50 Iowa 656 | Iowa | 1879
An objection to this question was overruled. We think there was no error in this ruling.
By the accident the plaintiff had the first and second fin
The plaintiff was asked this question:
“State whether you are able, with your hand in its present 'condition, to do the same kind of work that you had previously been accustomed to ? Could you brake or could you couple cars?”
An objection to this question was overruled. It is urged that the question called for the opinion of the witness as to the extent and permanency of the injury. It seems to us that an answer to the question did not involve an opinion. It was a fact purely as to whether plaintiff could do the specified work in his present condition.
■ It is claimed the injury was caused by the engineer disregarding a signal given him by the plaintiff to stop the train. One Bacon, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that such signal was given, and that while he did not see the engineer reverse his engine he knew he did reverse it because he heard the noise of taking up the slack. He further stated that he knew by the cars coming together, the drawheads bumping together along the train, that the engineer was again backing the train. At this point the witness was asked this question:
“Could that have been done in any other manner than by putting on steam ?” The answer was: “No, sir; it could not have been done in any other manner than by reversing his engine, because if he had left the engine the way it was it would have stopped and held them there.”
This question was objected to as incompetent and leading. That it was leading must be admitted, and we have very great doubts as to its competency. But we fail to see how the defendant was prejudiced thereby. It seems to us that the ■question and answer were merely the verification of a self-
The defendant, in the cross-examination of the witness Bacon, propounded certain questions to him as to the custom or rule among brakemen in making couplings. Objections to these interrogations were interposed upon the ground, among others, that they were not cross-examination. The objections were sustained. We think the ruling of the court was correct. This was a subject not embraced in the examination in chief, and it was in no sense legitimate cross-examination.
“I will ask you to state to what extent the injury impairs the usefulness of that hand for any skilled occupation, or any occupation requiring a quick and ready use of the hand?”
Answer. “It just simply involves the loss of those two fingers to a certain extent. As I said before, it may improve in the course of time, but to what extent I cannot exactly tell; but certainly they will never be as well as they were before. The forefinger is the principal finger used.”
“State the degree to which the usefulness of that hand would be impaired for skilled labor, requiring quick and ready
Answer. “I cannot conceive that anything wonld be more in the way than a stiff finger in coupling cars or jumping up on ears when it would be necessary to reach up. That short finger would always be in the way, or a finger that would not act as quick as it used to.”
The questions were objected to and the objections were overruled. We think the objections should have been sustained. The inquiries involved no question of skill, science or trade which authorizes expert testimony (Hamilton v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 36 Iowa, 31; Muldowney v. The Ill. Cent. R. Co., Id., 462); but we are inclined to think that the evidence elicted by these interrogations was not prejudicial to the defendant.
The plaintiff’s stiffened fingers were exhibited to the jury, and the medical witness properly gave his opinion as to the nature and extent of the injury. That the plaintiff could not use his fingers as he did before the injury was a self-evident .fact. The opinion of a thousand witnesses that he could not use his fingers as before would not add to the proof. How any party could be prejudiced by a witness gravely giving his opinion that the forefinger of the hand is the one principally used, and that stiff fingers would interfere with any work requiring their use, is more than we can comprehend. We must presume that jurors are men of ordinary comprehension, and that, without the opinion of this witness, the fact that plaintiff could not use his fingers as he did before the injury was established beyond all question.
There is one other alleged error as to the improper admission of evidence. We need not consider it. It belongs to the same class of testimony as that above discussed.
III. There was no evidence that the drawhead of the car received from the connecting road was out of repair. It was not exactly of the same height as the one on the car which plaintiff attempted to couple to it. The court in
These instructions are not objectionable on the ground that they contain erroneous propositions of law. But we think the instructions given by the court sufficiently elaborate the proper rules as to the alleged negligence of the engineer and contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
It is almost impossible for a trial judge, when he is required to reduce to writing all the instructions given to the jury, to call their attention to every fact' in the case proper for their consideration. If he should undertake to instruct upon the facts in detail for one party, he must, in fairness, do the same thing for the other. To do this would not be practicable in the trial of the jury cases.
Y. It is urged that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. Two witnesses, the plaintiff and Bacon, testify positively that the plaintiff signalled the 'engineer to stop - the
YI. The verdict is also claimed to be against the evidence because it is excessive. The amount of the recovery was one thousand four hundred and twenty-five dollars. The injury was severe and very painful. The surgeon who attended the plaintiff testified as follows:
“Such a wound is extremely painful — about the most painful a man can have.”
That the injury is permanent is beyond question. Under these circumstances we think the verdict was not excessive.
It is, perhaps, enough to say, in support of the ruling of the court below, that the newly discovered evidence is in its
As to the alleged improper conduct of the plaintiff, we, think it is sufficiently explained in the counter-affidavits.
Affirmed.