72 Pa. 155 | Pa. | 1872
The opinion of the court was delivered, by
— We cannot pronounce this agreement a gambling contract on the face of the writing. A bargain for an option, such as it presents, may be legitimate, and for a proper business object. We can imagine such cases. But it is evident such agreements can be readily prostituted to the worst kind of gambling ventures, and therefore its character may be weighed by a jury in connection with other facts in considering whether the bargain was a mere scheme to gamble upon the chance of prices. The form of the venture when aided by evidence may clearly indicate a purpose to wager upon a rise or fall in the price of oil at a future day, and not to deal in the article as men usually do in that business. We must not confound gambling, whether it be in corporation stocks or merchandise, with what is commonly termed speculation. Merchants speculate upon the future prices of that in which they deal, and buy and sell accordingly. In other words they think of and weigh, that is speculate upon, the probabilities of the coming market, and act upon this lookout into the future, in their business transactions; and in this they often exhibit high mental grasp, and great knowledge of business, and of the affairs of the world. Their speculations display talent and forecast, but they act upon their conclusions and buy or sell in a boná fide way. Such speculation cannot be denounced. But when ventures are made upon the turn of prices alone, with no boná fide intent to deal in the article, but merely to risk the difference between the rise and fall of the price at a given time, the case is changed. The purpose then is not to deal in the article, but to stake upon the rise or fall of its price. No money or capital is invested in the purchase, but so much only is required as will cover the difference — a margin, as it is figuratively termed. Then the bargain represents not a transfer of property, but a mere stake or wager upon its future price. The difference requires the ownership of only a few hundreds or thousands of dollars, while the capital to complete an actual purchase or sale may be hundreds of thousands or millions. Hence ventures upon prices invite men of small means to enter into transactions far beyond their capital, which they do not intend to fulfil, and thus the apparent business in the particular trade is inflated and unreal, and like a bubble needs only to be pricked to disappear; often carrying down the boná fide dealer in its collapse. Worse even than this, it tempts men of large capital to make bargains of stupendous proportions, and then to manipulate the market to produce the desired price. This, in the language of gambling speculation, is making a corner — that is to say, the article is so engrossed or manipulated as to make it scarce or plenty in the market at the will of the gamblers, and then to place its price within their power. Such transactions are destructive of good morals and fair dealing, and of the best interests of the community.
These remarks perhaps contain nothing new, but they are made to show how a contract, legal on its face, may become an instrument of illegal and ruinous schemes, injurious to the community and contrary to the highest policy of the state. The illegal purpose is therefore a fact falling within the province of the jury, and when found by them, brings the contract under the ban of the law. If this purpose or intent be nothing but to wager on the rise or fall in the price of an article, and not to deal in it bond fide, the law must pronounce the bai’gain a gambling contract. This brings us to consider the defendants’ offer of evidence which the court refused.
Every offer of testimony is to be judged of by the court upon the state of the evidence already in, or of that with which the offer is proposed to be followed. How then did this case stand when the offer was made ? The plaintiff had given, in evidence a written agreement; not illegal, it is true, on its face, but of that kind used in gambling ventures. The defendants had shown by the plaintiff’s own testimony that he was not a refiner of oil, or one who would buy for his own consumption — that he had not sold the oil when he made use of his call or option, and therefore had no contract of his own to fulfil — and also that he did not intend to call for the oil if the market price had gone below the price fixed in the agreement. What intent would reasonably be inferred from these circumstances? Certainly the belief induced that there was not an intent to bargain for oil for a real business purpose. Now if besides this contract it could be shown that many others of a similar kind were entered into by the same man, at and about the same time, certainly it would strenghten the conviction that the plaintiff was not a bond, fide contractor in a legitimate business; and if we then add to this the fact that he was financially unahle to take and pay for the total amount of oil he had contracted for, that conviction would become more firm, and that the real nature of his contracts was a wager on the rise and fall of the price of oil. The offer went therefore to the very question whether he was gambling in the price of oil. The objection to the offer that it was not of the time of the transaction is not tenable, for this agreement bears date the 15th of November 1870, and the contracts offered to be shown were those to mature on or prior to the 1st day of January 1871. They were therefore not too distant in time to have no bearing upon the character of the contract in question. The objection that these contracts would throw no light on the issue is plainly not valid, for the similarity of the contracts and the proximity of time considered with
Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.
