KLINKE v MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION
Docket Nos. 107730-107732
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued April 7, 1998. Decided July 31, 1998.
458 Mich 582 | 581 N.W.2d 272
In opinions by Justice WEAVER, joined by Justice TAYLOR, and by Justice BOYLE, joined by Chief Justice MALLETT, and Justice BRICKLEY, the Supreme Court held:
The seat belt statute does not apply in products liability actions.
Justice WEAVER, joined by Justice TAYLOR, further stated that the Michigan Vehicle Code is designed to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles. Nowhere in the title of the code is it provided that the act is concerned with the manufacture of motor vehicles or the civil liability of manufacturers. As a matter of statutory interpretation and constitutional principles, the statutes in the motor vehicle code cannot be applied to cases involving the civil liability of manufacturers. Accordingly, § 710e‘s cap on a reduction for comparative negligence for failure to wear a seat belt, does not apply in the present action, which involves the liability of a manufacturer. Rather, under Lowe v Estate Motors, Ltd, 428 Mich 439 (1987), the plaintiff‘s decedent‘s failure to use her seat belt was properly submitted to the jury.
Although the vehicle code does not directly apply to products liability actions, some portions of the code may be relevant in products liability actions under other theories of law. In determining whether the violation is relevant to the facts presented at trial, the court must consider whether the statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation, the рlaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute, and the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate contributing cause of the occurrence. Where these factors are met, the violation of a safety statute would be admissible as evidence creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence, even where the statute does not directly apply to the type of action at issue because of its title.
Justice BOYLE, joined by Chief Justice MALLETT, and Justice BRICKLEY, concurring, stated that the damages reduction cap in the safety belt law, by its express terms, limits its application to cases arising under the no-fault act, i.e., those that relate to civil liability arising out of the ownership and operation of a motor vehicle. The fact that the safety belt statute tracks the language of the no-fault act demonstrates the Legislature‘s clear intent to apply the five-percent limitation on reduction of damages for a plaintiff‘s negligence within the context of the no-fault act. No such intent is demonstrated with respect to actions for defects in design and manufacture of an automobile. On the basis of the statutory language of the safety belt statute, a products liability case generally fаlls outside the scope of the damages reduction cap. By definition, a defendant‘s liability in a products liability action is not the consequence of negligence arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. Thus, application of the safety belt statute to the defendant‘s liability on these facts would be error.
Affirmed.
Justice KELLY, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, stated that the seat belt statute was intended by the Legislature to apply in products liability actions and that the application of the statute in such actions creates no Title-Object Clause violation.
The Title-Object Clause insures that adequate notice will be given of the possible effects of a law enacted by the Legislature. The Legislature has the right to limit an act in its title or to provide for broader application. The mere fact that the seat belt statute mentions the liability of owners and drivers but does not mention manufacturers is inconclusive. It does not evidence a legislative intent to limit the act to owners and drivers. The title of the statute mentions owners and drivers because its purpose is to create liability
While the seat belt statute might increase the liability of a manufacturer today, at the time it became law, the statute lessened the liability of manufacturers. To determine properly whether a title-object violation has occurred, the state of the law at the time an act was adopted must be examined. On the date that the seat belt statute became law, it did not create liability for manufacturers. Instead, it limited the recovery of plaintiffs who failed to comply with its provisions. It provided a penalty for violation of the standard in the form of a civil infraction. To further encourage seat belt usage, the act provided the added penalty of allowing the admission at trial of evidence of a plaintiff‘s failure to properly use a seat belt.
Evidence of failure to use a seat belt was not admissible in any action, whether it was for products liability or for negligence, because contributory negligence acted as an absolute bar to plaintiffs who were only slightly at fault. When the Legislature enacted the seat belt statute, it replaced a zero-percent reduction under the common law with a five-percent reduction for violation of the statute as a penalty specifically authorized by the code‘s title and as a punishment for drivers and front seat passengers. It was not a windfall for plaintiffs, but was exactly the type of provision specifically authorized in the title of the act. The Legislature intended the broad-based penalty of the statute to be applicable in any action involving a motor vehicle accident.
Application of the motor vehicle code in products liability actions through negligence per se, alone, is inconsistent with legislative intent. Negligence per se allows the use of a violation of a statutory standard of care as evidence of negligence. The seat belt statute provides for the admission of otherwise excluded evidence and limits its use. It is a standard of care that carries with it a limited penalty for its violation. Applying the seat belt statute through negligence per se would allow use of the evidence without the limit placed on it by the Legislature.
219 Mich App 500; 556 NW2d 528 (1996) affirmed.
R. Stephen Olsen and V. Carl Shaner for the plaintiff-appellant.
Dykema, Gossett, P.L.L.C. (by Craig L. John and Mary E. Royce), for the defendants.
Lee R. Franklin for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
John P. Raleigh and Susan L. Barnowski (Hugh F. Young, Jr., of counsel), for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
Clark, Hill, P.L.C. (by J. Walker Henry and Duane L. Tarnacki), for Michigan Manufacturers Association.
WEAVER, J. We granted leave to decide whether the Michigan Vehicle Code‘s seat belt statute, which makes evidence of a plaintiff‘s failure to use a seat belt admissible and imposes a five-percent cap on reduction in comparative negligence, is applicable in a products liability action against an automobile manufacturer. We conclude that the Michigan Vehicle Code statute, with its five-percent cap on damages reduction, is not applicable in a products liability action and affirm the Court of Appeals.
I
On June 25, 1988, plaintiff‘s twenty-three-year-old daughter, Kimberly Marie Klinke, was killed in a one-car rollover accident. Testimony at trial indicated that the left front tire of the decedent‘s Dodge Colt collapsed while she was traveling at highway speeds. Emergency workers found the decedent with her lap belt on, but with the Colt‘s shoulder harness behind her, unused.
Plaintiff brought a products liability suit against Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of
The defective manufacture claim was tried by a jury. The parties presented substantial testimony about the steering knuckle at trial. Plaintiff‘s expert testified that there were small fractures in the metal of the steering knuckle. Plaintiff‘s theory was that the knuckle collapsed, causing the car to roll over and killing plaintiff‘s daughter.
Defense experts testified that the crash was not caused by the collapse of the steering knuckle, but that the reverse was true: The steering knuckle collapsed as a result of the force of the rollover accident. The defense argued that the crash resulted from a sudden and violent correction in the direction of the vehicle by the driver. Defense experts also testified that, had the decedent worn her shoulder harness, she would not have sustained a head injury.
The jury returned a $5,104,000 verdict against Mitsubishi, but found that the decedent was ninety percent negligent for not properly using her seat belt. The trial judge applied the statutory five-percent cap on comparative negligence for nonuse of a seat belt
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge‘s decision regarding the seat belt-cap issue, and held that the seat belt cap did not apply in products liability actions. 219 Mich App 500; 556 NW2d 528 (1996). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for recalculation of damages, consistent with this opinion.
II
The parties call upon us to decide whether the seat belt statute,
As always, we first examine the language of the statute itself when interpreting its meaning:
“The cardinal rule of all statutory construction is to identify and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The first step in discerning intent is to examine the language of the statute in question.” [Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998), quoting Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 611; 566 NW2d 571 (1997) (citations omitted).]
The Legislature enacted the products liability statute in 1978.3 It provided:
In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contribu-
In 1985, the Legislature adopted a mandatory seat belt law that punished failure to use seat belts, making it a civil infraction for front seat passengers in automobiles not to wear seat belts.
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%. [
MCL 257.710e(6) ; MSA 9.2410(5)(6).]
Shortly after the statute was enacted, this Court held that under the common law, for purposes of comparative negligence, “evidence of a plaintiff‘s failure to use an available seat belt may raise a factual issue to be submitted for jury consideration.” Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439; 410 NW2d 706 (1987).
Defendant Mitsubishi argues that the five-percent cap found in § 710e(4) of the Michigan Vehicle Code does not apply in products liability actions. We agree.
The Michigan Vehicle Code, as set forth in the title of the act, is designed, inter alia, “to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles . . . .”5 Nowhere in the title of the code does it say that the act provides for the manufacture of motor vehicles or is concerned with the civil liability of manufacturers. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that “express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.” Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 142; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).
The instant case concerns the liability of a manufacturer, rather than the liability of an owner or operator of a vehicle. The decedent‘s failure to use her
It is a well-recognized principle that an act shall not exceed the scope of its title. Maki v City of East Tawas, 385 Mich 151; 188 NW2d 593 (1971). As long ago as 1888 this Court quoted from Judge COOLEY‘S treatise on Constitutional Limitations:
“As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in the act which might, with entire propriety, have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are invested with no dispensing power. The constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been made more comрrehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so.” [In re Hauck, 70 Mich 396, 403; 38 NW 269 (1888).]
We note that although the motor vehicle code does not directly apply to products liability actions, some portions of the code may be relevant in products liability actions under other theories of law. Specifically, this Court has held that violation of a safety or penal statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence.9 Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78; 393 NW2d 356 (1986). In determining whethеr the violation is relevant to the facts presented at trial, the court must consider the following factors: “1. the statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation; 2. the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute; and 3. the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate contributing cause of the occurrence.” Id. at 87. Where these factors are met, the violation of a safety statute would be admissible as evidence creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence, even where the statute does not directly apply to the type of action at issue because of its title.10
CONCLUSION
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the seat belt statute does not apply in
TAYLOR, J., concurred with WEAVER, J.
BOYLE, J. (concurring). I concur with Justice WEAVER‘s result, but I write separately to explain my rationale.
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%. [Emphasis added.]
In the same fashion, the no-fault act,
“Motor vehicle accident” means a loss involving the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle regardless of whether the accident also
involves the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motorcycle as a motorcycle. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, reference in subsection 710e(6) of the Vehicle Code to recovery for damages or losses “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle” is a direct reference to a term of art in the no-fault act.1 More significantly, as explained below,
The only possible occasion for consideration of the five-percent cap on reduction of damages for failure to wear a safety belt is where liability, i.e., the plain-
The dissent‘s conclusion that the five-percent cap in the Vehicle Code applies to actions for products liability strains interpretation of the code and would expand the safety belt law well beyond its apparent limitations. The 1995 amendments of § 3135 added a significant limitation to an injured person‘s ability to recover noneconomic losses rеlated to death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. By adopting “modi-
However, if the Michigan Vehicle Code would trump the provisions of the RJA providing for comparative negligence in products liability cases, the same result with regard to the more directly relatеd provisions of the current no-fault act would logically follow. Thus, not only would the safety belt law prevail over comparative negligence in the RJA for products liability cases, it would also prevail over modified comparative negligence in the current no-fault act.
As I read the safety belt law and the current no-fault act, the Legislature‘s intent is as follows: If the injured person is not more than fifty percent at fault, failure to wear the safety belt will only effectuate a five-percent reduction in damages where the cause of action arises under subsections 3135(1) and (2) because of death, serious impairment of body func-
If the Legislature had intended that the cap on reduction of damages in the safety belt statute prevail over pure comparative negligence, it must have also intended to preclude evidence in the form of expert testimony that the plaintiff‘s negligence was one hundred percent the cause of the plaintiff‘s injuries. We should not lightly infer that the Legislature would, by indirection, assert a conflict with a court rule and the Court‘s asserted authority regarding the admission of evidence. MRE 702.
Finally, this Court has historically encouraged factual resolution of the question of fault and its consequences for recovery by juries. To conclude that the Legislature intended a broad-based preclusion of the comparative negligence principle we adopted in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), by its foray into safety belt usage, ascribes
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
MALLETT, C.J., and BRICKLEY, J., concurred with BOYLE, J.
KELLY, J. (dissenting). I believe the seat belt statute was intended by the Legislature to apply in products liability actions and that the application of the statute in such actions creates no Title-Object Clause violation. Therefore, I disagree with Justice WEAVER‘s opinion that would hold that the Title-Object Clause prohibits the application of the seat belt statute in a products liability case. I also disagree with Justice BOYLE‘s opinion, which states that the language of the seat belt statute indicates it was not intended by the Legislature to apply in products liability actions.
I. TITLE-OBJECT CLAUSE
I do not agree that the constitutional principles embodied in the Title-Object Clause prohibit the seat belt statute from applying in products liability cases. Justice WEAVER‘s opinion would hold “[a]s a matter of statutory interpretation, we must not, and under constitutional principles we cannot, apply statutes in the motor vehicle code to cases involving the civil liability of manufacturers.” Ante at 591. The opinion reaches this conclusion because the title of the act includes “liability of owners and operators,” but does not explicitly mention the liability of manufacturers. I find this reasoning to be flawed.
The Title-Object Clause provides:
No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not аlone by its title. [
Const 1963, art 4, § 24 .]
The purpose of the Title-Object Clause has been “‘many times discussed and passed on by this [C]ourt.‘”1 The clause insures that adequate notice will be given of the possible effects of a law enacted by the Legislature.
It may be said at the outset that the provision is designed to serve two purposes. First, to prevent action by the legislature without receiving the concurrence therein of the requisite number of members by-“bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all.“-[W]hat is commonly spoken of as log-rolling in legislation-and also to prevent clauses being-“inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect.” People [ex rel Drake] v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 494 [(1865)]. [A]nd, second, to “challenge the attention” of those affected by the act to its provisions. People v Wohlford, 226 Mich 166, 168 [197 NW 558 (1924)].2
Justice WEAVER‘s opinion holds that the seat belt statute is incongruous in a products liability action. Applying the act in such an action would result in the act exceeding the scope of its title in violation of the
Liability for torts is much broader than liability for negligence. We held in Maki that the specific mention of negligence in an act‘s title limits the constitutional scope of the act. The Legislature has the right to limit an act in its title or, conversely, to provide for broader application. 385 Mich 157. It limited the scope of the act reviewed in Maki by specifying in the title that it would apply to immunity for negligence.
Justice WEAVER has concluded that the Legislature limited the parties whose liability could be affected by the act. She has applied the rule of statutory construction that provides that mention of one thing, but not another, implies exclusion of the other. She maintains that the Legislature limited the parties affected by mentioning the liability of owners and drivers, but not of manufacturers. I find the conclusion unwarranted.
The mere fact that the statute mentions the liability of owners and drivers but does not mention manufacturers is inconclusive. It does not evidence a legislative intent to limit the act to owners and drivers in the way the governmental immunity statute‘s title pro
The seat belt statute affects the liability of manufacturers, but does not mention manufacturers in its title. It does not follow that its application to the civil liability of manufacturers is unconstitutional. If that were the case, would it not be unconstitutional to apply the motor vehicle code to the civil liability of pedestrians,5 bicyclists,6 passengers,7 and the state?8
The title of the motor vehicle code does not mention them any more than it mentions manufacturers.9
Although the Legislature did not name manufacturers in the title to the motor vehicle code, the code has been applied directly to manufacturers for many years. See, for example, 1915 PA 302(16). Several of the code‘s provisions create minimum standards for automobile equipment.10 Was not the Legislature attempting to make the manufacturers of that equipment responsible for compliance? Would a manufacturer building a vehicle not meeting those standards be able to sell it, despite the resulting violations, because the motor vehicle code does not apply to it?
The fundamental disagreement I have with Justice WEAVER‘s opinion is that it reflects a belief that the seat belt statute, if applied to manufacturers, created liability for them at the time it was enacted. This is incorrect. While the seat belt statute might increase the liability of a manufacturer today, at the time it became law, the statute lessened the liability of manufacturers. As a result of this misapprehension, Justice WEAVER‘S concurring opinion takes a narrow view of the code‘s title provisions by concentrating on the civil liability provision. It ignores other portions of
One purpose of the Title-Object Clause is to provide notice of a law‘s scope to those enacting it. Hence, our attention should go to what the Legislature knew at the time it considered enacting a law, and what the law was intended to accomplish when enacted. Not relevant is the state of the law when judicially reviewed. Therefore, to determine properly whether a title-object violation has occurred, we examine the state of the law at the time an act was adopted.13
On the date that the seat belt statute became law, it did not create liability for manufacturers. Instead, it limited the recovery of plaintiffs who failed to comply with its provisions. The Legislature enacted the seat belt statute in 1985, creating a standard of care for drivers and front seat passengers by requiring them to
As Justice WEAVER points out, evidence of seat belt nonuse was not admissible in any action, whether it was for products liability or for negligence, until the seat belt act became law. The reason is that contributory negligence was the law until this Court‘s decision in Placek v Sterling Heights.14 When we adopted comparative negligence, contributory negligence was seen as harsh and unjust because it had acted as an absolute bar to plaintiffs who were only slightly at fault. Evidence of seat belt nonuse had not been admissible to defeat contributory negligence. Romankewiz v Black, 16 Mich App 119; 167 NW2d 606 (1969).
In a negligence action, seat belt nonuse was not admissible under comparative negligence, either, before the seat belt statute was enacted, even though it was no longer a complete bar to recovery. Likewise, seat belt nonuse was inadmissible in products liability actions arising during the years between the enactment of the products liability statute that adopted comparative negligence and the seat belt statute.15 In effect, when the Legislature enacted the seat belt statute, it replaced a zero-percent reduction under the common law with a five-percent reduction for viola
I conclude that the Title-Object Clause does not prohibit the direct application of the motor vehicle code in cases involving the liability of a manufacturer. The issue, then, is how broadly the Legislature intended application to be of the punishment contained in the seat belt statute.
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals held that the language of the seat belt statute indicates that it was not intended to apply in products liability actions. 219 Mich App 500; 556 NW2d 528 (1996). The seat belt statute provides:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However,
such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%. [ MCL 257.710e(5) ; MSA 9.2410(5)(5) (emphasis added).]17
The Court of Appeals held that a products liability action does not “arise out of the ‘ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.‘” 219 Mich App 506. The Court based this conclusion on similar language in the no-fault act that this Court has held does not abolish the liability of a manufacturer. The no-fault act provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle . . . is abolished. . . . [
MCL 500.3135(3) ; MSA 24.13135(3) (emphasis added).]
As the Court of Appeals noted, we have held that the no-fault act did not abolish the products liability of a manufacturer:
Only persons who own, maintain or use motor vehicles can be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The non-motorist tortfeasor cannot be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. [Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536, 545; 309 NW2d 174 (1981).]
At first glance, a similarity in language of the two statutes is clear. However, the similarity does not indicate that the Legislature intended identical results under the statutes. A comparison of the two reveals that they аre not identical, and the difference in the
The no-fault act refers to ”liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use . . . of a motor vehicle.” The seat belt law refers to ”damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.” The liability arising from a cause and the damages arising from it, are, by definition, not identical. It is entirely possible that someone incurs damages from the operation of a motor vehicle when no liability has arisen from the ownership, maintenance, or operation of the vehicle.18
I take issue with Justice BOYLE‘S suggestion that my interpretation of the seat belt law would expand it beyond its limitations and “trump” recent legislative enactments in the no-fault act. The basis of Justice BOYLE‘S entire analysis seems to be the belief that the seat belt statute applies only under
It may be that the Legislature intended this recent enactment to “trump” the seat belt statute, and perhaps Justice BOYLE‘S dicta to that effect will turn out to be accurate. It is incorrect, howеver, to suggest that something has gone awry if the seat belt statute should “trump” the current system of apportionment of damages.
A five-percent cap is no more inconsistent with modified comparative negligence than it was with contributory negligence or pure comparative negligence. In each case, it interferes with a jury determination of fault. I express no opinion on the interaction between the two current statutes. However, it seems to me that the fact that the seat belt statute might “trump” modified comparative negligence is not as inconsistent as Justice BOYLE would suggest.
As indicated before, I believe Justice BOYLE‘S opinion suffers from the same analytical flaw as Justice WEAVER‘S: it attempts to determine legislative intent on the basis of the state of the law today, rather than at the time the law was enacted. The opinion concludes by stating:
To conclude that the Legislature intended a broad-based preclusion of the comparative negligence principle we adopted in Placek . . . by its foray into safety belt usage, ascribes an intent not evident from the language of the statute or its history. [Ante at 599-600.]
If the Legislature did not intend to preclude the application of pure comparative negligence when it adopted the seat belt statute, then what did it intend?
III. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
The concurring opinions admit that their analyses prevent the direct application of the motor vehicle code to the liability of manufacturers. Although they cannot agree on a rationale for this conclusion, they do agree that the availability of negligence per se limits the harm done. I believe that application of the motor vehicle code in products liability actions through negligence per se, alone, is inconsistent with legislative intent.
Negligence per se allows the use of a violation of a statutory standard of care as evidence of negligence. Not all statutes content themselves with merely providing standards of care. Some limit the penalty, as the seat belt statute does, to less than that arrived at
The seat belt statute provides for the admission of otherwise excluded evidence and limits its use. If the Legislature had the power to enact such a statute, the opinion places that power in serious doubt.
After today, the Legislature may not enact a statute of similarly limited effect without running the risk that the Court will apply it somewhere else and ignore the limit. It is not clear that, in 1985, the Legislature would have enacted a statute that allowed unlimited use of seat belt evidence, or allowed a massive reduction in damages for nonuse. What is clear, however, is that it did not. What it enacted was a standard of care that carried with it a limited penalty for its violation.
The concurring opinions would allow use of the evidence the Legislature made admissible in actions to which, they argue, the statute does not directly apply. Moreover, they would allow it without the limitations the Legislature placed on its admission. Under their analysis, the seat belt statute was intended to apply in negligence actions, where its application is limited by its own terms. Yet, the opinions state, in actions in which the statute was not intended to apply, the doctrine of negligence per se allows the evidence, without the statute‘s limitations.
Assume the Legislature had the power to create the standard of care and to provide that violations of it may be used as evidence of negligence. It would follow, then, that the Legislature had the power to limit the standard‘s application.
Moreover, unlike the negligence per se application of the seat belt statute, which expands its effect
One example of a statute that would be unnecessarily limited by today‘s concurring opinions is
A vehicle unloaded or with load shall not exceed a height of 13 feet 6 inches. The owner of a vehicle that collides with a lawfully established bridge or viaduct is liable for all damage and injury resulting from a collision caused by the height of the vehicle, whether the clearance of the bridge or viaduct is posted or not. [Emphasis added.]
The Court of Appeals recently held that, although a violation of the statute would establish negligence per se, the statute provides for “absolute liability.” Dep‘t of Transportation v Christensen, 229 Mich App 417; 581 NW2d 807 (1998). The Court reversed the trial court‘s decision that the driver‘s “liability was subject to the principles of comparative fault, joint and several liability, and proximate cause.”
Had the defendant been General Motors Corporation instead of MDOT, GM would not have had the benefit of this absolute liability statute. Instead, the concurring opinions’ conclusion that the motor vehicle code does not affect the liability of a manufacturer means that the standard of care may be applied through negligence per se. However, the absolute liability provision will not apply because the statute cannot be used directly in a products liability action.
The concurring opinions will have a much broader effect than they intend because they render some par
The plaintiff in Christensen, supra, bore the burden of pleading in avoidance of governmental immunity and also of proving his negligence action.19 There, the Court of Appeals applied provisions from the motor vehicle code to the liability of an agency of state government, for which its title does not specifically create liability. It seems to me that application of the statute to the state is entirely proper. However, it would seem to violate the rules proposed by the concurring opinions today.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Lowe we found that evidence of nonuse of a seat belt was admissible against rear seat passengers in a products liability action. We noted that the inclusion of the evidence might be inconsistent with the seat belt statute. However, we concluded that the inconsistency was for the Legislature to remedy.
In the years since Lowe, the Legislature has not amended or repealed the seat belt statute. Therefore, it is still the law. The state of the law has changed dramatically since the seat belt statute was enacted. However, that is no reason to ignore the state of the law at the time of the statute‘s passage and the reasons that impelled it. The fact that the landscape of the law is different today does not mean that there is a title-object problem. Nor does it mean that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the seat belt statute cannot apply.
The reason the seat belt statute now favors plaintiffs over defendants is that this Court has ruled that seat belt nonuse is admissible in products liability actions under the common law. Perhaps this ruling creates a conflict between acts of the Legislature, or between its acts and the decisions of this Court. The solution to the conflict, if one exists, is not to expand the purpose of the Title-Object Clause or, retroactively, to alter the Legislature‘s intent.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.
Notes
legal liability for damages including costs of defense, legal costs and fees, and other claims expenses because of personal injuries, property damage, or other damage or loss . . . .
Although this definition is not part of the chapter in which the relevant statutes appear, it exemplifies the fact that the Legislature does not subscribe to the distinction the majority observes.
The motor vehicle code defines the liability of a driver:
The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. [
MCL 257.401(1) ; MSA 9.2101(1).]
The code further provides for the liability of drivers through the enactment of standards of care, and creates penalties for violations of those duties. See, for examрle,
AN ACT to provide for the registration, titling, sale, transfer, and regulation of certain vehicles operated upon the public highways of this state or any other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles and distressed vehicles; to provide for the licensing of dealers; to provide for the examination, licensing, and control of operators and chauffeurs; to provide for the giving of proof of financial responsibility and security by owners and operators of vehicles; to provide for the imposition, levy, and collection of specific taxes on vehicles; and the levy and collection of sales and use taxes, license fees, and permit fees; to provide for the regulation and use of streets and highways; to create certain funds; to provide for penalties and sanctions for a violation of this act; to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles and service of process on residents and nonresidents; to provide for the levy of certain assessments; to provide for the enforcement of this act; to provide for the creation of and to prescribe the рowers and duties of certain state and local agencies; to repeal all other acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act or contrary to this act; and to repeal certain parts of this act on a specific date. The only damages “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle” in this litigation are the damages caused by plaintiff‘s fault. To the extent that plaintiff‘s damages were caused by a product defect, they do not arise out of “ownership, maintenance, or operation.” Thus, the five-percent cap would not apply. However, to the extent plaintiff‘s damages were caused by her own negligence, it is appropriate to allow the jury to consider the extent to which she caused her own injuries by failing to wear her safety belt. Jacobson v Carlson, 302 Mich 448; 4 NW2d 721 (1942). (There is no title-object violation where a provision of the motor vehicle code contains a standard of care for pedestrians.)
Further, the dissent apparently reads our opinion to hold that the motor vehicle code does not apply to manufacturers. This is incorrect. Rather, we hold that statutes in the motor vehicle code do not apply in products liability cases involving the civil liability of manufacturers. The question whether any of the myriad statutes of the motor vehicle code would apply to manufacturers in certain circumstances is not before us, and it is not appropriate for us to predetermine the issue. This appears to be the crucial distinction overlooked by the dissent.
See alsoA private passenger vehicle manufactured after January 1, 1965 shall not be offered for sale in this state unless the vehicle is equipped with safety belts for the use of the driver and 1 other front seat passenger.
One example along these lines is
In any action, in any court in this state when it is shown by competent evidence, that a vehicle traveling in a certain direction, overtook and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction . . . the driver or operator of such first mentioned vehicle shall be deemed prima facie guilty of negligence. [Emphasis added.]
The controlling language in this statute is very broad. It demonstrates the Legislature‘s intent to create a statutory duty of care and a punishment for its breach that applies outside the motor vehicle code.