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Knight v. City of Chicago
700 N.E.2d 110
Ill. App. Ct.
1998
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*1 (§§ 345), eff. Laws 80 344 to by § 2 (repealed ch. *** 1940) (“All signed writing, reduced to wills shall be January 1, *** testatrix, presence in the attested by the testator witnesses”). Again, two or more credible by or testatrix testator es allowing evidence to competent other provision in section 6— may by proponent which the expands the means tablish will will, required formalities for the but it does not reduce the prove Thus, pursuant 4—3 of Act. formation of a valid will section early guidance interpretation still on the provides law sound of the term “attestation.” application reasons,

Therefore, for the above we reverse County. circuit court of Cook

Reversed. COUSINS, J.,

McNULTY, EJ., and concur. CHICAGO, al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY JOHN KNIGHT et OF Defendant-Appellant. (3rd Division)

First District No. 1 — 96—0329 Opinion Rehearing September filed June denied 1998. *2 J., COUSINS, dissenting. (Lawrence Sher, Counsel, Rosenthal, Corporation Chicago

Susan S. of Solomon, Joranko, Timothy Corporation Ruth Benna and W. Assistant Counsel, counsel), appellant. of for Julian, Associates, Novoselsky Paul T. & and Julian David A. Linda Biyceland, Novoselsky Associates, A. both of David A. & for both Knight. appellee John (Victor Cummings, Ciardelli, Chicago

Ciardelli & E Patrick M. Cum- counsel), Rizzi, appellee for Alicia Rizzi, and Dom J. mings, J. Steven Washington. opinion court: CAHILL delivered JUSTICE fire, truck, to a fire on Chicago facts are these: repair and median The median was under strip. onto a raised drove pits. The driver lost control and tree empty planter contained boxes pit. a tree truck entered the boxes and when the wheels of the lane traffic and hit a car oc- then opposite truck entered car, Knight, Dovie was cupied by young two women. The driver injured. was Dovie Washington, killed and the Alicia passenger, Chicago Washington father Alicia each sued the Knight’s (the trial, the City). jury The actions were After returned consolidated. $1,500,000 for favor of Alicia Knight verdict favor of John $200,000. City appeals. Washington We reverse. midnight September Chicago fire- approximately

At fighter, Lynch, driving Chicago department Patrick was fire snorkel truck, call, to a responding truck on Halsted Street. southbound traveling per warning was miles hour with siren and approximately 35 time, her lights Knight driving At the same Dovie was car activated. on Halsted. north

The fire truck the intersection of 111th through went southbound Halsted, per miles light green, traveling where the still parked The parking hour. lane of southbound Halsted was filled with *3 double-parked right-hand cars. Two cars were in the southbound travel lane, only so left-hand southbound lane was clear for traffic. cars, approached double-parked

As the fire the truck truck left, to the on the left side of the truck swerved the wheels disputed mounted the median curb. Witnesses whether the driver of the fire truck had been forced to take action because a car had evasive alley only open left and lane adjacent come out and blocked the of traffic. median, in and

Once on wheels of fire truck rolled out planter pit. propelled boxes and into the tree The truck was then Dovie off the median into the northbound lanes where facing car The truck struck the driver’s Knight’s northbound. Knight’s of Dovie side door car. City damages jury negligent

The found the and awarded plaintiffs. City posttrial judgment The filed a motion for notwithstand- or, alternative, a The court denied the ing the verdict in the new trial. truck, motion, finding it was that a fire median, vehicle, City duty that the has would drive on a raised it and maintains boxes on reasonable care when installs medians.

If duty defendant owes no to the plaintiffs, evidence duty, establishes that there is no the verdict cannot stand. Pedrick v. (1967). Co., Peoria & Eastern R.R. 37 Ill. 2d 229 N.E.2d 504 judgment We review denial of a n.o.v. under the Pedrick standard: evidence, whether all the favorably when viewed most opponent, to the overwhelmingly so favors the contrary movant that no verdict could Pedrick, ever stand. 37 Ill. A notwithstanding 2d presents verdict will question granted of law and be is a only there prove total failure to plaintiffs essential element of the case. Baier Bostitch, (1993). 195, 202, App. v. 3d threshold issue in this City case is whether the owes maintain a raised median in asway by such to make it use vehicles. initially plaintiffs,

We note throughout brief, argue their City safe, that the not had a to make the median but also repair. out, warn a raised median As points under brief the alleged failure to warn through was addressed a motion in limine. The issue was excluded from trial no objection plaintiffs. jury by given instruction tendered jury not did raise the issue. The issue is waived. Green v. Union Pacific (1995). Co., App. R.R. 3d We note, however, that the City owes no to warn of obvious presumed and that leaving drivers are danger know that the road is District, ous. Bucheleres Park Chicago v. 171 Ill. 2d City immunity liability has absolute from based alleged warnings failures erect traffic or barricades. See 745 (West 1994). ILCS 10/3—104 claim negligence duty, must allege existence breach duty, injury by

of that and an proximately caused the breach. Ross City Chicago, subject to the Local Employ Governmental and Governmental (the Act) (745 (West 1994)). Immunity ees Tort Act ILCS 10/3—102 imposes duty ordinary Section Act to exercise care 3— to maintain safe condition. The bemay if, liable after it or improves public property, appears constructs its use that the has created a condition that is reason 102(a) (West 1994). ably safe. ILCS The Act codifies 10/3 — Ross, municipalities public ways. common law duties of law, At liability common arises when the under *4 improvement unreasonably dangerous taken creates condition. Ross, Ill. at App. 168 3d 87. argues scope that the of its reasonably of

a safe condition cannot be read to include maintenance

801 vehicles, including they are safe for that medians in such raised vehicles, roadway. the they when leave that, however, court has held note, supreme our Plaintiffs as injured someone is condition and a hazardous “when creates City Chicago Baran v. damages.” respond must consequence of (1969). argue 181, Plaintiffs 177, N.E.2d 227 43 2d 251 Heights, Ill. In created a hazardous condition. pits the boxes tree Salle, 121 3d App. Ill. County La they rely on Michalak v. support of Dudlow, 2d App. 17 Ill. 574, (1984), Kubala v. 459 N.E.2d 1131 463, 643 road, Michalak, plaintiff entered the shoulder

In left injured the car and guardrail pierced and slid into guardrail. court, relying Supreme opinion on the Illinois Court plaintiff. (1974), Brennan, Ill. 2d held that v. 56 Cunis reasonably duty is owed occurrence foreseeable. An occurrence reasonably have “reasonably prudent person if a could foreseeable” “ "highly likely transpired. foreseen as the events that If the events are ” “ ” “ ” extraordinary,’ is not ‘unique,’ ‘bizarre’ occurrence Michalak, 121 Ill. at Cu reasonably App. quoting foreseeable. 3d nis, 2d of a at 380-81. The court found that the construction foreseeability: guardrail at the site conceded that someone devi Michalak, roadway. App. ate from 3d Even the accidents though Michalak and Cunis stress whether foreseeable, noted that “the exis were the Cunis court legal duty tence of a factor foresee to be bottomed on the of Cunis, “Instead, must ability alone.” 56 Ill. 2d at 375. we balance foreseeability against the harm consequences burdens Bauer, recognition duty.” Hutchings result would (1992), Cunis, citing 56 Ill. 2d at Towner, 510, 522-23, and Lamkin v. Ill. (to Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 456 determine whether the com

See imposes duty, law courts examine four the likeli mon Illinois factors: foreseeability injury, of such injury, hood reasonable magnitude guarding against injury, and the conse burden defendant). placing that burden quences plaintiff In Kubala court stated a cause reviewed whether Kubala, at App. action relief upon granted. which could be plaintiff alleged placed had a row 467. defendant Kubala, posts roadway. concrete on his land near a curved roadway passenger 2d at 468. The was a car that left the victim Kubala, 17 Ill. 2d at posts. the curve and struck the concrete found general applicable The court rule to this case was noted that (Second) Torts, in the Restatement section 368: *5 “A possessor permits of land who creates or to remain thereon an existing excavation or other artificial condition so near an highway that he realizes or should realize that involves un- accidentally reasonable risk brought to others into contact with traveling such condition while upon with reasonable care the highway, subject liability is to for physical thereby harm caused to (Second) [them].” § Restatement of Torts at 268 The court not did address the but duty, plaintiff issue found that the a Kubala, stated cause of action. 2d at 469-70. Kubala is helpful. duty does not issue address the and a involves private land owner rather than municipality. a and,

A more believe, recent case we one dispositive of the case here, is DiBenedetto v. Flora Township, (1992). In DiBenedetto the victim’s car crossed an lane of traffic, then crossed a to five- seven-foot-wide shoulder and in crashed drainage ditch. The plaintiff maintained that the steepness the ditch proximity paved and its to the edge road were Our supreme traffic. court noted that ditch designed was not DiBenedetto, vehicular traffic. 153 Ill. 2d at 70. The court found that did not township duty have to maintain ditch drainage safe condition for vehicular Although traffic. the accident was foresee able, duty the common law will not impose municipality on a to keep drainage DiBenedetto, ditch safe for vehicles. 153 Ill. 2d at 70-72. duty DiBenedetto, great. burden such is far too Ill. 2d at J.). (Miller, C.J., Freeman, concurring, joined by attempt

Plaintiffs distinguish They argue DiBenedetto. that ap- plying DiBenedetto to expands holding effectively this case duty only confine roadways. traveled First, argue Plaintiffs there doing are several reasons for not so. plaintiffs maintain emergency that vehicles routinely drive on or emergency, they across medians avoid traffic in case of cite to the fire truck driver’s in testimony support. Plaintiffs conclude that it so, is emergency foreseeable that vehicles enter the If median. duty has a to make the median safe and free from Second, for emergency obstructions vehicles. argue distinguished. Here, DiBenedetto can be adjoined the median roadway and, ditch, separated unlike the from drainage was not roadway by a shoulder. disagree.

We Even if we were to concede fire trucks “rou- driver, tinely” testimony, on raised drive the fire truck his everywhere.” pointed emergency go “potentially out vehicles endless, hypothetical playgrounds pedestrian cases is A shopping malls —wherever there fire. foreseeably by emergency may be used all make safe limit. vehicles is a without DiBenedetto, accident “[w]hile this court wrote in that, all are foresee retrospect, accidents to the extent DiBenedetto, enlarge township’s duty.”

able, not sufficient to this is 2d at 72. roadways only need maintain municipality is unsafe surrounding roadway area That the passable condition. municipality for which a not the sort of defect for vehicular travel is DiBenedetto, only as a municipality Ill. 2d at 71. “Just liable. for their normal required to maintain its streets and sidewalks traveled uses, to maintain the township required intended way, shoulders, according to their normal and drainage ditches 71-72, citing Warchol v. intended uses.” An enlarge would to this rule for exception *6 supreme court City in a we believe is incompatible in decision DiBenedetto. motion denying

The trial court erred in for notwithstanding verdict.

Judgment reversed.

GORDON,J., concurs. COUSINS, dissenting:

JUSTICE

I dissent. emergency city record in the instant establishes that necessary to get vehicles used the medians as and when around traffic. Therefore, the of median in at bar by emergency use the case and, permissible case, both on the record in this vehicle was based foreseeable.

Although permitted City vehicles to use does it has make improvements contend that no to maintain or dangerous any in prevents medians a manner that condition majority, adopts that use the median. The appeal, vehicles However, Supreme contention. the Illinois Court declared more century ago than a creates a hazardous quarter “when respond in injured consequence condition and as a it must someone damages.” City Chicago Heights, Baran Ill. 2d N.E.2d 227 Further, Local section Governmental 3— (the Act) Act Employees Immunity provides: Governmental Tort public entity ordinary “[A] local has the to exercise care maintain its in safe condition for the use of ordinary entity the exercise care people whom the intended 102(a) (West permitted property.” use the 745 ILCS 10/3— 1994). Therefore, Act, if, under the liable after it or constructs improves public property appears “it its City] [the use has created a condition that not reasonably safe.” 745 ILCS 10/3— 1994). 103(a) (West Liability arises when the improve undertaken ment itself creates an unreasonably dangerous condition. Ross v. supreme cites the court’s decision DiBenedetto v. Flora Township, (1992), to support its conten tion that it owed no under the circumstances in this case. However, distinguishable DiBenedetto is present case. In DiBenedetto, the decedent’s automobile crossed over the lane, traffic entered a five- seven-foot-wide shoulder area on the edge paved roadway, shoulder, of a crossed over the landed in the ditch drainage immediately overturned, killing the decedent. The plaintiff maintained that the ditch drainage alongside the road was not safe for vehicular sought traffic and to hold township liable for its drainage failure make the ditch safe for vehicular traffic. DiBenedetto, 153 Ill. 2d at 70. The supreme court found that the ac cident type expected was that could have been under normal driving circumstances and held that there was no duty to make the drainage DiBenedetto, ditch vehicular travel.

Unlike an emergency the instant case involves vehi- Also, cle. roadway, DiBenedetto shoulder and ditch are dissimilar. Further, routinely record establishes vehicles get drive on across medians to around city. traffic Addition- ally, case, the instant Here,

would travel onto and traverse the median. defendant had *7 reasonably either make the median free obstruc- tions, warn or of obstructions on the median that were obscured so that emergency personnel could have the median warning that not safe to traverse. further,

Still unlike the record establishes that the directly adjoins area where the incident in this occurred Again, roadway. it was foreseeable that vehi cle come into contact an excavation other artificial Dudlow, built See adjacent roadway. condition Kubala v. In appeal, agree this I with the contention that “the is- *** making ‘improvements’ duty in on the centers sue on such relating to obstacles warn of medians and to by emergency routinely used they are it knows that when emergency situa- in other they could be used it is foreseeable and has this issue has addressed Supreme Court The Illinois tions.” stated: and someone condition a hazardous

“[W]hen a creates just oth damages, as respond in consequence it must injured as a *** like an individ corporation, municipal required to do. ers rights its required to exercise corporation, is private or a ual injury. subject others to as shall not precautions powers with such func governmental of its it in the exercise protects The rule which liability when the [it] to relieve not be construed tions should city’s streets leaves the devised, operation, put plan Chicago Heights, Baran v. public use.” dangerous condition Seben, 46 N.E. Chicago v. citing City Ill. 2d at be affirmed. The decision of the trial court should COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, AMERICAN COUNTRY INSURANCE al., Defendants-Appellees. et BROTHERS, INC., KRAEMER (4th Division) No. 1 — 97—0032 First District August Opinion filed

Case Details

Case Name: Knight v. City of Chicago
Court Name: Appellate Court of Illinois
Date Published: Jun 17, 1998
Citation: 700 N.E.2d 110
Docket Number: 1-96-0329
Court Abbreviation: Ill. App. Ct.
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