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Knight v. Employment Security Agency
398 P.2d 643
Idaho
1965
Check Treatment
KNUDSON, Justice.

Thе facts here involved are not in dispute. Appellant, after having served with the U. S. Air Force for approximately 21 years, was retired due to a partial physical disability. Since his retirement he receives $183.75 per month under the U. S. Air Force Retirement Program.

After his discharge appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits under *264 the Employment Security Law of this state. Following a hearing regularly had before the Industrial Accident Board its order was entered, affirming a decision of the appeals examiner herein, directing that the retirement benefits received by appellant must be reported and computed аs wages in connection with his claim for benefits. This appeal is taken from such order.

In his brief appellant calls attention to the fact that because of his partial disability at the time of his discharge he was entitled, at his election, to receive, as a disability payment, the sum of $35 per month from the Veterans Administration, but suсh payment would have been deducted from the benefits he was entitled to receive under the U. S. Air Force Retirement Program. However, appellant elеcted to receive retirement rather than disability benefits, consequently no disability benefits are here involved.

Appellant protests having his retirement benefits сonsidered as wages and assigns error to the interpretation placed upon I.C. § 72-1312(b) (4) ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍by the Board. Therefore the issue here presented necessitates а consideration of said statute, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

“72-1312. Compensable week. — (a) A week of unemployment with respect to whiсh an eligible benefit claimant ■shall be entitled to benefits shall be known as a compensable week; * *.
“(b) A compensable week of a benefit claimant shаll be a week of either no work or less than full-time work—
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“(4) in which the total wages payable to him for less than full-time work performed in such week amounted to less than one and one-half times his weekly benefit amount; provided, however, that for the purpose of this section all payments received by a benefit claimant for his retirement under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act or a retirement plan in which an employer has paid all ■ or a part of the costs, shall be treаted as wages; * *

This court has consistently adhered to the rule that its primary function in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect thereto. Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍must be given effect and there is no оccasion for construction. Tway v. Williams, 81 Idaho 1, 336 P.2d 115.

We do not consider the language of the foregoing quoted statute to be in any respect ambiguous. It clearly definеs a compensable week of unemployment with respect to eligible benefit claimants under the Employment Security Law. It plainly pro *265 vides that for the purрose of this section all payments received by a benefit claimed for his retirement under * * * a retirement plan in which an employer has paid all or a part of the cost, shall be treated as wages. Said statute does not provide for a single exception concerning any retirement plan in which the emрloyer has paid any part of its costs. Appellant makes no contention that the retirement plan under which he is paid $183.75 per month is not one in which his emplоyer has paid all or a part of the cost.

The identical language here being considered is also employed in I.C. § 72-1367, which section provides a benefit formula whereby the amount of weekly benefits to which a claimant is entitled, is to be computed. The pertinent portion of this section provides:

“(e) If in any comрensable week the total wages payable to such individual for less than full-time work performed in such week exceed one-half of his weekly benefit amount аs shown in Part C of the foregoing table, the excess shall be deducted from his weekly benefit amount. Such excess if not a multiple of a dollar, shall be computed to the next higher multiple of a dollar; provided, however, that for the purpose of this section all payments received by a benefit claimant for his retiremеnt under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act or a retirement plan in which an employer has paid all or part of the cost, shall be treated as wages.”

Briefly stated the effect of the statutes hereinbefore discussed is to provide for the allowance of reduced benefits in the event the benefit claimаnt is receiving wages for part-time work, or is receiving retirement payments ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍under an employer-contributing retirement program. The amounts which the claimant reсeives from either source may operate to proportionately reduce his benefit payments and they must be considered in determining such benefit.

Eaсh of said statutes (I.C. § 72-1312, I.C. § 72-1367) was amended by Chapter 298, of the 1961 Session Laws by adding the following quoted language:

“provided, however, that for the purpose of this section all рayments received by a benefit claimant for his retirement under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act or a retirement plan in which an employer has pаid all or a part of the cost, shall be treated as wages.”

Appellant argues that it was the intention of the legislature when it so amended I.C. § 72-1312, “to insure that persоns of old age would not be entitled to receive compensation from the unemployment fund while they were drawing on the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act or any retirement plan of similar nature such as the railroad companies provide.” Sub *266 sequent action in the legislature relative to said section does not support such contention.

In construing a statute not only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of other matters, such as the context, the object in view, ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporаneous construction and the like. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d 913. This' court takes judicial notice of public and private acts of the legislature and the journals of the legislativе bodies for the purpose of ascertaining what was done by the legislature. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662; Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432; State ex rel. Brassey v. Hanson, 81 Idaho 403, 342 P.2d 706.

Our attention has been called to page 254 of the Journal оf the State Senate of the Idaho Legislature 37th Session (1963 Legislative Session), wherein it is recorded that Senate Bill No. 103 was on February 5, 1963 read to the Senate for thе first time. By its terms said bill No. 103 proposed to amend both I.C. § 72-1312 and I.C. § 72-1367 by amending the language adopted by Chapter 298, 1961 Session Laws, to read as follows:

“however, that for the purрose of this section all payments received by a benefit claimant for his retirement under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act or a retirement plan in whiсh an employer, other than United States Army, United States Air Force, United States Navy, United States Marine Corps and United States Coast Guard, has paid all or a part оf the cost, shall be treated as wages;” ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍(the amendment referred to consists of the italicized portion)

Said Journal discloses that following its third reading on February 14, 1963 (see page 367 of said Journal) proposed bill No. 103 was presented to the Senate for final consideration and following a vote of 24 against and 6 for the bill, it was declared to be lost. This action on the part of our legislative body is most persuasive that an exemption as contended for by appellant was nеither authorized nor intended.

We are not unmindful of the declared public policy of this state as announced in I.C. § 72-1302 and that our Unemployment Compensation Law must bе liberally construed to the end that its purposes be accomplished. However, the relief which appellant seeks cannot be read into this law by judicial construction.

Order affirmed. Costs to respondent.

McQUADE, C. J., and McFADDEN, TAYLOR and SMITH, JJ., concur.

Case Details

Case Name: Knight v. Employment Security Agency
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Jan 29, 1965
Citation: 398 P.2d 643
Docket Number: 9266
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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