KNIGHT v. FULTON INDUSTRIES
45553
Court of Appeals of Georgia
March 10, 1971
March 31, 1971
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 16, 1970 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.
For both of the above reasons, the lower court erred in charging the jury in such a way as to direct the verdict against the plaintiff. I therefore dissent.
Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin & Lowe, Williston C. White, for appellee.
EVANS, Judge. Upon consideration of the motion for rehearing, a majority of this court voted to grant the motion, vacate the judgment of affirmance, and reverse the judgment.
It appears that the award of the State Board of Workmen‘s Compensation is premised upon an erroneous finding of fact. Among other things, the findings of fact by the board were: “His (Knight‘s) employment consisted of cutting leather straps and helping to install them on certain machinery of the employer. The record reveals that neither of the operations could be considered to be strenuous activity or of a nature to cause undue exertion on the part of the deceased. We further find that the deceased mode of locomotion between the two floors on which he worked was by elevator. The board further finds that ninety to ninety-five percent
The evidence before the board by a fellow worker was uncontradicted to the effect that Clifford R. Knight, the employee, walked everywhere his fellow employee walked; that there were two modes of locomotion, an elevator between floors to go from the belt shop to the picker room, and a flight of stairs from the picker room to the opening room, and that Knight walked up and down these stairs at least four times on the day of and shortly before his death. He had a long standing history of coronary disease and emphysema and had been for some time receiving active medical treatment for these conditions. It appears from a reading of the evidence of the witness McCord that the board failed to credit the testimony of McCord as to the working conditions and distances involved. This testimony is somewhat vague and conflicting due to the witness‘s misunderstanding of the questions asked of him, but a study of this testimony discloses that Knight and McCord worked together in three separate locations, i.e., (1) the belt shop on the ground floor; (2) the picker shop located one floor up by elevator and approximately a city block from the elevator; and (3) the opening room down a flight of stairs from the picker room. (It cannot be ascertained from the testimony whether the belt shop and the opening room are on the same floor). The findings of fact of the board are completely erroneous “that the deceased mode of locomotion between the floors on which he worked was by elevator.” (See Record, pp. 35, 36, 96, 97, 99, 102 and 120). Thus, the erroneous findings of fact to the effect that only an elevator was used for transportation between the two floors, and that Knight‘s employment was of a sedentary nature, and that his death took place following a short period of rest may well have influenced the board‘s finding against claimant. Be that as it may, where the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, the award should be reversed. See
Judgment reversed. Bell, C. J., Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Whitman, JJ., concur. Jordan, P. J., Hall, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., dissent.
HALL, Presiding Judge, dissenting. Under the mandate of our Supreme Court, this court has consistently affirmed awards to claimants in heart attack cases under the “any evidence” rule. Thomas v. U. S. Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493 (128 SE2d 749). The application of this neutral principle of law should be followed when the board finds for the employer as well as when it finds for the claimant.
The evidence shows that on the day of his death the employee‘s only work-related activity which could be considered strenuous was climbing and descending stairs. The medical evidence also showed that, to be a competent producing cause of his heart attack, this activity would have to have occurred within a very short time before the attack. The only evidence of what he was doing that day was the testimony of a co-worker—testimony which was unfortunately vague and conflicting. On direct examination, this witness gave the impression that deceased had descended the stairs about 30 minutes before his death. However, on cross examination and redirect (and in response to more specific and pointed questioning), he testified that deceased made that particular trip to the ground floor by elevator and that the last descent by stairs took place two or two and one-half hours previously. Specifically, he testified as follows: “Q. Now, do you know whether Mr. Knight went down those stairs that last time he went to the belt shop or whether he went to the elevator? A. He uses the elevator every time as well as I recall.” (T-116). “Q. Now, how did he come to go into the belt shop? A. He came from the picker room, down to the elevator and down to the belt shop.” (T-101). “Q. How long — what time did you all have lunch that day? A. We ate lunch just before 11:30, a little ahead of time, lunch time was 11:30. Q. And where did you all eat lunch? A. In the belt shop, sir. Q. Now, I believe
The above evidence shows that the last trip by stairs was prior to the 11:30 a.m. lunch; therefore, the period between the time of using the stairs and death at 2 p.m. was two and one-half hours. The trip made after lunch to the ground floor was by elevator.
The board found that “the deceased mode of locomotion between the two floors on which he worked was by elevator.” The majority opinion holds that in making this finding the board completely ignored clear and undisputed evidence that the deceased had used the stairs several times that day.
It is true that this finding could be subject to more than one construction, e.g. that the deceased always used the elevator or that he used the elevator on the trip he made within the medically relevant time period. The first construction would be contrary to the evidence, but the second is supported by evidence, although conflicting.
The board was authorized to believe that version of the testimony which said that about 30 minutes before his death the deceased made his last trip from one floor to the other by elevator—that the last descent by stairs took place two or two and one-half hours previously, and to make findings in accordance with it. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Maddox, 118 Ga. App. 596 (164 SE2d 850). This court should, in turn, adopt that construction of the findings which renders the award valid.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Jordan and Judge Eberhardt concur in this dissent.
