140 N.E.2d 9 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1955
This action was against two doctors for personal injuries, claimed to have proximately resulted from malpractice.
The doctors were engaged to treat the plaintiff following injuries received when she attempted to board a motor coach operated by the city of Cleveland through the Cleveland Transit System.
Pursuant to motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by the defendants, the court entered its judgment in favor of the movants. From this judgment the plaintiff has perfected her appeal to this court on questions of law, and claims the following errors:
"1. The Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County, Ohio, erred in sustaining the motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed on behalf of the defendants therein.
"2. The finding, order, decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals of Lorain County, Ohio, are contrary to law." *348
There was pleaded in the answers of the defendants the following release, given by the appellant to the city of Cleveland, which settled her case against the said city for the injuries received as a result of the claimed negligent operation of its motor coach:
"I hereby certify that this release is fully understood by me and is entirely satisfactory.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 26th day of October, A. D. 1953.
*349"(Signed) Agatha Swahn 143 Hernandez Avenue San Francisco, California (Witness) (Signed) "(Signed) Martin E. Swahn 143 Hernandez Avenue Emily Knight." San Francisco, California (Witness)
1. The relevant part of Section
"When, upon the statements in the pleadings * * *, one party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor, * * * judgment shall be so rendered by the court * * *."
In view of the language of the statute and the fact that interrogatories and their answers attached to the pleadings are not a part of the pleadings, the pleadings, entirely separated from the interrogatories and the answers, must be considered alone in reviewing a judgment rendered under authority of the statute. Home Owners' Service Corp. v. Hadley,
2. The release executed by the appellant to the city of Cleveland, set forth in the answer and not challenged by reply, controls the right to judgment in this case. By its terms it relinquished all right to recover from the original tort-feasor on account of the injury, and it operates as a bar for recovery against a doctor subsequently retained for negligent treatment of the original injuries.
The bar which prohibits a second claim predicated on malpractice, is based upon the theory that the original tort-feasor (the city of Cleveland in this case) is liable for the plaintiff's injuries, including the aggravation thereof, at the hands of a doctor selected with reasonable care by the injured person; and, as a consequence thereof, when settlement is made with one who was liable for the total damages, including the aggravation, full compensation has been received for all injuries arising out of the accident. See: 8 A. L. R., 506; 50 A. L. R., 1108; 40 A. L. R. (2d), 1075.
The Supreme Court of this state, in Tanner v. Espey,
"2. If one has suffered personal injuries which thereafter were aggravated by the malpractice of an attending physician or surgeon, and then executes a valid, general and unconditional release to the original tort feasor, in full settlement for all present *350 and future claims and causes of action, such release operates as a bar to an action against such physician or surgeon for such malpractice."
The judgment rendered for the defendants on the pleadings will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
STEVENS, P. J., and HUNSICKER, J., concur.