47 Neb. 776 | Neb. | 1896
The plaintiff in error, during the year 1886 and prior and subsequent thereto, was a part owner and had control of the premises known as the “Paxton Hotel property” in the city of Omaha. In 1886 the southwest portion of the building was what was called an “annex” to the main body of the building and this annex was fifty feet long, twenty-two feet wide, and two stories high. During the year stated the plaintiff caused an additional or third story to be built upon the annex. For this third story there were no plans and specifications made and no architect was employed to superintend its construction. A pencil sketch of the desiréd improvement was made and given by plaintiff in error to an experienced contractor and builder with directions to furnish the material and perform the labor, or have the necessary labor performed, the payment to be the reasonable value of the labor and material, or such sum as could be agreed upon between the parties. During the early part of the night of April 12, 1891, fire was discovered in the southwestern lower room of the annex, then being used as a kitchen. A fire-alarm was turned in and was promptly responded to by some of the organizations or companies belonging to the fire department, the members of which, as soon as they reached the premises, took active measures for stopping the fire. Some of them discovering, as they believed, evidences of fire in the upper northwest corner or room in the third
Counsellor plaintiff in error, in a reply brief, state, or assume it to be proven, that the deceased fireman was in or on the premises or building of plaintiff in error and was there a mere licensee,
But it is urged by counsel for plaintiff in error that the evidence is insufficient to support á finding of defective construction of the third story of this building, and the falling as a consequence thereof; and further, that if it be conceded that the structure was not of the safest character, or was not safe, the proximate cause of the falling of the wall was the effect of the fire; that this was an intervening cause, and the immediate and principal one, and not within the reasonable contení
The city building inspector was interrogated upon cross-examination and answered as follows:
Q. At the coroner’s inquest were you asked this question, and did you make this answer. I am not now asking you with respect to the facts in the answer or the matters inquired of, but simply ask you whether you so testified at the coroner’s inquest: “Q. So far as you can observe, there was nothing to indicate that the wall was hot, or that it fell out by reason of the heat?” To which you answered: “No, I think the ceiling joist, and that is what threw the wall over.”
A. That is what I thought at the time.
Q. And that is the. way you testified?
A. I presume that is the way I did, if it is down that way.
*786 Q. And that was your theory, — that the fire burned off the ceiling joist? “The fire followed the steam pipes and came up in between the roof and the ceiling and of course shows there, now, to have burned the ceiling joist off, and as soon as. they burned off it threw the wall out.”
A. That is what I said about that.
Q. Was this question asked you by Mr. Connell r “If that ceiling joist that burned and the wall fell in, can you account for the falling of the wall on any other theory except that the wall was of insufficient thickness and was not properly joined and connected together — can you account for it in any other way?” “A. I will say this, that the morning after the fire, that the ceiling joists, they were broken off, but whether they were burned off before the wall fell, I should judge, from the ceiling joists that were burned and remained there, that they must have burned before the wall fell.”Did you so testify?
A. I think so, about that way; it is a good while ago.
During re-direct examination:
Q. In reference to the burning of the ceiling joist, did you, at the coroner’s inquest, or do you now claim to have any personal knowledge as to' when the burning of those joists occurred?
A. Well, it must have occurred before the fire, because the joists could not have burned in the position they were in. The part down in the ground, they must have burned before the wall fell.
Q. Have you any personal knowledge except merely that is your conclusion?
A. That is what I found the morning after the fire.
*787 Q. Were yon at the fire?
A. No, sir; I was not at the fire.
Q. Yon have not any personal knowledge as to how the burning actually took place?
A. I was not there to see it, of course.
It was shown that just where the wall fell a number of the ceiling joists had been entirely severed by the fire, and pieces of them were among the brick and mortar which fell to the ground. One piece was there with an anchor attached, and ends of these ceiling joists were.also in the “fire room,” on the floor, with anchors attached. The roof timbers were none of them entirely burned off, but were blackened or rather charred. We are not unmindful here of the argument of counsel for defendant in error, in part founded upon the supposition that the anchor attached to the piece of lumber which was found in the debris was one which had fallen with a piece of floor joist, and the further argument on this part of the case, in which they refer to the different theories advanced by the witnesses in reference to what caused the wall to fall.' We must include, in any view we attempt to take of this subject, a few facts which were npt controverted. The wali was placed there during the year 1886 and stood almost, if not quite, five years, and was, to all appearances, safe and fit for the uses to which it was put and to withstand the effects of use, time, and any ordinary tests to which it might be subjected, and,, as stated by counsel for defendant in error in their brief: “There was the fact that the wall fell at the time of the fire, which was not disputed;” and in this connection we may add that there was the evidence, not contradicted, of the destruction by the fire of some of the means
But it is urged that what was the proximate cause was a question of fact for the jury, and their determination of it should not and will not be disturbed. Ordinarily, what is the proximate cause of an injury is, in any case where the question is involved, one of fact for the jury to determine; but where, as in this case, their decision of the question is manifestly wrong, it will be set aside. This is a case in which the sympathies are strongly
Reversed and remanded.