delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Anne Klobucar filed a two-count amended complaint seeking declaration of an easement over defendant Mary Stancik’s adjoining land and seеking to have defendant enjoined from erecting a fence to block plaintiff’s access to the land. The circuit court of Cook County granted defendаnt’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed that order.
We affirm.
The parties reside on adjoining lots on South Pulaski Road in Chicago. Their dispute concerns рlaintiff’s use of defendant’s driveway to gain access to two parking spaces behind plaintiff’s house.
In 1949 defendant and her husband, Edward Stancik (now deceased), acquired title to a tract of land commonly known as 10339-10349 South Pulaski Road in Chicago. In August 1950, plaintiff’s predecessors in title, Helen and John Cherne (plaintiff’s mother and brothеr, now both deceased) purchased from the Stanciks the south 30 feet of that property. The Chernes constructed a two-story building on the property in 1952. Plaintiff, 30 yеars old at the time, moved in with Helen and John and with her sister, Marie Cherne. In 1980 plaintiff acquired title to the property through inheritance from John Cherne.
The building’s dimensions prevented a driveway from being built from Pulaski to the rear of the home where two parking spaces were located. Initially, parking was permitted on Pulaski, which bordered the property on the west. The land to the east and south was vacant. Subsequently parking was banned on Pulaski. In 1958 the Chicago Transit Authority constructed а fence along the length of the property’s southern border. In 1981 a fence was erected along the entire east property line. By 1981 a restaurant wаs located on the parcel to the east, along with parking spaces. The restaurant owner allowed some of plaintiff’s tenants to park at thе restaurant and gave access to plaintiff’s building through a pedestrian gate in his fence. In deposition testimony, plaintiff stated that she had never inquired about thе possibility of parking there or of having a larger gate constructed to permit automobile access to her parking spaces.
It is undisputed that from 1952 tо the time of this lawsuit plaintiff’s predecessors in title and plaintiff used defendant’s driveway to gain automobile access to the parking spaces behind plaintiff’s home. The parties do not agree on all the circumstances surrounding that usage. We will discuss those circumstances as they pertain to our evaluatiоn of plaintiff’s easement theories.
We first consider plaintiff’s contention that a prescriptive easement was established over defendant’s driveway. A claimant seeking to establish an easement by prescription must show that the use of the land was adverse, uninterrupted, exclusive, continuous, and under a claim оf right for more than 20 years. (Petersen v. Corrubia (1961),
Plaintiff also contended that she was entitled to an easement by estoppel. A court of equity may impose such an easement as a remedy on behalf of one who, in reliance upon the representations of an adjoining landowner concerning a purported easement, has taken an action concerning his land whiсh would not have been taken absent those representations. See Cihak v. Klekr (1886),
Plaintiff relies on two independent representations allegedly made by dеfendant and defendant’s husband. One of those representations allegedly made at the time the Chernes purchased the property was that an alley existed along their eastern property line. Presumably this alley would have provided alternative access to plaintiff’s parking spaces. But a party рleading equitable estoppel must prove reliance on representations concerning which the party had no knowledge and no conveniеnt means of obtaining such knowledge. (Meakens v. City of Chicago (1980),
The second representаtion, allegedly was also made by defendant and her husband, and occurred at the time plaintiff’s house was being constructed. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that сonstruction was temporarily halted when the Chernes realized they would need a driveway. Defendant and her husband then told the Chernes not to worry, that they would sell аdditional land to them for a driveway and the Chernes completed construction of the building without leaving space for a driveway. The primary difficulty with plaintiff’s reliаnce on this representation to defeat defendant’s summary judgment motion is that it constitutes inadmissible hearsay. In her deposition and in a supporting affidavit, plaintiff never stated that she heard this representation being made. Indeed, plaintiff stated in her deposition that her statement concerning this representation was hearsay. She subsequently indicated that she had heard this information from her sister and her mother, further stating: “All I know is they were supposed to, they were going to sell рroperty to [the Chernes] and I don’t know what happened. ”
Affidavits supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment must be made on the personal knowledgе of the affiant and must affirmatively show that the affiant can testify competently to the facts stated therein. (87 Ill. 2d R. 191(a).) This rule on its face applies only to affidavits, but comparable standards apply to other material, such as depositions, for consideration in a summary judgment proceeding, since the court is еvaluating all the material as if it were trial evidence and a directed verdict was being contemplated. (Unzicker v. Chambers (1972),
Defendant in her deposition had specifically denied that any of these representatiоns were made. In the light of these evidentiary facts, plaintiff’s unsupported allegation did not raise a. question of fact as to this issue, and the circuit court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim of an easement by estoppel. Lesnik v. Estate of Lesnik (1980),
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.