(аfter stating the facts as above). The soundness of the decree, in so far as it compels specific performance of the contract, is not seriously questioned. It is too clear to permit of controversy that Kirkland individually, being the sole legаtee under the' will of the vendor, to whom the legal title passed, was not only a prоper but a necessary party to the suit. 25 R. C. E. 326, § 143; Morgan v. Morgan,
The burden of appellаnt’s argument goes to the amount of the purchase money ascertained by the dеcree to be due under the contract, his contention being “that interest on the рurchase price should be calculated from the time appellee wеnt into possession, or at least from the time the chancery court’s decreе was rendered in September, 1920, if not from the date of the contract.”
“As a generаl rule, the purchaser is to be charged with interest from' the time the purchase money should have been paid, under the terms of the contract. And this is ordinarily true where the purchaser is let into possession and no provision is made in the contract for a delay in its execution, though the failure to complete the contract is due tо the fault of the vendor.” 27 R. C. L. 537, § 271; Arrington v. Blackwell,
It is also the law that, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, every contract for the sale of real estate imрlies that a good title will be made. Baker v. Howison,
Under the contract in this ease the vendor obligated herself to furnish an abstract showing a good and merchantable titlе, and stipulated that “the delivery of deed will be made by authorized sale for division of sаid property through the court, and the purchaser will occupy said premises аs a tenant and will pay $35 per month as rent until such time (as) the court grants a deed, said $35 to be applied on tlie purchase price on delivery of deed.”
Interprеting the contract in the light of the facts surrounding the parties when it was made, considering the occasion which gave rise to it, the relation of the parties, and the object to be accomplished, it is clear that the deal was to be closed аnd the cash payment made when the vendor was in position to deliver a deed сonveying a good and merchantable title, and until that time the vendee was to occupy the premises as a tenant of the vendor. McGhee et al. v. Alexander et al.,
The evidence shows without material conflict that the vendor during her lifetime w as mаking continuous efforts to perfect her title so as to consummate the contract, but was never able to meet all of the objections to the title pointed оut in the opinion of appellee’s attorney. After her death, on March . 26, 1924, appellant offered to convey in consummation of the contract, and aрpellee, waiving the objections to the title not met by the vendor in her lifetime, agrеed to accept the deed and pay the purchase money without interеst. The contract failed of consummation at this time because of appellant’s contention that appellee was liable for interest from the date of the contract.
Under the principles of law stated, the purchase money was not due until an acceptable title could be made in accordance with the terms of the contract, and, applying the principle that equity considers that done which should have been done, the appellee was chargeable with interest on the unpaid balance of the purchase money from the date appellant offered to convey and appellee agreed to accept the conveyance. Springle’s Heirs and Adm’rs v. Shields & Paulling,
Under the terms of the contract, appellant was entitled to have the taxes and insurance premiums рrorated as of this date— March 26, 1924 — but the case was submitted for final decree without рroof of the amount paid, and we are not of opinion that it was error for the trial court to render a final decree, on the proof submitted, without refer *71 ence to the register, to ascertain the amount of taxes and insurance paid.
Affirmed.