The plaintiff brought the instant civil action against the officers who entered her home and arrested her, the former chief of police, the former mayor of the City of Allentown, and the City of Allentown. Concerning the asserted causes of action, she brings several
Currently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. The defendants request summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff has (1) failed to establish her claims as a matter of law and (2) the officers, for certain of her claims, qualify for immunity under federal and state law. As to all her claims but one, which the court dismisses without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey ,
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Charlene Klein, filed her complaint against the defendants, Officer Stephen Madison ("Officer Madison"), Officer Christopher Hendricks ("Officer Hendricks"), Officer Michael Good ("Officer Good"), Officer Jacoby Glenny ("Officer Glenny"), John/Jane Does 1-X ("Does"), (former) Mayor Edwin Pawlowski ("Mayor Pawlowski"), the (former) Chief of Police Keith Morris ("Chief Morris"), and the City of Allentown (the "City") on October 10, 2017. Doc. No. 1. The complaint asserted twelve causes of action:
The defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on December 27, 2017. Doc. No. 13. After discovery concluded, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims brought by the plaintiff on December 14, 2018. Doc. No. 55. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 58. The court heard oral argument on the motion on January 9, 2019. See Doc. No. 60. The defendants then filed a reply brief and a separate response to plaintiff's additional facts on January 14, 2019. Doc. Nos. 62, 63. Lastly, the plaintiff filed a sur-reply brief as to certain issues raised during oral argument on January 24, 2019. Doc. No. 68. On March 27, 2019, the parties dismissed the claims against the Does and Mayor Pawlowski by stipulation. Doc. No. 95.
The motion for summary judgment is ripe for disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review - Motions for Summary Judgment
A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Wright v. Corning ,
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett ,
"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter ,
B. Undisputed Material Facts
On May 2, 2016, at approximately 2:30 a.m., the Officers were dispatched to the
According to the defendants, witnesses informed several of the officers that Brandon lived at 830 North 9th Street (the "Residence") and that he ran up the alley towards his home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. Also according to the defendants, the victim informed the officers that Brandon ran into the home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. According to the plaintiff, the officers were never informed, at the time they approached the home, that Brandon was seen running into the house. Compare , Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("The victim stated that Brandon assaulted her and fled into Plaintiff's home."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("A genuine dispute exists. No witness told either Madison or Hendricks that the suspect 'fled towards the home through the alley.' ").
Armed with the information above, Officer Madison and, ultimately, the other officers, walked up to the Residence in search of Brandon.
Officer Madison then knocked on the front door of the Residence and the plaintiff answered by opening the solid door.
It is undisputed that at this time, Officer Madison's hand was holding the screen door open. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; see also Klein Dep. at 91 ("So in the meantime, my door, the screen door, is jugged. You know he [Officer Madison] had it in his hand."); Madison Dep. at 75 ("I held the door to keep her from closing it."). When the plaintiff refused to allow the Officers into her home, she attempted to close the screen door and end the encounter.
The parties dispute what occurred next. According to the defendants, Officer Madison tried to free his hand from the door and then the plaintiff punched him in the face. See Madison Dep. at 75 ("She then took both of her hands and forcefully closed it shutting my hand in the door. From then, I ripped the door open to get my hand out. And I stepped forward and she punched me in the face."), 94 ("Well, after I removed -- forced the door open and removed my hand, I stepped forward and she punched me in the face."). This prompted Officers Madison and Hendricks to approach the plaintiff and attempt to "detain her." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23.
After being placed in handcuffs, Officers Glenny and Madison placed the plaintiff in the back of Officer Madison's police car. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Klein Dep. at 146; see Madison Dep. at 128 (describing the plaintiff as being "placed in the rear side of my -- my vehicle by Officer Glenny. I opened the door and he placed her inside[ ]"). The plaintiff was later transported to the Allentown Police Department. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 28; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 28.
The plaintiff was subsequently "charged with aggravated assault, simple assault and harassment in connection with the incidents on May 2, 2016." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 30; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 30. The plaintiff successfully completed Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD"). Defs.' Facts at ¶ 35; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 35; see also Defs.' Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I ("Klein ARD") at 2, Doc. No. 56-9.
C. Analysis of the Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims
" Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' " Halsey v. Pfeiffer ,
In addressing the parties' arguments, the court first addresses whether the Officers have qualified immunity regarding the plaintiff's excessive force and unlawful search claims. Then, the court discusses the merits of the plaintiff's failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, denial of medical care, and due process violation claims.
1. Qualified Immunity: Excessive Force & Unlawful Search
The defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's section 1983 claims for excessive force and unlawful search. The Officers have qualified immunity if their conduct "does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan ,
[o]ne is whether the defendant's conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right. The other is whether the right at issue was clearly established when the conduct took place. [Courts] have discretion to address either inquiry first.
Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning ,
During this analysis, the court views the facts as most favorable to the non-moving party and "courts must take care not to define a case's 'context' in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions." Tolan v. Cotton ,
...either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. This is not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more general rule that a judge's function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In making that determination, a court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party.
Id. at 656-57 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
a. Excessive Force
To determine whether Officers Madison, Glenny, and Hendricks (collectively the "Arresting Officers") are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiff's excessive force claim, the court first determines whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff established a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
Reasonableness is determined objectively, "but should give appropriate scope to the circumstances of the police action, which are often 'tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.' " Groman ,
In the context of summary judgment, certain nuances arise. To the
Here, the parties do not dispute that the officers "seized" the plaintiff when they arrested her, thus, "the only question is whether it was unreasonable." Rivas ,
As to the force applied, the parties dispute what force was applied during the plaintiff's arrest. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25. Officers Madison and Hendricks both dispute that they "threw" the plaintiff over the barrier. Compare Hendricks Dep. at 90 ("Q. By somebody throwing her on a railing. A. She was not thrown.") and Madison Dep. at 122 ("Q. Was [the plaintiff's body] not placed against the banister? A. Absolutely not."), with Klein Dep. at 92 ("[Officers Madison and Hendricks] had me jerked over my concrete wall and I kept telling him they're hurting me, they're hurting me, and I'm screaming and telling these people to stop hurting me."). Officer Glenny admits only to helping Officer Hendricks handcuff the plaintiff. See Glenny Dep. at 63-64 ("Q. Why did you help him handcuff him [sic]? A. She was resisting and she was yelling at -- at all of us. And she was not -- she didn't cooperate and place her hands behind her back. She had her -- needed assistance with -- with getting her hands behind her back and handcuffed."). Whereas the plaintiff argues that the officers who transported her to the car caused her pain by lifting her off the ground while cuffed. Klein Dep. at 143-44.
The parties also dispute the nature of the plaintiff's behavior and demeanor during the entire incident. Evidence in the record supports two theories depending on whether the court believed the defendants or the plaintiff. Based on the record evidence cited by the defendants, the plaintiff was uncooperative to the point of violence, namely first slamming Officer Madison's hand in the door and then punching him in the face. See, e.g. , Madison Dep. at 117 ("She was very, very wild. She was swinging her arms around -- and just very uncooperative."). According to the plaintiff's testimony, four uniformed police officers tried to unlawfully enter her home, and she attempted prevent the unlawful search
As to the defendants' argument that the Arresting Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, even if there was a violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, the court cannot determine whether the Arresting Officers are entitled to the defense at this time. Both avenues to qualified immunity, i.e. , no violation or, if a violation, it is excused because the Arresting Officers made a reasonable mistake of law or fact, hinge on disputed facts (e.g. , whether the plaintiff punched Officer Madison, the degree to which the plaintiff resisted arrest, and the force applied during her arrest).
b. Illegal Search
To determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's illegal search claim, the court first asks whether a reasonable jury could find that the Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant. Here, the parties do not
i. Whether the Officers Violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Rights When They gEntered the Residence
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place tobe searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. When a search occurs without a warrant, it is "presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." See Parkhurst v. Trapp ,
"Examples of exigent circumstances include, but are not limited to, hot pursuit of a suspected felon, the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed, and danger to the lives of officers or others." United States v. Coles ,
"In determining whether exigent circumstances existed, [the court] must review 'the facts and reasonably discoverable information available to the officers at the time they took their actions and in making this determination consider the totality of the circumstances facing them.' " United States v. Jones ,
(1) the gravity of the crime that has been committed; (2) a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause based upon reasonably trustworthy information; (4) a strong belief that the suspect is in the premises; (5) "a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended"; and (6) peaceable entry, affording the suspect "an opportunity to surrender...without a struggle and thus to avoid the invasion of privacy involved in entry into the home."
United States v. Anderson ,
Application of the Dorman factors is fact intensive and difficult to generalize.
In the present case, a reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered the Residence without a warrant. The court addresses each Dorman factor in turn.
The first factor, the gravity of the crime, weighs in favor of finding that exigent circumstances privileged the search. The parties do not dispute that the Officers arrived at the scene in response to a violent crime, and the Officers acknowledge that they were investigating a violent crime and not a minor offense such as a traffic violation.
As to the second factor, the Officers did not have a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed. The victim did not report that the crime occurred with a weapon. Madison Dep. at 145. The Officers' only rationale that he may have been armed is the general assumption that someone who commits a crime may have access to weapons inside their home. Specifically, Officer Madison testified that "it was a concern" that Brandon may have "access to weapons in the home." Id. at 146. While this general assumption has some significance, law enforcement officers likely have (or could have) this same assumption in almost all circumstances involving individuals accused of assault. Cf. United States v. Butler ,
Concerning the third factor, the police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant of the Residence and an arrest warrant for Brandon. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti ,
Here, the Officers were responding to a 9-1-1 call wherein a witness reported that a male recently assaulted a female. See Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 3, Notes from 9-1-1 Calls at ECF p. 25 ("Um, I heard screaming outside. A woman was being attacked by a man. She said she was taking him home. When I came out, um, I seen him punch her right in her face."), Doc. No. 58-3.
As to the fourth factor, the Officers also had a reasonable belief that Brandon was at the Residence because of the information reported by the victim and witnesses. Even if the witnesses did not tell the Officers that Brandon ran into the home, it is reasonable to assume that it was his likely destination given the proximity of the Residence to the incident. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of finding exigent circumstances.
The fifth factor does not weigh in favor of justifying the Officers' entry into the Residence.
The sixth factor also does not weigh in favor of finding exigent circumstances. The Officers' entry into the home was not peaceable. While the Officers did attempt to gain the plaintiff's consent to enter, when she refused to let them inside, Officer Madison admits that he refused to allow her to close the door. Specifically, Officer Madison stated in his deposition that he "held the door to keep her from closing -- it was a screen door -- a storm door or screen door. I held the door to keep her from closing it so I could continue to speak with her." Madison Dep. at 74-75. Notably, in Officer Madison's "arrest narrative" he states that he "grabbed the screen door before it could be fully closed" which in turn caused his hand to get stuck and a struggle to ensue with the plaintiff. Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 4 ("Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps.") at ECF p. 36, Doc. No. 58-3.
The defendants seek to rely on Grayer v. Township of Edison ,
Lastly, this case does not fit within the "hot pursuit" exception. While the "hot pursuit" exception does not require a continuous chase or "an extended hue and cry in and about (the) public streets[ ]" typically "some type of chase" is required. Santana ,
ii. Whether the Officers are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Unlawful Search Claim
As stated above, the court finds that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Officers' violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant; therefore, the court must determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the court has already determined that a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights, the court moves onto the second question of whether the right at issue is clearly established.
The right to be free of warrantless searches of one's residence unless exigent circumstances apply is clearly established-"a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of 'exigent circumstances.' " Coolidge v. New Hampshire ,
The defendants also argue the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because "the situation, as perceived by the Defendants at the time was not so clear that a reasonable officer would conclude that exigent circumstances did not exist to enter the Plaintiff's home to search for her son."
As to their first argument, Grayer does not stand for the proposition cited by the defendants. In Grayer , police officers spotted Thomas Raiford ("Raiford") out in public.
The Third Circuit found that a "reasonable police officer could believe that the pursuit of Raiford into Grayer's home, even in the absence of the owner's consent, was constitutional[ ]" because "[p]olice officers had been chasing Raiford, for whom they had an arrest warrant, lost sight of him, had reason to believe he was in Grayer's apartment, and, apparently, saw him from the rear of the building at or around the time Anderko and Wheeler entered the building."
The defendants also offer no basis for why the Officers needed to immediately enter the Residence. The "common thread" between all exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement "is imminence-'the existence of a true emergency.' " Mallory ,
As to their second argument, that the Officers believed they were in "hot pursuit," this argument also fails. The defendants argue that because Brandon "assaulted a woman to the point of being unconscious and then fled the scene" and that "[w]itnesses identified who he was, where he lived, and where he had fled - Plaintiff's home[,]" the Officers were justified in believing they were in "hot pursuit" and could enter the home. Defs.' Br. at 28. This is not a reasonable mistake of law because every hot pursuit case involves "some sort of a chase." Santana ,
2. Remaining Section 1983 Claims: Failure to Intervene, Civil Conspiracy, Denial of Medical Care, and Fourth Amendment Due Process
The plaintiff brings four additional claims under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities: failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, denial of medical care, and a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court addresses each in turn.
a. Failure to Intervene
The plaintiff argues that the Officers failed to intervene to prevent the violation of her constitutional rights against excessive force and unlawful search. Compl. at ¶¶ 119-129. The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) there was no predicate constitutional violation, and (2) even if there was a violation, the officers had no "reasonable opportunity to intervene." Defs.' Br. at 11-12. The plaintiff argues that there are disputed issues of material fact with respect to the underlying violations and whether the respective defendants had an opportunity to intervene. Pl.'s Mem. at 11-12.
To be directly liable under a failure to intervene theory, (1) the plaintiff must have "demonstrate[d] that her underlying constitutional rights were violated[,]" Adams v. Officer Eric Selhorst ,
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the Officers failed to intervene with respect to two constitutional violations: excessive force and the illegal search of her Residence. First, for the reasons stated above, a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered her Residence and used excessive force in arresting her.
Officer Glenny observed Officers Madison and Hendricks restrain the plaintiff, helped Officer Madison handcuff the plaintiff, and assisted in taking her to Madison's squad car. Glenny Dep. at 62-63. A reasonable jury could find that because Officer Glenny was close enough to assist in her restraint, that he could have intervened to prevent the excessive force. Officer Glenny also went to the backyard of the Residence while certain other officers went inside. Glenny Dep. at 92. If Officer Glenny had time to stand guard in the plaintiff's backyard, a reasonable jury could find that he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the allegedly illegal search.
Officer Good, who the parties unfortunately did not depose, submitted an affidavit which indicates that he near the event and attests to personal knowledge as to what occurred on the porch and during the plaintiff's arrest. See generally Good Aff. at ¶¶ 4-13. The supplement to the "incident narrative" prepared by Officer Good also states that he went into the home with Officer Hendricks. Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps. at ECF p. 35. The reasonable inferences drawn from the record, i.e. , that he was in the area near the arrest and search, are sufficient to deny summary judgment as to the plaintiff's failure to intervene claims against Officer Good.
Officer Hendricks actively participated in restraining the plaintiff and could have intervened in Officer Madison's use of force.
Officer Madison was the primary actor in the arrest. As a result, a reasonable jury could find he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the any excessive force applied by Officers Glenny and Hendricks. While Officer Madison did not enter the home, it appears that he was on the scene for some time after the other officers restrained the plaintiff. As already stated, the plaintiff remained on the scene long enough for Brandon to be brought out of the house and placed under arrest, and Officer Madison had time to search for the keys to Brandon's car prior to transporting the plaintiff to the police station. Madison Dep. at 133-34. At bottom, the record supports the plaintiff's augment that each officer had the opportunity prevent the constitutional violations from occurring. Therefore, the court denies the request for summary judgment on this claim.
b. Civil Conspiracy
"To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state
Thus,
the rule is clear that the plaintiff must provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action. To show agreement, he must demonstrate that the state actors named as defendants in the[ ] complaint somehow reached an understanding to deny [the plaintiff] his rights, and in the absence of direct proof, that meeting of the minds or understanding or agreement to conspire can be infer[red] from circumstantial evidence. Such circumstantial evidence may include that the alleged conspirators did or said something...to create an understanding, the approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific parties to the agreement[,] the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy. And in the context of an alleged conspiracy among police officers, it may manifest as conversations between officers about the incident, allegedly distorted stories that emerged, an awareness of conflicting stories and irregularities in the series of official investigations into the incident.
Jutrowski ,
Here, the plaintiff argues two bases for her civil conspiracy claim: (1) an agreement to violate her Fourth Amendment rights based on a conversation between Officers Madison and Hendricks and (2) that the defendants fabricated evidence as part of a conspiracy to cover-up the constitutional violations committed during the arrest and search. Pl.'s Mem. at 13-14. As to her first argument, the plaintiff did not produce any record evidence of a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights other than testifying that prior to entering her home, Officer Hendricks allegedly turned to Officer Madison and said, "it's your call, Bud." Klein Dep. at 92. While the court finds this argument very weak, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the conversation's purpose, it is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Given the procedural posture, the court cannot hold, as a matter of law, that the conversation does not provide evidence of a civil conspiracy because to do so requires the court to credit disputed material facts, namely that the conversation never happened. According to the plaintiff, the two officers came to an agreement and then conducted a warrantless search of her home. It is plausible this conversation was an agreement to illegally enter the home in violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and the court cannot make a contrary factual finding on summary judgment. See Jutrowski ,
The plaintiff's second argument, while weakly supported by the record, also survives summary judgment. The plaintiff alleges that the Officers conspired to cover up the constitutional violations in this case by fabricating evidence, namely submitting false police reports. See Pl.'s Mem. at 14 ("In addition, there is evidence that the officers conspired to cover up their actions by submitting false police reports that significantly downplayed the amount of force they used against Klein."). The plaintiff also points to an allegedly false affidavit submitted by Officer Hendricks.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the incident reports support an argument that the Officers conspired to downplay the incident. For example, Officer Hendricks describes the Officers as asking "politely" to enter the home and the plaintiff as becoming "very short and increasingly angry." Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps. at ECF p. 40. Officer Hendricks also states that "K[l]ein escalated without reason even more when she suddenly grabbed the metal storm door and closed it on [Officer Madison's] hand."
c. Denial of Medical Care
The plaintiff argues that the Officers violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying her access to medical care during her pretrial detention, namely by hurting her shoulder while handcuffing her, handcuffing her too tightly, and failing to provide her medical treatment upon request at the police department holding cell.
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must
[f]irst,...set forth evidence of an objectively serious medical need. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro ,, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987). A medical need qualifies as "serious" for purposes of this analysis if, for example, "it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." 834 F.2d 326 Id. ...Second, a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan ,, 837, 511 U.S. 825 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). Moreover, whether or not a defendant's conduct amounts to "deliberate indifference has been described as a classic issue for the fact finder." See Armstrong v. Squadrito , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 , 577 (7th Cir. 1998) (cited by A.M. ex. rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr. , 152 F.3d 564 , 588 (3d Cir. 2004) ). 372 F.3d 572
Young v. Kazmerski ,
With respect to an arrestee, "a police officer [must]...provide medical care to an individual who was injured during the course of an arrest when the need 'is so obvious that a reasonably trained officer would recognize the necessity for attention.' " Bornstad ex rel. Estate of Bornstad v. Honey Brook Twp. , No. C.A. 03-CV-3822,
As to the first prong, whether the plaintiff suffers from a serious medical condition, courts have found certain obvious conditions, such as gunshot wounds, "serious medical conditions." See, e.g. , Sullivan v. Warminster Twp. ,
Here, the court is unable to determine whether the plaintiff's protests during the handcuffing incident sufficiently notified the Officers to the severity of her medical conditions because the material facts surrounding the incident are disputed. While it is undisputed that the plaintiff complained of shoulder pain to Officers Madison and Hendricks, and that they did not provide her with medical care,
d. Fabrication of Evidence: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
The defendants move for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for fabrication of evidence. The defendants argue that her "fabrication of evidence claim" is merely a "false arrest claim" hidden by "creative pleading." Defs. Br. at 19. As a result, the defendants argue Heck bars the claim, because success on her fabrication of evidence claim necessarily implicates her underlying criminal charges. Defs.' Br. at 21-22. In response, the plaintiff argues that the court should deny summary judgment because the Third Circuit in Halsey v. Pfeiffer ,
In Halsey , the Third Circuit held
that if a defendant has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted.
Halsey ,
a civil plaintiff alleging that he had been convicted in a criminal prosecution in which the prosecutor used fabricated evidence should not be permitted to survive a motion for summary judgment or for judgment as a matter of law unless he can demonstrate that the record supports a conclusion that the allegedly fabricated evidence was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal case. Moreover, testimony that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to have been wrong. Therefore, for example, a witness's misidentification should not be regarded as a fabrication in the absence of persuasive evidence supporting a conclusion that the proponents of the evidence were aware that the identification was incorrect, and thus, in effect, offered the evidence in bad faith. Accordingly, we expect that it will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot obtain a summary judgment in a civil action charging him with having fabricated evidence used in an earlier criminal case.
Halsey ,
At the summary judgment stage, "a civil plaintiff's fabricated evidence claim should not survive summary judgment unless he can demonstrate that the fabricated evidence 'was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal
As to the defendants' argument that Heck bars this claim because it is actually a malicious prosecution claim, the defendants' argument is partially correct. As described above, the plaintiff may bring a standalone cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Halsey ; however, Heck can bar standalone fabrication of evidence claims. See, e.g. , Ortiz v. N.J. State Police ,
Heck bars section 1983 actions which implicate the validity of an underlying criminal conviction unless said conviction has been invalidated. Heck ,
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
In practice, Heck requires a section 1983 plaintiff to have received a "favorable termination" before bringing claims which implicate their underlying criminal conviction (e.g. , false arrest, malicious prosecution). Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty. ,
In the present case, Heck bars the plaintiff's fabrication of evidence claim because (1) it implicates the validity of her criminal charges, and (2) she did not receive a favorable termination in her criminal proceeding. Under the first prong of Heck , her claim implicates the validity of her criminal charges because it seeks to establish that she was incorrectly charged based on fabricated evidence. Ortiz ,
The plaintiff brings two Monell claims: (1) supervisory liability-policymaker liability against Chief Morris, in his individual capacity, and (2) municipal liability against the City. See Compl. at 43 (Count VII), 51 (VIII).
a. Supervisory Liability
"Individual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under § 1983 if it is shown that such defendants, 'with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.' " A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. ,
The defendants ask the court to dismiss the official capacity claim against Chief Morris because it is duplicative of the plaintiff's claim against the City, Defs.' Br. at 37, however, the plaintiff's claim is brought against Chief Morris in his individual capacity. Compl. at 43. Unlike official capacity claims brought against policy-makers and supervisors, individual capacity claims are not duplicative of Monell claims against a locality. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. ,
b. Municipal Liability
The defendants seek summary judgment on the plaintiff's Monell claim against the City because she allegedly failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation and, in the alternative, because the City's policies and practices did not constitute deliberate indifference that caused her harms. Defs.' Br. at 29-36. The plaintiff argues that she has produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her Monell claim, namely that her expert report shows how the City has failed to train police officers to avoid the constitutional violations that she suffered and that she has identified a constitutionally deficient policy. Pl.'s Mem. at 26-28.
Local governments can be held liable under section 1983"when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible for under § 1983." Monell ,
Here, the plaintiff produced an expert report in support of her claim that the City's policies are deficient. See Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 5, Expert Op. Report: John G. Peters, Jr. ("Peters Rep.") at ECF pp. 43-72, Doc. No. 58-3. As to the first prong of Monell liability, i.e. , a violation of an underlying constitutional or statutory right, for the reasons stated above, a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights (excessive force and illegal search). As to the second prong, whether municipal policies and/or practices caused these violations, the plaintiff has produced evidence of policies which she alleges are constitutionally deficient and presented arguments, via expert, why those policies caused the violations she
D. State Law Claims
The plaintiff brings several state law claims: assault and battery against Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny (Count IX); state constitutional violations against the Officers (Count X); trespass against the Officers (Count XI); state civil conspiracy against the Officers (Count XII). Compl. at 60-64. As to the plaintiff's state law tort claims against certain individual Officers, the defendants argue (1) the defendants did not commit such torts because their actions are privileged and (2) the respective Officers are entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PSTCA"). The defendants also seek summary judgment as to the plaintiff's "claim" for punitive damages.
1. State Law Torts: Assault, Battery, Civil Conspiracy, and Trespass
For each of the plaintiff's state law tort claims, the defendants assert Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PTSCA") immunity.
[t]he Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act grants the City governmental immunity from liability for any damages resulting from an injury to a person or property caused by any act of the City, its employee, or any other person, except as specifically provided for under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542. This immunity extends to an employee of the City who is liable for civil damages caused by acts which are within the scope of his office or duties. An employee may be indemnified for the payment of a judgment arising from a lawsuit when the employee was acting, or reasonably believed that he was acting, within the scope of hisduties. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8548(a). An employee's immunity does not extend to acts that are judicially determined to be crimes, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 8550.
Renk v. City of Pittsburgh ,
Aside from the exceptions for criminal activity, fraud, "actual malice, or willful conduct[,]" there are eight enumerated exceptions to PTSCA immunity: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody or control of personal property; (3) real property; (4) trees, traffic control and street lighting; (5) utility services facilities; (6) streets; (7) sidewalks; and (8) care, custody, or control of animals. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b)(1)-(8).
a. Assault & Battery
The plaintiff argues that Officers Hendricks, Madison, and Glenny committed the state torts of assault and battery during her arrest. An assault constitutes "an intentional attempt by force to do injury to the person of another and a battery is committed whenever the violence menaced in an assault is actually done, though in ever so small a degree, upon the person." Renk ,
Here, for the reasons stated above with respect to the plaintiff's excessive force claim, the material factual disputes preclude summary judgment as to whether the Officers applied reasonable force during her arrest. Because the court cannot determine whether such force was reasonable, without accepting disputed facts, the court is also precluded from determining whether the Officers are entitled to summary judgment because their actions were not "willful" pursuant to the PTSCA. Cf. Rodriguez v. Panarello ,
b. Trespass
Under Pennsylvania law, " '[o]ne who intentionally enters land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so is liable' " for trespass. Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. ,
c. Civil Conspiracy
The plaintiff also brings a claim for state law civil conspiracy based on the same grounds as her section 1983 civil conspiracy claim. See Pl.'s Mem. at 35 ("For the reasons set forth in the civil conspiracy / federal claims discussed above, the motion for summary judgment must be denied."). Under Pennsylvania law,
[i]n order to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show "that two or more persons combined or agreed with intent to do an unlawful act or to do an otherwise lawful act by unlawful means. Proof of malice, i.e., an intent to injure, is essential in proof of a conspiracy." Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co. ,, 211, 488 Pa. 198 , 472 (1979) (citations omitted). 412 A.2d 466
Skipworth by Williams v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. ,
Here, as discussed above, while the plaintiff presents a weak claim for civil conspiracy, disputed issues of material fact prevent the court from granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants at this time. Therefore, the court denies the request for summary judgment on the plaintiff's state law civil conspiracy claim.
2. Violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution Claim
The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's state constitutional law claim because there is no private right of action under the state constitution for monetary damages. Defs.' Br. at 39. The plaintiff argues in response that, to the extent she seeks non-monetary relief, the court should deny summary judgment. Pl.'s Mem. at 33-34.
"No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution." Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist .,
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated her rights under Article 1, Section 1,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's (1) section 1983 claims for (a) excessive force, (b) illegal search, (c) failure to intervene, (d) civil conspiracy, and (e) denial of medical care against the Officers; (2) section 1983 derivative liability claims against Chief Morris and the City; (3) state law claims against the individual Officers (i.e. , assault and battery, trespass, civil conspiracy) and her claim for injunctive relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court will (1) dismiss without prejudice the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on fabrication of evidence because Heck bars this claim and (2) grant summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The parties may re-raise the following arguments at trial: qualified immunity on excessive force, PTSCA immunity as to the plaintiff's state law tort claims, and the plaintiff's request for a punitive damages instruction.
A separate order follows.
Notes
The plaintiff also names fictitious defendants for each claim in the complaint. The parties ultimately dismissed any claims against the fictitious defendants by stipulation. See Doc. Nos. 94, 95. As such, the court omits reference to the fictitious defendants in describing the plaintiff's causes of action.
Although the parties dispute most of the facts relating to the events on May 2, 2016, the court has construed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as she is the party opposing summary judgment. See Green v. N.J. State Police ,
The parties dispute what the witnesses told Officers Madison and Hendricks, but not that there were two witnesses or that Officers Madison and Hendricks conducted interviews. Compare Defs.' Facts at ¶ 12 ("Two (2) witnesses on the scene reported that the individual who had assaulted the victim lived at the Plaintiff's home and had fled towards the home through the alley."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 12 (stating that "[n]o witness told either Madison or Hendricks that the suspect 'fled towards the home through the alley[,]' " but citing to record evidence indicating that Officers Madison and Hendricks both interviewed witnesses on subject night).
The parties dispute which Officers arrived initially at the house. See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 15 ("A genuine dispute exists. It is contested that Officer Good proceeded to the Plaintiff's house and knocked on the door with Officers Madison and Glenny."). However, ultimately all four officers arrived at her home and were present during the incident with the plaintiff.
It appears from the record that Officers Madison and Hendricks walked up onto the porch and Officers Glenny and Good remained nearby but did not walk onto the porch. See, e.g. , Madison Dep. at 40 (describing Officer Good as standing "at the bottom of the -- steps watching it, you know, occur"); Defs.' Facts, Ex. C, Dep. of Jacoby Glenny ("Glenny Dep.") at 49 ("When I got there, there were officers on the porch of the Klein resident-residence speaking with Klein at the front door."), Doc. No. 56-3.
It appears that after the plaintiff refused to allow the Officers into her home, Officer Madison proceeded to try and glean information about Brandon from the plaintiff. See Madison Dep. at 83 ("Q. And when she said get an arrest warrant, you did not do anything to get an arrest warrant. Correct? A. Besides getting his name and date of birth or attempting to[?] Q. Right. A. Um-hm.").
The plaintiff does not respond to the defendant's factual assertion and instead makes legal arguments about the plaintiff's constitutional right to close her door. The court considers the fact undisputed because the parties do not appear to dispute that she attempted to close the door, but rather, whether she had such a right. See Pl.'s Mem. at 3 (stating that plaintiff "began to close the door" after declining to provide consent).
It appears that the plaintiff was left unattended, but secured, in Officer Madison's vehicle while he went to look for the victim's car keys. Madison Dep. at 128-29. After his search proved unsuccessful, he drove the plaintiff to the police station. Id. at 133-34.
As to Officer Good, the defendants argue that he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not participate in the arrest, Defs.' Br. at 4 n.1; however, the plaintiff did not bring a claim for excessive force under section 1983 against Officer Good. See Compl. at 26 (bringing claim for excessive force "[a]gainst Individual Defendants Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny").
The record is unclear which officers she is referring to in this testimony. See Madison Dep. at 117 (describing Officer Glenny as assisting with handcuffing plaintiff).
To determine whether an officer made a "reasonable mistake" with respect to their use of force, the Third Circuit considers the Graham and Sharrar factors because the factors "are well-recognized and that when an officer applies them in an unreasonable manner, he is not entitled to qualified immunity." Green ,
The defendants may re-raise their qualified immunity defense at trial. See Geist v. Ammary ,
The defendants ask the court to grant summary judgment as to Officer Madison and Officer Glenny because they allegedly did not enter the plaintiff's home. Defs.' Br. at 7 n.3. The plaintiff does not address this argument. In actions brought under section 1983,
[a] defendant...must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior . Parratt v. Taylor ,, 537 n. 3, 451 U.S. 527 , 1913 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1908 (1981) ; Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 , 1082 (3d Cir. 1976). Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. 546 F.2d 1077
Rode v. Dellarciprete ,
As to Officer Madison, it is disputed whether he crossed the threshold of the plaintiff's home while he was standing at the doorway. See Klein Dep. at 91-92 (describing Officer Madison as coming "into my doorway, pulls me out of the doorway"). Therefore, the court declines to grant summary judgement as to Officer Madison for lack of personal involvement. As to Officer Glenny, he testified that he did not enter the home after assisting Officer Madison with placing the plaintiff in the police car. See Glenny Dep. at 92 ("Q. Did you enter the house without a search warrant? A. No. Q. You were at the back door? A. I was at the -- back of the house and the yard."). However, Officer Glenny testified that he was aware that a search of the plaintiff's home was ongoing, and he participated in the investigation by going to the back door and standing in the backyard. Id. at 92-95. The backyard of one's home is generally considered to be "curtilage." Estate of Smith v. Marasco ,
At oral argument, the defendants also argued that the plaintiff's ARD proceeding should preclude her from asserting an unlawful search claim under the Fourth Amendment because Heck v. Humphrey ,
The court also notes that while "the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe police from seeking citizens' voluntary assistance in discovering or investigating crime[,]" United States v. Butler ,
"The Supreme Court has referred to Dorman as 'a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances.' " Anderson ,
See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden ,
Courts have concluded that law enforcement officers should not rely on the hot pursuit exception for minor criminal offenses. See, e.g. , Zavec ,
The plaintiff's exhibits are attached in a single document. The court refers to the ECF page number for ease of reference.
The court notes that this factor is fairly duplicitous with the general "hot pursuit" doctrine. Therefore, the court addresses whether there was any element of a "chase" separately from this factor.
This report is dated as "reviewed" by Officer Madison on May 5, 2016. In a report dated May 2, 2016, Officer Madison states that "Klein attempted to close the screen door, to which I was able to grab it." Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps. at ECF p. 39.
What the Officers were told at the time they approached the house is contested. The plaintiff argues that they were never informed that he ran into the house and only Officer Good's affidavit supports that fact. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 (referencing Officer Good's affidavit for statement that victim stated that Brandon fled into Residence); Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("It is not contested that Officer Good has made this statement. It is contested that this occurred.").
The court notes there are several disputed facts related to the search. As indicated earlier in this opinion, the parties dispute whether anyone told the Officers that Brandon went into the Residence. Additionally, the Officers provided conflicting testimony about whether witnesses told them Brandon ran into the Residence. Compare Madison Dep. at 51 (testifying that witness at scene told him that Brandon "ran in that direction" and "pointed to a house"), with Defs.' Facts, Ex. D, Aff. of Officer Michael Good ("Good Aff.") at ¶ 5 ("The victim, who was outside in her car, advised that a male assaulted her and ran into 830 N. 9th Street - Plaintiff's home."), Doc. No. 56-4. These facts are not material to the court's analysis because, even under the Officer's description of the facts, it was not a reasonable mistake of law or fact to believe they had exigent circumstances to enter the house.
Officer Hendricks testified to this point in his deposition:
Q. "[i]f you initially wanted to de-escalate things, why didn't you simply secure the residence before, you know, the -- the -- the door, you know, caught Madison's hand, if it did, or before there was contact with his face. Why didn't you say to Mrs. Klein, [a]ll right, you know, we'll go get a warrant as you've demanded?"
A. Why didn't I do that initially?
Q. Yeah.
A. We tried to talk to her about the fact that we just had someone run in and we wanted to -- we wanted to -- we wanted to be allowed to look for him .
Hendricks Dep. at 98-99 (emphasis added).
Concerning the plaintiff's failure to intervene to prevent the unlawful search claim, the defendants argue that the court should grant summary judgment because Officers Madison and Glenny had no "reasonable opportunity" to intervene because they were placing the plaintiff into Officer Madison's vehicle during the search. Defs.' Br. at 12- 13. The record is unclear as to what occurred after the plaintiff's arrest and whether the Arresting Officers could have intervened to prevent the search of the home. For example, the plaintiff remained on the scene long enough for Brandon to be brought out of the house and placed under arrest, and Officer Madison had time to search for the keys to Brandon's car prior to transporting the plaintiff to the police station. Madison Dep. at 133, 134. Because it does not appear so implausible that the officers near the allegedly illegal search could have prevented the search once the plaintiff was detained, summary judgment is denied.
Unless the plaintiff refers to Officer Hendrick's incident report as his "affidavit," the affidavit does not appear to be in the record.
The court notes that the Officers can be sued for deliberate indifference to medical needs for their own behavior. See, e.g. , Williams v. City of Scranton , Civ. A. No. 3:10-CV-388,
The court notes that a post-hoc diagnosis cannot be used to prove that the medical condition is "serious" because the diagnosis must occur "before the defendant's alleged deliberate indifference[.]"Mattern ,
Both Officers Hendricks and Madison testified during their depositions that the plaintiff stated that her shoulder hurt; however, none of the Officers sought to provide the plaintiff with medical care. See Madison Dep. at 135-36 ("But she was -- she did state -- that's when she said her shoulder hurt. So I let her brace herself off my arm. But she said she didn't want any help, that she would do it herself. And I insisted on helping her get out of the vehicle."); Hendricks Dep. at 82 ("Q. Do you remember her -- her saying that her -- her shoulder was hurting from what the police were doing?...A. I remember that she said later on that we hurt her shoulder. Q. When did she say that? A. I believe she said that in [the] cell block.").
The Officers that were deposed (Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny) all testified that during the arrest the plaintiff was screaming and yelling, but that they generally did not recall what she was "yelling" about. See generally Madison Dep. at 124 ("No. She never said I hurt -- I'm hurting her. But I don't recall anything about her -- I don't recall."); Hendricks Dep. at 90 ("Q. Do you recall her yelling the handcuffs were hurting her? A. No."); Glenny Dep. at 66 ("I heard her yelling. But I -- I don't recall what she said."). The plaintiff argues that those yells were for help and for the officers to be gentle because of her shoulder injury and/or she was in pain. Klein Dep. at 142-43 ("Q. What were you yelling? A. That they were hurting me.").
To the extent the plaintiff intends to argue at trial that the Officers are responsible for the police department's denial of medical care while she was in the holding cell because the plaintiff allegedly requested treatment for her stomach injury, this claim fails because the plaintiff does not state that the Officers knew of her request to the unnamed official, therefore, his/her conduct cannot be held to show the "state of mind" of the Officers. See Innis v. Wilson ,
At the outset, the court notes that the plaintiff was neither convicted nor acquitted; instead, she participated in ARD. Whether an individual who was charged, but not convicted or acquitted, can bring a standalone Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim is an open question in the Third Circuit. However, district courts in the Third Circuit that have previously addressed the issue have found that a conviction or acquittal is not required. See Castellani v. City of Atl. City , Civil No. 13-5848 (JBS/AMD),
The court agrees with the reading of Black described in Castellani , namely that "[t]here is no requirement under Black that the defendant in the criminal case (plaintiff here) must have faced trial."
The court also notes that the plaintiff has not established how the fabricated evidence impacted her criminal charges and generally fails to identify with specificity which evidence in the record is fabricated. See Halsey ,
When a court disposes of a claim on the basis of Heck , even at the summary judgment stage, it should be a dismissal without prejudice. See Schreane v. Marr ,
The defendants address only an official capacity claim against Chief Morris, see Defs.' Br. at 28 ("Plaintiff names Keith Morris in his "official" capacity as the (former) Chief of the Allentown Police Department, former Mayor Edwin Pawlowski in his "official" capacity as the Mayor of the City of Allentown."); however, the plaintiff sued Chief Morris exclusively in his individual capacity. See Compl. at 43 ("Supervisory Liability-Policymaker Liability Against Defendants Pawlowski, Morris and Does, Individually"). To the extent the plaintiff raised an official capacity claim against Chief Morris, summary judgment is granted with respect to that claim because it is duplicative of the Monell claim against the City. See Brandon v. Holt ,
The record also includes the City's Search and Seizure Policy and Arrest Procedures Policy along with the individual officers' training records. See generally Defs.' Facts, Ex. N, Doc. No. 56-14; Defs.' Facts, Ex. O, Doc. No. 56-15; Defs.' Facts, Ex. P, Doc. No. 56-16.
Because "punitive damages" is not a claim, but rather a remedy, the court will defer ruling on this until after trial and the parties may re-raise this argument during the charge conference based on the evidence presented at trial.
The plaintiff also argues that the defendants are not entitled to PTSCA immunity because she also seeks injunctive relief and PTSCA immunity provides immunity from suit solely for damages. Pl.'s Mem. at 35. As described below, the court is unable to determine whether the defendants are entitled to PTSCA immunity because such analysis hinges on disputed issues of material fact. Therefore, the court declines to address this argument at the present time.
Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.").
Pa. Const. art. I, § 8 ("The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.").
Pa. Const. art. I, § 9 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. The use of a suppressed voluntary admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a person may be permitted and shall not be construed as compelling a person to give evidence against himself.").