No. 34638 | Ct. Cl. | Mar 20, 1922
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
The question for decision is whether from the facts there arises the implication- of a contract, by which the Government agreed to pay $5,000, the value of the shovel, as for a taking of the property of plaintiffs for public use.
The law upn the subject is well settled. In a late case the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Mr. Justice McKenna have said: “It is to be remembered that to bind the Government there must be implication of a contract to pay, but the circumstances may rebut that implication.” John Horstmann Co. case, 257 U., S. 138. And in the Tempel case, 248 U.S. 121" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1918-12-09" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/tempel-v-united-states-99236?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99236">248 U. S. 121, 129, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandéis, say: “If the plaintiff can recover, it must be upon an implied contract. For, under the Tucker Act, the consent of the United States to be sued is (so far as here material) limited to claims founded upon any contract, express or implied; and a remedy for claims sounding in tort is expressly denied.” In Ball Engineering. Co. v. White & Co., 250 U.S. 46" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1919-05-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ball-engineering-co-v-j-g-white--co-99391?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99391">250 U. S. 46, 57, it was held that the facts rebutted the implication of a contract that the Government would pay, which, it is said in that case, must be the basis of its liability. What, then are the facts ? These have been stipulated by the parties, and from this
The contractor undertook to furnish the labor, materials, equipment, etc., necessary for the completion of certain work involving sewers, excavation, grading, and subsurface work, according to plans and specifications, and lie was to be paid for the cost of the work, as provided in Article II of the contract. Among other things, he was to be reimbursed for “ rentals actual]3? paid ” by him for “ steam shovels ” at rates not to exceed those mentioned in the schedule of rates, as well as for similar equipment the contractor “ may own and furnish,” at the named scheduled rental rates. Provision is made for the filing by the contractor with the contracting officer of a schedule setting forth the fair valuation of each part of the construction plant upon its arrival at the site, and this valuation was to be deemed final unless the contracting officer seasonably objected to the same. If the total rental paid to the contractor for any article should equal tire valuation thereof, no further rental was payable and title would vest in the United States, and at the completion of the work the contracting officer could, at his option, purchase for the United States any part of the plant then owned by the contractor by paying the difference between its valuation and the rentals that had been paid thereon. In May, 1918, following this contract, the contractor, Bates & Rogers Construction Company, entered into a written agreement — called a lease — with Klebe & Company, the plaintiffs, for the use of a steam shovel at $25.00 per day. This lease contemplated the use of the shovel on the Government’s work. .It stated that the plaintiffs had acquainted themselves with the terms of the contract between the contractor and the United States, and contained a provision to the effect that all of the rights which the Government had under its contract as against property of the contractor should “ apply to and be enforceable against ” the property leased by plaintiffs, “to the end that the United States Government may have and exercise as to and against the said equipment all
The stipulation says: “ The said steam shovel of the claimants was appropriated by the Government as its property under the purchase privilege clause of the contract between the claimants and the Bates & -Rogers Construction Company, and the facts pertaining to said appropriation arc as follows.” Then follows certain correspondence, from which it appears that on October 2, when the work was nearing completion, the contractor notified the contracting officer of the fact, and, stating that at that time about $3,825 in rentals had been paid upon the shovel, inquired whether it was “ the intention of the Government to exercise its purchase privilege.” This notice was forwarded to Washington with his recommendation, and later, on October 17, the contracting officer replied to the inquiry of October 2, that “ acting upon instructions from Washington, we hereby exercise the Government’s purchase privilege and take over said Erie steam shovel B-74 as the property of the United States.” The contractor notified the plaintiffs of this action, and on November 5 they replied to him that their contract did not provide that the Government could take the shovel at an agreed valuation, less rentals paid, and they would look to the contractor “ for the payment of the rental and return of the shovel, as provided for in the contract.” This letter of November 5 was brought to the contracting officer’s attention, and he wrote to plaintiffs, stating: “This is to advise you that the Government has taken over your shovel No. 74, as distinctly provided in the contract.” It should be observed that the facts clearly show that this officer’s “instructions from Washington” were to exercise the Government’s right to purchase the shovel, and that he neither had, nor attempted to exercise, any other right of appropriation by the Government. The record does
It is unquestionably settled that where the Government takes property for public use, conceding the ownership to be in an individual, it impliedly promises to make just compensation therefor. Great Falls Mfg. Co. case, 112 U. S. 645; Bigby case, 188 U.S. 400" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1903-02-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bigby-v-united-states-95789?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="95789">188 U. S. 400, 407; Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co., 250 U.S. 46" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1919-05-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ball-engineering-co-v-j-g-white--co-99391?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99391">250 U. S. 46, 56; North American Co. case, 253 U.S. 330" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1920-06-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-north-american-transportation--trading-co-99618?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99618">253 U. S. 330, 333.
The basis for the enforcement of this liability in the Court of Claims is that the taking, under the circumstances stated, raises an implied contract to pay for the property. Great Falls Mfg. Co. case, 112 U.S. 645" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1884-12-22" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-great-falls-manufacturing-co-91239?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="91239">112 U. S. 645, 658; Tempel case, supra; Peabody case, 231 U.S. 530" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1913-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/peabody-v-united-states-98024?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="98024">231 U. S. 530, 539. See also Russell case, 182 U.S. 516" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1901-05-27" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/russell-v-united-states-95516?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="95516">182 U. S. 516, 530; Harley case, 198 U.S. 229" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1905-05-08" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/harley-v-united-states-96294?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96294">198 U. S. 229, 234; Court of Marion County, 53 Ct. Cl. 120" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1918-01-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/county-court-of-marion-county-v-united-states-8585768?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8585768">53 C. Cls. 120, 149. As was held in United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1920-06-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-north-american-transportation--trading-co-99618?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99618">253 U. S. 330, 335 : “ The right to bring this suit against the United States in the Court of Claims is not founded upon the fifth amendment (Schillinger case, 155 U.S. 163" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1894-11-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/schillinger-v-united-states-94026?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="94026">155 U. S. 163, 168; Basso case, 239 U.S. 602" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1916-01-17" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/basso-v-united-states-98620?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="98620">239 U. S. 602), but upon the existence of an implied contract entered into by the United States.”
It follows that where the circumstances in Avhich the appropriation occurs rebut the implication of a contract there can be no recovery. Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co., 250 U.S. 46" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1919-05-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ball-engineering-co-v-j-g-white--co-99391?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99391">250 U. S. 46, 57, distinguishing Buffalo Pitts Co. case, 234 U.S. 228" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1914-06-08" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-buffalo-pitts-co-98222?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="98222">234 U. S. 228; Tempel case, supra; Natron Soda Co. case, 54 Ct. Cl. 169" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1919-10-20" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/natron-soda-co-v-united-states-8585837?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8585837">54 C. Cls. 169, affirmed 257 U.S. 138" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1921-11-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/john-horstmann-co-v-united-states-99869?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99869">257 U. S. 138.
Stating some of these rules, it Avas further said in United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1920-06-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-north-american-transportation--trading-co-99618?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99618">253 U. S. 330, 333, that in order that the Government shall be liable, it must appear
We are required to observe the settled distinction between actions ex contractu and those ex delicto, because in the latter the Government has not subjected itself -to suit. Langford case, 101 U.S. 341" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1880-04-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/langford-v-united-states-90133?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="90133">101 U. S. 341, 345; Jones case, 131 U.S. 1" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1889-05-13" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-jones-92515?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="92515">131 U. S. 1; Hill case, 149 U.S. 593" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1893-05-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hill-v-united-states-93655?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93655">149 U. S. 593, 598; Bigby case, 188 U.S. 400" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1903-02-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bigby-v-united-states-95789?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="95789">188 U. S. 400, 405.
The property was taken possession of because the Government officer asserted that an express contract gave it the right to purchase by paying the difference between what it had paid as rental, $4,225. and the stated valuation, $5,000. To claim that by the very act of exercising this asserted right- to purchase for $775 the Government made itself liable, upon an implied contract, to pay $5,000 involves a contradiction of terms. It ignores any distinction between express and implied agreements and confuses that class of contracts which grow out of the dealings of parties with the distinct class of implied contracts arising from the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain because of the fifth amendment. And this situation is not relieved by characterizing the contract right as an option, requiring actual payment, before the property could be taken in virtue of the contract. The appropriation was itself an exercise of this right of purchase, and the Government’s agents so stated. The contract contemplated that the Government might elect to appropriate the property before making the payment. It provided that the plaintiffs were to be entitled, as owners, to receive any purchase price payments, “ which upon appropriation of said equipment * * * may be coming from said Government.” And it is not to be conceded that under a cost-plus contract, such as was made between the parties, the Government can not avail itself of the right of purchase stipulated for except upon paying in advance for the property involved. It, of course, becomes liable under the terms of purchase.
Under the facts it can not be asserted that the Government’s claim was a mere subterfuge (and as to its interest and claim see Propeller Company case, 14 Wall. 670" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1872-11-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/propeller-company-v-united-states-88573?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="88573">14 Wall. 670, 675),
The plaintiffs rely upon the Buffalo Pitts Co. case, 234 U.S. 228" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1914-06-08" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-buffalo-pitts-co-98222?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="98222">234 U. S. 228, but, plainly, the facts in that case are different from the facts in the instant case. The rule stated in Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co., 250 U.S. 46" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1919-05-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ball-engineering-co-v-j-g-white--co-99391?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99391">250 U. S. 46, is applicable here. In the last-named case, Mr. Justice Day, who wrote the opinions in both cases, distinguishes the Buffalo Pitts Go. ease, and from his analysis of the latter (250 U. S. 56) it appears that the Government recognized the claim of the Buffalo Pitts Company as mortgagor to the property in question, and represented that if the property were left in its possession and use, its attorney would recommend payment therefor, and, further, that the company relied on these representations and consented to the Government retaining possession of its property in expectation of receiving compensation therefor. In Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co., it appeared that the Government had a contract with Hubbard and Company for the construction of a lock and dam, which provided for annulment under certain
In the instant case the facts show that the Government officer took possession of the shovel under what was asserted to be a claim of right to take it, founded upon an express contract, and the circumstances clearly rebut the implication of a promise to pay its fixed valuation.
As already stated, taking the property under an express contract, which created a liability for $-775, is itself sufficient to rebut an implication that it was taken under an implied contract involving a liability for $5,000. See Bogert case, 2 Ct. Cl. 159" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1866-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bogert-v-united-states-6589473?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6589473">2 C. Cls. 159, 165.
'Whilst, strictly speaking, the plaintiffs’ petition is framed on a theory that would preclude a recovery of any sum, it makes the contracts part of it, and may, therefore, be held to authorize a judgment for $775, especially in Anew of the stipulation to this effect. This course obviates the necessity for a new petition; but it may be added, however, that the court does not recognize a right' in the parties to stipulate the questions that shall be decided upon the facts when found. They can not by stipulation confer jurisdiction of an action sounding in tort.
Judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $775.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
In view of the situation which developed in this case by reason of the Government’s retention of and failure to return or pay for the property it does not seem necessary to pass upon the question of whether, as a third party to the contract between the plaintiffs and Bates & Rogers Co., it secured any rights under it. The considerations and conclusions hereinafter presented do not seem to render this necessary for the reason that if the Government secured a right of option to purchase under this contract and did not exercise the option, it secured no rights and the situation is
It must be borne in mind that this contract did not purport and did not attempt to confer upon the United States anything but a mere privilege to purchase. It was not a sale, and for this option as between the plaintiff and the United States no consideration passed from the United States. It secured an option, if it secured anything, without having given any consideration therefor or without any consideration appearing.
“An option is not an actual or existing contract, but merely a right reserved in a subsisting argument. In a certain sense an option is a mere pollicitation, a promise without mutuality, not yet ripened into a perfect agreement. It is a proposition by one party to a contract, which must be accepted in precise terms by the other in order that it may be binding upon both parties.” Rivers v. Oak Lawn Sugar Co., 52 La. Ann. 762" court="La." date_filed="1900-02-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/rivers-v-oak-lawn-sugar-co-7198171?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7198171">52 La. Ann. 762.
“An option is an unaccepted offer. It states the terms and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell or lease his land, if the holder elects to accept them within the time limited. If the holder does so elect, he must give notice to the other party, and the accepted offer thereupon becomes a valid and binding contract. If an acceptance is not made within the time fixed, the owner is no longer bound by his offer, and the option is at an end.” McMillan v. Philadelphia Co., 159 Pa. 142" court="Pa." date_filed="1893-12-30" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mcmillan-v-philadelphia-co-6241939?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6241939">159 Pa. 142.
“An option is, in a sense, a continuing offer of a contract ; and if the offeree decides to exercise his right to demand the conveyance, or other act contemplated, he must signify that fact to the offeror.” Sixer v. Glark, 116 Wis. 534" court="Wis." date_filed="1903-02-03" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/sizer-v-clark-8187516?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8187516">116 Wis. 534.
“An option is nothing more than a continuing offer to sell; but until it is accepted it does not become a contract of sale * * *. It is only when there has been an acceptance of a proposal to sell that the vendee becomes in any sense the equitable owner of the subject matter of the
“ The offeree must accept within the specified time.” Johnston v. Trippe, 33 F. 530" court="None" date_filed="1887-12-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/johnston-v-trippe-9305150?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="9305150">33 Fed. 530, 536.
“Where the buyer has an option and.elects to purchase he must tender the money according to the terms of the contract.” Watts v. Kellar, 56 F. 1" court="8th Cir." date_filed="1893-05-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/watts-v-kellar-8846991?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8846991">56 Fed. 1, 4.
“ Time is of the essence of contracts of this nature.” Ross v. Bank of Goldhill, 20 Nev. 191" court="Nev." date_filed="1888-07-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ross-v-bank-of-gold-hill-3547859?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3547859">20 Nev. 191.
Assuming that the defendant had the right to purchase, it could only acquire a right of possession by complying with the terms of the option of purchase. That is to say, by first paying the price at the time fixed for the exercise of the option, which was when the whole work was completed. It failed to pay the price and took over the property nearly a month before the work was completed. It could only exercise its option at the time fixed and an attempt to exercise it before that time gave it no rights in the property. It would make no difference whether it was a day or a month before. So that in any aspect of the matter, assuming that the defendant had acquired rights under the contract between the plaintiffs and the Bates & Bogers Construction Co., it never legally exercised those lights, and at no time acquired title to or right of possession of the property and possessed neither at the time it was taken over, the property being at that time the undisputed property of the plaintiffs.
However, assuming for present purposes the Government’s right to recover as a third party under the contract between the plaintiffs and Bates & Rogers and, also, that the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts where the contract was made and where the property was located and where the act creating the controversy occurred do not control, let us proceed to consider the case free from these questions and on the assumption that the Government acquired an enforcible right under the contract between the plaintiffs and Bates & Bogers. It is important to have the facts here clear and to analyze them properly in order to reach a proper conclusion.
1. The property in question here was originally owned by the plaintiffs. It delivered it to the Bates & Bogers
2. Subsequently the parties entered into a written contract upon the statement of the Bates & Sogers Co., a cost-plus contractor with the Government, that certain provisions and forms were required by the department. This contract was executed by the plaintiffs, and for the purposes of the discussion, it is assumed, conferred a certain right on the Government, which was not a party to the contract, as a third party.
8. What was that right? It was an option to ‘purchase the property when the whole work under the cost-plus contract with Bates & Rogers had been completed, and not, it is to be borne in mind, when the work for which the shovel was being used had been completed. This option of purchase was to be exercised before the Government obtained any rights in the property or control over it. The price to be paid was fixed as the difference between the appraised value of the property, $5,000, and the amount of rental which had been paid up to the time that the Government exercised its right of purchase.
4. Did the Government decide- to exercise its right of' purchase? It did. Did it exercise that right in accordance with the provisions and terms of the contract? It did not, as the following facts will show:
■ Bearing in mind that it had a right of purchase upon paying the difference between the rental paid and the appraised value, which difference was $775, when did it acquire this right? When the work on the whole contract was completed. When was this work completed? It was completed about December 2. When did the Government receive the property from the bailee? About November 2, one month before the time fixed for the exercise of its option. When it received the property did it pay the price, $775, which it was required to pay in order to become the purchaser of it? It did not. Has it ever paid that price? It has not. It therefore seems clear that the Government in
5. If the Government had no right to receive this property, having- no property interest in it, and it being still the property of the plaintiffs, and the Bates & Rogers Co. having no right to deliver it, what became the duty of the Government ? As between individuals, and the Government can claim under the circumstances of this case no higher privilege or right, it would have been the duty of the party illegally receiving and holding possession of property to have returned it; and if it refused to return it and had appropriated it to its own use it would have been liable for its value under an implied contract. Did the Government return the property? It did not. Did it refuse to return it at the demand of the plaintiffs? It did. Has it since retained and used it, and appropriated it to its own use? It has. It would seem under the law that under these circumstances there arose an implication of an obligation to pay the value of the property. It will therefore be readily seen that the liability of the Government grows out of its retention of the property erroneously delivered to it by the bailee and its refusal to return it, and not out of the manner in and circumstances under which it received possession.
6. ITow did this property come into the possession of the defendant? The Bates & Rogers Co. erroneously believing that the Government had an option of purchase wrote and asked the local representative of the Government whether the Government intended to exercise this option. The local representative recommended that the Government should, and forwarded his recommendation to the department in Washington indorsed on the letter of Bates & Rogers Co. The proper official of that department approved the recommendation and directed that the option of purchase be exercised. Thereupon the local representative by letter instructed Bates & Rogers to deliver the prop
7. What under the decisions is the legal liability of the Government under these circumstances? It received property of a third party delivered to it by mistake. It refused to return the property to the owner and appropriated it to public use. It has received the benefit and the owner has sustained the loss. Having appropriated private property in its possession to public use there will arise an implication under the fifth amendment to pay just compensation, which, is its fair value, and this is conceded to be $5,000. See Salomon v. United: States, 7 C. Cls. 482, 19 Wall. 17" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1873-12-22" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/salomon-v-united-states-88854?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="88854">19 Wall. 17; and Peck v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 84" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1878-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/peck-v-united-states-8579494?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8579494">14 C. Cls. 84; 102 U.S. 64" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1880-03-22" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-peck-90207?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="90207">102 U. S. 64.
This last case was a case where property of the plaintiff, after he had refused to rent it to the Government, was taken by a subordinate officer of the Government without authority to act, without his knowledge or consent, and used for public purposes in Government work. It was a hay press. It was held that he could recover the value thereof and not the rental value. This cuse was decided, as stated in the opinion, upon the principles announced dn the case of Mason v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 59" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1878-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mason-v-united-states-8579472?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8579472">14 C. Cls. 59, 70, which was a case of taking property consisting of ox teams and the services of the. owner in connection therewith without his consent and using them for public purposes against his protest and under threats. Justice Bichardson in delivering the opinion of the court in this last case said:
If it be urged under the facts heretofore stated that the action of the Government in retaining the property was tortious in character it is to be said that it was no more tortious than in the last two cases named, in which the principle announced in the Burchiel case, 4 Ct. Cl. 549" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1868-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/burchiel-v-united-states-6590001?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6590001">4 C. Cls. 549, was reiterated, namely, that where private property has been taken for public use and the Government has received the benefit, and the individual sustained a loss, there is an implied contract to compensate the owner.
If this case is to be treated as a taking by the Government in the sense that after it received the property by mistake, it took it by refusing to return it to the owner, the answer is that the agent who received the property and who held it acted with authority under instructions from the War Department. The Secretary of War under the national security and defense act had authority to take this property for public use. Where the agent or representative of the Government acts with authority there can be nothing tortious in the chax’acter of the acts because it was lawful. In the very conception of a tort the basis of it is an unlawful act. In the very essence of the idea of a sovereign, it can not itself commit an unlawful act. It is the source of all law; it. creates the law; its acts are law. It creates the courts, appoints the judges, and says what the law shall be.
As the Government can only act through its officers, when they act with authority their acts are the acts of the sovereign and must be lawful. If the officer acts beyond the scope of his authority, then the act is his individual act and not that of the sovereign. He commits the wrong, and not the sovereign. Thus, the sovereign can not commit a tort.
It is true that in this case at common law, as between individuals, the retention of another’s property, and the refusal to return it, or the appropriation of it to the holder’s use, sounded in tort, and the action for recovery would have been in form ex delicto, but this is equally true of the Burchiel case, 4 Ct. Cl. 549" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1868-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/burchiel-v-united-states-6590001?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6590001">4 C. Cls. 549; the Mason case, 14 Ct. Cl. 59" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1878-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mason-v-united-states-8579472?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8579472">14 C. Cls. 59; the Peck, case, 14 Ct. Cl. 84" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1878-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/peck-v-united-states-8579494?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8579494">14 C. Cls. 84; and the Salomon case, 7 C. Cls. 482. In these cases the Government received the goods under an invalid contract, or by the use of duress, and as between individuals at common law the action would have been in form ex delicto for the unlawful deprivation of the plaintiffs of their right of possession, but the property having been retained and used for public purposes these cases have held that an implication of an obligation to pay just
This case is not controlled by the principle announced in Langford’s case, 101 U.S. 341" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1880-04-19" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/langford-v-united-states-90133?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="90133">101 U. S. 341, or that in the Tempel case, 248 U.S. 121" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1918-12-09" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/tempel-v-united-states-99236?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="99236">248 U. S. 121. In the former case the Government claimed ownership of the property prior to the time of taking. In this case, if there was a taking, the ownership of the property prior thereto was admittedly in the plaintiffs. As pointed out, however, this was not a taking in the sense .of taking real property. This property was erroneously put in the possession of the Government while still the property of the plaintiffs. The Government had no right to retain it, but did retain it and refused to return it and used it for public purposes, and under the circumstances of the cases cited there arose an implication of a promise to pay under the fifth amendment.
This case is ruled by the case of United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., post. There the Government took and used the plaintiff’s property under the belief that it had a right to do so by reason of its contract with the contractor whose work it had taken over, and on demand refused to deliver the property to the plaintiff and continued to use it. It had no legal right to retain the property or to refuse to return it to the plaintiff. The court held that the Government was liable on an implied contract, as it would be presumed in taking and using the property the implication arose that it intended to pay for its use.
In United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U.S. 228" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1914-06-08" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-buffalo-pitts-co-98222?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="98222">234 U. S. 228, 235, the court said:
“ In the present case the Government had the right to contract for this work under statutory authority and to acquire property necessary to that end. Under the contract it might take possession of the construction company’s property, and, it may be conceded, finish the contract with such property, but it had no right to use the property of others without compensation. * * * The mortgagee had a distinct right in the property which had accrued to it before the property was entered upon, and
It will be seen that this last case is a case of the Government taking or receiving from a defaulting contractor property of a third person, applying it to public use under a mistaken contractural right, and retaining it and refusing to return it, which is just the case at bar. This case is distinguished by the court in the case of Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co., 250 U. S. 46, from that case in that in the latter, while the property came into the possession of the Government under a mistaken right of contract, it toas not retained and used for public purposes, but was surrendered into the possession of a third party who made no claim to the ownership of the property, and it was specifically stated that the Government would not be liable therefor. The Government received no benefit, and the act of surrendering it into the possession of a third party was altogether an unauthorized act of the Government officer and entirely beyond the scope of his authority. But the real distinction was that the Government did not receive the benefit and that the property was not used for public purposes.