118 Mo. App. 685 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1906
Lead Opinion
Omitting caption, the petition is as follows:
“Plaintiff states that Ralph H. Pybus Knapp, deceased, late of the city of St. Louis, State of Missouri, departed this life on or about the twentieth day of January, 1904, leaving hijn surviving, as his widow, the plaintiff herein; that thereafter, to-wit, on the eighteenth day of April, 1904, the plaintiff was, by the probate court in and for the city and State aforesaid, duly appointed administratrix of the estate of the said Ralph H. Pybus Knapp, deceased; that, under which appointment, she*689 was duly qualified, and is now in charge of said estate as the administratrix thereof.
“Plaintiff states that in or about the month of May, 1902, the said Ralph H. Pybus Knapp, deceased, placed in the keeping, care and custody of the defendant, a large sum of money, to-wit, the sum of five thousand dollars, with and under the understanding and agreement, then had and made, that said sum of money should be held and retained by the defendant for the said Ralph H. Pybus Knapp, and to -be repaid and redelivered to the said Ralph H. Pybus Knapp, upon request; that the defendant, since said last-mentioned date, has continued to retain the possession and custody of said sum of money; that, though the payment Of said sum of money has been demanded by the plaintiff, as such administratrix, defendant has wrongfully refused, and still refuses to pay the same, or any part thereof, to the plaintiff.
“Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment for the sum of five thousand dollars, with interest, and the costs of this action.”
The answer was a general denial.
The cause was submitted to the court, without the intervention of a jury, who, after hearing the evidence, found the issues for plaintiff and rendered judgment in her favor for twenty-one hundred and eighty dollars and interest thereon. After taking the usual preliminary steps, defendant appealed.
The history out of which the litigation grew, briefly stated, is as follows: In 1902, Ralph Knapp, as the elder son of his father, was, under the law of primogeniture, entitled to an estate, or interest in an estate in England of the value of about seven thousand dollars. He employed the law firm of Dodge & Mulvihill, of the city of St. Louis, to establish his right in the estate. His attorneys were successful and as soon as the matter was settled in his favor, he sailed for England and collected about seven thousand dollars of the estate. He pur
It is practically conceded by defendant that Ralph Knapp placed the $5,811.43 in the hands of his mother for the fraudulent purpose of defeating Dodge & Mulvihill in the collection of the debt he owed them.
Defendant testified that she had kept a deposit account with the Mississippi Valley Trust Company for several years prior to 1903. The state of her account on May 16, 1903, was as follows:
Balance...............$ 94.77
January 23,1903 ........ 2,000.00
January 26, 1903 ........ 30.00
February 4, 1903 ........ 67.00
February 5, 1903 ................ $ 7.00
February 9, 1903 ................ 2,180.00
May 16,1903 .................'... 4.77
$2,191.77 $2,191.77
Defendant’s evidence shows that her income from all sources was, and had been for several years, thirty-five dollars per month. She testified that after her brother returned from England, she gave him several checks on her bank account for the purpose of enabling him to pay his bills and at one time gave him a check
It is contended by defendant that the evidence tends to show two theories: one, that the money sent by Ralph Knapp to his mother was in payment of a debt he owed her; the other, that the money was transferred to her by Ralph for the purpose of defrauding his creditors; and it is strenuously contended there is no evidence that the money was deposited by Ralph Knapp with his
Schouler says: “The simple fact of knowingly holding possession of property which belongs to another will oblige the possessor, no matter how he came by it, to apply a certain care and diligence, and stand to a certain bailment accountability.” [Schouler’s Bailments and Carriers (3 Ed.), sec. 3.]
There is evidence in the record tending to show
In Repplier v. Jacobs, 149 Pa. St. 167, the court, speaking in respect to the necessity of identifying money, at p. 169, said: “The argument that it was not the same money [the same argument made here] that plaintiff originally deposited but part of the winnings of the illegal transactions is of no weight. The cases where money is required to be earmarked, or where the law will inquire whether it is the identical coin or bank notes are exceptional. For all ordinary purposes in law as in the business of life, the same sum of money is the same money, whether it is represented by the identical coin or not.”
This is sound reasoning and sound practical common sense to make use of in the ordinary purposes of the law and in business life. .It his been repeatedly held in circumstances where the identical grain commingled with other grain is not to be returned to the depositor, but a like quantity of the same kind and quality is to be returned, are not sufficient to convert the transaction from a bailment into a contract of sale. [See authorities cited in Potter v. Mt. Vernon Roller Mill Co., supra, p. 584.] The same rule has been applied in replevin suits to recover specific personal property, as where the goods replevied are mixed with others, but are nevertheless of the same nature and value, as in the case of grain, though an actual separation cannot be made by identifying each particle, if a division of equal value can be made, it has been repeatedly held the plain
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOE REHEARING AND TO TRANSFER TO SUPREME COURT.
The learned counsel for appellant insists, seemingly with much earnestness, in their motion to transfer this case to the Supreme Court, that the adjudication herein is in conflict with Coleman v. Lipscomb, 18 Mo. App. 443, decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, wherein it was held the law is well settled that in order to constitute a bailment, the parties must have intended that there should be a return or delivery of the identical article bailed, and also as being in conflict with the decision of that court in Corn v. City of Cameron, 19 Mo. App. 583, wherein it is said that money deposited in bank becomes eo instcwvti the money of the bank and not. that of the depositor and the relation of .creditor and debtor arises thereby between the depositor and the bank. After having re-examined the
1. In respect to the proposition that to constitute a bailment, the parties must have intended that there should be a return or delivery of the identical thing; it is well settled in law and the nature of some transactions is such that the rule can only be sufficiently answered by returning other property of like value and kind. As said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Repplier v. Jacobs, 149 Pa. St. 167, and as said by Judge Bland, in the opinion of the court in this case: “For all ordinary purposes in law, as in the business of life, the same sum of money is the same money, whether it is represented by the identical coin or not.” This is certainly reasonable and we do not understand that it necessarily infringes upon the doctrine that a deposit in bank constitutes the bank the owner of the money; or, in other words, ipso f-aeto, transfers the title of the money to the bank and creates the relation of debtor with respect to such bank in favor of the depositor, who is thereby constituted a creditor, for, in the very nature of things, when one in such circumstances has clearly indicated that no intention is present to create the relation of creditor and debtor, but, on the contrary, it is manifest that the parties intended to create the relation of bailor and bailee, we are unable to see why the court should not enforce such intention even though the bailee has employed in business or transferred the actual amount deposited to another and was thereby rendered unable to make restitution of the identical subject of bailment. The question with Avhich the court has to deal is the intention of the parties in creating the relation rather than the manual possession of the subject of bailment, and we know no reason why, when it is apparent that a bailment was intended by the parties, that the bailor shall be precluded of his rights herein because, forsooth, the identical thing is incapable of being returned to the owner because of no fault on his part. We are persuaded that the authori
As indicated, the theory upon which the courts sustain actions of this nature being that instead of the fraudulent party invoking the aid of the court to enforce a recovery upon the contract or arrangement, born in iniquity and made in fraud, he is, by this proceeding, rather seeking a disaffirmance of such arrangement, and the law aids the party who is receding from his original fraudulent purpose to become re-possessed of his property in those cases where the parties intended bailment and there has been no transfer of title. Now that is the case before the court here. There are facts in the--' record which constitute substantial evidence sustaining the finding of the trial court that in this instance the money was held by the defendant as bailee, the purpose being, no doubt, to defraud the creditors of the bailor, and the court found the transaction to have been a bailment rather than a transfer of title. Had the court ' found that title to the money was transferred to the defendant for the purpose of defrauding creditors of the
Now because of the great similarity of the reasons thus given to the reasoning of the case permitting the penitent party to recover what he has advanced under an illegal contract, which remains unexecuted, it is urged by learned counsel that the doctrine mentioned is identical with that pertaining to illegal contracts generally and therefore it is subject in its application, to the limitation of the locus poenitentiae, and in order for the bailor to avail himself of his right to recover from the bailee, the property which he has placed in bailment in fraud of creditors, he must disaffirm the fraud and move to that end, prior to its consummation by the creditors having been actually defrauded by reason of the bailment, and therefore the purpose to defraud the creditors, Dodge & Mulvihill, having been actually consummated so far as was possible, the bailor not having become penitent and receded from the fraud intended prior thereto, no right to recovery can now be predicated upon this principle inasmuch as he failed to avail himself of the right to recede from the fraud and recover within the period of a locus poenitentiae, properly speaking. And it is argued that the affirmance of the judgment in this case will establish the principle in Missouri that a fraudulent bailor may recover the subject of bailment from the bailee even after the fraudulent purpose of the bailment is accomplished. It is error to say that such affirmance in this case will establish this doctrine, for the doctrine has long since been settled with us by the Supreme Court in Gowan’s Admr. v. Gowan, supra. Indeed, the principle, as applicable to illegal contracts generally, is subject to the limitation suggested and with this in mind, we have been quite diligent in attempting to ascertain if the proposition be true with respect to proceedings of this nature as well.
We have been unable to discover, however, that the
In Gowan’s Admr. v. Gowan, supra, the property in bailment, a slave, was transported by the owner from Tennessee to Missouri for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, twenty years prior to the institution of the litigation with respect thereto. The owner afterwards returned to Tennessee and there departed this life. The slave remained in the fraudulent bailment sixteen years in this State, when suit was instituted by the administrator of the bailor seeking to recover therefor, and it was held by the Supreme Court that the fraudulent bailee would not be permitted to plead the fraudulent bailment in defense of that action, twenty years having elapsed after the removal of the slave to this. State in order to defraud creditors, although it does not appear in the opinion, the fair inference is, the fraud contemplated and intended twenty years before, had actually been accomplished. Although this identical phase of the question does not seem to have been noticed by the court in the opinion, the adjudication that the bailor can not set up the fraud in defense on the facts of that case, without noticing the limitation of the doctrine contended for by counsel here, is a complete answer to the argument ad
In Block v. Darlington, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States squarely adjudicated the doctrine that the fraudulent bailor may recover from the bailee for property in bailment even though it was held by the bailee in fraud of creditors, and that august tribunal did not notice the limitation contended for by the learned counsel here. Nor did it, by any expression or by inference, limit the right of recovery during the period of a locus poemtentiae or prior to' the consummated fraud. Nor did the other cases supra express or decide any such limitation, save the English case of Taylor v. Bowes, 1 Q. B. D. 291, in which, although the question was not necessary to decision, inasmuch as the court said the contemplated fraud had not been actually accomplished. It was said, however, in the opinion, that the right of the bailor to recover under such circumstances exists prior to the consummation of the fraudulent purpose of bailment ; or, in other words, the court in that case seems to proceed upon the principle which applies to illegal contracts- generally, that courts will only aid the bailor when he has become penitent and seeks to recede from his fraud prior to its consummation. From the adjudications in all of the cases, however, coming under our observation, except the English case mentioned, it is apparent that while the courts limit the doctrine with respect to illegal contracts, that the law will aid the penitent party in disaffirmance of a fraudulent contract prior to the actual consummation of the fraud by the execution of the contract, and rest it upon the principle that in so doing, it is encouraging and rewarding the pen
The following cases, cited by appellant as holding to a doctrine contrary to that announced in the opinion in this case, we regard as wholly inappropriate to the issue as found by the court.
Brown’s Admr. v. Finley, 18 Mo. 375, involved the question of where the property had been transferred by gift from father to daughter in fraud of the father’s creditors. The court very properly refused to aid the administrator of the father’s estate in setting aside such fraudulent conveyance.
In George v. Williamson, 26 Mo. 190, the transaction involved a tranfer of lands by a father to his daugffi ter in fraud of creditors, and the court refused to aid the-administrator to set such transfer aside.
Jackman v. Robinson, 64 Mo. 289, decided no more than that the administrator cannot impeach the fraudulent conveyance of his intestate.
Ober v. Howard, 11 Mo. 425, decided that a father, for a fraudulent purpose having conveyed lands to trustees for the benefit of two of his children, after his death, his heirs cannot, in equity set such conveyance aside on the ground of such fraud.
Thomas v. Thomas, 107 Mo. 459, holds that the heir cannot impeach the acts of his ancestor in the disposition of his property on the ground of fraud.
Davidson v. Dockery, 179 Mo. 687, holds that the devisees of the grantor in a fraudulent conveyance cannot be heard to ask a court of equity to set aside a fraudulent deed of his grantor for the devisees take under the fraudulent- grantor and their rights cannot be superior to those of the grantor.
Zoll v. Soper, 75 Mo. 460, announces the familiar doctrine supra, that an administrator cannot impeach the voluntary conveyance of his intestate for fraud as to creditors, although the estate may be insolvent.
Merry v. Fremon, 44 Mo. 518, holds that a conveyance by his intestate cannot be impeached by the administrator as being fraudulent on the part of the grantor.
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. 242, decided that a conveyance of an intestate cannot be impeached by his administrator or heirs of the grantor for fraud as to creditors, holding that none but the creditors themselves or those in privity with them can avoid it.
Crook v. Tull, 111 Mo. 283, holds that neither a grantor nor his administrator can assail the grantor’s conveyance because made in fraud of creditors.
Hamilton v. Scull’s Admr., 25 Mo. 165, holds that the deceased having given a. note to the plaintiff in furtherance of an attempt on the part of the maker of the note to defraud his creditors, and afterwards died, such note having been filed as a demand against his estate, the administrator of the maker of the note will be permitted
The following cases decided by the courts of appeals and relied upon by appellant as being in conflict with the adjudication in this case are as follows:
Tyler v. Larimore, 19 Mo. App. 445, holds in an action founded on a fraudulent contract by one of the parties to the fraud, seeking to enforce its provisions against the other party, that the courts will close their doors against the complainant.
Hayes v. Fry, 110 Mo. App. 20, holds that neither the administrator nor the heirs can maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of the intestate. Such action can only be maintained by creditors and those in privity with them.
Goldstein v. Einkelman, 28 Mo. App. 432, holds that the administrator of the deceased payee in a promissory note, although also a judgment creditor of the estate, cannot disaffirm his intestate’s transfer as in fraud of creditors or recall to himself the title of the note.
It is apparent that each of the cases above referred to are adjudications resting upon an entirely different proposition than that before the court in this case, and each and all of them announce the well-settled rule that the courts will not aid the enforcement of a contract made in fraud, nor will they aid an attempt to set aside a. conveyance made in fraud and reinvest the title in the fraudulent grantor or his representatives; Avhereas the question before the court is Avholly unlike that proposition, inasmuch as here, the plaintiff does not invoke the aid of the law to set aside a conveyance nor to enforce a fraudulent contract. All that she prays is that the moneys Avhich were placed in bailment by her deceased in order to defraud creditors may be reinstated to the estate of Avhich she is administratrix,'and in which title rightfully rests; that is, that the moneys be reinstated to
We are unable to see where the principles of the cases last above cited are at all pertinent here and the motion for rehearing and to transfer to the Supreme Court will be overruled.