Klein v. Affiliated Group, Inc.Klein v. Affiliated Group, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Dina Klein’s (Klein or Plaintiff) Second Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 51) (Motion to Compel). For the reasons below, the Court denies the Motion to Compel.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Case Background
The present action relates to Defendants’ alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,
As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, on November 20, 2017, Defendant The Affiliated Group, Inc. (Affiliated), a debt collector, attempted to collect a debt from Klein arising out of health care goods or services provided by North Memorial Health Care (North Memorial), providing her a billing statement for two separate accounts totaling $1,084.35. (Dkt. No. 48 ¶ 7.)
B. Discovery at Issue
On November 29, 2018, Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendants’ counsel, via email, with PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS (SET II) (Set II). (Dkt. Nos. 54-1; 54-2.) Defendants assert they never expressly consented to electronic service in this case. (Dkt. No. 56 at 12.) Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. Set II of discovery contained a single document request—Request No. 6:
6. Produce a copy of all written communication between Credit Management LP and patients of North Memorial Health Care prior to October 30, 2018, where the patient had previously received written communication from the Affiliated Group, Inc.
(Dkt. No. 54-1 (hereinafter Request No. 6) (emphasis added).)
On January 9, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel sent an email to Defendants asserting that the period for objections had expired, and seeking confirmation that Defendants would produce all the responsive documents. . . . (Dkt. No. 54-2.) On January 10, 2019, Defendants served the following response and objections to Request No. 6, via email, on Plaintiff:
RESPONSE: Defendants object to this request as irrelevant and not proportional to the needs to of the case. Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks confidential and proprietary information. Defendants object to this request as irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant objects to this request as it seek [sic] confidential and private information of non-parties. Defendant is withholding documents responsive to this request.
(Dkt. No. 54-3 (emphasis in original).)
On January 28, 2019, Defendants served on Plaintiff the following amended response and objections to Request No. 6, via email and U.S. Mail:
AMENDED RESPONSE: Defendants object to this request as irrelevant and not proportional to the needs to of the case. Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks confidential and proprietary information. Defendants object to this request as irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants object to this request as it seeks confidential and private information of non-parties. Additionally, Defendants are unable to respond to this request as written because Defendants do not have a way to determine who received actual communication.
(Dkt. No. 54-5 (emphasis in original).)
The parties were unable to resolve their dispute as part of the meet and confer process. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel followed. The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Compel on February 22, 2019. (Dkt. No. 58.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Relevancy encompasses any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in this case. Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). While
Further, as set forth above, not only must information sought in discovery be relevant, it must also be proportional to the needs of the case.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview of the Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel asserts as follows:
Plaintiff’s request for production seeks letters sent by Defendants to patients of North Memorial Health Care prior to October 30, 2018. October 30, 2018 is the date of the signature by Credit Management, LP on the alleged agreement between North Memorial Health Care and Credit Management, LP. The request is further limited to letters sent to consumer
in the same situation as Plaintiff – consumers who had previously been sent collection letters by The Affiliated Group Inc.
(Dkt. No. 53 at 1.)
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that the letters sent to North Memorial patients by Credit Management who also received previous collection letters from Affiliated are relevant to issues in this case because: (1) ‘the frequency and persistence of such noncompliance by the debt collector’ is relevant to the amount of statutory damages.
As to Defendants’ objections, Plaintiff argues: (1) that any objections have been waived because they are untimely; (2) the objections are improper boilerplate objections; and (3) the discovery at issue does not implicate concerns under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) because the Protective Order (Dkt. No. 28) in place provides sufficient protection to non-party patients of North Memorial. (Id. at 10-13.)
Defendants respond that the Motion to Compel should be denied because (1) the discovery sought by Plaintiff is not proportional to the needs of this case in that it would
Plaintiff’s counsel provided additional detail about the proposed survey during the February 22 hearing.1 At the hearing (for the first time), Plaintiff provided the Court with a copy of a survey sent to consumers in Dakowa v. MSW Capital, LLC, No. 16-cv-2753 (ADM/DTS) (D. Minn.), regarding interlocking discovery2 received from a creditor (reproduced below):
Plaintiff’s counsel explained that they proposed to use the documents produced in response to Request No. 6 to identify non-party patients of North Memorial who had received N41 and G41 correspondence3 and send a survey drafted by Plaintiff’s counsel questioning whether the recipient was confused by the receipt of such correspondence along with a cover letter from their office. The cover letter would explain that the Court had ordered that a letter sent to the recipient by Credit Management be produced to Plaintiff, and would ask the patient to complete and return
In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel represented that an unidentified number of the consumers who received the survey in Dakowa contacted Plaintiff’s counsel and volunteered serve as supporting witnesses in that case.7 When the Court asked counsel what he would say to a North Memorial patient who contacted him to say that the patient had received the letter at issue and asked what can we do about it?, counsel stated that he would probably provide information about the present lawsuit and if they asked do we have a remedy based on this letter?, his response would be to encourage them to talk to legal counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel did not believe advising the North Memorial patients to contact legal counsel if they contacted him would violate the Protective Order in this case because those patients had a right to bring a lawsuit.
B. Waiver of Objections
The Court concludes that Defendants have not waived their objections to Request No. 6. Pursuant to
Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to serve their objections within 30 days from November 29, 2018, the date on which Plaintiff emailed Request No. 6 to Defendants’ counsel. Defendants counter that their objections are not untimely because they never consented to service of discovery via email. (Dkt. No. 56 at 11-12.) In support of their waiver argument, Plaintiff relies on the Electronic Case Filing Procedures Guide for the District Court of Minnesota (ECF Filing Guide),8 section D(8), for the proposition that parties consent to the electronic service of all pleadings, including discovery, by registering for the District of Minnesota’s Electronic Case Filing system (ECF). (Dkt. No. 53 at 2 n.1.) The provision relied upon by Plaintiff is as follows:
Registration as a participant in the Electronic Filing System constitutes consent to electronic service of all documents in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal procedure.
ECF Filing Guide, Section D(8) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s argument ignores the fact that the introduction section to the ECF Filing Guide makes it evident that it pertains to electronic filings with the Court and the service of those electronically filed documents:
Unless otherwise permitted by these administrative procedures, by local rules, or by a general order of the court, or unless otherwise specifically authorized by the assigned District or Magistrate Judge, all documents [] submitted for filing in civil cases in this district on or after May 17, 2004, no matter when a case was originally filed, must be filed electronically as Portable Document Format (PDF) files using the Electronic Case Filing System (ECF).
ECF Filing Guide, Section I(A) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
sending it to a registered user by filing it with the court’s electronic-filing system or sending it by other electronic means that the person consented to in writing--in either of which events service is complete upon filing or sending. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
Even assuming that service by email was proper, the Court concludes that Defendants have not waived their objections. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the party’s failure to object is excused by the court for good cause shown. See Cargill, 284 F.R.D. at 424. In this case, the discovery was served via email on November 29, 2018. This would have given Defendants until December 31, 2018 to object. See
C. Relevancy to the Amount of Statutory Damages
Plaintiff argues that letters to non-party patients of North Memorial go to the frequency and persistence of Credit Management’s alleged noncompliance with the FDCPA, which in turn is relevant to the amount of statutory damages. (Dkt. No. 54 at 5.) Courts are authorized to award up to $1,000.00 in statutory damages per plaintiff for any violation of the FDCPA. See
Other courts have concluded that whether a debt collector sends similar communications to third-party consumers is relevant to the the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector element under
D. Relevancy to Bona Fide Error Defense
As mentioned previously, Plaintiff also argues that Request No. 6 seeks relevant information regarding the frequency of Defendants’ alleged violations because it is relevant to the bona fide error defense asserted by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 53 at 2.) In particular, Plaintiff relied on the fact that, Defendants assert the frequency of the FDCPA violation (letters to similarly situated consumers) is relevant to whether the violation was ‘not intentional’ and whether the procedures were reasonably adapted to prevent the error. (Id. at 7.) Indeed, Defendants have asserted as part of their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint the following affirmative defense:
Any violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error within the meaning of
15 U.S.C. § 1692k .
(Dkt. No. 50 at 4-5.)
The FDCPA includes a narrow carve-out to the general rule of strict liability, known as the bona fide error defense.
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
Courts have concluded that evidence that a debt collector took similar actions with respect to other debtors is relevant to a defendant’s bona fide error defense. See Mohr v. Sec. Credit Servs., LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 179, 183-84 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) ([T]he Court agrees with plaintiff that the complaints may lead to discoverable material relevant to defendants’ bona fide error defense.); Strom v. Nat’l Enter. Sys., Inc., No. 09-CV-72A(F), 2010 WL 1533383, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010) (Plaintiff may also use such previous multiple violations [BBB and attorneys general complaints] to negate Defendant’s bona fide clerical error defense.); but see, Cusumano, 1998 WL 673833, at *3 (Cusumanos do not persuasively explain how NRB’s actions with respect to others would tend to prove whether NRB did or did not make a bona fide error in its actions with respect to the Cusumanos.) While the Court agrees that the number of similar letters to non-party consumers may be relevant to whether the violation was not intentional and whether Defendants’ procedures were reasonably adapted to prevent the error, the issue of intent and procedures (not the identity of the recipients of the collection letters) is what bears on Defendants’ conduct. See Hoch v. Mid-Minnesota Mgmt. Servs. Inc., No. CV 15-2445 ADM/LIB, 2016 WL 386037, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2016) ([A] debt collector’s intent is irrelevant unless the debt collector can satisfy the bona fide error defense under
Plaintiff has not explained why she needs copies of the actual correspondence to rebut Defendants’ bona fide error defense. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that, as with
E. Consumer Confusion
Plaintiff represented that she needs the letters to obtain the names and addresses of the North Memorial patients that received collection letters from both Affiliated and Credit Management for purposes of sending a survey directed to consumer confusion to those patients. The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from asserting any ‘false, deceptive, or misleading representation,’ or using any ‘unfair or unconscionable means,’ to attempt to collect a debt. Coyne v. Midland Funding LLC, 895 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing
The objective element of reasonableness is often decided as a matter of law without reliance on survey or other extrinsic evidence. For example, courts need not look at extrinsic evidence where the representations at issue are on their face not misleading or deceptive. See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 800 (7th Cir. 2009) (where cases involve statements that plainly, on their face, are not misleading or deceptive, courts need not look to extrinsic evidence to determine whether consumers were confused.); see also Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2002) (We conclude that the VA’s ‘only alternative’ statement is not literally false. Even if it were deemed to be literally false, however, it would not mislead because it effectively conveys the consequences of failing to sign and return the VA. We conclude as a matter of law that the statement does not violate
However, courts have concluded that where a case involves statements that are not plainly misleading or deceptive but might possibly mislead or deceive the unsophisticated consumer, extrinsic evidence, such as consumer surveys, are probative to whether unsophisticated consumers do in fact find the challenged statements misleading or deceptive. See Ruth, 577 F.3d at 801 (string citation omitted); see also Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, 825 F.3d 317, 322-23 (7th Cir. 2016); Campbell v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, L.P., No. 4:12CV00289AGF, 2013 WL 1282348, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2013)
Defendants do not argue that extrinsic evidence such as surveys are not relevant to whether the hypothetical unsophisticated consumer would be misled or deceived by the communications from Defendants to Plaintiff at issue. Instead, Defendants argue that it is unreasonable to force them to spend the time and money required to produce these letters (1) when Plaintiff has given no indication that she would be able to conduct a survey based on the information obtained from the letters that is actually admissible because she failed to retain an expert to conduct the survey and (2) due to the confidentiality and privacy issues raised by HIPAA. (Dkt. No. 56 at 10-11.)
Courts have concluded that confusion surveys, including those conducted in the FDCPA context, are a form of expert testimony. See Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) ([S]urvey evidence in debt-collection . . . cases must comply with the principles of professional survey research; if it does not, it is not even admissible, . . . let alone probative of deception.) (citations omitted); Riel v. Immediate Credit Recovery Inc., No. 17-CV-440-JPS, 2018 WL 502659, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018) (FDCPA case) (citing DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., 599 F.3d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 2010))
Plaintiff relies on U.S. Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz’s decision in Dakowa where he concluded that allowing Dakowa access to past cases involving ‘interlocking discovery’ is relevant to his claim that such requests are by nature confusing and violate the FDCPA. (Dkt. No. 53 at 9; Dkt. No. 54-4 at 13.) In Dakowa, the plaintiff sought via interrogatories a list of all cases—filed and unfiled—in which the defendants served interlocking discovery on debtors in state legal actions during the previous twelve months. (Dkt. No. 54-4 at 12.) Plaintiff’s counsel asserted at the February 22 hearing that the survey he provided the Court was ultimately issued to non-party debtors in
Plaintiff has cited no case where a court ordered the type of discovery she seeks—copies of letters containing HIPAA protected information—for the purpose of sending a survey drafted by an attorney to non-party patients who had received the letters so the attorney could collect the number of instances of consumer confusion. When considering the proportionality factors, the Court finds the likely benefit of Plaintiff’s proposed discovery is outweighed by the burden and expense the discovery would impose on Defendants. Based on the available information before the Court, the likely benefit of ordering Defendants to produce the requested correspondence would be an unknown number of persons potentially willing to testify at trial that they were confused by correspondence similar to that received by Plaintiff, and confusion data generated from an attorney-drafted survey and analyzed without the benefit of an expert.
Further, setting aside the burden and expense imposed on Defendants in collecting and producing the requested documents, the Court is persuaded by Defendants’ arguments that many of the potentially thousands of non-party patients who would receive a cover letter and proposed survey inquiring about correspondence relating to unpaid medical debt might well have concerns about whether Affiliated, Credit Management, and/or North Memorial handled their protected health information as required by HIPAA, resulting in unwarranted negative consequences for Defendants and North Memorial12—not to mention anxiety on the part of the patients caused by receiving a letter and survey about their medical debt that refers to a court order.13 See Beseke, 2018 WL 6040016, at *3 (quoting
IV. ORDER
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
- Plaintiff Dina Klein’s Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 51) is DENIED.
- Plaintiff may propound a single interrogatory to Defendants (only to the extent that Plaintiff has not already sought such information through the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Credit Management or any other form of discovery), seeking the number of North Memorial patients who received N41 and G41 letters before October 30, 2018 who had previously been sent collection letters by Affiliated. The Court will extend the
inherent risk that Plaintiff will violate, albeit not intentionally, the Protective Order.
DATED: March 22, 2019
s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT
United States Magistrate Judge