20 F. 287 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1884
(orally.) The motion must be overruled. The case was submitted fairly to the jury, and their is evidence to sustain their verdict. It may be that if the case had been tried by the court alone a different result would have been reached, or, if the judge of the court had been one of the jury, he might have drawn different inferences from the facts, and insisted on a different verdict. But it would be a mere usurpation of the functions of a jury for the court to-set aside the verdict because it might or would have given a different one.
The trial by jury is a constitutional right of the parties, and this means the concurrent judgment'of 12 men, on questions of fact, and not the single judgment of the judge of the court, who cannot lawfully set aside verdicts until one is procured in accordance with his own judgment of the facts. This court is committed to this view of the law by several reported opinions, and its almost invariable practice not to disturb verdicts on the ground that they were contrary to the judge’s opinion of the weight of the evidence. The power to do this in a proper case is not denied; but, under our practice, where the par
The law was charged, strictly according to the adjudged cases of Irwin v. Williar, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, (to appear in 110 U. S. 499,) and Marshall v. Thruston, 3 Lea, 740, and very favorably to defendants. Both sides seemed contented, and neither made exceptions to tho charge. Since the verdict it has been subjected to a searching scrutiny, as is proper, to find some error. The court does not see that the jury could have been misled by it. If the court had directed a verdict for the plaintiffs there would have been great complaint by defendants, and if for defendants alike complaint by plaintiffs, and justly so, for it is a clear case for the jury to determine.
It is as plain to the court as a mathematical demonstration that there is no foundation for the objection that the court eliminated from the consideration of the jury the intention of Adams & Son to gamble in prices. Both sides argued the case, and tried it from first to last, on the question whether the contracts out of which the controversy arises were gambling contracts or not. Here are contracts A, B, and C, etc., each for 100 bales of cotton, arid the contention is that they were not contracts for actual delivery, but for mere speculation in differences. Now, Adams & Son did not, in fact, make these contracts ; they were hundreds of miles away, had no dealings with the other contracting parties, and were ignorant of all the details of the transactions. How, then, can their intention enter into the determination of the question whether they were gambling contracts or not ? They employed an agent to make tho contracts, without specific instructions about the details; and, in testing the legality of the contracts, we must necessarily inquire about the intention of the agent and tho other parties. The principal may have intended to gamble, to pocket the profits and repudiate the losses, but if the agent was not engaged in the gambling business, and supposed his princi
Overrule the motion.