320 A.2d 837 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1974
The plaintiff brought this action in two counts seeking damages for false imprisonment and for negligent medical or psychiatric treatment while he was confined from July 21, 1941, to August 11, 1967, in mental hospitals within Connecticut. A demurrer was sustained in respect to the defendant James H. Kinsella, the present probate judge for the district of Hartford, whose predecessor in office ordered the original commitment of the plaintiff to the mental hospital operated by the defendant Institute of Living on August 6, 1941. Judgment was entered on this demurrer, and the case also has been withdrawn against the defendant Jay E. Rubinow, administrator of the probate courts at the time suit was brought. The remaining defendants are the Institute of Living; Ernest A. Shepherd, commissioner of mental health, and Franklin M. Foote, commissioner of health.
The Institute of Living, which unsuccessfully attempted to raise the defense of the Statute of Limitations by demurrer to the complaint, has filed an answer containing as a first special defense a claim that "it does not appear that the acts complained of on the part of this defendant occurred within three years next nor within six years next before commencement of this action." Presumably *48
this defense is intended to raise the bar of General Statutes §
The plaintiff denied the allegations of this defense and also has pleaded an affirmative reply as follows: "A. Any statute of limitations which might apply was tolled because the plaintiff's decedent was of unsound mind.1 B. Any statute of limitations which might apply was tolled because the plaintiff's decedent was falsely imprisoned." The demurrer of the defendant Institute to this reply relies on two grounds: (1) The Statute of Limitations would not be tolled by the fact that the deceased plaintiff was of unsound mind. (2) The pleadings show that any false imprisonment by the Institute terminated in 1942, and subsequent false imprisonment by other unrelated parties would not toll the Statute of Limitations so far as the Institute is concerned.
Although the ground of disability relied upon here is that the plaintiff was non compos mentis, the reasoning of the Lametta case is fully applicable to such a situation. If the legislature wanted to create an exception for such persons in respect to §
It is the general rule, followed in most jurisdictions, that the court will not read into a Statute of Limitations any exception in favor of minors or persons non compos mentis. 51 Am. Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 178-186. The plaintiff relies upon several cases which appear to take a contrary view.Triplett v. Williams,
Considering the applicable precedent and the statutory pattern of our limitation statutes, some of which create exceptions applicable to the situation involved here for certain causes of action, the court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in our limitation statutes can best be remedied by the legislature.Lametta v. Connecticut Light Power Co.,
The term "legally incapable" includes minors, who cannot commence a suit in their own names. 2 Locke Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice § 709. In this state, however, an incompetent person is under no legal disability to bring suit in his own name. Ibid.;Looby v. Redmond,
Nevertheless, the authorities are in agreement that the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run on a cause of action for false imprisonment until termination of the imprisonment. 32 Am.Jur.2d, False Imprisonment, § 84; 54 C.J.S. 145, Limitation of Actions, § 175; note, 49 A.L.R. 2d 922. "The right of action for false imprisonment accrues at the beginning of the imprisonment but does not become complete until the termination thereof, the tort being regarded as divisible." 35 C.J.S. 714, False Imprisonment, § 49. The defendant Institute claims, however, that any false imprisonment for which it was responsible terminated in 1942, according to the complaint, and the subsequent false imprisonment alleged on the part of other persons would not prevent the statute from running in its favor since 1942. In Alexander v. Thompson,
195 F. 31, it was held that the limitation statute on a suit for false imprisonment against a sheriff began to run at the time he surrendered custody of the plaintiff to an insane asylum. "It is properly conceded that the statutory limitation runs, not from the time imprisonment begins, but from the time it ends, and in our opinion, for the purposes of this case, the imprisonment must be deemed to have ended when the detention for which defendants were responsible ceased; or, otherwise stated, when, if ever, a lawful restraint by the asylum authorities became substituted for that previously exercised ... by defendants." Id., 33. A similar conclusion was reached in Kenney v. Killian,
In Matovina v. Hult,
No facts are alleged either in the affirmative reply or in the complaint to indicate that the defendant Institute participated in the confinement of the plaintiff after 1942, nor does it appear that the Institute had any privity or other legal relationship with the other hospitals in which the plaintiff was subsequently confined or with the other parties involved in this later confinement. A claim to the contrary is made in the plaintiff's brief, based on the claimed noncompliance with a statute requiring Probate Court approval of transfers of patients in mental hospitals. The factual basis for this claim does not appear in the pleadings, however. *53
The special rule pertaining to the running of the Statute of Limitations in an action for false imprisonment would not pertain to the claim for malpractice set forth in the second count of the complaint. The circumstance of false imprisonment would not toll the statute in respect to any other causes of action. The portion of the affirmative reply which appears to claim false imprisonment as a basis for tolling the statute in respect to both causes of action, false imprisonment and malpractice, is unsound.
The demurrer is sustained.