95 N.Y.S. 406 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1905
This action was brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the cancellation of a contract for the construction of a stable upon the premises of the defendant; and lias resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,000, which, it seems to us, might be sustained, except for the fact that upon the trial the learned justice presiding insisted upon placing his own interpretation upon the evidence, thus usurping the province of the jury. It is true, of course, that the issues of- fact wére formally submitted to the jury for determination, but the trial is so full of matter which could not fail to prejudice the defendant’s case that within well-known authorities the verdict should, be set aside and the defendant be granted a new trial.
The defendant is a corporation and, after advertising for bids for the construction of a stable, its board of directors at a meeting adopted a resolution directing its executive committee to enter into a contract, at its discretion, with the plaintiff for the construction of the building. There is no evidence that the executive committee ever met, or that all of the members'acted in the premises, but there is evidence from which the jury might find that some of the members of the executive committee, who constituted the officers of the defendant, conveyed to the plaintiff the information that his bid had been accepted and directed him to conimence the work. After
What chance has counsel-of getting respectful attention from the jury when the court in effect tells them that he is there without preparation and that he is deliberately seeking to deceive ? Generally speaking, counsel has a light to present his theory of the case, or at -least to offer to present it without being accused of duplicity, ignorance .or bad faith, and where the trial court transgresses this right of counsel, invading as it does the rights of litigants, it is the duty of appellate courts, in the interests of the orderly administration of justice, to reverse the.verdict and send the case back for a new trial, and this should be the disposition of the case now before us. (See Swan v. Keough, 35 App. Div. 80; Beers v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 88 id. 9.)
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
Hirschberg, P. J., Jenks, Rich and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.