70 Ky. 599 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1870
delivered the opinion of the court
On the 23d of July, 1870, tbe General Council of the city of Louisville adopted an ordinance defining what class of persons and corporations carrying on business within the city limits should be deemed brewers, and requiring all such
The appellant Kniper was proceeded against for a violation of this ordinance, and upon trial in the city court was fined the sum of fifty dollars. To reverse this judgment he has, under a provision of the city charter, prosecuted an appeal directly to this court.
It is claimed that the General Council had power to adopt this ordinance under the provisions of the 96th section of the city charter, which provides that “ the General Council shall, by ordinance, provide for the following licenses, to be paid into the sinking fund, with adequate penalties for doing business without the required license;” among others, “for each brewer or distiller, not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars;” and concluding by authorizing said council to grade, class, and fix the rate of license within the minimum and maximum amounts designated.
The right of the legislature to delegate to the city government of Louisville this power we do not regard as an open question. Such right has been frequently discussed and recognized by this court, and while statutes conferring such powers upon cities and towns keep within revenue purposes they are beyond the control of the courts. (Mason v. Trustees of Lancaster, 4 (Bush, 406.) Nor do we think there is anything in the 118th section of the city charter limiting or abridging the authority delegated to the city government by section 96. By section 118 it is provided that the tools of the manufacturer shall not be taxed, nor shall he be required to take out a license to sell the products manufactured by him. He may
In the language of the New York Court of Appeals, “the ordinance of a municipal corporation must conform strictly to the provisions of the statute giving power to pass the ordinance in question, or its proceedings will be void.”
The ordinance under which this prosecution was had can not be said either to pursue or to conform strictly to the provisions of the city charter, however liberally that instrument may be construed. Upon the contrary, upon its face, in clear and unequivocal terms, it ignores a limitation plainly imposed upon the exercise by the city of the “ delegated sovereignty ” under which it derives all its authority to act at all in the premises.
From these facts it follows that the ordinance imposing the annual charge upon Kniper (whatever amount it may be under the rule prescribed) is unauthorized and void. Hence he can not be punished for refusing to pay such charge.
The judgment against him is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to the city court to dismiss the proceeding.