Michael KLINE, et al. v. Jim McCLOUD, et al., etc.
No. 16042.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Dec. 14, 1984.
326 S.E.2d 715
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 8, 1985.
stantiated charges, even given the exist- ence of probable cause to initiate an inves- tigation, ought immediately to be open to the public. For example, a lawyer might find himself in the position of being able to defend himself against some charge only by exposing material that ought to be kept confidential. It would be preferable in my opinion, to permit unrestricted public exam- ination only after a case has been conclud- ed by the Legal Ethics Committee.
Furthermore, in light of the fact that newspapers are primarily, and by economic necessity, in the entertainment business it is not advisable to splatter unfounded alle- gations against lawyers on the front page, in bold headlines above the fold. Clients, like nervous investors on the stock ex- change, can be frightened all too quickly by rumors. Therefore, I believe that the ma- jority was too expansive in setting the “pa- rameters” of the public‘s access to lawyer disciplinary proceedings.
James E. Cain, Pros. Atty., J. Fred Queen, Elkins, Lee O. Hill and Charlotte R. Lane, Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O‘Farrell, Charleston, for appellees.
MILLER, Justice:
This case involves the valuation of ap-
proximately 35,000 acres of timberland in
the Middle Fork and Roaring Creek Dis-
tricts of Randolph County, West Virginia
owned by Westvaco Corporation (herein-
after Westvaco). The appellants are citi-
zens and taxpayers of Randolph County
who challenged the value of Westvaco‘s
property, as set by the county assessor,
before the Randolph County Commission,
sitting as the Board of Review and Equali-
zation
The facts are not basically in dispute. For the 1982 tax year, this land was valued at an average of approximately $13 per acre. The appellants contend that this val- uation is far below the true and actual value of the land, as shown by the fact that Westvaco, by its deed values, paid more than eight million dollars for it.2 They also allege that approximately 7,670 acres owned by Westvaco were omitted from the tax books for 1982.
In February, 1982, the appellants applied for relief to the Board of Review, which set the matter for hearing. During the hear- ing, the appellants introduced deeds given to Westvaco by the McMullans, former owners of the land. One deed conveying 11,776 acres recited a consideration of $2,148,994, or approximately $180 an acre. A second tract covering 23,366 acres was subject to a lease purchase agreement in- volving a rental of $480,000 a year pending the purchase at a price of six million dol- lars, or approximately $260 an acre. The appellants also introduced entries from the 1982 land books for the tracts involved, showing that Westvaco‘s assessments on the various tracts ranged from a low of $9.60 per acre to a high of $33 per acre.
Westvaco admitted purchasing the prop- erty, and indicated that it paid $8,000 a year in taxes on the property. One of Westvaco‘s witnesses was Sherman Stal- naker, who had been the assessor of Ran- dolph County for twenty-one years. He testified that he used a 1965 State Tax Department appraisal as the basis for his valuation, and that he did not change the valuation on property when it was sold. Under the 1965 appraisal, timberland was valued at $15 an acre. Mr. Stalnaker also stated that if he raised the value of West- vaco‘s land, he would have to increase the value on residential property in order to preserve equality of taxation.
Counsel for the appellants took issue with some of Mr. Stalnaker‘s statements, asserting that recent sale prices had been considered in valuing some property not belonging to Westvaco, and that the values on the appellants’ properties were closer to true and actual value than the value on Westvaco‘s land. Counsel for both West- vaco and the appellants repeatedly urged the Board of Review to examine the tax records concerning other property in Ran- dolph County. The Board refused, stating that the only issue properly before it was the true and actual value of Westvaco‘s property, and that evidence concerning the value of other property was irrelevant.
After hearing evidence and examining the various deeds submitted in this case, the Board of Review upheld the valuation used by the county assessor. Its ruling was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Ran- dolph County.
I.
Westvaco argues that we should af- firm the decision of the lower court be- cause there was substantial evidence to support the assessment. This, however, is not our traditional test for appellate review in tax assessment cases. We have histori- cally utilized a two-pronged inquiry: first, whether there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court‘s findings; and, second, whether there was an error of law. We summarized this rule in the single Syl- labus Point of In Re Assessment of Union Carbide Corp., 157 W.Va. 631, 203 S.E.2d 370 (1974):
“This Court will not reverse the order of a circuit court by which the valuation for taxation purposes of ... property was reduced on ... appeal, except [for] an error of law, or where the court‘s action was clearly not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Sylla- bus pt. 2, Western Maryland Railway Company v. The Board of Public Works, 124 W.Va. 539, 21 S.E.2d 683 (1942).
See also Application of Sprinkle, 122 W.Va. 611, 11 S.E.2d 757 (1940); Liberty Coal Co. v. Bassett, 108 W.Va. 293, 150 S.E. 745 (1929).
In this case the lower court has acted under an erroneous conception of the law, i.e., that property cannot be appraised at a value greater than that set by the State Tax Commissioner under an old appraisal.3
As we have said in earlier deci-
sions, determining “true and actual value”
is the first step in taxing real property.
See
We also said in Shonk Land, 157 W.Va. at 761, 204 S.E.2d at 70, that: “Although the assessor is under the supervision of the state tax commissioner he is not restricted in his search for information leading to the true and actual value of properties to ques- tions formulated by that state official.” In Killen, we reaffirmed that county asses- sors are not limited to following the State Tax Commissioner‘s appraisals, saying that:
“Similarly, we recognize that the statute uses the term ‘a basis’ in reference to use of the appraisal. Therefore, we in- terpret this term to mean that county assessors may consult other credible and reliable sources of information, e.g., the property owner‘s sworn valuation and appraisal by bona fide appraisers, in de- termining the assessed value.” 170 W.Va. at 618, 295 S.E.2d at 705-06. (Emphasis in original).
Furthermore, in Crouch v. County
Court of Wyoming County, 116 W.Va.
476, 477, 181 S.E. 819, 819 (1935), we recog-
nized that the price paid for real estate was
a substantial indicia of its true and actual
value, so long as the property changed
hands in an arm‘s length transaction: “The
price paid for property is not conclusive as
to value, but it may be a very important
element of proof where there has been an
open transaction between competent par-
ties
Westvaco contends that in Tug Valley, we indicated that real property must be assessed at the amount established by the State Tax Commissioner. We do not be- lieve that Tug Valley, Killen, or any of our other tax cases stand for the proposition that a tax assessor must always use the Tax Commissioner‘s appraisal no matter how old or erroneous it may be with regard to an individual parcel‘s true and actual value.
Tug Valley dealt with a situation where the county tax assessor was utilizing an average assessed value of $18 an acre on certain coal property. The Tax Commis- sioner‘s 1977 coal appraisal summary indi- cated an average value per acre of $168. There was some evidence that a later sum- mary had placed the average value per acre at $360. We held that the local assessor could not ignore the Tax Commissioner‘s appraisal. What we said in Tug Valley is that an assessor cannot establish a value for real property which is below the State Tax Commissioner‘s appraisal.
We pointed out in Killen that coun- ty assessors were not limited to the com- missioner‘s appraisals and that they could “consult other credible and reliable sources of information, e.g., the property owner‘s sworn valuation and appraisal by bona fide appraisers, in determining the assessed val- ue.” 170 W.Va. at 618, 295 S.E.2d at 706. (Emphasis in original). Regarding taxpay- er objections to the valuation of property, we said that “[a]n objection to any assess- ment value may be sustained only upon the presentation of competent evidence, such as that equivalent to testimony of qualified appraisers, that the property has been un- der- or over-appraised by the tax commis- sioner and wrongly assessed by the asses- sor.” Id., Syllabus Point 8. We believe that the price paid for a parcel of land in a recent arm‘s length transaction is an indi- cator of market value on a par with the testimony of a qualified appraiser.
II.
Westvaco argues that if its property
were assessed at a higher value to reflect
what it paid in acquiring the land, this
would violate the equal and uniform taxa-
tion provision of our State Constitution,
The question is: May an assessor supple- ment the Tax Commissioner‘s appraisal re- port with information obtained from prop- erty owners or from recent deed values to determine the true and actual value of property without violating the equal and uniform provisions of our State Constitu- tion?
The Meyers argued on appeal that using the purchase price rather than the sexenni- al appraisal figure violated equal and uni- form taxation principles because other homeowners’ properties were valued ac- cording to the sexennial appraisal.
The Supreme Court of Ohio noted prior cases in which it had “rather consistently held that the best evidence of true value is the actual sale price of the property in an arm‘s length transaction.” 58 Ohio St.2d at 333, 390 N.E.2d at 799. The court went on to address the unequal taxation issue arising from the Meyers’ claim that other property owners’ values were based on the sexennial appraisal rather than deed sales, quoting from Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 526, 43 S.Ct. 192, 195, 67 L.Ed. 375, 387 (1923):
“The rule is well settled that a taxpayer, although assessed on not more than full value, may be unlawfully discriminated against by undervaluation of property of the same class belonging to others.... But, unless it is shown that the underval- uation was intentional and systematic, unequal assessment will not be held to violate the equality clause.”
See also Shaw v. Bd. of Revision of Cuya- hoga County, 70 Ohio St.2d 255, 436 N.E.2d 1033 (1982).
Finding no intentional and systematic discrimination, the court in Meyer refused to grant any relief, giving this general summary:
“The system of taxation unfortunately will always have some inequality and nonuniformity attendant with such gov- ernmental function. It seems that per- fect equality in taxation would be utopian, but yet, as a practicality, unat- tainable. We must satisfy ourselves with a principle of reason that practical equality is the standard to be applied in these matters, and this standard is satis- fied when the tax system is free of sys- tematic and intentional departures from this principle.” 58 Ohio St.2d at 335, 390 N.E.2d at 800.
The use of sale prices in reappraising property was also challenged on uniformity of taxation grounds in Merlino v. Tax As- sessors for Town of N. Providence, 114 R.I. 630, 337 A.2d 796 (1975). In that case, the assessed value of the plaintiffs’ house was increased from $12,300 to $18,900 when they purchased it in 1972. They ar- gued that this increase was unconstitution- al because there had not been a general revaluation of property in their community since 1960, and property which had not been sold since then had not been reas- sessed.
The court held that the plaintiffs could not make out a cause of action unless they could show that there had been “a system- atic, intentional undervaluation of other property in the locality.” 114 R.I. at 639, 337 A.2d at 802. This burden was not met merely by showing that other properties in the same area were not revalued in 1972. Instead, they had to show “that a substan- tial amount of property was taxed at a lower percentage of fair market value than their property.” Id. Since they failed to meet this burden, the court denied relief.
The present case is somewhat analogous
to those situations where an assessor
makes a partial reappraisal of property
which results in such property receiving a
higher value than other property or there is
disparate valuation between tax districts.
Courts have rather uniformly rejected
equal protection and uniformity of taxation
arguments in such cases. In Spooner v.
Askew, 345 So.2d 1055 (Fla.1976), for in-
stance, the court refused to accept an equal
protection argument where taxpayers in
one county claimed their property was val-
ued
In In Re Hawaiian Land Co., 53 Hawaii 45, 487 P.2d 1070 (1971), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hawaiian Land Co. v. Director of Taxation, State of Hawaii, 405 U.S. 907, 92 S.Ct. 938, 30 L.Ed.2d 778 (1972), an assessor selected certain proper- ties to be valued annually while others were valuated every two or three years. The annually valuated taxpayer claimed this resulted in a higher assessment on its property and constituted a violation of equal protection and uniform taxation, but the court rejected this argument.6 The Idaho Supreme Court found no equal pro- tection or uniform taxation problem where
piecemeal reappraisals were made over a period of time with property being assessed at the new appraisal figure instead of wait- ing until all property had been reappraised. Justus v. Bd. of Equalization, 101 Idaho 743, 620 P.2d 777 (1980). This same result was reached in Recanzone v. Nevada Tax Comm‘n, 92 Nev. 302, 550 P.2d 401 (1976).7 See also Melvin v. Dunn, 607 P.2d 694 (Okla.1980); State ex rel. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. State of Wisconsin Lake Dis- trict Bd. of Review, 82 Wis.2d 491, 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1077 (1961).8
Our constitutional requirement that tax-
es shall be equal and uniform has been
discussed in a number of cases, but a clear
syllabus point has not evolved. This can be
demonstrated by reviewing the syllabi of
our major property tax cases, all of which
were overruled in part in Syllabus Point 4
of In Re Assessment of Kanawha Valley
Bank, 144 W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649
(1959). See, e.g., In Re Assessment
Against the Southern Land Co., 143
W.Va. 152, 100 S.E.2d 555 (1957); In Re
Tax Assessment Against the National
Bank of West Virginia at Wheeling, 137
W.Va. 673, 73 S.E.2d 655 (1952); Bankers
Pocahontas Coal Co. v. County Court,
135 W.Va. 174, 62 S.E.2d 801 (1950); In Re
Tax Assessments Against Charleston Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Ass‘n, 126 W.Va.
506, 30 S.E.2d 513 (1944), aff‘d, 324 U.S.
182, 65 S.Ct. 624, 89 L.Ed. 857 (1945); In
Re Hancock County Federal Savings &
Loan Ass‘n, 125 W.Va. 426, 25 S.E.2d 543
(1943); Christopher v. James, 122 W.Va.
665, 12 S.E.2d 813 (1940); Charleston &
Southside Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County
Court, 41 W.Va. 658, 24 S.E. 1002 (1896),
The lack of a clear syllabus point or
statement of law summarizing what is
meant by a violation of the equal and uni-
form taxation provision of our Constitution
may be accounted for by the peculiar facts
which influence the value of a given piece
of property and by certain changes in our
tax statutes. Prior to 1955, the method for
determining the value of property was set
out in
In pre-1955 cases where the taxpayer claimed that his property was assessed at a higher value than surrounding property, this Court would ordinarily refuse relief absent a clear showing of discrimination. “Such discrimination is not established where the showing is only that other prop- erty of a different type is assessed at less than its apparent or face value, through a process of estimation, and in a good faith effort to arrive at the true and actual value thereof.” Syllabus Point 3, in part, In Re Tax Assessments Against Charleston Fed- eral Savings & Loan Ass‘n, supra. In a somewhat similar vein, we said in Syllabus Point 3 of Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. County Court, supra, that:
“The valuation of land for purposes of taxation on the theory that such reduc- tion in value is necessary in order to comply with the constitutional require- ment of equality and uniformity will not be reduced in the absence of proof that there is a plan of valuation applied gener- ally to the same species of property situ- ate in the same taxing unit, and that such plan of valuation has not been ad- hered to in assessing the land upon which such reduction is sought.”
In 1955, through the adoption of
“Where there is intentional discrimina- tion against a taxpayer by knowingly applying a different formula to the com- putation of its taxes from that generally used for all other taxpayers in similar circumstances, such discrimination can- not be excused as a sporadic deviation and the aggrieved taxpayer is entitled to have its taxes computed in the same manner and on the same basis as the favored taxpayers.”
In In Re Assessment of Kanawha Val- ley Bank, this Court determined that the equal and uniform requirement was not limited to the same species of property, but would apply to all species of property.12 Thus, a property owner could challenge his assessment on property not only by show- ing that the same species of property was being systematically assessed at a lower value, but also by showing that other types of property were being assessed at a lower value.13 This case marked a departure from our prior precedents by holding that our constitutional equal and uniform in- quiry was not limited to the same species of property involved in the tax protest.
In Killen, we were confronted for the
first time with the question of whether our
constitutional mandate that “all property,
both real and personal, shall be taxed in
proportion to its value to be ascertained as
directed by law,”
Following the Killen decision, Section 1b
of Article X of our Constitution was
adopted to authorize the assessment of
property at 60 percent of its value, subject
to the right of the legislature to establish a
higher percentage by a two-thirds vote.16
From this background several points emerge that are applicable to this case. First, property subject to our ad valorem tax is required to be appraised or valued at true and actual value. Second, assessed values, which are recognized un- der Section 1b of Article X are less than true and actual values. Third, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the United States Constitution re- quires a taxpayer whose property is as- sessed at true and actual value to show more than the fact that other property is undervalued. He must demonstrate that the undervaluation was intentional and sys- tematic. E.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, supra; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town- ship of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 38 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918).
We recognize that our cases under the equal and uniform mandate of Section 1 of Article X of our Constitution have uti- lized a somewhat similar rule although we have not precisely articulated it in a partic- ular syllabus point. We, therefore, hold that the equal and uniform clause of Sec- tion 1 of Article X of the West Virginia Constitution requires a taxpayer whose property is assessed at true and actual value to show more than the fact that other property is valued at less than true and actual value. To obtain relief, he must prove that the undervaluation was inten- tional and systematic.18
We further hold that the price paid for property in an arm‘s length trans- action, while not conclusive, is relevant evi- dence of its true and actual value. Such evidence may not be rejected in favor of a Tax Commissioner‘s old appraisal of the property. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the only proper measure of value was the 1965 property tax appraisal of the State Tax Commissioner.
On remand, the circuit court should also
consider the appellants’ claim that 7,670
acres of land owned by Westvaco have
never been placed on the tax books. Under
A final contention involves the rul- ing of the trial court that the 1982 Property Tax Limitation and Homestead Amendment foreclosed consideration of the valuation issue. We do not agree. First of all, this amendment which was ratified on Novem- ber 2, 1982, speaks in terms of assessments “for the first day of July one thousand nine hundred eighty-two.”19 This would not af- fect Westvaco‘s July 1, 1981 assessment, which is at issue here. Furthermore, this provision recognizes that “until the values may be fixed as a result of the first state-
wide reappraisal hereinafter required, as- sessments shall be made under the provi- sions of current statutory law, which is hereby validated for such purpose until and unless amended by the legislature.”For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County is reversed and remanded.
Reversed and Remanded.
NEELY, Chief Justice, dissenting:
In this case the county assessor, the board of equalization and review, and the Circuit Court of Randolph County acted in accordance with our tax law as it was then written by a majority of this Court. The county assessor valued the Westvaco Cor- poration‘s timberland, not on its purchase price, but rather on the 1965 appraisal of the property by the State Tax Commission- er. This was upheld by the board of equal- ization and review. The circuit court, studying this Court‘s judgments and read- ing the West Virginia statutes, quietly and confidently affirmed the board.
Let us consider this Court‘s own lan-
guage in Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc.
v. Mingo County Commission, 164 W.Va.
94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979). In that case, we
considered “the problems inherent in set-
ting the proper amount of tax to be paid on
any given parcel of land.” 164 W.Va. at
108, 261 S.E.2d at 173. Noting that such
problems are peculiarly technical and com-
plex, we discovered, to our relief, that our
task is alleviated by
Therefore, once the Tax Commission- er‘s appraisal has been made, the duty of the circuit court is clear and the taking of further evidence would not be neces- sary. It is incumbent upon the circuit
court, as it would be upon the county commission and the assessor, to set the assessed value of all parcels of land at the amount established by the State Tax Commissioner. Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc., 164 W.Va. at 108, 261 S.E.2d at 173.
Today, however, the majority instructs us that Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc., supra, signifies only that the local assessor may not ignore the Tax Commissioner‘s appraisal and that “an assessor cannot es- tablish a value for real property that is below the State Tax Commissioner‘s ap- praisal” [emphasis added]. The majority now informs us that the price paid for property “is relevant evidence of its true and actual value ...” and “may not be rejected in favor of an old Tax Commission- er‘s appraisal.” [Query: How old must the Tax Commissioner or his appraisal be?] Apparently an assessor may now appraise real property at a value above that deter- mined by the State Tax Commissioner, per- haps even when that same property has declined in value over the years.
Previously, this Court has held that a taxpayer‘s objection to any assessment can be sustained only by the presentation of competent evidence by experts such as qualified appraisers. “The objecting party, whether it be the taxpayer, the tax commis- sioner or another third party, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment is incorrect.” Syl.Pt., Kil- len v. Logan County Commission, 170 W.Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689 (1982). But in the case before us the majority turns a blind eye to its own directive. No neutral, independent appraiser offered any testimo- ny at all to show that the assessment was “incorrect.”
Syllabus point one gives another fine
twist to the majority‘s veneration for prece-
dent.
The majority now insists that an aggriev-
ed taxpayer, who finds his neighbors taxed
less heavily than himself, is afforded no
protection by the equal and uniform provi-
sion of
More to the point in this case, however, is the fact that the record clearly reflects that all property in Randolph County is more or less appraised in accord with the tax commissioner‘s 1965 evaluation. If this property is evaluated by a different means—if the Court in this one specific case rejects application of an equal and uniform standard—then we will have re- versed the role that this Court traditionally plays in tax cases. Although in all previ- ous decades of our history this Court has been a guarantor of equality and uniform- ity, we are now, by this case, the propo- nents of deviation from equality and uni- formity.
If the Court deems it necessary to dis- regard precedent, let it boldly overrule a prior decision and not, with passionate in- tensity, manoeuvre interstitially among the lines of cases written only yesterday. In conclusion, I am reminded of Lord Holt‘s protest, in 1704: “... these scrambling re- ports ... will make us appear to posterity for a parcel of blockheads.” Slayter v. May, 2 Ld.Raym. 1072 [1704].
Notes
“2. The Assessor and County Commission- er are required to determine the value of any property in accordance with the evaluation determined by the appraisal of such property by the State Tax Commissioner. *** “4. The Assessor, the County Commission- er and even the Circuit Court must abide by the appraisal of the State Tax Commissioner in arriving at the assessed value of property. *** “9. The valuation placed upon the property by the Randolph County Assessor and upheld by the Randolph County Commissioner is, in the opinion of this Court, the proper valuation until it is changed by the State Tax Commis- sioner or until another method of valuation is prescribed by the legislature.”
“All property shall be assessed annually as of the first day of July at its true and actual value; that is to say, at the price for which such property would sell if voluntarily offered for sale by the owner thereof, upon such terms as such property, the value of which is sought to be ascertained, is usually sold, and not the price which might be realized if such property were sold at a forced sale.”
“An assessor violates the law, and a portion of the taxpayers receive an advantage from such violation. When this occurs, other taxpayers naturally feel that they should be accorded the same treatment.... Is it not time to find some remedy for this situation, other than one involving an appeal to the courts to en- force a system of assessments for tax pur- poses which is plainly in violation of the law as written? It would be refreshing, indeed, if some taxpayer, or a group of taxpayers, would sponsor an effort to see that our tax laws are obeyed, rather than to take advantage of their open violation. It is not for this Court to point out ways by which regard for law may be required of public officials, but they exist. It is probably too much to expect that they will ever be used.”
“A systematic plan of assessing property whereby some property owners’ assessments were increased 20% and other property own- ers in the same class were intentionally omit- ted from such increase is in violation of the equal and uniform taxation provision of Arti- cle X, Section 1 of the Constitution of West Virginia.”
14. Syllabus Point 2 of In Re Assessment of Ka- nawha Valley Bank states: “The systematic as- sessment of money and shares of bank stock at a higher percentage of its true and actual value than that at which other species of property are assessed violates Section 1, Article X, of the Constitution of this State and is illegal.” Fur- ther, Syllabus Point 6 states: “Where there is a systematic plan to assess all property of a certain species at a particular per centum of its value, substantially less than actual value, a showing that there were spo- radic variations to the plan of assessment will not deprive the owner of property of another species of his right to relief, under the provi- sions of Section 1, Article X, of the Constitu- tion of this State, where the property of the latter was assessed at a substantially higher per centum of actual value than the approxi- mate level of valuation of the other species of property of equal value.”
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution and except as otherwise pro- vided in this section, all property subject to ad valorem taxation shall be assessed at sixty percent of its value, as directed to be ascer- tained in this section, except that the legisla- ture may from time to time, by general law agreed to by two thirds of the members elect- ed to each house, establish a higher percent- age for the purposes of this paragraph, which percentage shall be uniform as to all classes of property defined in section one of this article, but not more than one hundred per- cent of such value.”
“Notwithstanding the foregoing, for the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred eighty-two, and the first day of July of each year thereafter until the values may be fixed as a result of the first statewide reappraisal hereinafter required, assessments shall be made under the provisions of current statu- tory law, which is hereby validated for such purpose until and unless amended by the leg- islature. Assessment and taxation in accord with this section shall be deemed to be equal and uniform for all purposes.”