Klak v. SkellionKlak v. Skellion
delivered the opinion of the court:
BACKGROUND
This case involves an interlocutory appeal, brought by Larry Skellion (respondent), from an order entered in the circuit court of Cook County. Mary Klak, a 17-year-old minоr (petitioner), petitioned the circuit court to declare a parent-child relationship between herself and respondent pursuant to the Illinois Parentаge Act of 1984 (the Act) (
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. Respondent and petitioner’s biological mother, Jacqueline Klak, had an ongoing sexual relationship from 1980 to April of 1982. Petitioner was born on July 9, 1982, in Cook County, Illinois.
On August 3, 1999, petitioner filed a petition, in her name, to establish the existence of a father-child relationship between herself and respondent. Additionally, petitioner sought “funds or resources to provide for her reasonable needs, including support, mаintenance, and educational expenses.” Petitioner was 17 years old when she filed her action against respondent. Petitioner is represented by counsеl and no guardian ad litem has been appointed. On September 16, 1999, respondent filed his motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that petitioner is a minor and does not have the legal capacity to initiate a civil cause of action in her own name.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On interlocutory appeal, the scope of review is limited to the question of law certified by the circuit court. Teverbaugh v. Moore,
II. CERTIFIED QUESTION
In the instant appeаl, the legal question presented raises an issue of first impression. Our research has uncovered no case in which an unemancipated child has filed a parеntage action on her own
Respondent contends that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss petitioner’s action because she is a minor and cannot initiate or pursue a civil action in her own name. Respondent also contends that, as a minor, petitioner must bring the action by a guardian or next friend. Petitioner contends that the Act allows a minor child to bring a paternity suit on her own behalf without a parent or other guardian. We disagree.
Initially, we note that a minor does not have the legal capacity to initiate, pursue or maintain legal action in her own name. Doe v. Montessori Sсhool,
When interpreting a statute, the primary function is to ascertain and give effect to the truе intent and meaning of the drafters. People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Soccer Enterprises, Inc.,
Section 7 of the Act оutlines the parties who may bring an action to determine a father-child relationship. Section 7 provides in relevant part:
“Determination of Father and Child Relationship; Who May Bring Action; Parties.
(a) An action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship *** may be brought by the child; the mother; a pregnant woman; аny person or public agency who has custody of, or is providing or has provided financial support to, the child; *** or a man presumed or alleging himself to be the fаther of the child or expected child.” (Emphasis added.)750 ILCS 45/7(a) (West 1998).
Having set out the relevant case and statutory law, we interpret the statutory language of the Act in accordance with the well-established principles of common law. There is nothing in the Act which indicates that the legislature intended to change the settled common law rule that minors are unable to initiate or pursue civil litigation in their own name although they may be a party to such a suit. Section 7 of the Act states that an action “may be brought by the child.”
We also note that each party filing a petition under the Act is bound by a different statute of limitations period.- Section 8 of the Act provides the relevant periods of limitation for those parties delineated in section 7. Section 8 in рertinent part states:
“Statute of limitations.
(a)(1) An action brought by or on behalf of a child *** shall be barred if brought later than 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority; however, if the action on behalf of the child is brought by a public agency,*** it shall be barred 2 years after the agency has ceased to provide assistance to the сhild.
(3) An action to declare the non-existence of the parent and child relationship brought under subsection (b) of Section 7 of this Act shall be barred if brought later than 2 years after the petitioner obtains knowledge of relevant facts.”750 ILCS 45/8(a)(l) , (a)(3) (West 1998).
Relying on the language set forth in section 8 of the Act, we conclude that the Act allows an offspring who has reached the age of majority to bring an action within two years after she attains the age of 18 years. In this case, petitioner has until July 9, 2002, when she reaсhes the age of 20 or “2 years after the child reaches the age of majority” to file her claim against respondent.
In sum, we find that the common law and section 7 оf the Act do not allow a minor child to initiate a legal proceeding in her own name to establish a parent-child relationship. Instead, a minor child must appear by a guardian, guardian ad litem, parent, next friend or custodian. Alternatively, an offspring who has reached the age of majority may bring the action within two years after she has attained the age of 18 years. See
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HOFFMAN, EJ., and SOUTH, J., concur.
Notes
The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 replaced the Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 1351 et seq.). “The Paternity Act was repealed in response to the United States Supreme Court’s denunciation of State statutes which denied equal protection to nonmarital children seeking support from their parents.” Department of Public Aid ex rel. Cox v. Miller,
Petitioner has retained counsel and is represented by an attorney in this proceeding.