58 Mo. App. 165 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1894
In July, 1892, the plaintiffs purchased from the defendant a steam riding gallery, commonly called a “merry go round,at the agreed price of $1,980. The plaintiffs made a cash payment of $250 with the understanding that the machine should be shipped not later than July 26, and that at the date of the shipment a sight draft would be drawn for the balance of the purchase money, payable through a bank at Canton, Missouri. On the third day of August the shipment was made from Tonawando, New York, where the defendant and interpleader do business. The Armitage Herschel Company was named as consignee. Defend-' ant, in pursuance of the terms of sale, drew its draft oh plaintiffs for $1,730, payable to the order of the appellant. The. draft was delivered to the appellant by the defendant, and at the same time the bill of lading for the machine was indorsed by the defendant, and it also was delivered to the appellant, The machine arrived
The contention of the appellant on the trial, was, and it is now, that it discounted the draft and received the bill of lading as collateral security. On the other hand, the plaintiffs insisted that the appellant received the draft for cdllection merely, and that the appellant was conducting the litigation solely in the interest of the Armitage Herschel Company, and for the purpose of defeating the plaintiffs in the collection of their claim. On the trial of those issues, counsel for the appellant saved many exceptions, and they now press them on our attention in support of a reversal of the judgment herein. However, as we are of the opinion that the appellant’s action is defeated by its own testimony, the particular assignments need not be noticed.
For the sake of the argument we will concede that the appellant in good faith discounted the draft, and that it received the bill of lading as collateral security. Under this view the transfer of the bill of lading, whether it was negotiable or not, amounted to a symbolical delivery of the machine to the appellant, which
An interplea under the statute has been held to be substantially an action of replevin, engrafted upon the attachment suit. Burgert v. Borchert, 59 Mo. 80; Mansur v. Hill, 22 Mo. App. 375. However, it is entirely independent of the main action, and in it the interpleader occupies the position of a plaintiff in an ordinary action, and the plaintiff in the attachment takes the position of a defendant. Brennan v. O'Driscoll, 33 Mo. 372. Treating it as an action for the recovery of specific personal property, it is perfectly obvious on principle that an interpleader, in order to maintain it, must show that at the time he filed his interplea he was either the general or special owner of the property,
In the case of Mansur v. Hill, supra, the attached property had been sold by the interpleader before the attachment and interplea, but the property had not been delivered. The respondent there contended that the judgment ought not to be disturbed, for the reason that the interpleader had parted with his interest. The court overruled the exception on the principle that, “so long as the sale is so far incomplete that the purchaser may look to the seller for further action, so as to perfect the sale, the seller has sufficient interest to maintain an action for possession.” Pace v. Pierce 49 Mo. 393; Lacy v. Giboney, 36 Mo. 320.
The unavoidable conclusion is that the appellant began and has prosecuted this action without legal right. Its interest in the property was that of a pledgee holding the property as security for a debt. The payment of the debt destroyed the pledge, thus satisfying all claims of the appellant to the property. The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.