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Kirby v. Edgewood Independent School District
761 S.W.2d 859
Tex. App.
1988
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*1 «59 good good a unilateral mistake made the defense of faith and commercial Petrofina, faith is no defense. representa- American afforded to a reasonableness Indus., Inc., 740, 3.419(c). Inc. PPG tive under section We overrule (Tex.App. Worth writ point the sole of error and the trial affirm — Fort agr.); Ligon dism’d v. E.F. Hutton & judgment. court’s Co., (Tex.Civ.App.— n.r.e.). Consequent Dallas writ ref’d good

ly, the faith and commercial reason

ableness defense authorized under subsec (c)

tion is a one. novel Because of this

exceptional aspect, wary must we be

attributing to the drafters of the an Code grant bank, payor/drawee

intention to to a newly designated the primary converter KIRBY, al., Appellants, et William process, the bank collection the same newly created defense as is afforded to specified certain other banks. To do so EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, al., Appellees. would indeed emasculate the conversion et right just confirmed. It follows that a No. 3-87-190-CV. provision relief for all converters should Texas, Appeals read into the section if the defense Court portion reasonably can be limited to a class Austin. pay- converters which does not include Dec. 1988.

or/drawee banks. Rehearing Denied Jan. 1989. key application a limited defense lies in “rep- the Code’sdefinition of

resentative” which makes that term co-ex-

tensive an agency relationship.5 By with

confining relationship this agency to an

affiliation between the true owner of the being

instrument dealt with and that own- “representative” banks,

er’s the conversion against of that pay- owner meaningfully pro-

or/drawee bank can be interpretation permitted

tected. This payor Code which excludes a “collecting

bank from the term bank.” 4.105(4)

TEX.BUS. & COM.CODEANN. §

(Tex.U.C.C.)(Vernon 1968). This exclusion that, paying

is attributable to the fact

item, payor collecting bank acts not as a

agent for the owner the item but rather

acts its own behalf under its contractual

agreement depositor. with its basis, payor/drawee

On this bank qualify “representative”

does not as a Accordingly,

the owner. the trial court

properly ruled that as a matter of law a

payor/drawee bank is not entitled to assert (35) "Repre- person empowered TEX. 1.201. General to act for another. Definitions. agent, (Vernon (Tex.U.C.C.) sentative" includes an an officer of a BUS. & COM.CODEANN. association, trustee, corporation or and a execu- 1968). estate, tor administrator of an or other *2 Educ., Kirby,

N. Texas Com’r Clements, Educ., Bd. of William Gov- State Bullock, Texas, Comptrol- ernor of Robert Texas, Mattox, Atty. Gen. ler of Jim Texas. Kauffman, American Mexican

Albert H. Fund, Legal Anto- Defense and Educ. San nio, Edgewood Independent School Dist., et al. Richards, Richards, Wiseman &

David R. Durst, III, Gray, Gray & Beck- Richard E. er, Austin, Independent for Alvarado Dist., et al. School C.J., SHANNON, Before ABOUSSIE, JJ. GAMMAGE SHANNON, Chief Justice. districts, parents, and Appellee school suit in the district court of students filed County seeking a declaration that Travis financing system, Tex. the Texas school seq., is in violation 16.001, et Educ.Code § After a bench Constitution.1 trial, judgment the district court rendered to that effect. This Court will reverse judgment judgment and here render nothing. appellees take By judgment the district court funding in violation of declared the scheme Const, I, (equal rights), Tex. § § (effi (due law)2 course of and art. 1 Turner, Hall, system). The district court Timothy Hughes Jim cient school L. & Luce, Austin, is a “fundamental Independent for Eanes concluded that education School Dist., right”; “suspect et al. that wealth is a classifica context; Luna, Luna,

Robert E. tion” in the school finance Earl Mary Mil- ford, Dallas, existing funding scheme is unconstitu Andrews Independent Dist., “inefficient”; tionally School et and that the Texas al. Brown, F. Robert Hutchinson, Price, neutrality” “fiscal Constitution demands Boyle Brooks, & Dallas, i.e., funding, James ex W. school the level of Deather- age, Power, Deatherage, Tharp penditures per pupil & not Blanken- ship, Irving, for Irving Independent according property vary wealth of School Dist. Finally, that district. the district court en Mattox, Gen., Atty. joined Kevin T. state officials from en Jim O’Han- relevant Gen., Austin, lon, Atty. forcing challenged statutes Asst. for William but existing Appellants Accordingly, are the Commissioner of Edu- the issue of whether the 1. cation, Education, State Board of State funding other scheme violates the due course a number school districts. officials and provision a basis for the district of law is not judgment is also not before this court’s 2. There is no mention of the due course law Court. pleadings or conclusions of law, and such claim was tried consent. injunction September dents at least a basic education. Under the “stayed” the until of state aid received program, the amount by any given “equalized” district is accord- many findings of The district court filed formula, prop- ing complex to a so that low fact, There a distillation of which follows. generally erty wealth districts receive sub- 1,061 school districts in Texas with high stantially more state aid than do the about three million students attendance. districts. wealth existing system, finance Under the *3 the school districts share the error, the state and points appellants By several operations not the cost of cost of school but challenge the district court’s overall conclu- facilities, entirely by which is borne the funding sion that the scheme State’s Const, costs, districts. Of total education the I, is in violation of Tex. 3.§ approximately forty-two per- provides State I, provides pertinent part: Article cent, fif- approximately the school districts men, All free when form a social (derived ty percent property from local tax- compact, equal rights.... have es), coming with the remainder from vari- specifically, appellants More dis- attack the sources, including Be- ous federal funds. application trict court’s of the “strict scruti- cause taxable wealth varies from ny” evaluating standard in the school fi- district, district to school districts’ abilities because, assert, appellants nance and, generate vary revenues as one right” education is not a “fundamental and expect, disparities would there are “suspect not a wealth is classification.” expenditures per level of student between equal protection equal rights In an wealthy wealthy the and the less court, analysis, appellate necessity, the districts. Wealthier school districts are begin recognizing applicable must provide physi- able to their students better judicial ques standard of If the review.3 facilities, curriculum, cal more extensive infringes upon tioned statute a “fundamen larger libraries and better trained teachers right” inherently “suspect tal or creates an wealthy than are the less districts. classification,” subjected the statute will be The local school district tax rates also judicial scrutiny. scrutiny to strict Such vary widely from district to district. The requires compelling the state to establish wealthy frequently less districts must set a discharge interest in its enactment. To higher average than tax rate to achieve the such a burden the state must demonstrate necessary revenue to meet minimum edu- purpose that its or interest is both constitu cational standards. tionally permissible compelling, and State, through that its use of the classification is neces its Foundation School Program, sary accomplishment purpose. to the of its degree inability offsets to a Stamos, 695 wealthy gen- Spring of the less Branch I.S.D. v. S.W. school districts to (Tex.1985); purpose pro- erate revenues. The 2d 556 Hernandez v. Houston District, gram Independent is to insure that each has the 558 S.W.2d district School n.r.e.).4 necessary provide (Tex.Civ.App.1977, funds to ref’d each of its stu- writ out, Appellees point correctly, subject upon urge appellees that do not hesitate to seize well, precedent. meeting equal protection to federal standards as the courts federal liberty of this State are at to fashion their own important, opinions More in several our courts to determine statute is tests whether a Texas employed equal protection the federal valid under the Texas constitution. Whitworth analysis considering "equal rights” provi (Tex.1985).Ap- Bynum, pe 699 S.W.2d Spring Branch sion of the Texas Constitution. urge disregard then this Court to federal Stamos, (Tex. 1985); S.W.2d 556 I.S.D. v. llees precedent resolving Appellees’ appeal. this Independent School Dis v. Houston Hernandez position ignores the fact this cause was that trict, (Tex.Civ.App.1977, 558 S.W.2d 121 writ tried, pleaded, judgment pursuant rendered n.r.e.). Because the Texas courts have refd equal protection analysis by the evolved precedent analysis, is federal federal utilized the opinions of the federal courts: a statute is sub highly persuasive. judicial infringes jected scrutiny to strict if it Hernandez, upon right precise holding a fundamental or if it creates a 4. The Moreover, education suspect Court State not a tuition-free classification. this need children, by Plyler advantageous position, illegal to their alien was overruled notes that when hand, support if does the statute not for the and mainte- On other right collide with a fundamental or create a nance an efficient classification, accord suspect the statute is free schools. constitutionality. presumption ed a Appellees’ argument, by the embraced not presumption may be disturbed unless court, ignores difference be- upon wholly grounds rests enactment tween Constitution United States legit of a irrelevant to the achievement that of Unlike Texas. the United By objective. imate state Whitworth Constitution, is States which a document num, (Tex.1985). authority delegating power, limited great num- the district court’s conclu- Texas Constitution addresses a subjects, large majority is a

sion fundamental ber rights. Indeed, purposes equal protection analysis, fundamental (1) appellees premises many provi- ed- contains advance Texas Constitution (2) important usually subject legis- that are vitally ucation edu- sions example, to in the Con- lation. For specifically cation referred Constitution *4 Const, Texas, county poor for the particularly stitution of Tex. vides establishment XVI, VII, one, farms, 8; course, disputes art. 1. No houses art. defines § § XVI, 11; impor- usury, provides that art. for local appellees’ premise education is § XVI, elections, 20; public long option provides has art. tant and that education § XVI, liens, mechanic art. and for commanded a central role in the affairs of for § storage facilities, Ill, art. 49-d. Importance this State. of a state service water § however, affairs, Yet, seriously propose and its in state is not no one that role would right, funda- controlling ascertaining example, in whether a one has fundamental for rights storage facility mental are involved. or mechanics constitutional to a water Independent although Dist. Antonio School v. for each finds San lien the 1, 30-31, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. This place the Texas Constitution. its Court, course, 36 L.Ed.2d suggest does not that footing provisions equal on an these premise grounded Appellees’ second is provisions edu- those which concern with upon Indepen- statement San Antonio cation, placement but the the Constitu- supra, v. to Rodriguez, dent School Dist. legislative-type provisions of such tion purposes for of federal the effect that appellees’ argu- points up the weakness protection analysis deter- one should i.e., ment, is con- subject that because is a right mine there to education “whether in the Constitution it must be tained Texas guaranteed by explicitly implicitly the right. a fundamental is Constitution.” Because education Constitution, appel- in the Texas mentioned out, point however, Appellees right lees an education is insist that to only refers to edu- Texas Constitution ap- right. specifically, More a fundamental cation, states that education but also Const, pellees rely upon Tex. § preservation of the liber- “essential provides: rights people.” Because ties and of the sys- Support and maintenance Texas Constitution states free tem of schools. liberties, appellees “essential” to the basic argue knowl- education must be fundamental general diffusion of Sec. 1. education, ap- right. system of edge preservation Without a being essential reason, people not be rights people, pellees would liberties meaningfully exercise duty Legislature able to liberties it shall be right and the to vote.5 speech as freedom make suitable the State establish and Doe, meaningfully his exercise 72 L.Ed.2d cation sufficient 457 U.S. S.Ct. Instead, court found the district basic liberties. many inferior because of that in resources, fails 5. We not understand that the district court educational do many "adequate” an edu- vide children with concluded that educational "adequate court defined an basic edu- cation. The district fails to each child with a law, however, Appellees’ analysis termed rect. In the term has been “funda- narrow, theory legal writings. “nexus” right” special, mental has a techni- Court, course, meaning. cal This must Supreme Court of the United States legal meaning. employ the term’s concluded that education is not a funda- right though provision by narrow, mental even discussing technical mean necessary the state be for its citizens ing, Supreme plain Court of has meaningfully to exercise their basic liber- ly stated that “fundamental ties. Independent San Antonio School genesis express implied their Rodriguez, supra. Dist. v. The Court rea- protections personal recognized liberty analysis log- soned that the “nexus” lacked in federal and state constitutions” such as limitation; example, ical that there is right speech to free or free exercise of no fundamental to food and shelter religion. Stamos, Spring Branch I.S.D. although the existence of each is essential (Emphasis 695 S.W.2d at 559 for the recognized exercise of fundamental right” term limi “fundamental refers to a connection, rights. In this the court stated: upon governmental tation the exercise of Furthermore, power; imply it does not logical affirmative limitations on obligation upon government appellees’ to insure that theory nexus are difficult to How, instance, persons all have the financial perceive. resources is education distinguished significant liberty available exercise their or funda from the personal rights. person mental The issue is one of interests in the basics of decent term, liberty, food and al a broad but one that nec Empirical shelter? examination essarily contemplates might things well that some assumption buttress an *5 ill-fed, ill-clothed, scope “liberty” must fall outside the ill-housed are among scope hence outside the of “fundamental participants most ineffective Roth, rights.” in political process, Regents See Board v. and that 564, 570-573, 2701, 408 U.S. 92 2705- enjoyment derive the least from the S.Ct. ben- 2707, (1972). so, present efits of 33 L.Ed.2d 548 In the the First Amendment. If appellees’ appeal, suggestion there is no thesis would of unwar cast serious governmental any on ranted interference authority doubt with Dandridge v. kind, 471, person’s “liberty,” of such Williams ... U.S. 90 whatever S.Ct. [397 1153, travel, (1970) 25 L.Ed.2d as the freedom to to choose an and Lindsey ] 56, 862, occupation, family v. Normet U.S. make decisions S.Ct. [405 (whether (1972)]. marry L.Ed.2d 36 or whether to chil have dren), fit, worship God as one sees “and Rodriguez, 37, 411 U.S. at 93 S.Ct. at 1299. generally enjoy privileges long those Education, doubt, occupies without recognized orderly pur as essential to the important place in the maintenance of the Roth, happiness by suit of free men.” certainly State’s basic institutions and is (Emphasis U.S. at 92 S.Ct. at 2706 primary transmitting vehicle for the values upon society which our Plyler rests. See Doe, 202, 221, education, 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. This court concludes that vital, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 although issue does not rise to the same resolved, however, here to be engage is whether level as the freedom of catego- gov education is included in the speech religion limited or to exercise free of ry interference, rights rights of fundamental that reach consti- ernmental both which Initially, might long recognized tutional dimensions. one been as fundamental Same; protection conclude that the two issues are the and entitled to under both important, that because education is Spring it federal and state constitutions. right. Stamos, should abe fundamental In ordi- 695 S.W.2d at Branch I.S.D. v. nary usage, Court, probably opinion that conclusion is cor- In of this dis- opportunity” apparently as the "education court concluded that the Texas Con- 600,000

gram guarantees type op- available to ... the in the stitution this of educational students portunity state’s wealthiest school districts.” The district to each child. that the impor- We thus conclude erroneously elevated the trict court disadvan- operate peculiar does not financing interest of educational tant state tage any suspect class. protected right on the opportunity into a long rec- ancient liberties same level with at 1293. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 93 S.Ct. fundamental, such ognized by the courts as under the Texas Constitu- analysis Our depend do not recognized result. reaches no different tion support. upon public financial public school finance Because the Moreover, adopted in 1977 this Court a fundamental system neither collides with analysis prop- constitutional federal classification, suspect right nor creates validity of approach er to determine the presumption is accorded right to education” claims “constitutional presumption constitutionality. Such Hernandez under the Texas Constitution. unless the disturbed be District, Independent School v. Houston relation system bears no rational finance holding in Although precise supra. legitimate purpose. state ship Plyler, supra, it that case was overruled Spring Bynum, supra; Whitworth i.e., grounds, was on other overruled Stamos, and Her supra; Branch I.S.D. v. As federal constitution. claim under the Independent School nandez v. Houston such, fed- requires still that the Hernandez Dist., Utilizing property taxa supra. analysis employed to measure state eral partly finance free tion revenues to conclusion, reach its effectuating claims. order to rationally related to schools disregarded prece- this the district court use of local of education. The local control dent. the freedom a school district taxes allows educating its funds toward to devote more reasons, the district all of these For are otherwise available children than concluding that education court erred in amount. It also state-guaranteed minimum right. a “fundamental” greater influence the local citizen enables decision-making participation erred further The district court local dollars are process as to how these suspect classi determining is a that wealth Marrs, 120 Tex. spent. Mumme v. purposes equal protection fication for Rodriguez analysis. plaintiffs *6 that, unequal funding for school recognizes claimed that be Although this Court protection wealth, practical districts violated disparities of cause existing of students in the less well-funded finance can effect having proposition, the rejecting property-value that districts districts. lead to low districts, Supreme Court wrote: than wealthier United States less fiscal control result, itself, cannot by this undesirable this Court to [Ajppellees’ suit asks ... system. The fact that the entire invalidate exacting scrutiny to re- extend its most promote may disparities wealth obvious allegedly discrimi- system that view a than in in some districts more local control diverse, amor- against large, nates legit entirely invalidate others does not class, only by the common phous unified legisla A goal participation. imate of hap- residence in districts that factor of simply may condemned not be tive scheme than pen have less taxable wealth the state’s not effectuate it does because alleged system of districts. The other Inde perfection. San Antonio goals with it defines and the class discrimination Rodriguez, Dist. v. pendent School of traditional indicia none of the 50-54, at 1305-1307. 93 S.Ct. U.S. at is not saddled suspectness: the class present disabilities, urge subjected to also that Appellants or with such by authorized unequal finance is purposeful system of school history of Const, VII, 3. This Court treatment, position Tex. art. relegated or to such a § Const, 3, VII, agrees. Texas § as to command political powerlessness of pro- subsequently, in 1883 and majori- amended from the extraordinary protection part as follows: in relevant vides process. political tarian One-fourth of the revenue derived from tution the State Texas: An Annotat- of of occupation the State poll taxes and tax of Comparative Analysis, ed and 511-520 every one dollar on inhabitant of the (1977). State, ages between the twenty-one of The district court concluded that the years, and sixty shall be apart set annu- VII, permissive visions of art. 3 are § ally for the public benefit of the free merely nature allow the schools; ... and it duty shall be the of power create school districts with the the State Board of Education to set aside providing tax as but one means public a sufficient amount of the said tax to opined, education. The district court final- provide free text books for the use of ly, nothing language that in the of art. attending children public free schools 3 or history requires finding State; provided, however, this present of school finance is should the limit of taxation herein named constitutional. be insufficient the may deficit met proper guiding principle in the con appropriation general from the funds of struction give of a constitution is to effect Legislature the State and may also to the intent of the adopted voters who it. school dis- formation for Robison, Cox v. 426, 105 Tex. 150 S.W. laws; by general trict and all such [sic] 1149, (1912). A state constitution is may parts districts embrace grant power not a oper but instead it counties, two or more Legisla- and the solely ates power. as a limitation of Watts ture shall be pass authorized to laws for Mann, 917, 187 S.W.2d (Tex.Civ.App. the assessment and collection of taxes in 1945, ref’d). power writ All which is not all said districts and for management limited the constitution inheres in the and control of school or people legislative and a act is valid when schools of such whether such prohibition constitution contains no composed districts are territory wholly Id. against general it. provision county within a parts or in or two yield constitution specific must to a provi counties, more Legislature and the sion, State, Ry. San Antonio & A.P. Co. v. authorize an additional ad valorem tax 680, (1936), 128 Tex. 95 S.W.2d or to to be levied and collected within all provision adopted another later in time. school districts heretofore formed Brownson, State v. 94 Tex. 61 S.W. formed, main- hereafter for further The wisdom of a constitu tenance schools, and free provision tional questioned by cannot be the erection equipment Sheppard, Cramer v. the courts. 140 Tex. therein; buildings provided that a ma- If the

jority qualified property taxpay- meaning language of the constitu ing voters voting at an plain, tional given it must be election to be held purpose, regard effect without consequences. shall vote such tax not to exceed in *7 A Id. presumed statute is constitutional year ($1.00) one one dollar on the one and will not be declared unconstitutional hundred dollars valuation prop- the of unless some of the constitution erty subject to district, taxation in such plainly can showing invalidity. be cited but the upon limitation the amount of McGraw, Tex. Armory Nat. Guard Bd. v. school district tax herein authorized (1939). 132 Tex. 634 apply shall not incorporated cities then, duty, Our is to examine the of words or towns constituting separate and in- the constitution and intent of the voters to dependent districts, school nor to inde- determine whether a reason exists to de pendent or common school districts presumption validity. feat the statute’s of by created general special law. Cox, McGraw, supra; supra. (Emphasis See also Tex. Const. XI, (repealed 1969); Shepherd v. One need not history § be a student of Dist., San Jacinto Jr. Coll. leading 363 S.W.2d 742 of the know events to the Constitu- (Tex.1963); (ed.), 2 G. Braden The Consti- tional Convention of 1875. From 1865 to system blindly gov- of this people the state were school the convention by group supporters of Union orga- erned a and the entire wrecked [radical school] outsiders, imposed nization, a rule and maintained destroying the which features Ramsdell, by might. military Reconstruc- good together with those were were in The Reconstruction tion Id. at bad.” 170. strong 1869 set cen- up Constitution of a response ex- regime’s In to the radical system providing tralized education for travagance taxing in and the spending, compulsory generous free education with drafters of the Constitution of 1876 embed- support. Eby, tax Development The of against ded that document with inhibitions Education in Texas Pursuant taxing power exercise the the of the and Constitution, to that of 1871 law set “[t]he money. expenditures public “The farm- up system imperial the most of education large proportion ers of constituted any known to American It was or- state. convention, and, writhing of that under the ganized military along lines and assumed exactions and extortions of the state authority training over of the absolute them, government upon pendu- forced children.” Id. at 159. Under the law of swung lum from the extreme of riotous em- state board education was irresponsive expenditure mon- public and

powered place legislature in act economy, if ey to the extreme of close repugnant school affairs. Id. One feature Middleton, penuriousness.” Terrell most of one Texans was district tax (Tex.Civ.App.1916, S.W. 367 writ ref’d at percent building maintaining and school 1138). 108 Tex. S.W. district, 163; houses in the Id. at the tax by appointed was levied five citizens economy” In the “close and in exercise of district directors. at 160-161. board of Id. excesses, response to Reconstruction did not drafters the 1876 Constitution Opposition system to the new school was By provide for local taxation schools. immediate, vigorous, widespread. For 1880, however, change pub- was a there example, taxpayers’ convention convened support lic sentiment in education. proclamation in Austin resulted in a advis- Eby, supra, support 193. Such was at ing pay the citizens not to the tax. Id. at adoption reflected of the role, pay 163. The people had no “but to adop- 3. By amendment to art. taxes for the of the tion amendment voters evidenced obediently to send their children to school their intent that the initiative for the for- foreign more ... to the senti- people ments of Texas could not mation maintenance school districts Texans, directly have been Id. 161. most devised.” at be vested those affected: large, ignored citizenry. new school laws. the local was empowered to the method for the establish majority After a en- people were districts creation so that regained franchised and of state control might organized need for new government, a convention was assembled limitations, districts arose. Within in 1875 No to draft new constitution. property-owning voters within the subject ag- at the convention created more impose upon an ad valo- could themselves itation than that education. Id. at help rem tax to maintain the schools in the provisions reaction to the education taxing pow- district. limitation on the laws, the Reconstruction Constitution and however, imposed, upon er was not opposition there was considerable incorporated constituting cities towns form. convention to separate independent debate, adopted After much the convention *8 thereby permitting op- those districts the the article on education “fell far which sup- meeting greater of the of the tion to raise revenue for the short real needs port times. In its intense hatred of the radical of their schools.6 times, early permitted 6. From the in Texas were The towns to vote taxes for the towns were granted by legislature buildings. special privileges the for construction and maintenance of management They independently state the conduct and of their schools. formed districts GAMMAGE,Justice, dissenting. summary, people the intended up system retaining signifi set a school a I respectfully dissent. degree cant of local control. The scheme imposes The Constitution on the wholly of financing evolved is not of for suitably providing State the burden goal irrelevant to the of local control. imple- of purposes education. For The also the district court concluded that mentation, and as an to a uni- alternative present system school was “inefficient” system, fied and centralized the Constitu- Const, 1. violation of Tex. permits the tion to create dis- support tricts allows local taxation course, does, provision That of re Nowhere, of the schools within a district. quire “efficient,” system that the school be however, permit does the the Constitution provides guidance but the adoption any system creation or of school this other how court arrive other one which is than efficient which of at a determination what is efficient or comports requirements with the of complexi inefficient. the enormous Given adequacy under the law. of The ty of a mil system educating school three in competitive, child’s education free-mar- children, lion this Court concludes political system ket economic and such as not, is, essentially or is “efficient” is relative; ours is it is of a function what political question judicial suitable for program are getting. other children A review. instruction available to child one cannot “patched-up rather and overly cob- truly adequate be deemed or efficient if 7 system bled” fi- administration and other children are better afforded a edu- nance for education has evolved program thereby cational and are consist- past years. this state the one over hundred advantaged lifelong ently competi- The does not edu- an ideal status, money, tion political influ- cation for all completely students nor a fair ence.

distribution of tax benefits and burdens among patrons. all of school Neverthe- I less, system government, under our ef- fact, findings The court’s trial and the forts to those ideals achieve come from sufficiency supporting the evidence people through constitutional amendments them, undisputed. Among the many are legislative through enactments and not findings by majority not articulated judgments of courts. following: opinion judgment The Court this in Texas wealthiest should not as an be viewed affirmation that $14,000,000 property has over wealth present financing system is de- student, per poorest while the district has it sirable or that should continue without $20,000 approximately property wealth change; rather, solely our conclusion is per The one million students in student. that the is not in violation upper range prop- at school districts Constitution of Texas. erty have more than two and one- wealth judgment judgment reversed and half times as much taxable wealth appellees is here noth- their do the one rendered take schools than ing. poorer million districts. students rules, managed by city while at the same time received the should council or per capita state allotment for appointed purpose. their children. for that board of trustees privileges

These reaffirmed Consti- were great rapidity the towns availed them- With by subsequent tution of 1876 and porated Incor- laws. privileges, especially selves after 1880. of these privilege voting on towns had Eby, supra, at 178. assuming question control own of their ques- independent schools as districts and the quoted phrase has borrowed 7. This Court pay large people a tax tion of how desired opinion Shepherd from Norvell’s Justice They purpose. for this could also choose Dist., at San Jr. Coll. Jacinto government, form of whether the schools *9 300,000 Program in not students the lowest-wealth The Foundation School does

The percent of guarantee eligible have less than three in- schools student basic each property support to their edu- State wealth program his or her structional suitable to 300,000 cation, in while the students needs, in low educational and students twenty- highest-wealth over schools have equal oppor- do have an wealth districts not percent property to five State wealth tunity to instruction under obtain support their education. requirements. State’s year, great In the due to 1985-86 school poorer districts cannot to and afford wealth, disparities district in high quality do as facilities as dis- spending per student varied between districts, negatively affecting the wealthier $2,112 $19,333. 600,000 tricts from to opportunity in the educational of children two- students in the wealthiest districts had those districts. spent thirds on their education than more heavy pattern is a concentration There 600,000 poorest in dis- students poverty poor- in the of families below level tricts. compared er districts as to the wealthier Because of the variations in school wide districts, greater even concentration wealth, vastly differing are district there of both low-incomefamilies and students imposed upon taxpayers burdens district Furthermore, very poorest districts. districts, In the support poorest education. percent of the twenty-one while in 1980 twenty taxpayers pay must more than Mexican-American, population was State’s per one dollars valuation to cents hundred percent population eighty-four student; per raise one hundred dollars Mexican-American; poorest districts was taxpayers pay the wealthiest districts need significantly expensive more and it per less than two cents one hundred dollars provide equal opportunity to educational per raise hundred dollars valuation to one minority low-income and children than student. higher non-minority educate income and support financial enables Greater children. wealthy provide much school districts to experiences broader educational and better Forty-five percent Hispanic ninth students, including things for their drop grade students out school before facilities, more extensive curricula better graduation, thirty-four percent of while activities, more co-curricular enhanced twenty-seven percent of Whites Blacks and through training materi- additional Hispanic dropouts Nearly do so. half of li- technology, als and better libraries and complete grade less than ninth when professionals, curriculum- brary additional schooling, compared eigh- discontinue staff-development specialists dropouts. Black and White percent teen aides, counseling teacher more extensive finance The Texas school services, drop- special programs to combat negative impact on continues to have outs, parenting programs to involve the of students low wealth dis- experi- family in educational the student’s learn, ability to tricts in terms of their ratios, ence, pupil-teacher and the lower skills, skills, acquire master basic salable ability to retain better teachers attract and quality of life. their and administrators. development of In the creation and one- preparation The educational over boundaries, population inade- third of the State’s or articulated did not follow rational the school districts do quate. One-third of creation nor policy. Neither their standards for maxi- not meet the State’s effort made perpetuation their has an been size, great majority and the mum class local tax bases. equalize the districts’ great are low wealth districts. The these underlying is no rationale in the There fully accred- majority of school districts not many inability to stan- boundaries meet State ited because many pure tax havens. are dards low wealth districts.

«69 ties, II Legislature and the shall be autho- pass rized to laws the assessment Const, for I, provides: Texas art. 3§ and collection taxes in all said dis- of men, free All when form a social management tricts and and for compact, rights, have and public control school or schools of districts, man, men, or set is entitled to exclu- of such whether such districts of emoluments, separate public sive or composed territory wholly within a privileges, public but in consideration of county parts inor of two or more coun- services, (emphasis added) ties, Legislature and the may authorize Const, I, Texas provides: art. 3a§ an additional ad valorem tax to be lev- Equality under the law shall not be de- ied and collected within all school dis- abridged sex, race, nied or because of tricts heretofore formed or hereafter color, creed, origin. or national This formed, the further maintenance of self-operative. amendment is schools, public free and for the erection Const, VII, provides: art. 1§ equipment and buildings school general knowledge diffusion of being therein; provided that majority of the preservation essential to the the lib- qualified property taxpaying voters of rights erties people, it shall voting the district at an election to be be the duty Legislature purpose, held for that shall vote such tax State to establish and make suitable ($1.00) any year not to exceed in one one support visions for the and maintenance dollar on the one hundred dollars valua- of an schools, public free efficient subject tion of to taxation in added) (emphasis district, upon but the limitation Const, provides: amount of school district tax herein au- One-fourth of the revenue derived from apply incorporated thorized shall not occupation the State taxes poll tax of constituting separate cities or towns every one dollar on inhabitant of the independent school nor to inde- State, ages between the twenty-one pendent or common school districts cre- sixty years, apart shall be set annu- by general special (empha- ated or law. ally public for the benefit of the free added) sis schools; thereto, and in addition there The district court held that education is a shall levied and collected an annual ad right” necessitating ju- “fundamental strict valorem State tax of such an amount not dicial scrutiny funding scheme under thirty-five to exceed cents on the one I, 3a; article 3 that wealth is a §§ ($100.00) valuation, hundred dollars “suspect classification” in the fi- school arising with the available school fund context, necessitating nance also strict sources, from all other will be sufficient I, scrutiny; 3a, that article 3 and de- §§ public to maintain and neutrality” funding mands “fiscal period schools of this State for a of not (expenditures per pupil for instruction and less than six months in each year, and it may facilities in not be a func- duty shall be the of the State Board tion of wealth other than the wealth of the Education to set aside a sufficient whole); existing State as a and that the provide amount of the said tax to free funding unconstitutionally scheme is “inef- text books for the use of children attend- ficient.” ing State; free schools of this however, provided, that should the limit Ill of taxation herein named be insufficient is, course, the deficit free to de- may by appropriation be met “methods, restrictions, general from the termine funds of the State and Legislature regulations” necessary may also to administer long schools “so as that determination is districts] formation of law; general arbitrary and all such school districts not so as to violate the constitu- parts embrace Spring two more coun- tional of Texas’ citizens.” Stamos, though guaranteed, expressly

Branch I.S.D. (Tex.1985). recognized indispensable been ... as enjoyment rights explicitly defined.” majority opinion in its is correct ob- Newspapers, Virginia, Richmond Inc. v. the United servation that States Constitu- *11 2814, 555, 579-80, 448 100 U.S. S.Ct. 2828- different, tion and of Texas that are that 29, (1980). L.Ed.2d 65 973 Courts the Texas charter a number addresses repeatedly protected fundamental in normally-legislative matters of a non-fun- despite specific lack of terests their textual nature, opinion fails damental but to See, e.g., bases in our State Constitution. per- none of is observe that these matters Emp. Dept. Texas State Union v. Tex. ceived, education, “being as is essential Retardation, Health Mental 746 Mental & preservation to the of the and liberties (Tex.1987) (right privacy); 203 S.W.2d to rights people,” nor are couched (Tex.1985) Smith, Holick v. 685 S.W.2d 18 language lending itself constitutional to State, (parental rights); v. 68 S.W. Waller such treatment. ref’d) (Tex.Civ.App.1934, (right 2d 601 writ pursue occupation). to an explicitly pro- and are not Food shelter majority The relies on San Antonio I.S. Constitution, vided for in State nor our 1, 1278, 411 93 Rodriguez, D. v. U.S. S.Ct. does the State undertake to them (1973) (wherein five-judge L.Ed.2d 36 16 so, for all its children. If it did a serious majority Supreme of the United States question would arise whether State Court, construing Constitu- federal substantially must do so on a basis. tion, held education not to be a fundamen- principle equal citizenship im- But the right tal under Fourteenth Amend- 3a, I, plicit 3 and is not a in article §§ ment) for that education is its conclusion leveling, guar- nor a charter for economic right; and rea- fundamental further government provide the antee that the will sons, Rodriguez, based on that because Basic our tradition of necessities life. are essential the exer- food and shelter is, all, responsible citizenship after the con- recognized rights, cise fundamental cept provide for that an individual should right to them must also be fundamental if family. himself his It is another mat- and education is to be so under the determined provides the altogether ter if the State fails theory. reasoning “nexus” Such opportunity acquire means to these and recognize in Rodriguez that the Court was some, substantially de- necessities to but Constitution, relying on the federal opportunities to nies the same means and no explicit includes for education. others. us on The claim relies instead before Constitution, which include does provision, recognizes explicitly that such B indispensable meaning- education is acknowledges majority opinion The liberties ful exercise of other fundamental genesis in rights have their “fundamental rights, and mandates and protections per- express implied provision for “effi- make “suitable” liberty recognized in federal sonal system. education cient” constitutions,” Spring state Branch I.S.D. 559, Stamos, concludes Furthermore, supra at but that a fundamen v. the fact no obli- government has affirmative in the Bill right may tal not be enumerated persons the financial gation to ensure all Rights our federal or state of either rights necessary to exercise certainly impediment to resources constitutions Here, opinion fails again, the Belous, or liberties. People 71 Cal.2d its existence. v. Constitution (1969), recognize that our State P.2d Cal.Rptr. 458 194 imposes just explicitly prominently denied, cert. 397 U.S. S.Ct. government obligation on State such an “Certain unarticulated L.Ed.2d has The State regard to education. guaran with rights implicit in enumerated sys- provide an educational rights, even undertaken fundamental tees .... [and] Furthermore, tem, provi- and is mandated to make Court Hernandez. Appeals specifically “suitable” for the and mainte- con sion Dallas Court of system adequate nance of an “efficient” is a funda “[pjublic cluded that education preserve other “liberties right guaranteed by Texas con mental has, people.” excep- stitution,” few though State with under article even tions, system compulsory guaranteed made that “public education not a individuals are not at to avoid it. liberty Consti to individuals United States Ann. Tex.Educ.Code 21.032 tution,” citing Rodriguez, in Stout I.S.D., Prairie Grand Supreme As noted United States n.r.e.). (Tex.App.1987, ref’d writ Court Brown Board Education: Today, opinion acknowledge is perhaps majority the most im- does portant holding precise function state that the in Hernandez was *12 governments. Compulsory school by Supreme at- United overruled States great expendi- Doe, tendance laws in Plyler v. Court U.S.

tures for education both our (1982), demonstrate L.Ed.2d 786 S.Ct. wherein recognition the importance of of edu- Texas’ denial access to that Court held of society. cation to our democratic It is illegal free schools the children required performance in the our most guar- aliens violated constitutional federal public responsibilities, basic even service antees, though pro- even that Constitution in very the armed forces. It is the foun- right vides fundamental to education. good dation of citizenship. Today it is a in Plyler The Court reasoned principal awakening instrument in [pjublic “right” grant- is education not a values, child to preparing cultural in him by ed individuals Constitution. [U.S.] adjust normally to his environment. merely governmen- But neither it is some In days any these it is doubtful that child indistinguishable tal “benefit” from oth- may reasonably expected be to succeed legislation. er forms of social welfare in life if opportunity he is denied the importance Both the education an opportunity, education. Such an institutions, maintaining basic our pro- where the has state undertaken lasting impact deprivation of its on it, right vide is a must made child, the life mark distinc- available to on all terms. addition, provides tion. ... In 483, 493, 686, 691, 347 U.S. 74 S.Ct. by the basic tools which individuals (1954) (emphasis L.Ed. 873 might economically productive lead lives tion, Hernandez 1.S.D., this Rodriguez ing 1.S.D. explicit of error to our cation stitution. writ federal constitutional cided The majority opinion correctly notes that education, the existence of a constitutional ref 'd nor was the Court, without equal rights provision is a provisions Rodriguez, n.r.e.), relying Moreover, deals petitioners’ application for writ fundamental in Hernandez v. Houston separate but Supreme only fails question 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, C with the federal Con analysis Hernandez supra, adopted consideration again Court. on San Antonio Texas whether edu raised to note that in determin under the Constitu was de ques right the values and skills tion. ... We cannot maintaining the groups smallest tions, them for the rest of their lives. ty within the cation has a social order rests.... denying cation, costs borne ... The the benefit [******] and foreclose are denied we way stigma these structure ignore deny them by will of us our Nation when select children a basic edu- fundamental fabric of contribute in even the any progress of our Na- illiteracy of our civic institu- all. means significant realistic upon which ability our sum, will mark to absorb possibili- role society. to live social edu- our By tion was not before Supreme [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] desired deprivation of the bene- precisely absolute ... It difficult to understand the Minimum Texas asserts that hopes fit.... what State achieve Program provides an “ade- Foundation moting perpetuation the creation all children in the quate” education for our bound- subclass illiterates within repeatedly asserted State.... State aries, problems surely adding to the it has in its briefs this Court that welfare, unemployment, costs it and that now as- fulfilled this desire crime. It thus clear that whatever “every every child in sures denying savings might be achieved adequate proof No was education.” education, they are these children an persuasively discrediting at trial light wholly insubstantial offered or refuting the State’s assertion. children, costs involved to these furthers est. must be residing If of cation that it State, the State is to innocent No and the Nation. justified by within some substantial children the showing offers deny a discrete borders, free was made here. showing that it other children state inter- that denial group edu- For these two reasons—the absence the absolute of identification gory discriminates any disadvantaged class is not [*] evidence “poor” people sje deprivation of education— against that the [*] in traditional terms. [*] financing system definable cate- it results in sjc susceptible [*] 221-23, hardly need add that this Court’s at 102 S.Ct. at 2396- ... We 457 U.S. *13 plac- to be as 97, (citations omitted). today action is not viewed 2401 ing judicial imprimatur on the status its IV in quo. apparent is for reform The need again majority opinion relies on may Rod- relied systems The well have tax is not riguez long heavily conclusion that wealth too on the local its too purposes certainly innovative “suspect classification” for tax. And a education, meth- thinking as it equal rights analysis, majori- but the to ods, necessary to as- funding is finding to in and its ty fails note that so further quality and higher sure a level of both Supreme observed the United States Court greater opportunity. uniformity in did not in- Rodriguez that the record undisputed findings of fact made clude the 1290-92, 22-5, 58, at 93 S.Ct. 411 U.S. at us by trial court in the case before (emphasis 1309 today: us, the district court In the case before cursory a demon- Even examination ... heavily con- poor people that did find that neither of the two distin- strates peo- poorer Poor districts. centrated guishing of wealth classi- characteristics in low which consti- ple wealth First, here. in can be found fications districts great majority of school tute the charge support of their that the fully because of in Texas not accredited against “poor,” appel- discriminates stan- inability to minimum state meet basic made effort to demonstrate lees have no dards, might “suspect classifica- well be operates disadvan- peculiar it to that inability to of their financial tion” because fairly tages any on class definable schooling our adequate basic composed persons indigent, or as power- The relative compulsory system. designat- any incomes are beneath whose to their situa- people of these alter lessness [Tjhere no poverty ed level.... is basis through political means indicates tion assuming on in this case they the record considered a strongly should be by people poorest context. suspect in the education class ref- —defined impecu- 220-21, any absolute Doe, supra erence level 457 U.S. at Plyler v. poorest concentrated in the nity at 2396. 102 S.Ct. —are districts. V Second, nor appellees the District neither opinion concludes that the majority fact that lack addressed the ... Court Constitution, in the of the 1876 has occasioned an drafters personal resources not

873 Schneider, interpretation. Koy v. economy,” exercise “close did 110 479, schools, 369, (1920). for local taxation for but Tex. 218 481 If the vide after S.W. subsequent change ambiguous, try text is to ascertain sentiment we first meaning examining parts its by 3 other amendment article was Robison, the Constitution. Coxv. adopted permitting financing 105 Tex. with the 426, 1149, (1912). 150 S.W. 1151 up system retaining intent to set significant control; degree presum- of local provisions be inter- Constitutional must ably authorizing present sys- finance give preted every a manner effect tem, all. I disagree. warts and document; phrase ordi- another, narily duplicates provisions primary interpretation rule of our interpreted ascertain, should not be so as be ren- possi- State Constitution if ble, the Interest Mc- meaningless. dered give effect to the intent of the Lean, (Tex.1987); Hanson 696 adopted it gave voters who it life. Jordan, Castleman, v. 320, 262, 145 Tex. 198 S.W.2d Williams Tex. (1946). State, Smissen S.W.

Tex. 9 S.W. part qualify One another so as to restrict it operation, apply For as the or other- constitution does not derive its framed, force wise than the natural from the construction would convention which itself; require if it, part but from it stood one people but who ratified another, is not to be allowed to intent to be arrived at if is that defeat people, any reasonable construction the supposed and it not to two can they together. be made stand have looked for dark ab- meaning struse employed, the words Cooley, supra 1 T. at In other 127-129. but they accepted rather that them words, parts all Constitution must be in the sense most obvious to the common interpreted, if possible, so that are in understanding, and ratified instru- State, Clapp v. harmony. ment in the belief that the sense was 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). *14 designed conveyed. to be If, examining document, after the entire 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations meaning are of we still unsure the of a (8th 1927) (emphasis added); 143 ed. see may consider, particular provision, then we also C. Antieau, Constitutional Construc- circumspection, with hesitation and such (1982). tion § 3.01 politi as and extraneous factors the social intent, In original existing adop cal conditions at of determining we the time look tion, apparent first to the the text of evil to be remedied or provision literal the achieved, question attempt purpose (as a and and last re determine how it sort) have of the would been understood a voter statements drafters. by of Marrs, 383, Mumme v. 120 40 ordinary intelligence Tex. S.W.2d at the time .of 31, (1931); supra v. adoption. Cooley, 35 T. at 141- Sheppard, Cramer 140 1 Tex. 271, 167 147, 152 142, 171; C.J.S., Constitutional Law (1943). 16 S.W.2d Where the (1984). provision 30 clear, of If a constitutional terms that which § finally open interpreta more meaning words than one declare tion, interpreted equitably it provision, must be so as interpreta unless a literal absurdity unjust not to lead to or discrimi by tion would lead to result not intended supra, Sheppard, Cramer v. nation. C.J.S., 167 See Constitutional the voters. 16 Sargeant Sargeant, 155; Antineau, supra, Law 23 at 82 (1984); S.W.2d at 118 C. § 343, (1929). 2.04; Black, Tex. 15 589 Construction and Inter H. § pretation Laws (1896). 15 When determining interpreta a certain whether terms, VII, 3, given language By

tion should be its literal article as § permits provision, proper subsequently, it is to consider whether amended 1883 adopted it have in the voters who would to establish a dual involving consequences funding tended the which must follow of State and dis- 874 poten- the minimum costs with supplemented in rural and urban areas with

tricts raising tax comparatively little effort tially tax rates. But nowhere different slightly. rates repeal provision explicitly does rights provision respect with The Incom Note: Texas School Finance: finance, implied repeal of an school patability Property Taxation and provision especially provision Education, 253, earlier L.Rev. Quality 56 Texas — Rights inferred (1978). the Bill of to be 254 —is Allred, lightly. Collingsworth County v. period of that had no cause The voters 13, 473, (1931) and 120 Tex. 15 3, VII, permit- article while believe that § 29, 40 C.J.S. Law 16 Constitutional §§ separate ting cities and towns constitute (1984). great dis- authorized the existing property parities today article Would the voters who amended to raise of the districts wealth abilities VII, interpreted their action as an § Furthermore, although money per pupil. provi- repeal equal rights implicit VII, 3 limited the 1883 version article § finance, so as to respect sion with by rural school dis- the tax rate allowed highly inequitable system exist- allow tricts, was removed limitation ing today? The answer must be “no.” (ed.), in 1920. G. Braden amendment See Texas; The Constitution State of B Comparative Analysis Annotated and An century, our In the late nineteenth 1883, was no By “[education “population property wealth State’s private char- longer regarded as a spread relatively evenly across the were govern- function of ity necessary but 7-8, Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at state.” every and the natural ment no great There were 93 S.Ct. at 1282-83. Development Edu- Eby, F. child.” today as there are urban areas (1925)(emphasis Texas, at 195-6 cation wealth. great concentrations people’s intent remained Cubberley, E. Funds and Their See School same, circumstances but local economic 1880, Apportionment changed. five (only of small towns with was a land 22,- 10,000 over people and none with over C sparsely rural ar- people) settled I, 3 and 3a Article 3 and article §§ Interior, U.S.Dept. of the Com- eas. See equita interpreted harmonized and can be (June 19, pendium Tenth Census State, supra, Clapp v. S.W. bly. See 1880). Priest, 18 Cal.3d 2d at and Serrano land was the Beginning when Cal.Rptr. 557 P.2d *15 wealth, the state primary source II). (1977) fairly and in the Read {Serrano greater powers of granted progressively perspective, article proper historical to taxation to local districts property I, conjunc 3 and 3a—in 3 and article §§ agriculture-cen- In an fund education. permit disparities between not tion—do society, perhaps property accurate- tered unless the to be substantial school districts ability of local school ly measured compelling reason for can show State Rapid in- Here, to finance education. districts has shown disparity. the State such growing economy, and a dustrialization If are to compelling reason. there be no however, districts, legislature rural com- delineated urban and if and munities, categories and created new valorem and to allow educational ad chooses The wealth. within those concentrations taxes to be levied that all property-poor system designed forced to ensure of education must be cost higher approximately equal property at districts have to tax their such districts spend on a to raise to and revenue property-rich districts abilities raise rates than for and mainte legislated per pupil Poor revenues. basis the minimum and facilities. fi- of efficient instruction struggled meet minimum nance districts to Court, Supreme well before The Texas districts requirements; wealthier nancial

875 development rights” an “efficient” of the “fundamental “suitable” “suspect hardly argued system; doctrine or the but it can be classification” analysis, “patched-up overly cobbled” recognized requirement system, fully protection compulsory which denies one- equal “all” education—that substantially its third of students of a permitted must be “treated alike”—but dis- time, opportunity educational to attain parity, at that under the “rational test, required even the basic inapplicable is here. minimum stan- basis” imposes, is Marrs, supra, dards it “efficient.” What Mumme v. at S.W.2d subject proper legisla- be is a “suitable” 36-7. decision; political tive debate and but the D system resulting process from that must be enough protected preserve “efficient” majority opinion implies, The rea- by its rights in constitutional accordance with soning, that the places Texas Constitution necessary, manageable discernible and le- limit power whatsoever on the Marrs, gal supra, standards. Mumme v. to establish school district at S.W.2d 36-37. reasoning dangerously boundaries. Such methods, legislative determination precious erodes that political most restrictions, final, regulations is ex- rights right respect to be treated with —the cept so arbitrary when as be violative equality by government, right the constitutional of the citi- full participating citizenship in zen. ... I, 3a, legis- state. Article 3 and forbids §§ lation that degrades or stigmatizes through [*] [*] [*] ‡ # $ Meskill, Branch I.S.D. v. participation in today’s society; as a consti- al ing maintained as tutional open political system and labor market. deprived 559. Education is critical to an individual’s tution or attain a compelling State participation whether the use of seriously impairs individual “fundamental,” unless the state can show relatively equal scheme are not present disparities legislation 172 Conn. explicitly present not—that “suspect classifications,” control. it is easily opportunity society basis with hollow its system. mentioned in the Consti- Stamos, absolutely necessary necessary in an are so Local in the school financ- 376 A.2d as to be deemed if interest. equitable control See Horton v. critical to full others to the surviv- pursue possessor interests— Spring can in our 375-6 it on at Judicial nance would Id. S.Ct. ture. legal policymaking Upholding That cient, relationship educational government. are lation is not es.... treated ... (emphasis arbitrary n statutes Equal protection See tend brought Litigation ... there Control 7 L.Ed.2d alike in the Baker v. frustrate or to make [*] appropriations the trial court’s do not can open opportunities exercise of It is well settled that under [*] be no doubt. function in State Carr, our subject subject of laws objection embarrass the non- same circumstanc- Purse-School (1962); [*] influence of equalizing have a U.S. is Courts, [*] powers more effi- if secured if judgment individual all who legisla- Note, state, legis- [*] real Fi- *16 Wayne L.Rev. 1410-15

VI discussed, regard to the I With matters Finally, majority opinion concludes judgment would affirm the of the trial that, while 1 requires article court. system provided “efficient,” it guidance provides no for this ar- Court to at a

rive determination of what is efficient Clearly,

or inefficient. it is dis- within the legislature,

cretion the exercise duty,

its constitutional determine what

Case Details

Case Name: Kirby v. Edgewood Independent School District
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Dec 14, 1988
Citation: 761 S.W.2d 859
Docket Number: 3-87-190-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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