167 Wis. 450 | Wis. | 1918
The validity of the agreement between the Kleinschmidt brothers, upon which the claim here under consideration is based, has not been questioned. In view of the decision of this court in Estate of Staab, 166 Wis. 587, 166 N. W. 826, with reference to agreements between interested parties looking to the suppression of will contests, it would be unfortunate if, by our silence, it might be inferred that the agreement mentioned was regarded as a valid and bind
The allowance of the claim is contested by the minor heirs and the executrix on the ground that it should have been pro-sented within the time fixed for the presentation of claims as required by the provisions'of secs. 3840 and 3843, Stats., and, not having been presented within such time, was barred by the provisions of sec. 3844, which provides that “Every person having a claim against a deceased person, proper to be allowed by the court, who shall not after notice given as required by sections 3840 and 3840m, exhibit his claim to the court within the time limited for that purpose, shall forever be barred from recovering such demand or from setting off the same in any action.” The claimant contends that the claim was properly filable under sec. 3860, which provides that any claim accruing or becoming absolute after the time limited for creditors to present their claims may be presented to the county court, proved, and allowed at any time within one year after it shall have accrued or become absolute. It will be seen that, under the provisions of sec. 3844, if the claim was a proper one to be filed against the estate within the time fixed for filing claims, it was barred because not so filed.
Sec. 3843 expressly empowers the court to try and decide upon all claims which by law survive against or in favor of executors or administrators and to examine and allow all demands “at the then present value thereof,” which may be “payable at a future day,” and to offset such demands in the same manner in favor of the estate. In Austin v. Saveland's
This is not a claim falling under the provisions of sec. 3860. While it is neither necessary nor desirable to undertake a definition embracing all the claims falling under that section, the nature of the claims comprehended thereby are well illustrated by the following cases: Logan v. Dixon, 73 Wis. 533, 41 N. W. 713; Webster v. Estate of Lawson, 73 Wis. 561, 41 N. W. 710; C. & J. Michel B. Co. v. Estate of Wightman, 97 Wis. 657, 73 N. W. 316; Estate of Ryan, 157 Wis. 576, 147 N. W. 993. A little reflection will suggest other classes of claims which no doubt fall within the provisions of see. 3860. But a consideration of the cases above cited is sufficient to indicate pretty conclusively that this is not one of them. Neither is this a contingent claim, such as is provided for by secs. 3858 and 3859. A contingent claim exists only where there is uncertainty as to whether it will ever become absolute. It is the uncertainty concerning an eventual actual liability that makes it contingent. A claim which is certain to become an actual liability at some time in the future is not contingent merely because the exact time when it will become due is uncertain. South Milwaukee Co. v. Murphy, 112 Wis. 614, 88 N. W. 583, and cases there cited.
We must hold that the circuit court was in error in its judgment allowing this claim.
By the Court.- — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the county couirt.