131 A. 361 | Pa. | 1925
The will of Allen Kirkpatrick provided that the residue of his estate should go to his wife, "for and during the term of her natural life, or so long as she remains my widow, she to have full possession, control over and management of the principal of all my personal estate, and to manage and invest same in whatever manner she may deem proper and shall not be required to give any security therefor, to my hereinafter named executors." He died in 1890, his widow survived him and received from his estate $155,112.67. She died in 1924 naming, as beneficiaries, her children, the same persons who take the father's property at the mother's death. The widow's estate was appraised at $848,439.64. It is contended by appellant that part of these assets of the mother represented increased value of the father's property since his death and should be distributed as his estate, and not be the subject of an inheritance tax of $16,000. The question presented is whether this estate vesting in the children came from their mother or their father. The majority of the court below held that the widow took a life estate in the amount first stated and that only that much went to the children from their father; but that the balance of the second amount stated was the widow's own estate and that it went to the children from their mother.
The Act of May 17, 1871, P. L. 269, provides that, where personal property is given to one for life with remainder over, the life tenant may take possession thereof on giving security. We held in Reiff's App., *586
Where the testator directs that no security be given, the legal relations between life tenant and remaindermen must be the same as if a bond had been given under the Act of 1871. Prior to that act, section 49 of the Act of February 24, 1834, P. L. 70, 83, controlled; the wording is substantially the same as in the Act of 1871. Under the earlier statutes we held the life tenant was not a trustee within the Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784, (Mackinson v. Mackinson, 2 Grant 286), and under the Act of 1871, further bearing on the nonexistence of a trust estate, we held that no fiduciary relation existed to prevent the life tenant from becoming a purchaser of testator's property (Fidelity Ins., Trust Safe Deposit Co. v. Dietz,
Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions as to holding the life tenant to the obligations of quasi trustee, our Act of 1871 was enacted for the protection of the remaindermen as well as the life tenant by directing security to be given. The quantity of the estate was made certain and assured to those who were ultimately to receive it. But for the statute there would have been no necessity for testator to mention security. If a trust was implied, a bond would not change it (the Act of 1871 does not apply to an active trust, Watson's App.,
When Allen Kirkpatrick's estate was distributed, a decree was entered on September 29, 1891, awarding the $155,112.67 to "Rebecca H. Kirkpatrick in trust for the purpose specified in will of deceased." This decree did not, however, fasten a trusteeship on the life tenant with respect to that property; to say "in trust" was purely a gratuitous and voluntary statement on the part of the judge who made the decree, for there was no *588 controversy on such a question, or on any other question, before the court at that time. It must be disregarded. The title here involved goes back to the original testator's will and is in no way dependent upon that decree.
Decree affirmed at cost of appellant.