*1 527 “Mrs. her Long, pay husband and two children monthly rental of their only apartment at Oak $99.00 Ridge Gardens. There is a certain value at obviously stake this lease if plaintiff which would be lost were $10,000 evicted. The amount of such loss exceed would over the life of Long, Mrs. who is 21 presently only age. Additional costs such as moving storage expenses are also at stake.” Townhouses, Inc.,
See Bloodworth v. 377 Village Oxford 709, (N.D.Ga.1974); F.Supp. 357 Mandina v. Lynn, 269, F.Supp. (W.D.Mo.1973); Note, Due Process on Eviction, 255, (1976). 36 Md.L.Rev. cases,
In the computed above courts have the value of the right occupy subsidized over the federally housing remaining tenant’s life span, period or at least over a that, years. case, There can be no present doubt right value Mrs. possession Carroll’s exceeds $500. The circuit court erred in deciding that Mrs. Carroll is not entitled to a trial. jury
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONT- REVERSED, GOMERY COUNTY AND CASE REMAND- ED TO THAT A COURT FOR JURY TRIAL. COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT. A.2d 546 KNILL
Charles R.
Cledythe I. KNILL. Term, Sept.
No. 1985. Appeals Maryland. Court June *2 O’Connor, F. Gay,
Gerald John Wheeler Glenn and Pres- ton, Smith, P.A., Baltimore, Glenn & and Edwin F. Nikirk II Nikirk, Nikirk, brief, Frederick, Nikirk & on for appel- lant. Frederick, for
Cleopatra Campbell, appellee. SMITH, ELDRIDGE, MURPHY, C.J., Argued before McAULIFFE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and JJ. *3 COLE, Judge. a husband bemay
We shall decide this case whether who, to his wife required support though to a child born wedlock, during was not sired him. and
We set forth the salient facts as follows. Charles Knill had two Cledythe years had been married for ten Stephen’s children at the time of birth in 1970. One and birth, one-half had under- years Stephen’s before Charles gone a full and the is vasectomy, parties agree Stephen for forgave Cledythe not Charles’s son. Charles apparently marriage her continued for another infidelity because being reared as a member of the years Stephen twelve with Knill family.
During knowledge this had no of his period, Stephen however, told other two illegitimacy. Cledythe, had her children that was not father. Stephen’s Charles family argument aftermath of a tumultuous March Stephen informed that Charles was not Cledythe thereafter, attempted father. to com- Immediately Charles fort admitted to that he was not Stephen. Charles that he still Stephen’s Stephen. but loved Two later, and Cledythe separated. Charles Charles con- until support Stephen January tinued to when for in the Cledythe sued divorce Circuit Court for Frederick relief, her for County. Among prayers Cledythe requested Charles, turn, for support Stephen. denied that his natural child Stephen was and asserted that he was not legally obligated to him. trial,
In a taken deposition prior Cledythe to testified that Herring Stephen’s a man named James natural father. trial, Mr. Herring, who testified at is a retired federal of the Atomic employee Energy Commission and is also the gasoline owner of a service station. Herring admitted but knowing Cledythe, alleged stated that because of his alcoholism, he could neither deny paternity. admit nor evidence at trial indicated Herring that Mr. was at all times process available for Ste- financially able phen. suggested No evidence had done any- Charles thing prevent Mr. Herring supporting Stephen, from or that Charles had at time any marriage discour- aged Mr. Cledythe pursuing Herring support. Moreover, there was no that Cledythe sought evidence ever concluded, from Mr. Herring. The circuit court nonetheless, equitably estopped that Charles was from de- nying obligation Following a final support Stephen. divorce, decree of to the appealed Special Charles Court Appeals, that the trial court erred in claiming applying doctrine of under the circumstances of equitable estoppel prior argument this case. issued a writ of certiorari We *4 in that court. imposing exists for legal
Charles contends that no basis him a child other than his own obligation upon an to provide support, child. The to adopted obligation natural or asserts, legal relationship must be based Charles that, most, he parties. argues the two Charles between Stephen during stood to the twelve parentis in loco supported him. Charles asserts voluntarily that he temporary parentis because in loco
531 character, legal no to continue duty owed hand, other separated. after the On the parties not acknowledges Stephen’s that Charles is Cledythe behavior,” is now “by maintains that overt Charles but reasons that estopped paternity. She equitably deny more,” and a father do and everything “did would Charles the child and to represented himself to that Charles community Stephen’s father.
I
(1984),
5-203(b)(l)
the Family
Maryland Code
§
of a minor child are
parents
Article
“The
provides,
Law
sup
the child’s
severally responsible
jointly
encompass-
of a minor child”
port____”
“parents
The term
5-308(b) of the
adoptive parents.
es both natural and
See §
of child
extends to
duty
Law Article. The
Family
child,
not to a
natural
of an
but
parents
183,
Bledsoe,
448 A.2d
v.
294 Md.
stepparent. See Bledsoe
Md.
(1982);
v.
293
Virginia Autry,
353
Commonwealth of
273,
Brown,
53,
(1982);
441
287 Md.
A.2d 1056
Brown v.
(1980). Indeed,
line of
cases
long
Maryland
the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. Blackstone,
1 quoted Commentaries in Brown v. *447, W. Brown, supra, 287 284, Md. 412 A.2d at 402. rule, this
Notwithstanding general argues Cledythe the child support obligation be an may placed on individual who is not the child’s natural parent through application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. She claims that doctrine should applied prevent inequitable to words, unconscionable result. In other argues she should not be made to “suffer the ultimate humilia- having tion of no from a man purposes who for all as a years.” acted father fourteen Brief for Appellee at
II
Court,
the issue
Although
has not been considered
this
many jurisdictions have addressed the
applicability
eq-
estoppel
uitable
the context of a child support proceeding.
See,
v.
658,
e.g., Clevenger
Clevenger,
Cal.App.2d
189
11
Remkiewicz,
(1961);
Remkiewicz v.
Cal.Rptr.
707
180 Conn.
Fuller,
Fuller v.
114,
(1980);
In the declined to majority these courts have the doctrine to apply estop denying See Rem obligation and an the child. paternity Remkiewicz, (court held evidence was supra kiewicz v. equitable insufficient elements of establish pregnant, where husband married wife while she was exe cuted of parentage, publicly acknowledged an affidavit Fuller, father); supra Fuller v. that he was child’s natural (court equitably estopped deny support held husband not causing of fact misrepresentation absent evidence S.L.S., child); to the supra R.D.S. prejudice (court held husband not equitably estopped deny paternity *6 proceedings where husband married wife while she was pregnant another man and later by acknowledged own); v. Berrisford, supra as his (court held Berrisford husband not from estopped in denying paternity support proceeding where husband married wife while she was man, pregnant by another permitted his name to used on be father, the birth certificate as the and assumed role of father during parties’ Walton, Walton v. marriage); brief (court supra held husband not equitably estopped to deny paternity where proceeding husband married woman while she pregnant with child, another man’s permitted surname, child to use and supported child over Wiese, Wiese v. eight-year period); (court supra held hus- band not equitably from estopped denying liability sup- port stepson where record was barren of any evidence that mother had ever approached natural father for sup- port, even though husband had consented to be named as father on birth certificate, had caused decree of divorce him between and mother to reflect that child was the issue of the marriage, and had treated child as his own and him). supported
Two jurisdictions, California and New Jersey, have held that equitable estoppel may apply estop the husband from denying paternity and a obligation. Cleven- (court held record before it was ger Clevenger, supra insufficient estoppel, pointed establish but out facts necessary estoppel establish where husband asserts ille- denying support obligation); In re Marriage of gitimacy Valle, (1975) (court Cal.App.3d 126 38 held Cal.Rptr. that evidence was sufficient to find where husband represented his conduct to child that he was his relied on such and was when injured Miller, Miller v. parental relationship); husband disavowed (court held supra may equitably estopped husband from denying paternity, only actively but where husband inter- parent). feres with children’s from their natural Johnson, Marriage also re 848, 152 See Cal.App.3d (court (1979) Cal.Rptr. estopped held husband role of father denying paternity where assumed child’s continued to that role play years); from birth and for six H.T.B., M.H.B. v. (1985) 100 N.J. A.2d 775 (equally judgment divided court affirmed lower court’s that held was equitably estopped deny support of wife’s during parties’ marriage). child born Ill consist- equitable estoppel definition has been follows: ently applied Maryland is the effect of the conduct Equitable estoppel voluntary law party precluded of a he is both at whereby absolutely *7 rights might perhaps and in which equity, asserting existed, contract, or property, either of have otherwise of in remedy, person, good who has against of another conduct, has thereby faith relied such and been led and his change part his the worse who on position either of acquires corresponding right, property, some contract, remedy. or of 1941), Jurisprudence, (5th 804 ed. Equity Pomeroy,
3 J. § Services, 204, v. Md. Sav-A-Stop Leonard 289 qupted 211, 336, (1981). 424 339 A.2d
Thus, party the estoppel requires equitable the must misled claiming estoppel the have been benefit worse, having for the injury changed position to his and party and on the of the representations relied believed Brunswick 277 Md. Corp., Dahl v. sought estopped. Burke, Savonis v. 221, (1976); 471, 487, 230-31 356 A.2d 521, (1966). Although 316, 319, Md. 216 A.2d 523 241 element generally or conduct is an wrongful unconscionable no there is may arise even where estoppel, estoppel mislead, one cause party if the actions of intent Bean v. in the other. change conduct prejudicial (1966); Petroleum, 244 Md. 459, 224 295 A.2d Steuart Nationwide, (1966); v. 401, 224 285 Travelers 244 Md. A.2d
535 571, (1959). v. 220 Md. A.2d 491 Of Alvey Alvey, course, an who relies on has the burden party Mason, the facts that create it. proving Doub v. Md. (1852); First Nat. Bank v. Mayor City Council, (D.Md.1939). F.Supp. above,
As indicated the definition set forth equitable estoppel comprised of three elements: basic reliance, conduct” or “voluntary representation, detri ment. These elements are related to each other. necessarily conduct or voluntary party to be estopped give must rise to the estopping party’s reliance and, turn, result detriment to the estopping party. See Burke, Dahl v. Corp., supra; Brunswick Savonis v. su then, pra. Clearly equitable estoppel requires conduct or voluntary representation constitute the source of the estopping party’s detriment. Clevenger Clevenger, supra, sought sup- wife
port from the husband for an to the born wife during marriage. The court indicated that an important element in in this situation determining estoppel husband, had de- marriage, whether the mother, prived potential the child of the action of the as his guardian, support. to hold the natural father liable for child circumstances, Under such a detriment would inure to repre- child because of the child’s reliance on husband’s sentation that would the child. *8 Miller, Jersey, of New Miller v. Supreme Court that the or conduct of the
supra, recognized
representation
in-
rise to the detriment
party
estopped
give
to be
must
Miller,
In
estopping
sought
curred
the
the wife
party.
her
for her two
a
support
daughters by
from
marriage. Although
stepchil-
the case thus involved
prior
dren,
application
equitable estoppel
its
of
analysis
addressing
estoppel
instructive.
the wife’s
nonetheless
high
the New
court set forth the same
argument,
Jersey
equitable estoppel
three-element
test
as enunciated
declared:
above. The court then
has
parent
the custodial
estoppel,
prove equitable
To
support
of
only representation
not
the
establish
burden
i.e.,
detriment,
that the children will
also
and reliance but
step-
financial detriment as a result
suffer future
of
that caused the
or conduct
representation
parent’s
parent’s
their natural
be cut
children to
from
off
support.
financial
The court
supplied).
(emphasis
Id. at based estoppel the establishment permit refused to the ele- and reliance without representation showing detriment, applied “no court has ever because ment of chil- support to force a husband estoppel equitable developed spouse merely because dren of his divorced children, into a nurtured them with the close children and had the himself as the unit with family ” ‘daddy.’ call him Id. the husband Indeed, in Miller showed that the evidence father the children’s natural offers from refused all a check ten- up and even tore support to their contribute evidence, Notwithstanding such that purpose. dered for wife, looking stepfather to the before required the court natural father before bring support, for child doing, him. In so from support and to seek court should parent that “the natural emphasized Miller court for child recourse primary considered the always be that the natu- laws assume and its current society because 169, 478 his or her child.” Id. will parent ral equitable application The court limited A.2d at 359. or her by his stepparent where “a to situations estoppel children’s interferes with the actively conduct parent.” Id. their natural
IV of the doctrine application to the turn now We instant case. We facts of the to the equitable estoppel elements believe no evidence Although there was here. present reliance are he was told expressly ever that Charles *9 Stephen’s in father, implicit a was such as fully-supported with Charles a relationship twelve-year In the Knills’ Knill common with family. member Knill children, used the surname was Stephen other two in the Knills resided. We community in the which so known that intend- reasonably think it inferable Charles therefore him his father. As to the Stephen ed that consider as element, that believed Stephen reliance the record discloses mother, apparent his in was his father until Charles not his father. Plain- anger, Stephen told that Charles was until this upon was Charles ly, Stephen relying in point time. however, case, demonstrate
The evidence in this
fails to
a
by Stephen
financial detriment incurred
as
result of
any
twelve-year
course of conduct
their
rela-
Charles’s
Indeed,
Stephen,
if
detriment was incurred
tionship.
any
to his mother.
It was she
it was emotional and attributable
following
off the
a
ripped
legitimacy”
boy
who
“cloak
to him that
family dispute, when she revealed
Charles
not his
a fact she had not concealed from
rest
attempt
Stephen
to console
demon-
family. Charles’s
Stephen’s
well-being.
concern for
emotional
strates his
event,
loss
incurred no financial
as
any
The
fails
result of his
with Charles.
evidence
sup
voluntary
even an inference that Charles’s
pursuing
forego
possibility
caused
port
Cledythe
Because there is no
natural father.
Stephen’s
cases,
Cle
paternity
statute of limitations
longer any
against Stephen’s
action
bring
paternity
still
dythe may
support.1
natural
father and establish
Cf
304,
Maldonado,
(1983),
Nonetheless,
that,
maintains
unless
Cledythe
the court
estoppel, Stephen
finds an
will suffer the “ultimate humilia-
tion of
no
from a man
having
purposes
who for all
believe,
was his father for fourteen
We do not
years.”
however, that this loss or
is the
of
injury
type
detriment
Here,
gives
equitable
that
rise to
the detriment
estoppel.
must
be established is a financial loss.
case,
In this
Stephen
Charles knew that
was not his son
and, nevertheless,
him
treated
as his son and as a member
of the Knill
Such conduct is consistent with
family.
this
of
public policy
strengthening
family,
State’s
basic
encourage spouses
unit of civilized
We
to under-
society.
feasible,
take,
support, guidance,
rearing
where
longer any
paternity
that there is no
statute of limitations in
cases and
brought
may
age.
that an action
until the child is 18
98-378,
regard,
Congress, by
we note
Pub.L. No.
this
enacted
1984, required
adopt procedures
permit
that all states
"the estab-
paternity
any
prior
any
of the
child at
time
to a child’s
lishment
eighteenth
(1983,
birthday.”
Cum.Supp.).
See 42 U.S.C.A. 666
§
legislature, by enacting Chapter
Mary
of the 1982 Laws of
land,
testing
recognized
genetic
the advances made in the science of
impact
paternity
Chapter
and the
of these advances in
suits.
now
(1984), 5-1029(e)
Family
Maryland
of the
Law
§
codified at
Code
Article,
testing
"sufficiently
the use of blood
that is
extensive
authorizes
alleged
biological
fathers who are not
fathers and
to exclude 97.3%
alleged
paternity
probability
at least
the statistical
of the
father’s
figure
recognition
development
Id. This 97.3%
is in
97.3%.”
(HLA),
Leukocyte Antigens
system
which
a test
produces
known as Human
probability
of non-fathers. See
a 97.3% mean
of exclusion
denied,
Shanholtz,
(1984),
Md.App.
92
MURPHY, dissenting: Judge, Chief of equitable holds that the doctrine majority a estop denying to a husband applied not be may another by child to his wife born to voluntary husband’s marriage the unless the man rise to gives the child as his own treating in conduct in the and results upon such conduct reliance the child distinguished loss as financial or economic suffering child’s Stephen’s Because or other detriment. from emotional action for paternity still initiate may mother father, notwithstanding expiration against putative birth, the concludes Stephen’s Court sixteen since years financial detriment requisite not incur the Stephen did voluntary rep- long-continuing his Charles disavowed when and de- natural father Stephen’s he was resentation I major- him. think the further thereafter to clined therefore, I dissent. respectfully, Most wrong. is dead ity I. 23, November Knill were married and Charles
Cledythe born; children were marriage, two As a result of mar- during the April adults. On both are now knew that Charles child, Stephen, was born. a third riage, father, according natural father. The Stephen’s not he was Cle- a former co-worker. Herring, Cledythe, was James dythe any Herring never made effort to have declared as Stephen’s father. Stephen’s
Charles was named as father on the birth acknowledged treating certificate. He as “one of Stephen he him. family” fully supported common with children, Knill Stephen the Knills’ other two used the sur- in in thereby community name and was so known which Stephen resided. Charles named as his son and family chief in his Last and Testament. beneficiary Will
Stephen believed that Charles was his father for twelve when, following family dispute, until March of 1982 told that Charles was not his father. Cledythe support Stephen Charles nevertheless continued natural son until of 1984 when sued for January Cledythe for Frederick County. Among divorce the Circuit Court relief, sought requiring her an order prayers Cledythe hearing, After a support Stephen. that Charles continue (Barrick, J.) though the court held that even Charles was was, circumstances, Stephen’s not natural asserting illegitimacy “from equitably estopped his support.” order avoid
II. at common law either as a defense Estoppel cognizable *12 v. See Leonard to avoid a defense. to a cause of action or Services, 212, (1980); 204, 424 A.2d Sav-A-Stop 289 Md. 336 Sales, 296, 322, v. Md. 389 Impala Impala Platinum 283 Co., 56, 60, v. Home Ins. (1978); Md. Bitting A.2d 887 161 in (1931). equitable estoppel A. The definition of 155 329 out, and as the point majority as these cases Maryland, Pomeroy, in 3 acknowledges, is that contained J. readily (5th 1941): 804 ed. Equity Jurisprudence, § conduct voluntary is the effect of the “Equitable estoppel at law absolutely precluded, he is both party whereby of a asserting rights might perhaps in which equity, and contract, existed, or property, either have otherwise in person, good another who has against remedy,
541 conduct, faith relied such and has been led thereby worse, to change position his for the and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, contract, or of remedy.” definition,
From this
the majority correctly recognizes that
equitable estoppel
comprised of three elements: volun-
representation,
tary
reliance and detriment. The majority
recognizes
also
that it is
for the application
essential
doctrine of equitable estoppel in
“that
Maryland
the party
claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have been misled
worse,
to his
and
injury
changed
position
his
for the
having
believed and relied on
representations
of the party
Dahl v. Brunswick Corp.,
sought to
estopped,” citing
471, 487,
Burke,
(1976)
277 Md.
221
and Savonis v.
356 A.2d
316, 319,
(1966). And,
241 Md.
III. adoption, Absent not ordinarily husband is bound to support an spouse by child born to another Annot., See marriage. man cases collected in husband, Liability mother’s not the the ille- father of *13 542 (1963); child, 583 10 support, its 90 A.L.R.2d
gitimate 10 Am.Jur.2d Bastards (1938); 67 C.J.S. Bastards § § however, courts, applying principles of (1963). A number that in some circum- recognized estoppel, have equitable during marriage of a woman who stances the husband held may legally another man be birth to a gave child’s after the termination of for the responsible Clevenger seminal case is leading and marriage. (1961). 658, 11 Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. Clevenger, a decade as There, and acted for over supported a husband to his illegitimate to an child born wife father marriage, of the the wife Upon termination marriage. husband, he claiming from the that sought illegitimacy of the child and estopped to assert was support. opin- for the child’s its liability avoid thereby ion, undertook to define “the the court child when owes to his wife’s which husband child, husband, accepts of the from the date birth acknowledges the child as family, publicly the child into his legitimate.” child as if he were his own and treats the 662, 11 707. At the outset of the Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. at there is “an remarked that opinion, court’s Justice Tobriner for over a in the conduct of an adult who immorality innate own, then, in child as his but accepts proclaims decade announces, child’s support, relieved of the order to be Id. Cal.Rptr. bastardy.” his upon, relies prevent if can such any legal hypothesis The court said that it should be publication illegitimacy, inducement an Thus, said, if the facts would establish it adopted. for the child, the husband would be liable as to the estoppel if would be established child’s Such an support. the facts showed to the represented boy
“that the representation intended that his that the husband child, the child accepted upon by and acted and treated the husband relied him, his love and affection gave his father and [and] *14 facts____” that the child Id. at ignorant was of the true Cal.Rptr. 707. factors, Considering these the court said that the benefits to the husband such an instance be would
“(1) the him upon bestowal of the love and affection of child, the child as a upon natural based the representation father, (2) that the husband the was natural the substitu- tion of place the husband in the status of father in the of father, the natural that the putative so father would have possession the and of custody the child instead of the father, natural right earnings, (3) and the to the child’s community’s recognition the of the husband as a a status from which appellant undoubtedly derived prestige Id. and fulfillment.” at 11 Cal.Rptr. 707.
The court further noted that a husband’s representation that he the child’s natural father would cause these consequences and detriments to the child:
“(1) deprive potential It would the child of the action of mother, the as his guardian, at the time of the child’s birth, to hold the natural father liable for the the child. child thus relies the upon repre- husband’s and sentation does not to find attempt the fa- natural ther____This reliance works a definite detriment to the (2) child. It would induce the to accept child the husband as his natural and him father render to the affection and son, love of with the son’s reasonable expectation of care, support and education until adulthood. The rever- sal of representation, publication this the through of the child, illegitimacy of deep the inflicts him. injury upon To designated preadolescence an emotional consequence. trauma lasting Having placed child, the cloak the legitimacy having induced the child rely upon its husband protection, it abruptly removing surely harms child. The child has therefore relied on conduct of the to his husband (3) It would induce the injury. hold himself out to ..., the community as the natural son of the husband status, and to only abrupt to suffer the removal injury.” social Id. undergo subsequent the record in showed that Clevenger While acknowledged child into his and accepted family publicly years, him as his own for eleven the court treated or found no “that the husband made direct evidence to the child that he was the implied representation boy’s 670-71, The court said Cal.Rptr. father.” Id. child, run in that the must be found to favor mother, predicated “upon rather than the child’s putative of the father that acceptance *15 674, 11 Id. 707. The Cal.Rptr. he is the natural father.” at reiterated, court restricted “to the liability, husband’s the is expressly by he to the child or represents case in which the natural father and the child implication that he is child’s 674, at 11 him to the natural father.” believes be Id. Moreover, court cautioned that to hold Cal.Rptr. for the responsible support, child’s legally the husband long of representation “must be such continu husband’s of opportunity the realistic discover ance that it frustrates paternal and establishes the ing truly the natural father 675, 11 and child.” Id. at putative of the father concluded, it, on the record before 707. The court Cal.Rptr. find an that was an insufficient basis to there against the husband. indicated, present
As case already evidence for Stephen years, twelve and represented that Charles large years, Stephen for fourteen that community to. the of evidentia- Although largely natural son. devoid was his from record in this detail, reasonably it is inferable ry him his Stephen consider as case that Charles intended that did so for twelve Stephen years. father and that natural his own son is accepting Stephen as Charles’ motivation may the record. It have Charles by not disclosed been unit, family of the to avoid integrity to maintain the wished humiliation, to avoid embarrassment or personal family But reasons. whatever Charles’ Cledythe, or other as represented himself reason, the fact remains that 545 time, Stephen’s long natural father for period which affection, he benefitted from Stephen’s love and and community’s acceptance as a member of the Knill family. And because of representa- Charles’ tions, Stephen for many had no opportunity dis- father, cover the real identity paternal his to establish a him, relationship with or to seek from him through paternity action or otherwise. Other appellate cases, California intermediate court ap plying Clevenger principles, have concluded that the evi dence impose was sufficient to child-support liability upon a father, nonbiological based upon estoppel principles, i.e., that the by represented husband his conduct illegit to the father, imate child that he was his intended that such a representation accepted on acted child and the child, ignorant facts, true relied on the treated the thereby suffering injury when the husband the parental disavowed relation ship. Valle, See In Re 53 Marriage Cal.App.3d (1975); Cal.Rptr. Johnson, In re Marriage Cal. App.3d (1979). Cal.Rptr. Valle, a husband and wife brought two children from certificates, Mexico on forged birth knowing hus- *16 band’s brother was the natural father. The husband and wife represented the children as their own for a period of years. Nevertheless, six when the husband and wife di- vorced, the husband appealed the award of child support against him ground on the he not that the children’s natural father. Applying Clevenger principles, the court stated that the husband could be from estopped denying for liability “representation if his ofwas such duration that it to opportunity frustrated realistic dis- cover the natural father to the child-parent and reestablish relationship between the child and the natural father.” 53 841, Cal.Rptr. at Cal.App.3d emphasized 707. The court that young the children “were so when removed from the family home Mexico that did not even know or they paternal remember their natural “a true parents” that relationship” had been established between the husband 842, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707. and the children. Id. Johnson,
In
an
child was born to the wife ten
were married. For a
of six
parties
period
before the
days
thereafter,
the husband
himself as the
represented
only
said
he did
for
father, although he
that
so
a
child’s
holding
estopped
In
the husband
religious purpose.
the court
pay
support,
placed
a
denying
role of
on the fact that
“assumed the
Jim-
importance
from the
moment of
birth and
my’s
very
Jimmy’s
father
life,”
role
and that
Jimmy’s
for
entire
play
continued
child had known the husband
his father
“only
Cal.App.3d
capacity.”
has known no other
Cal.Rptr.
inquire
nor
did the court
into
neither
Johnson
Valle
viability
or the
of an
identity of the natural
father
therefore,
support. Clearly,
him child
against
action
interpreted
first announced in
has been
Clevenger
doctrine
require
cases to not
courts to
subsequent California
by
(1)
representa-
when
the husband’s
inquiry
make such
paternal
a
of such duration that
true
tions
fatherhood are
the child and
the husband and
relationship exists between
a
establish such relation-
(2)
opportunity
a realistic
where
Indeed,
father no
exists.
as so
longer
with the natural
ship
nothing
could be more
recognized
Clevenger,
forcefully
a child
devastating
fragile psychology
than the
paternal
long-established
of a
sudden breach
without a
being proclaimed a
and left
by
followed
bastard
in its effect
To
harm so profound
father.
trivialize
necessary
or economic detriment as
requiring financial
and is not
all reason
ingredient
beyond
with
law.
Maryland
consistent
declined to
child case that has
every illegitimate
In almost
husband,
the kind
the absence of
estoppel against
apply
termination
flows from the sudden
necessarily
harm that
*17
is
in the court’s
relationship
pivotal
paternal
an established
322 N.W.2d
Berrisford,
v.
reasoning.
In Berrisford
(Minn.1982), the husband “assumed a
role
parental
period
parties
short
lived
relatively
together” and
young
was so
that she
not
given
“could
have
thought
the nature of the
at
relationship.” Id.
745.
Albert, 415
Albert v.
So.2d 818
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982),
one and
only
a half
at
time
years
age
and the
divorce
court concluded that
was not
estoppel
appropriate
misrepresentation
where “the only
upon
relied
in an
given
original
birth
application.”
certificate
Id.
at 820. There were insufficient representations causing
D.M.M.,
detriment to the child in S.E.M. v.
S.W.2d
(Mo.Ct.Ap.1984)because
separated
the “husband and wife
for the last time approximately eight months after the
child’s birth.”
Id.
667. There was insufficient evidence
representations
child,
on which
a
who was two
age
divorce,
at the time of the
could have
relied
Fuller,
Fuller
(D.C.1967).
To
its
position that emotional harm suffered
aby
detriment,
child is an insufficient
and that financial detri-
S.C.A.,
Only
(Alaska 1985)
1.
in H.P.A. v.
The evidence that father. It also not their natural that the husband was knew consistently had refused stepparent disclosed that his financially support stepchil- father to the natural permit them. and, result, father did not as a dren parties for the seven that the that There was evidence developed loving the husband together lived and referred who used surname stepchildren with “daddy.” him as claim of proof burden of court held that asserting estoppel, party rests
equitable estoppel done, or alleged conduct must show “that who or such cir- made, intentionally under representation was it probable natural and it was both cumstances on, must relied the conduct action induce ... would [and] change his or her act so as to must relying party and the 478 A.2d 355. The Id. to his or her detriment.” position said, the court estoppel, equitable prerequisites three Id. at 358. and detriment. reliance representation, were court cases appellate intermediate Citing Clevenger and two Jersey, New the court concluded that equitable estoppel would be appropriately applied some child support cases, but that the doctrine had applied to be with caution so as not to discourage voluntary support aby nonbiological father. one point At in its opinion the court noted that in some cases where the husband married a woman who was either pregnant by another man or gave birth an illegit- *19 imate child during marriage, the represent- the husband ed himself to both the child and the community as the father, natural principles equitable estoppel may be in applied furtherance of general against the policy allowing parents to testify to the illegitimacy of children whom they have previously treated as their own. Id. at As 357. to the support stepchildren, the court said it was essential that the stepparent’s conduct be shown to have “actively inter- fered with the support children’s by their natural parent” before the doctrine equitable would estoppel apply. Id. on, Further the court said equitable that for estop- to pel “the apply stepparent must have made some repre- sentation of support to either the children or the natural parent as to his or responsibilities her in or her relation- ship with them.” Id. court said equitable further that applied would not be to force a to support a stepchild upon marriage termination of the “merely be- cause he developed a close children, with the nurtured them into a family unit himself with as the ” and had the children him call Id. Nor ‘daddy.’ would “the development bonding” of emotional be sufficient to equitable invoke estoppel principles stepparent cases since, was, it stepparent if who tried to create a warm “[a] family atmosphere with his or her stepchildren would be penalized by being forced to for pay support them in the event of a prove divorce.” To equitable estoppel, Id. said, requires court showing an affirmative to establish “not only representation of support and reliance but also detriment, i.e., that the children will suffer future finan- cial detriment as a result of stepparent’s representa- the children to cut off from
tion or conduct that caused be Id. support.” parent’s their natural financial a And, nonbiological stressed that where finally, the court from his interferes with child’s actively father equitably be stepparent may estopped parent, natural since, in such circumstanc- duty a denying es, to his future have incurred detriment as would support. previous stepfather reliance on support by Id. at 359. (Utah 1985), the Wiese,
Similarly, Wiese
children, equitable estoppel analysis application its less instructive.” While Miller may indeed be none the requiring it for economic instructive, most is authority a the issue of where the child was those cases detriment prior marriage and is the natural prior husband. Certainly, where a prior husband stands ready pay a support for legitimate issue of his prior marriage to the mother, no one can doubt the wisdom of requiring that child sought prior from the husband unless the chil- dren’s stepfather has made representations substantial causing financial i.e., detriment to the stepchild, by interfer- ing with stepchild’s financial from the natural Furthermore, father. cases, such the mother does not suffer the humiliation of seeking out her paramour obtain child nor support, is the child thereby bastardized. Moreover, there had been no finding of financial detriment Miller, the children would have been free to resume their paternal natural, their legitimate with father whom they Likewise, already knew. the three-year-old child in may Wiese now turn to his legitimate father for paternal guidance.
That a great difference exists between stepchild cases
and cases involving illegitimate children is clear
H.T.B.,
(1985).
M.H.B.
100 N.J.
Three in an Justice Handler announc- ing the of the court judgment found the evidence that child’s dependence the total filial the husband upon was father; through- that whom she believed her natural be thereafter, for the hus- marriage, out the and some surname; he to use his that permitted band the child and so himself as the child’s father consistently conducted her, treating this her as one relationship to represented child’s the the family; successfully gained husband affection; himself as the and that he established love and support. material provider child’s of emotional and parental that the husband’s actions opinion Justice Handler’s stated father-daughter previously well-developed “attest to the bond, of an affirmative and convey all indicia possible which con- continuing support, purposeful 498 A.2d estoppel.” element of primary equitable stitutes conduct” upon “purposeful the husband’s at 778. Reliance established, said, and Handler resulted was also Justice her belief that the husband was the child’s reasonable if the stated that Continuing, opinion natural father. relation- the parent-child was disavow permitted repudiate he created and fostered and ship “that relationship that flowed from that responsibility parental fully demonstrable harm com- would suffer ... [the child] condition.” Id. at 779. dependent her mensurate with took a Pollock, justices, himself two other Justice evidence, as to the extent particularly different view of the to the child and the effect representations of the husband’s conduct, stating that the husband’s with of his 782. This opin- Id. at “always ambivalent.” was elapsed that had since the eight years in the ion noted that fourteen spent a total of the husband but child’s birth no there evi- Pollock said with her. Justice months with the natural ever interfered the husband dence the child and that where relationship with father’s located, the natural father bears known and can opinion child. The responsibility financial which to upon apply no basis that there was concluded of the in the circumstances equitable doctrine illegit- the husband to wife’s require case to child, marriage. termination imate
553 is, course, There nothing ambivalent about Charles’ paternal relationship Stephen. with lived They together under the roof same for years, twelve with repre- Charles to senting throughout period extended that he was his natural father—a also implicitly made to the in community they which for lived fourteen That years. Charles paternal fostered true Stephen with cannot be doubted. Notwithstanding the ac- genetic curacy testing, it is expect not reasonable to Stephen, after passage of sixteen years, establish a paternal relationship who, with another man because his drunkenness, claimed has no recollection one way or the other whether he engaged ever in sexual with intercourse Stephen’s mother.
The majority recognizes that
the estoppel elements of
representation and
present
reliance are clearly
this case.
And while it cites cases where the husband was not es-
topped to deny paternity and
liability
child support,
cases,
others,
those
do recognize,
and
or
implicitly
explicitly,
that a
may
estopped
under certain circumstanc
es which do not
requirement
involve
financial detri
S.C.A.,
ment.
(Alaska 1985);
See H.P.A. v.
I that Charles under him. Stephen’s His silence this illegitimacy disclose was, itself, nor wrongful neither unconscionable. regard *23 analysis, in the final the effect Charles’ continuous But inequitable so it many years course of conduct over renders Stephen’s legitimacy responsibili- for him now to and a deny Stephen’s eighteenth To so birthday. ty case, Charles, in is estop the circumstances this not of child affirmatively impose duty support upon him. Charles, appli- not placed directly That itself, rather because his volun- cation but parental role over such an extended tary assumption of disavowing respon- him precludes parental now period support. for child sibility ELDRIDGE, JJ., have authorized me state
SMITH they expressed concur with views herein.