109 F.2d 281 | 3rd Cir. | 1940
This is an interpleader proceeding involving claims to a $1,000 group life insurance certificate in the Equitable Life Assurance Society. The plaintiff, Helen Kit, alleged that she was named beneficiary by Peter Stacy, the deceased assured; and the defendant, Anna Stecker, a sister of Peter Stacy, claims both as administratrix of his estate and as belonging to the class designated by the policy where no beneficiary had been named.
The individual certificate issued to the deceased by the Society provided: “Subject to the terms and conditions of the policy the insurance is to be payable to the beneficiary”; and the form for request for change of the beneficiary which accompanied the policy, contained the words: “Subject to the right of the Insured to change the beneficiary in accordance with the policy provisions.” When the policy was issued on February 1, 1936, it had the following beneficiary clause: “Any employee may from time to time while insured hereunder change the beneficiary by a written request upon the Society’s blank filed at its Home Office. Such change to take effect only upon the receipt of the request for change at the Home Office of the Society.” On February 1, 1937, this clause was amended to read: “Any employee insured hereunder may from time to time, while this policy is in force, change the beneficiary. Every change of beneficiary must be made by written notice to the employer, signed by the employee. Upon receipt of said notice by the employer a record of such change will be entered by the employer upon the insured’s records. maintained by it in connection with the insurance under this policy and unless such entry is made the change shall not be effective.” Neither Stacy nor Mrs. Kit had any actual knowledge of the contents of the policy. Early in September, 1937, Stacy filled in on the form the name and address of Helen Kit and wrote above this: “In case of my death, ful Beneficiary for the sum of one Thousand Dollars goes to Mrs. Helen Kit and no body else.” He signed the form, on which the date of February 4, 1936, had already been typewritten; his signature was witnessed by Jane McCollough, and he delivered the executed request for' change and the certificate to Mrs. Kit, telling her that he was giving her the policy. He died October 15, 1937. The question presented, therefore, is whether this was a sufficient designation of the beneficiary under the provisions of the policy. The District Court for the-Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to enter judgment for Anna Stecker, the defendant, on her statutory demurrer. The case was tried, and .the jury found a verdict in favor of Helen Kit, under instructions that they must determine whether Stacy intended to make Mrs. Kit his beneficiary, and “whether he did all that could be reasonably expected” to that end. Thereafter, the court entered judgment for the defendant stating in the accompanying opinion that under the decisions something more than a mere intention is necessary to effect a change of beneficiary, and that since the policy required that the request should reach the company, “the insured must at least start a communication of his intention moving in that direction.” [29 F.Supp. 261.] The learned trial judge was of the opinion that the proof showed only “that the insured had formed an intention that Mrs. Kit should have the money * * * which is not sufficient. * * * ”
The question is a narrow one. How closely do directions in a policy relating to the manner of effecting a change in the beneficiary have to be complied with? The early cases required strict compliance. A will devising death benefits from a lodge was held not to comply with the regulations adopted by the lodge that the change of beneficiary must be made on the certificate in a prescribed form; Vollman’s Appeal, 92 Pa. 50. Bell v. Police Beneficiary Ass’n, et al., 270 Pa. 407, 411, 113 A. 417, 418, held that a requirement in the by-laws of a benevolent association that the consent of beneficiaries was necessary before the change could be made, must be complied with.’ The “right must be exercised strictly in accord with the by-laws of the association * * *These two cases dealt with beneficial associations, and per
As the lower court in the case before us indicated, the execution of the request or the endorsement of the policy alone is not sufficient. Some external act of delivery or surrender must be made. Jinks v. Banner Lodge, 139 Pa. 414, 418, 21 A. 4, 5; Thomeuf v. Knights of Birmingham, 12 Pa.Super. 195, 201; Sproat v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 289 Pa. 351, 137 A. 621, 622, where the insured signed the blank request, but did not return it, and the court said, quoting from Corpus Juris, that a “mere unexecuted intention to change the beneficiary is not sufficient”; and in Stoll v. Boyle, Casserly, appellant, 116 Pa.Super. 64, 176 A. 43, the court held that the execution of a will did not satisfy a requirement of written notice of a change of beneficiary in a mutual benefit association.
Other and more recent cases have taken a more liberal view by endeavoring to give effect to the intention of the assured where this intention has been clearly expressed, or where the holder of the policy “has made every reasonable effort to effect a change.”
The most recent case in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Cody v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 334 Pa. 137, 140, 5 A.2d 887, 888, spoke of “the rule requiring one claiming on a defectively or imperfectly executed appointment to show
Deciding as we do, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the insurance company waived the provision for notice by paying the money into court. We think that the inconsistency in the cases dealing with waiver is more apparent than real.
It has been suggested that if strictly there has been no change of beneficiary under the terms of the policy, there is a gift or equitable assignment of the policy. But we think it unnecessary to preserve the appearance of a stricter construction of the requirement for notice by invoking another legal process, not contemplated by the assured, to reach the same desirable result. The courts, as we have seen, have tended to relax the strict rule, to find exceptions to it, rather than to preserve the form of definition while changing the substance., The broader conception is more equitable, and gives effect to the assured’s intent, while insisting that it must be expressed by action on his part.
Judgment reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to enter judgment for Helen Kit, the plaintiff.
Sproat v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., supra.
Grant v. Faires, 253 Pa. 232, 97 A. 1060, held that payment of the money to a stakeholder, pending judicial determination, was not a waiver of any rights. The assured had filled out the blank form on the certificate and sent it to the fraternal society, which returned it for an affidavit and the transfer fee, and it was found in the deceased’s possession, undelivered, at his death. The cofirt held that there had been no change of beneficiary. The decision, however, was not based only on the failure to comply strictly with the regulations of the association, but also because the court thought the assured had abandoned the attempt to make the change. In Kress v. Kress, 75 Pa.Super. 404, it was held that the assured by not forwarding the policy had not done all he could to effect the change; and that payment of the fund into court did not constitute a waiver.
On the other hand, more recent cases have held that payment into court by the company “waived its right to insist upon literal compliance”, Skamoricus v. Kon-agiskie, supra [318 Pa. 128, 177 A. 810]; that the “company may waive compliance with a provision inserted for its benefit,” Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362, 366, 169 A. 139, 140; and does so by paying the money into court, Scheid v. Storch, 271 Pa. 496, 115 A. 841; Tomilio v. Pisco, supra; Estate of K. L Sanes, supra.