Lead
OPINION
Judith A. Knarr (Appellant) appeals from an Order of the Superior Court that reversed an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cameron County (trial court) granting Appellant’s Petition to Vacate and/or Modify an Arbitration Award. Because the Superior Court exceeded its proper scoрe of review, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 5,1991, Appellant was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Appellant commenced an action against Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), and the case proceeded to arbitration. Following two hearings, the panel of Arbitrators awarded Appellant a total of $110,305.00 for lost earnings and earning capacity and pain and suffering. However, the Arbitrators deducted from the award the sum of $58,587.20, which represented future social security disability benefits that Appellant would receive because of the accident. Thus, the Arbitrators’ final award аmounted to $51,617.80.
Both parties filed Petitions to Vacate and/or Modify the Arbitration Award. The trial court held that, pursuant to Browne v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
In a Memorandum Opinion, the Superior Court reversed the Order of the trial court, holding that the Uniform Arbitration Aсt of 1980 (1980 Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301-7320, and not the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1927 (1927 Act), Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, No. 248, governed the trial court’s scope of review. Pursuant to the 1927 Act, a trial court may “modify or correct the [arbitrators’] award where the award is contrary to law....” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2). The 1980 Act, however, removed the “contrary to law” grounds from the sсope of the trial court’s review. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7314. Here, the trial court modified the Arbitrators’ award on the ground that it was contrary to law, and the Superior Court concluded that in doing so, the trial court erroneously applied the broader scope of review of the 1927 Act instead of the more limitеd review permitted by the 1980 Act.
On appeal to this Court, Appellant argues, quite correctly, that the Superior Court itself exceeded its proрer scope of review. At neither the trial court level nor the appellate court level did Erie argue that the provisions of the 1980 Act сontrolled the trial court’s review of the arbitration award. To the contrary, in its Petition to Vacate and/or Modify the Arbitration Award, Erie specifically stated that the arbitration was conducted pursuant to the 1927 Act. Erie’s failure to raise the issue of the applicability of the 1980 Act constituted a waiver of that issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Winters v. Erie Insurance Group,
Notwithstanding Erie’s waiver, the Superior Court sua sponte addressed the issue of whether the 1980 Act applied. This was clear error. We have held on numerous occasions that where the parties fail to preserve an issue for appeal, the Superior Court may not address the issue, even if the disposition of the trial cоurt was fundamentally wrong. See, e.g., National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Gateway Motels, Inc.,
Notes
. In its appeal to the Superior Court, Erie raised three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in adding back to the arbitration award the amount оf Appellant’s future social security disability benefits; (2) whether the trial court erred in holding that Appellant was a resident of her parents’ home for рurposes of uninsured motorist coverage under her parents’ policy with Erie; and (3) whether the trial court erred in holding that Appellant’s injuries were caused by the October 5, 1991 motor vehicle accident. The Superior Court erroneously applied the provisions of the 1980 Act in addressing the threе issues. Nevertheless, we decline to remand the residency and causation issues to the Superior Court for consideration pursuant to the prоvisions of the 1927 Act, because those issues are matters of pure fact, and therefore they are not reviewable pursuant to the “contrаry to law” standard.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Superior Court erred in reversing the trial court where it applied the wrong scope оf review in an appeal from an arbitration award. To the contrary, an appellate court must have the ability to review a casе in the proper framework when determining if there was error in the forum below.
The Superior Court has previously vacated a trial court’s judgment sua sponte wherе the trial court reviewed an arbitration award pursuant to an erroneous standard. In MGA Insurance Co. v. Bakos,
Before reaching these issues, the Superior Court reviewed the insurance policy that applied to the dispute. It provided for arbitration in accordance with the Uniform Arbitration Act. Thus, the court found that the rules of statutory arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1980 governed the appeal. MGA,
Like the Superior Court in MGA, the Superior Court here found that the trial court reviewed the issues before it under an erroneous scope of review. While I recognize that in other cases cited by the majority, the Superior Court has proceeded under an improper scоpe of review where that scope is not challenged, I disagree with such an approach. Since an appellate court’s sсope of review establishes the framework for its decision on the substantive issues raised, it seems illogical to preclude it from addressing these issuеs under the proper scope of review.
. I note that this case is distinguishable from Sammons v. Civil Service Comm’n,