| Pa. | Oct 7, 1878
delivered the opinion of the court,
This contention arises on the distribution of a fund produced by a sheriff’s sale of real estate. The rights of the claimants depend on the effect to be given to a release executed by E. Hammond, of the lien of the judgment on which the appellants claim the money. The judgment was recovered by McNeal. . In the assignment thereof, which he made to Hammond, he declared it was “to be held by Hammond as collateral security for the payment of the claim of Boggs & Kirk, for which claim I have this day given to the said Boggs & Kirk three promissory notes.” This assignment was filed of record. The prothonotary entered on the docket the substance of the assignment, and added: “ see paper filed.” Hammond was an attorney-at-law. As attorney for Boggs & Kirk he took the notes of McNeal for a debt due them, and accepted the assignment. Pie therefore held it for their benefit. The assignment showed this fact. As between him and them he had no more right to release the lien of the judgment on lands bound thereby, than he had to give up the notes to the maker without payment.
In conducting a suit, an attorney-at-law has large powers. After judgment recovered, he may execute a valid receipt on its payment. Yet he cannot sell and assign it without the ratification of his client: Campbell’s Appeal, 5 Casey 401. Nor can he accept land in satisfaction of a debt of his client: Huston v. Mitchell, 14 S. & R. 307; Stackhouse et al. v. O’Hara, 2 Harris 88; Stokely v. Robinson, 10 Casey 315. His authority is limited to the discharge of that professional action which lies at the foundation of the relation of counsel and client. He has large discretionary power as to the manner and time of prosecuting his client’s claim to judgment. He may order and direct the sheriff in regard to the collection of the execution. These powers are given to him to protect the rights and advance the interests of his client. He has no right to release property bound by his client’s judgment. This appears to have been conceded by the learned judge if the record had showed Hammond held the assignment as attorney for Boggs & Kirk. It is true the record did not distinctly show that fact; yet we think it showed enough to have put the appellee on inquiry, and if so, inquiry thereupon became a duty. The exercise of common prudence and ordinary diligence, which he was bound to use, would have disclosed to him that Hammond held the assignment as attorney or counsel for Boggs & Kirk: Lodge v. Simonton, 2 P. & W. 439; Cresson v. Miller, 2 Watts 272" court="Pa." date_filed="1834-05-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/cresson-v-miller-6311221?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6311221">2 Watts 272; Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Id. 261; Walsh v.
Decree reversed, and record remitted, with instructions to decree distribution conformably with this opinion. It is further ordered that the appellee pay the costs of this appeal.