Christine Lynn Klinect appeals her conviction on one count of malice murder. 1 For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
Evidence showed that the victim, Lewis Kalo, was Klinect’s former husband and the father of Klinect’s daughter. At the time of the murder, Kalo resided with Klinect, her common-law husband Mark Wilson, and Klinect’s children, including the daughter by Kalo. On the evening of November 13, 1993, Kalo and a co-worker, Dennis Simpson, attended a party and returned to Klinect’s house around midnight,. Kalo remained asleep in the passenger seat of Simpson’s vehicle while Simpson went behind the house where Klinect and Wilson had built a bonfire. Simpson told Klinect and Wilson that Kalo supplied the police with the information that had resulted in Klinect and Wilson being arrested on a marijuana charge a few days earlier. Simpson also told Klinect and Wilson that when he and Kalo were *571 sharing a motel room and Klinect’s daughter was present, he saw Kalo masturbate while lying next to the sleeping child.
Shortly thereafter, Klineet left the fire and went into the house, where she retrieved a pair of handcuffs. She then handcuffed the left wrist of the sleeping Kalo to the steering wheel of Simpson’s car. Kalo awoke and began arguing with Klineet. Wilson and Simpson tried unsuccessfully to remove the handcuffs while Kalo and Klineet were yelling at one another.
According to Simpson’s testimony, Klineet stated she would “shut [Kalo] up once and for all” and wrapped duct tape around Kalo’s head and face, completely covering his mouth and nose; Kalo’s body jerked for approximately a minute before he died. Simpson then cut the handcuff chain and he and Wilson took Kalo’s body to a wooded area where Wilson removed Kalo’s clothes and the tape around Kalo’s head, and left the body. Simpson and Wilson returned to Klinect’s home, where Wilson burned his own clothes, Kalo’s clothes, and the tape. Klineet declared that they should all have a consistent story; that when Kalo and Simpson returned from the party they began to walk behind the house and a pickup truck turned into the driveway, Kalo went back to the truck, spoke with the driver, got into the truck stating he would be back shortly, and was not seen again. Simpson met with Klineet and Wilson a few days later, and she repeated the version of events she wanted them to report. Simpson left town shortly thereafter.
Three days after the murder, Klineet telephoned police and filed a report that Kalo was missing. She reported that Kalo had left the house with Simpson about 10:00 p.m. on November 13 to go to a party, and had not been seen since. After filing the report, Klineet repeatedly telephoned Kalo’s pager and searched a mobile home where Kalo had resided, passing on information she found there to the police. When Kalo’s body was discovered after approximately two months, Klineet told police that Simpson had returned from the party about 2:00 a.m. and told her and Wilson that Kalo had left the party with someone in a black pickup truck.
Klineet and Wilson testified that Klineet handcuffed Kalo to the steering wheel as a joke and that Simpson then cut Kalo on the head and wrapped his head in tape. They testified that they did not inform the police that Simpson had killed Kalo because Simpson had threatened them and Klinect’s children.
1. Klineet contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict because the only evidence showing her guilt is Simpson’s testimony and a defendant cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated
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testimony of an accomplice.
2
See OCGA § 24-4-8. The corroborating evidence connecting a defendant to a crime may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that the defendant participated in the crime.
Bradford v. State,
By her own testimony, Klinect actively deceived police, filing a false report that Kalo was missing and participating in efforts to locate him which she knew to be futile. This, coupled with her testimony that she handcuffed Kalo to the steering wheel, was sufficient corroboration. The jury was authorized to accept Simpson’s testimony, and the evidence authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Klinect was guilty of malice murder.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. At the time of his testimony in Klinect’s trial, Simpson had not been tried for his alleged role in the crime. The State was under an obligation to reveal any agreement it had with Simpson concerning future prosecution, and failure to reveal such an agreement would constitute a due process violation.
Giglio v. United States,
At a pretrial hearing, and again before the jury, Simpson testified there was no agreement and he had received no promise of leniency or incentive to testify. After hearing testimony and reviewing evidence on the motion for new trial, the court ruled that no agreement had been formed. Although Klinect points to an affidavit of Simpson’s attorney that arguably suggests the existence of an informal agreement, the attorney later clarified in a letter that no agreement existed, and testified at the hearing that no agreement existed. Additionally, the district attorney testified that no agreement was discussed before the completion of Klinect’s trial, and that he made it clear to Simpson’s counsel that no agreement would be discussed before that time. That Simpson or his counsel held a hope that testifying in Klinect’s trial would benefit him later does not show an agreement.
Isaacs v. State,
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3. Klinect sought to question a police investigator about what Simpson’s girl friend told the investigator regarding an altercation between Simpson and a man named Triplett, and what the investigator learned about the altercation through other means. She urges that questioning of the investigator would tend to show that Simpson had a violent disposition, supporting her contention that he killed Kalo, although she made no proffer of the officer’s expected testimony.
See Harris v. State,
Klinect contends that curtailing her cross-examination of the investigator nonetheless prevented her from showing that Simpson was the true murderer. Certainly a defendant is entitled to introduce relevant and admissible testimony tending to show that another person committed the crime for which the defendant is tried.
Henderson v. State,
The court’s ruling did not violate Klinect’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation or her statutory right to cross-examine witnesses.
See Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
4. The court admitted into evidence photographs of Kalo’s body
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in the condition in which it was found; it was partially decomposed and the skull was essentially skeletonized. Photographs showing the condition and location of the victim’s body are admissible where alterations to the body are due to the combined forces of the murderer and the elements.
Garcia v. State,
5. Nor was it error to admit a photograph of Kalo while he was alive. Although the better practice is to have the photograph identified by one not a close family member,
Ledford v. State,
6. On cross-examination, the State questioned Klinect about whether she ever called the police to report the crime, and during closing argument commented on her failure to do so. Klinect contends this violated her right to pre-arrest silence. See
Mallory v. State,
7. It was not error to allow the admission of testimony to the effect that Klinect and Wilson were arrested on a marijuana charge a few days before the murder. This evidence was relevant because the State contended that Klinect’s motive for the murder was her belief that Kalo had informed police about her drug activities, resulting in her arrest, and that the pending charges raised the possibility that Kalo would gain custody of Klinect’s daughter, who Klinect feared Kalo might molest. See
Hartman v. State,
Nor was it error to admit Simpson’s testimony that he had overheard Kalo tell another person at the party that, because of Klinect’s arrest, Kalo might gain custody of his daughter. Testimony is considered hearsay only if the declarant’s out-of-court statement is admitted to prove the truth of the statement.
Waldrip v. State,
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8. It was not error to charge the jury on the law of parties to a crime pursuant to OCGA § 16-2-20. Klinect’s own testimony was that she handcuffed Kalo to the steering wheel, Simpson killed Kalo, and she then participated in efforts to conceal the crime. This authorized a charge on parties to a crime.
Moore v. State,
9. Lastly, the court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the law of accessory after the fact. Klinect was not indicted for the separate crime of obstruction of justice. See OCGA § 16-10-24;
Jones v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crime occurred November 14, 1993. Klinect was indicted for malice murder October 19, 1994, and tried before a jury February 6-10, 1995. On February 13, 1995, she was sentenced to life in prison. Her motion for new trial was filed February 13, 1995, amended September 3,1996, and denied November 25,1996. Her notice of appeal was filed December 20,1996, and the appeal was docketed in this Court February 11,1997. On May 2,1997, this Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on Klinect’s claim of ineffective assistance of prior appellate counsel. Her second amended motion for new trial was filed September 26, 1997, and denied September 29, 1997. Her notice of appeal was filed October 15, 1997, the appeal was docketed in this Court on December 11,1997, and orally argued March 16, 1998.
Simpson was also indicted for Kalo’s murder. He was later tried and acquitted.