162 F. 675 | 7th Cir. | 1908
Lead Opinion
On petition of creditors the Standard Telephone ik Electric Company was adjudged a bankrupt. Knapp, on coming into court to answer the trustee’s petition to sell, claimed chattel mortgage liens on part of the estate in the hands of the trustee. The trus-1ee contended that the chattel mortgages were void, and the court so found. Knapp has appealed, and has also filed a petition to review and revise. The petition is dismissed, as the matter is properly reviewable on appeal.
Appellant insists that the decree in this litigation between him and the trustee must be held void on account of alleged defects in the petition and proofs on which the adjudication of bankruptcy was made. No challenge of the trustee’s capacity was made before or during the trial in the court below, and so no ruling was made which appellant can bring- before us for review. He claims, however, that it is a question of want of jurisdiction in the District Court. The only want of jurisdiction which appellant would have the riuht to require us to look into would be the District Court’s want of jurisdiction to render the decree appealed from. This decree is of the class the District Court-has authority to enter. The parties to this decree are of the class the District Court has authority to hear. The District Court’s jurisdiction to enter this decree was no more dependent than a state court’s would have been, upon the rightful appointment of the trustee.
The decree is affirmed.
Rehearing
On Rehearing.
No matters are presented in the petition for a rehearing that were not fully considered on the original hearing, and the petition is therefore denied.
The appellant has petitioned that, in the event a rehearing is denied, this court will prepare a special finding of facts and thereupon state its conclusions of law in order that appellant may prosecute an appeal from this court to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Sections 2 and 3 of Order .‘56 of the General Orders in bankruptcy (89 Fed. xxxvi, 22 C. C. A. xxxvi), promulgated by the Supreme Court, read as follows:
“See. 2. Appeals under the act to the Supreme Court of the United. States from a Circuit Court of Appeals, or from the Supreme Court of a territory, or from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or from any court of bankruptcy whatever, shall be taken within thirty days after the judgment or decree, and shall be allowed by a judge of the court appealed from, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
“Sec. IS. In every case in which either party is entitled by the act to take an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the court from which the appeal lies shall, a t or before the time of entering its judgment or decree, make and iiie a finding of the facts, and its conclusions of law thereon, stated separately; and the record transmitted to the Supreme Court of the United Stab's on such an appeal shall consist only of the pleadings, the judgment or decree, the finding of facts, and the conclusions of law.”
The decree of this court was rendered on April 14, 1908. Whether the subject-matter of this controversy makes a case that is appealable to the Supreme Court under subdivision “b” of section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act (Act July 1, 1898, c. oil, 30 Stat. 553 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3432]), and whether it is loo late in any event to take the appeal under section 2 of the General Order above quoted, are questions that would have to be considered should an allowance of an .appeal hereafter be asked. At this time it is enough to say that we do not understand that section 3 of General Order 36 intends that a Cir
