129 Mich. 35 | Mich. | 1901
The plaintiff claims to have been injured through a failure of the defendant to keep its street in repair on the 31st of December, 1895. On January 7, 1896, his petition was presexxted to the common council in compliance with the statute (section 46 of an act approved June 1, 1895), which provides that:
“No action shall be brought against said city, nor any of its boards, commissions, or officers, for any negligent injury, unless it be commenced within one year from the time when the injury was received, nor xxnless notice shall be given in writing, within three months from the time of such injury, to the head of the law department, or to his chief assistant, of the time, place, and cause of such injury, and of the nature thereof. The provisions of this section shall not be a bar to a suit for any injury for which there is now a lawful cause of action, but for every such injury suit shall be commenced within six months from the time when this act shall take effect.” Act No. 463, Local Acts 1895.
The action in this cause having been commenced on March 23, 1897, the court directed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that it was barred by the statute, and the plaintiff has brought it to this court by writ of error.
The plaintiff’s testimony shows that in January, 1896, the claim was referred by the council to its committee on claims and accounts, and that testimony was taken before such committee in June, September, October, and December, 1896, and in January, February, and March, 1897; the last being taken about 10 days previous to the time the action was begun, when the city counselor told plaintiff’s counsel that a settlement could not be made. The' com
Defendant’s counsel urged, and the trial court appears to have been of the opinion, that the action of the council in disallowing the claim in September, 1896, deprived the committee of further power, and that its subsequent action was not the action of the council. The committee never had authority to do more than to investigate and report, and with the acceptance and adoption of its report its authority ended. There is no indication of secrecy on the part of the council. Its action was public, and it was published. There was no obligation upon it to notify plaintiff or his counsel of its action, and there is nothing in the record to show why the committee or city counselor permitted negotiations to continue after such report. We are not informed that these negotiations were more than a listening to importunities of plaintiff’s counsel, and a patient hearing and investigation of what he had to offer, with a view to recommend some recompense for plaintiff’s injury if convinced that he had a meritorious case, notwithstanding the statute had run against his right. of action; and there is nothing to indicate that the members
The statute is an unambiguous limitation on the right to bring an action after the lapse of a year. It was presumably known to the plaintiff and his counsel. The common council was under no obligation to take any action, and, had it pursued that policy, the plaintiff could not maintain an action not begun within the statutory period. But the council did take action, and solemnly resolved that plaintiff had no legal claim, by adopting the report of the committee. It did not notify the plaintiff, and it was under no obligation to. The case is barren of the usual elements of an estoppel, and is therein plainly distinguishable from the Case of Renackowsky, supra. That case was heard upon demurrer to a declaration which alleged that the defendant recognized plaintiff’s right of action, made payments thereon, and adopted a resolution, before the statute had run, to the effect that the plaintiff should receive full pay so long as he was disabled, and that it finally declined to pay after the statute had run. In the case of Armstrong v. Levan, 109 Pa. St. 177 (1 Atl. 204), upon which the Renackowsky Case is based, a distinct promise to pay was made in consideration that the plaintiff would not sue. So, in the case of Voorheis v. Benefit Society, 91 Mich. 474 (51 N. W. 1110), Mr. Justice Long says:
“The company could not delay the party entitled to bring suit by promises of payment and overtures for settlement. beyond the period fixed for bringing the suit, and then set up in its defense that the action was not brought within the limit of time stated in the contract.”
• This case, however, did not involve a statute of limitation.
The-legislature has found reason for requiring actions
In Moore v. Moore, 103 Ga. 517 (30 S. E. 535), it was held that a mutual mistake does not create an estoppel to plead the statute of limitations. In North Carolina it was held that a request not to sue will not stay the statute, but it must be an agreement, not to plead it. Haymore v. Commissioners of Yadkin, 85 N. C. 268; Hill v. Hilliard, 103 N. C. 34 (9 S. E. 639); Raby v. Stuman, 127 N. C. 463 (37 S. E. 476). In McFaddin v. Prater, (Tex. Sup.) 3 S. W. 306, it was held that an innocent misrepresentation concerning the boundary between the lands of the parties would not estop the pleading of the statute. In Railway Conductors’ Benefit Ass’n v. Loomis, 124 Ill. 560 (32 N. E. 424), where there were no promises to pay, and nothing holding out hopes of adjustment, it was held that there was no estoppel.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the usual rules pertaining to estoppel should he applied in such cases, and that the defendant will not be precluded from availing himself of such defense unless it can be fairly said that he is responsible for deceiving the plaintiff, and inducing him to postpone action upon some reasonably well grounded belief that his claim will be adjusted if he does not sue. In both of the cases cited by counsel such estoppel rested upon a promise to pay, and in one, if not both, there was an express promise not to sue, induced by the promise to pay. As said in the Armstrong Case, all
The judgment of the learned circuit judge is affirmed.