), business elsewhere within undertaking agent. By officer as would seem to no to its hav corporation to do business in the ing appointed process agent. The de accepts ap- and is bound the automatic presumed fendant must to have knowl pointment makes, which statute and is state; and, edge of the law of the when it prevented thereby responsi- escaping knowledge did the state with bility to the citizens of state its tri- provision of the law to we which have bunals, by appoint qualify a failure to or to referred, necessarily ap consented to the agent.” a resident pointment process agent pro therein Supreme rule is thus by p. vided. said Court in stated 23 As Am.Jur. Harris, 65, “Upon 81, theory implied consent, R. R. 12 512: Co. v. Wall. 20 L. point by entering Ed. 354: chief state “The of difference and engaging be in busi- person tween the natural the artificial therein without ness first qualifying under may laws, is that whatever is local provide former not valid do which for . law; by statutory agent, forbidden service on the latter can do a or complying by requirement is what with lawful designate authorized its can that it charter. It person migrate, may some of its authority pre- exercise its own selection or a foreign territory upon scribed agent such conditions state official as its to receive may prescribed process it, service of against law suits such place. corporation may may One these conditions that be deemed have to con- jurisdiction it shall consent to be sued If sented that there. it do of the local courts presumed over business there it will be it while engaged may to have thus be ac- quired accordingly.” through upon assented and will be bound agent charge business, of such whom it is deemed Co., supra, In Simon Southern R. v. 236 to designated have purpose, upon 255, 260, 35 U.S. S.Ct. 59 L.Ed. prescribed state official as the case 492, Supreme Court stated the rule with be, may arising all suits out of such busi- respect to causes of action arising within ness, although on foreign suits tran- “Subject excep- the state as follows: to sitory causes action unconnected with here, tions, every not material state has the corporation’s state, business in the where right provide undoubted to for service of sought is to be rested on service process upon any foreign corporations do- upon made a state person officer or other therein; require ing business such com- authority whose process receive is de- panies agents upon to name whom service rived exclusively from statute, unaided made; provide also to that in any representative relation to corpora- company’s appoint case failure to tion.” service, proper cases, agent, may be upon designated 498; made See 23 an officer law. also Flexner v. Am.Jur. Farson, Phelps, 289, Ass’n 248 97, Mutual Reserve 190 v. U.S. 39 U.S. S.Ct. 63 L.Ed. 147, 707, 987; 250; 23 Pennsylvania 47 L.Ed. Connecti- Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Co., cut Mutual Life Spratley, Mining 93, Ins. Co. v. Issue 243 U.S. 37 S.Ct. 344. 602, 308, 610; U.S. 19 S.Ct. Wayne 569.” L.Ed. Old L.Ed. Mutual Life Ins. 20 i 8, 27 S.Ct. McDonough, 204 U.S. Co. states their And so v. activities. Philadelphia 345; they Bagdon required by desig-

236, legislatures Co., agents process N.E. nate etc. Coal 217 N.Y. for service of in return for the privilege Ann.Cas.1918A 389. local business. That service agent, such an in con- have adverted to which we decisions statute, formity with a valid consti- state express and draw a between distinction tuted consent to be sued in the federal court implied respect causes of consent with thereby supplanted immunity as to done out of business action arise venue, was the rationale of Schollenberger’s do not within those which so the state and case.” latter, former, but not arise. to the As implied equivalent that which consent Applying the case bar at express. Only to causes “common sense” which Chief Waite Justice done arising action not Supreme ap is said Court to have any question within the state does arise as plied in the Schollenberger we sufficiency implied to the See consent. it clear that waiving 499-501; pp. Lipe also C. v. C. provisions Am.Jur. of the federal venue statute there O. R. Co. 123 S.C. S.E. 30 can be no distinction between the consent to note; A.L.R. 248 Smolik v. Philadel- suit and service of implied from phia Co., D.C., 222 etc. Coal F. 148. doing business in state that appointment out of process agent, of a so appointment It well settled corporation foreign where given agent upon of an whom service of subjects such consent as it to suit in the pro can be made within a state waives the courts of the sub same consent statute, of the federal so vision venue jects it to suit the in federal courts there a defendant be in the in sued state the sitting if the jurisdic of elements federal court, federal as in court well as the state present. tion are put Or to the matter con jurisdic if the case is within the federal cretely, implied the consent from Corp., tion. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem 308 in business state the authorizes 165, 167, U.S. 60 84 S.Ct. L.Ed. state, suit in the of courts the service 1437; Schollenberger, 128 Ex Parte A.L.R. process upon of designated officer, a state 369, 96 U.S. 24 L.Ed. 853. The basis of the but also provisions waives the of the fed by was rule well stated Frank Mr. Justice eral venue statute so that suit can be furter in the Neirbo case as follows: “The brought court, in the federal if the elements corporation classic doctrine was that a present. of federal are creation, place in ‘must dwell the of and migrate There sovereignty.’ cannot distinction express another is a between 519, implied consent, Augusta Earle, Bank 13 of v. Pet. but this distinction has 588, applied, origin Logically action, 10 L.Ed. this relation of to the the cause of theory non-migration prevented effect of suit in a not on venue. It is reasonable state, imply corporation to consent non-chartering for the to suit service of from could not there.. And such be of within business practice opin as causes of circuit courts until the state of action out parte ion of business Ex such but not as to Chief Waite in other causes Justice 853, Schollenberger, 24 any 96 U.S. action. There no reason for dis- express metaphor implied sense. tinction between displaced common con- sent, however, prac difference between when it comes to essential waiver If Mr. venue. tice which Nelson initiated at can be Justice Schollenberger’s decision in held to furnish the basis of circuit and consent with state, matter of to suit legal not a technical in courts case was construction, way looking why there no reason it at cor be a should not equally minds had efficacious with porations. Men’s become habit furnish- corporate ing activities the basis consent to suit in which crossed the fed- uated corporations fact that If the be eral courts. view taken did that the state lines. fictitious, wholly consent is there originating their is no rea- outside bounds do immunity why their from the fiction intolerable suit son should not as made serve fendant be sued in this has consented to If the other. case in well the one as Clearly federal he has court. court, to use statute purposes justice”, “for consented court to be sued Hand State Judge Learned language of prescribed by form of the Act. 151], service treats the supra Smolilc F. [222 point personal No made consent, there been here if had been situation as less justice” on a in this State is why “purposes defendant is no reason bearing effective consent than if the as under federal as considered should less form authorized Certainly no direct of service well under state as statutes. logically I Act had by permitting been purpose justice is served had. principle of Neirbo from the state but not follows to be sued defendant Schollenberger as and cases that defend- such situation courts in a ant’s federal court this, unques- consent to sued himself where the defendant implied voluntary from use of the remove the case his tionably right has the Maryland highways.” if the state to the federal courts sued courts. Everything said in these cases with re- spect to the consent to suit and service very A raised similar has been process implied operation by an two of the District Courts Cir- this individual of a over motor vehicle the roads Judges Waring in. cuit before actions manifestly applies state fortiori Hider, D.C., Krueger Chesnut in v. F. corporation case of a foreign Dennis, Supp. D.C., 62 v. Steele business within a state. F.Supp. 73. Both of these were .actions against foreign motorists under statutes We are advertent to the decisions motorist, by operat- of which the terms Straight Cummer-Graham v. Side Bas- Co. upon ing vehicle roads Corp., Cir., 828; ket 136 F.2d Robinson impliedly consented an ac- Bay v. Corp., Cir., Coos Pulp 147 F.2d against growing op- tion him 512; Co., Cir., Moss A. C. L. R. might eration be served a state 701; officer. Keasby 149 F.2d In re Mattison cases, implied In both suph it was Co., held U.S. 40 L.Ed. provisions consent venue cases, however, waived 402. In none these might brought statute and that suit providing, a statute there involved does the federal as well as in state the courts. statute, Virginia appointment the that the ground Krueger of decision in v. Hi- agent of a state officer as for the by der was Judge Waring stated as follows process presumed doing from would be F.Supp. state, and, “It seems clear to me [48 im- 710]: business in the what is more defendant, Hider, the when he portant, ap- drove in none of it these cases did upon accepted the South Carolina here, roads pear, that the cause action sued as terms Section 437 of the South Carolina arose of business done within the on out thereby appointed Code and the director of state. High- Motor Vehicle State Division above, only pointed out it with re- As is Department way as true lawful his at- spect of action out of causes to torney upon process whom could be served. state business done within the that consent By doing question such act he waived implied, doing will because of the be - jurisdiction person. This statement business, process and service of to suit might seriously questioned been law have Qa transitory causes within the state. mere before the decision in Neirbo case here- of causes action arising action or with- cited, inabove but in since the decision state, the consent must be evidenced out the appears case me inescapable to to be an process by appointment agent; of a and sound conclusion.” and, appointment, the absence such In Dennis, the case of Steele no waiver of supra only not is there under venue [62 F.Supp. 75], Judge statute, is Chesnut stated federal but there also no the the ground jurisdiction acquired pre- decision as follows: under stat- “The the state question presented cise by necessary is In the Neirbo it was whether his ute. case use Maryland distinguish Keasby case, highways, to Mattison accord- statute, Maryland ance with the de- because neither case arose of business state, arisen; done only appoint- within into court had not but it was cer- process ment of tainly competent, reserved, agent power in the Neirbo under the which Keasby provide was for absent in & Mattison how state to service'on such case, supplied corporations the consent sued within to be within should be made this, state which waiver of venue under Reservation. If it could there is no do the federal reason why general statute was based. Where such laws reference given consent is corporations to to foreign causes service on should action arising out applicable corpora- of business done within not be held foreign to by business, state such tions business within the Reservation. there any is nothing in power cases cited It foreign that the true exclude which suggests corporations holds that it not should the Reservation not was given be waiving effect in reserved, federal venue power process but the to serve as well conferring jurisdiction. reserved; as in state corporations To given hold that it be should business effect for within the Reservation must be purpose one presumed but thereby not for the other would to consent to the conse- illogical quences be prescribed but would result state re- laws with anomaly permitting spect process. defendant to be to service of sued in the state federal Corporations doing business *onthe courts, although all the elements federal reservation come in contact citi with the jurisdiction present although are de- Virginia zens of do business with them fendant itself right have would to re- way corporations foreign the same as move the case into the federal court if sued doing elsewhere within business courts of state. making and there the same for reason then, come, We to the as them process amenable to local application whether the of the statute is courts. Since the state retained the right different because business done on foreign corpora to serve on Military the Fort Monroe Reservation. We tions as well within as others the reser do not think so. It would be an anomalous vation power say and has the what shall result, indeed, 'corporation if foreign service, any do- constitute it follows that Virginia ing may could not sued act legally which taken as an ac ceptance federal court with of service elsewhere within the merely done because it was done on state taken so within the reserva territory; nothing we find law necessarily tion. This means any corporation which lead foreign would such result. The of business within effect, land contained in Reservation was reservation ceded the has the same so far Virginia submitting the State of as the United itself the local concerned, States the Act of March the service of “* * * following provision: doing contained the business elsewhere within the state. that the cession shall not be construed said up point, To on sum this hold: we prevent or taken so to the officers of the (1) unquestionably The defendant was do executing any process State from dis- or ing Military business on the Fort Monroe any legal charging functions within Reservation within the Eastern District of jurisdiction territory herein or directed to Virginia, brought. was (2) where suit be ceded.” purposes consenting For the of suit to and provision anything, means If this it waiving venue there no difference be that the laws of the of Virginia State business on the means tween Reservation reference to the service of run business elsewhere within the and throughout means, Virginia. (3) This of Reservation. Eastern District Under course, only Virginia, may go of that of of state officers the statute busi process, Reservation to serve to within the state amounts consent but ness the state laws in the courts of the also that as amended from sued state with to be arising time to will determine of action of time what acts on to causes out part consent their constitute In 1821 and service. the such business of problem bringing foreign corporations Secretary of be made on the of resources; had been her Virginia. (4) Consent left and own Commonwealth of extremity carries of state the moment in the courts to be sued did she and federal her husband resort to ex- in the consent be sued it pedient from trying descend the win- if the within the state elements courts hardly (5) The dow. Reasonable men differ present. could jurisdiction are pres- exonerating negligence her in at- elements of federal were escape case, tempting from what action arose this method the cause of ent this manifestly desper- appeared to her to be a done within ate busi- Defendant in this connec- situation. consent from complains applying tion of this suit in of the court’s here bringing ness authorized emergency question doctrine to the the business was the federal court where contributory Quite irrespective negligence. done. doctrine, this it clear that the questions The other case contributory negligence was one for the present difficulty disposed can be no jury; but, applicable if the doctrine sufficiency briefly. As evi in the case of one who thinks that he is dence, motion this is raised defendant’s trapped hotel, on burning the fifth floor of a verdict; directed it is imagine hard to circumstances under rule must is well settled that the evidence applicable. which it would be light be taken in the most favorable to charge court submitted taken, plaintiff. When so there is evidence parties fairly of the contentions clearly tending to here establish that the fire correctly applicable law stated in the negligence from the of defendant resulted premises, charging duty that the of the de in permitting the accumulation of com innkeeper fendant as was that of reason bustible material well the west stair or care, ordinary able or that it not an in was hotel, escape fire of the leading that doors guarantor surer safety guests, negligently stair well left but that applied to be standard is “what open causing plaintiff the floor ordinarily prudent person an would do un sleeping was filled with smoke and der the fumes, keep same circumstances to his negligent delay was guests in safety.” comfort and That this department calling extinguish the fire ais correct statement of applicable, fire, rule ing the and that there was negligence see 28 and notes in 37 A.L.R. in failing guests to awaken the and advise Am.Jur. (N.S.) 43 L.R.A. and Ann.Cas. them as to the condition of affairs. There 1917A 144 cases there cited. We have conflicting evidence with carefully matters; charge light examined all of these but this was for the exceptions taken at the time and jury consideration of the and not for the nothing find of which defendant rea on the court motion for directed verdict. complaint. ground sonable contributory As to negligence, only evidentiary matter jury say was for the under all the cir complained of in the brief plaintiff is that of the case whether the action cumstances allowed to cross examine as hostile a plaintiff in attempting to let herself down called, witness whom she had but it is well rope from the window of bed sheets settled that this was matter resting contributory negligence. constituted In sound discretion of the judge. trial Point being stead of the defendant’s entitled to a process; was made as to the but this, verdict as to real directed appears that summons upon was served ly suggested the evidence whether manager in charge defendant’s of the hotel plaintiff not entitled to have verdict Secretary also Com in her behalf. directed The evidence shows and, in monwealth view of what we have midnight around that she was awakened discussing venue, unques said in this was fumes; room filled with her smoke find tionably sufficient. husband stairway her tried find the judgment no error ap- or means of exit in the hall There some could progress; pealed will nothing make no that she heard be affirmed. thought Affirmed.

from the hotel office and that she

208

GRONER, (dissenting). C. J. re should I judgment below improp dismissed

versed and the action diversity on er suit based venue. brought citizenship was not plain either district of the residence of defendant,1 nothing

tiff or the shown, case of waiver is

nature 1939, Corp., of Nierbo Co. Bethlehem v. 167, 165, 153, 308 84 L.Ed. 60 S.Ct. U.S. 2 128 of action A.L.R. 1437. cause military belonging reservation

arose which the the United States and over exercised “entire had and

United States

jurisdiction,” the act of ces put beyond the Virginia

sion had field operation of her law.3 of the that the

In this state hold by Virginia right of the

reservation proc- “any of the state to execute

officers “any discharge legal

ess” functions”4 positive jurisdictional limita-

nullified subject would

tion federal statute requirements procedure T think law, not be state —which

done. OF INTERNAL REVE

COMMISSIONER v. HANOVER NUE CENTRAL BANK TRUST CO. et al. 270, Docket

No. 20545. Appeals, Court

Circuit Second Circuit. 24, July 1947. 24, Certiorari Denied Nov.

Writ of 1947.

See 68 S.Ct. 208. Code, 761; 1 51, & 94, Section Stat. Co. 36 L.Ed. la, Stewart v. Sadraku Judicial 100, 1101, 1940, § March 309 60 Act 28 U.S.C. U.S. 431, 596, 821; L.Ed. 127 A.L.R. Col 84 Co., 1938, Park lins Yosemite 304 v. U. following 2 also the And see three cas 1009, 533, 1502; 518, 82 L.Ed. S. 58 S.Ct. line with the Nierbo Moss ease: es Murray 315, Gerrick, 1934, 291 v. U.S. R., Cir„ 1945, Line R. 2 v. Coast Atlantic 537; 318, 75, L.Ed. 54 S.Ct. 78 Standard 701; Corp., Robinson F.2d v. Coos 149 California, 1934, 242, 291 Oil v. U.S. Co. 512; Cir., 1945, F.2d Cummer- 775; L.Ed. United 54 S.Ct. States Corp., Cir., Basket Graham Co. v. Unzeuta, 1930, 281 U.S. S. F.2d 828. 761; Arlington Hotel Ct. Dairy Depart Fant, 1929, Coast See — Pacific U.S. Co. v. 49 S.Ct. Agriculture California, 1943, ment of (1820-21) pp. U.S. Va.Laws c. 102-3.

Case Details

Case Name: Knott Corporation v. Furman

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Jun 16, 1947

Citation: 163 F.2d 199

Docket Number: 5589

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.