113 Mo. App. 306 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1905
(after stating the facts). — 1. It is apparent that the learned circuit judge erred in holding there could he no personal judgment against the defend- ' ant Hayward. He was a member of the firm of Edward B. Stoddard Company and was one of the original debtors for the material in controversy. As he was personally served with process in the case, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against him. The court below was under the impression that Hayward, as well as Stoddard, had been brought into court by constructive service and, therefore, was not amenable to a personal judgment. Counsel for the defendants say the court’s attention was not called to this erroneous ruling in the motion for a new trial; but by inspecting the grounds of that motion it will be seen that it was called to the court’s attention in a sufficiently definite way. Besides, the declaration of law given by the court explicitly declared there was no service on Stoddard and Hayward in this State to support a personal judgment. That declaration was erroneous as regards Hayward, and the motion for new trial complained of the declaration.
2. The notice of an intention to file a lien was served only on Corl, one of the owners of the premises, and not on his co-owner, Murray. .For this reason the contention is preferred that the lien must fail, as the law requires subcontractors to give notice to all the owners of premises of an intention to file a lien. There may be a question as to whether service on Corl would support a judgment enforcing a lien against Murray’s interest in the premises,' although the two were partners and in some sense agents for each other. This question we waive, as it does not call for present decision. We have no doubt that, notice having been served on Corl, the lien can be enforced against his undivided interest.
3. The important and difficult question is whether the lien statement was sufficiently full and definite to satisfy the law. The lower court held it inadequately stated the items and the dates when'they were furnished.
4. The next point to be considered is the effect of the absence of dates. As to the time the extras were furnished, the months and days of the month are indicated by numbers, as is customary in commercial affairs. These numerical designations could have been explained by testimony and the time they indicated defined. But
As the term “account” has no precise technical meaning, when interpreting a statute in which it is used, we should adopt that one of its common meanings which will realize best the main object of the statute. Now as a statement of debits and credits may either contain dates or not, and still constitute an account, we should not require any fuller showing of dates in a lien account than the language of the lien statutes calls for, or than will aid in accomplishing the purpose of those statutes. To require more would encumber the law with a useless rule. The principal facts to be shown by a lien
There has been a diversity of rulings by the appellate courts of this State as to the necessity of dates to a lien account. It may be said that all the decisions hold that a date need not be affixed to every item. The real problem is as to whether the lien paper must show the extreme dates of the account — that is, the dates of the initial and the final transaction — or whether it suffices to show that the demand accrued within four months before the filing of the lien account; or whatever the period may be, depending on the character of the claimant. The decision in Curless v. Lewis, 46 Mo. App. 278, was that a just and true account meant an itemized account with dates; and that a lien paper which did not show the beginning of the account, but did show that the demand accrued within six months prior to the filing (the claim was that of an original contractor) was insufficient. The same court (Kansas City Court of Appeals) declared the same doctrine in Mitchell, etc., Co. v. Allison, 71 Mo. App. 251. The latter case was certified to the Supreme Court as in conflict with the decision of this court in Haydon v. Wulfing, 19 Mo. App. 353. In the following decisions accounts that gave the initial and the final dates of various transactions, but not the dates of the intermediate items, were held good. [Mesker v. Cutler, 51 Mo. App. 341; McDermott v. Claas, 104 Mo. 14, 23, 15 S. W. 995; Ittner v. Hughes, 133 Mo. 679, 684, 34 S. W. 1110.] The first and last dates appeared, too, in Mitchell, etc., Co. v. Allison; for though there was
“In view of the foregoing, we have come to the conclusion that the account required by the statute is not necessarily invalidated as a lien because it fails to give the dates when the work was done, provided it appears from it or other parts of the lien paper filed, that it was completed, and the indebtedness accrued within the period required by the statute to entitle the contractor, or subcontractor, to a lien.”
In Cole v. Barron, 8 Mo. App. 509, the months and days of the months when the material was supplied, Avere given in the lien statement, but not the year. The opinion said that if the items were over four months old the right to a lien was gone; but that the account Avas a just and true one within the meaning of the statutes, as every object of the law Avas fulfilled. The court held the Pennsylvania cases were not in point on account of the difference between the Pennsylvania and the Missouri statutes.
In Kern v. Pfaff, 44 Mo. App. 29, the account contained no dates, but the defect was held to be supplied by the averment in the affidavit that the demand accrued within six months prior to the filing of the lien.
In Bambrick v. Assn., 53 Mo. App. 225, the account was practically like the one before us and without dates. It was adjudged sufficient on the authority of Haydon v. Wulfing, supra and Kearney v. Wurdeman, 33 Mo. App. 447. The latter case appears not to be in point, because dates Avere given in the account involved.
In Brockmeier v. Dette, 58 Mo. App. 607, the ac
The foregoing decisions of this court show, beyond question, that the doctrine it upholds is that a lien account is good though no dates are given, provided the attached affidavit shows the indebtedness accrued within the requisite period before the filing of the lien claim in the office of the circuit clerk. Decisions of like tenor can be found in other states having statutes similar to our own. [Noel v. Kennealy, 37 Neb. 879; Chapman v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890.]
In Peoples’ Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 75 Mo. App. 516, the Kansas City Court of Appeals dealt with a lien statement containing a large number of items, many of which had no dates. The court said that, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the Allison case, the lien account must be held sufficient, as the affidavit contained a 'statement that the demand accrued four months prior to the filing of the lien.
In Sanderson v. Fleming, 37 Mo. App. 595, the account had no dates and was not cured by an averment elsewhere in the lien paper that the indebtedness accrued within the time prescribed for filing the lien claim; therefore the court held that Hayden v. Wulfing did not control the decision and the lien must fail.
In the work of a leading text-writer on the subject the doctrine seems to be maintained that unless the lien statute requires dates, it is sufficient if the statement of a lien shows it was filed within the requisite time after the indebtedness accrued. [Phillips, Mechanic’s Liens (3 Ed.), sec. 359; citing Knauft v. Miller, 45 Minn. 61; Johnson v. Stout, 42 Minn. 514.]
We have no decision by the Supreme Court on the exact point involved; but incline to the view that the Allison case sanctions the previous rulings of this court, which were to the effect that a lien paper is good if the affidavit states that it was filed within the statutory period after the indebtedness accrued, though no dates are
The estoppel and counterclaim pleaded in the answer call for no attention at this stage of the case, in view of the above ruling.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.