KIRKALDY v RIM
Docket No. 129128
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided July 11, 2007
478 MICH 581
2007] KIRKALDY v RIM 581
Mary and William Kirkaldy brought a medical-malpractice action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Choon Soo Rim, M.D., and others. The court, Marianne O. Battani, J., dismissed the complaint without prejudice after determining the plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit to be defective. The Court of Appeals, KELLY, P.J., and HOOD and DOCTOROFF, JJ., affirmed. 251 Mich App 570 (2002). The Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, partially vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, directing the Court to consider the defendants’ argument that they were entitled to dismissal with prejudice because the period of limitations was not tolled by the plaintiffs’ filing of a defective affidavit of merit. 471 Mich 924 (2004). On remand, the Court of Appeals, MURPHY and CAVANAGH, JJ. (KELLY, P.J., concurring in the result only), held that, because the plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit was determined to be defective, the plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed with prejudice. The majority, however, indicated that it would not have reached that result if it were not bound by Geralds v Munson Healthcare, 259 Mich App 225 (2003), and Mouradian v Goldberg, 256 Mich App 566 (2003). 266 Mich App 626 (2005). The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. 477 Mich 1063 (2007).
In a memorandum opinion signed by Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices WEAVER, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
A medical-malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit toll the statutory period of limitations until the validity of the affidavit is successfully challenged in subsequent judicial proceedings. If a defendant believes that an affidavit is deficient, the defendant must challenge the affidavit. If the challenge is successful, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice, leaving the plaintiff with whatever time remains in the period of limitations to file a complaint with a conforming affidavit of merit. Accordingly, the holdings of the Court of Appeals in this case are reversed, and Geralds, Mouradian, and their progeny are overruled.
Justice CAVANAGH, concurring, agreed with the result reached by the majority but disagreed with the statement that “the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant.”
Justice KELLY, concurring, joined the result of the majority opinion because the plaintiffs filed an affidavit of merit and thus Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547 (2000), which held that a medical-malpractice complaint filed without an affidavit of merit does not toll the period of limitations, does not control this case. Justice KELLY wrote separately, however, to note her concern that the issue decided peremptorily in Scarsella has never been fully briefed and argued, despite meritorious arguments indicating that the Court misread
Reversed and remanded to the trial court.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — MEDICAL MALPRACTICE — AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT — TOLLING.
A medical-malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit toll the statutory period of limitations unless the validity of the affidavit is successfully challenged in subsequent judicial proceedings, at which time the period of limitations resumes running (
Mark Granzotto, P.C. (by Mark Granzotto), and Erlich, Rosen & Bartnick, P.C. (by Sheldon D. Erlich), for Mary and William Kirkaldy.
Siemion, Huckabay, Bodary, Padilla, Morganti & Bowerman P.C. (by Raymond
Saurbier & Siegan, P.C. (by Renée S. Siegan and Debbie K. Taylor), for Raina M. Ernstoff, M.D.; and Raina M. Ernstoff, M.D., P.C.
Amici Curiae:
Olsman Mueller, P.C. (by Jules B. Olsman and Donna M. MacKenzie), for Citizens for Better Care.
Janet M. Brandon for the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
MEMORANDUM OPINION. The issue presented in this case concerns the proper disposition of a medical-malpractice lawsuit after a court determines that the plaintiff‘s affidavit of merit does not meet the requirements of
In Geralds and Mouradian, the Court of Appeals purported to rely on this Court‘s opinion in Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), to hold that filing a defective affidavit of merit is the functional equivalent of failing to file an affidavit of merit for the purpose of tolling the period of limitations. Therefore, the Court held that a defective affidavit of merit does not toll the period of limitations under
Scarsella concerned the tolling effect of a medical-malpractice complaint filed without an affidavit of merit. This Court held that filing a medical-malpractice complaint without an affidavit of merit “is ineffective, and does not work a tolling of the applicable period of limitation.” Id. at 553. However, in the very next sentence, this Court noted that “[t]his holding does not extend to a situation in which a court subsequently determines that a timely filed affidavit is inadequate or defective.” Id. In a footnote to that
Mouradian was the first attempt by the Court of Appeals at that decisional development. The Court held that the affidavit of merit was “grossly nonconforming” because it did not contain all the statutorily required statements. Because the affidavit was deemed “grossly nonconforming,” it was “insufficient to constitute an affidavit of merit within the meaning of the statute . . . .” Mouradian, supra at 574. The Court went on to hold that “as a matter of law, plaintiffs’ complaint against defendants for the second surgery was not commenced because of their failure to file an affidavit of merit before the period of limitations expired . . . .” Id. Thus, under Mouradian, filing a “grossly nonconforming” affidavit of merit, similar to failing to file any affidavit, does not toll the period of limitations under
In Geralds, the Court of Appeals extended the Mouradian rule beyond a grossly nonconforming affidavit to any nonconforming affidavit. The Geralds panel held that
whether the adjective used is “defective” or “grossly nonconforming” or “inadequate,” in the case at bar, plaintiff‘s affidavit did not meet the standards contained in
MCL 600.2912d(1) . . . . [P]laintiff‘s affidavit was defective and did not constitute an effective affidavit for the purpose ofMCL 600.2912d(1) and, therefore, plaintiff filed a complaint without an affidavit of merit sufficient to commence a medical malpractice action. [Geralds, supra at 240.]
Although bound by Geralds, the panel in the present case criticized it as “especially harsh,” inconsistent with Scarsella, and inconsistent with
We agree that Geralds and Mouradian are inconsistent with Scarsella and
Thus, if
We reverse the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary and remand to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TAYLOR, C.J., and WEAVER, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree with the majority‘s formulation of its rule. Specifically, I believe that Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), was incorrectly decided, so I cannot agree with the majority‘s statement, ante at 585, that under the statutes at issue, “the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant.” Rather, I would hold that under the plain language of
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances:
(a) At the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules.
Clearly, the Legislature did not instruct that the period of limitations for a medical malpractice action would be tolled only when a complaint and an affidavit of merit are filed. In fact, as plaintiffs and their amici curiae point out, the Legislature considered and rejected a formulation of
KELLY, J. (concurring). In Scarsella v Pollak,1 this Court held that filing a medical-malpractice complaint without an affidavit of merit “is ineffective, and does not work a tolling of the applicable period of limitation.”2 I did not join the majority opinion. I dissented because I did not think that we should decide the issue without the benefit of full briefing and argument.3 In this case, plaintiffs filed an affidavit of merit. Therefore, Scarsella is not controlling, and this case does not require us to determine whether Scarsella was correctly decided. Consequently, I join the result of the majority opinion.
But I write separately to note my concern that the issue in Scarsella has never received a full hearing from this Court. As Justice CAVANAGH points out in his concurrence,
Notes
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled:
(a) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant.
