*1 «59 good good a unilateral mistake made the defense of faith and commercial Petrofina, faith is no defense. representa- American afforded to a reasonableness Indus., Inc., 740, 3.419(c). Inc. PPG tive under section We overrule (Tex.App. Worth writ point the sole of error and the trial affirm — Fort agr.); Ligon dism’d v. E.F. Hutton & judgment. court’s Co., (Tex.Civ.App.— n.r.e.). Consequent Dallas writ ref’d good
ly, the faith and commercial reason
ableness defense authorized under subsec (c)
tion is a one. novel Because of this
exceptional aspect, wary must we be
attributing to the drafters of the an Code grant bank, payor/drawee
intention to to a newly designated the primary converter KIRBY, al., Appellants, et William process, the bank collection the same newly created defense as is afforded to specified certain other banks. To do so EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, al., Appellees. would indeed emasculate the conversion et right just confirmed. It follows that a No. 3-87-190-CV. provision relief for all converters should Texas, Appeals read into the section if the defense Court portion reasonably can be limited to a class Austin. pay- converters which does not include Dec. 1988.
or/drawee banks. Rehearing Denied Jan. 1989. key application a limited defense lies in “rep- the Code’sdefinition of
resentative” which makes that term co-ex-
tensive an agency relationship.5 By with
confining relationship this agency to an
affiliation between the true owner of the being
instrument dealt with and that own- “representative” banks,
er’s the conversion against of that pay- owner meaningfully pro-
or/drawee bank can be interpretation permitted
tected. This payor Code which excludes a “collecting
bank from the term bank.” 4.105(4)
TEX.BUS. & COM.CODEANN. §
(Tex.U.C.C.)(Vernon 1968). This exclusion that, paying
is attributable to the fact
item, payor collecting bank acts not as a
agent for the owner the item but rather
acts its own behalf under its contractual
agreement depositor. with its basis, payor/drawee
On this bank qualify “representative”
does not as a Accordingly,
the owner. the trial court
properly ruled that as a matter of law a
payor/drawee bank is not entitled to assert (35) "Repre- person empowered TEX. 1.201. General to act for another. Definitions. agent, (Vernon (Tex.U.C.C.) sentative" includes an an officer of a BUS. & COM.CODEANN. association, trustee, corporation or and a execu- 1968). estate, tor administrator of an or other *2 Educ., Kirby,
N. Texas Com’r Clements, Educ., Bd. of William Gov- State Bullock, Texas, Comptrol- ernor of Robert Texas, Mattox, Atty. Gen. ler of Jim Texas. Kauffman, American Mexican
Albert H. Fund, Legal Anto- Defense and Educ. San nio, Edgewood Independent School Dist., et al. Richards, Richards, Wiseman &
David R. Durst, III, Gray, Gray & Beck- Richard E. er, Austin, Independent for Alvarado Dist., et al. School C.J., SHANNON, Before ABOUSSIE, JJ. GAMMAGE SHANNON, Chief Justice. districts, parents, and Appellee school suit in the district court of students filed County seeking a declaration that Travis financing system, Tex. the Texas school seq., is in violation 16.001, et Educ.Code § After a bench Constitution.1 trial, judgment the district court rendered to that effect. This Court will reverse judgment judgment and here render nothing. appellees take By judgment the district court funding in violation of declared the scheme Const, I, (equal rights), Tex. § § (effi (due law)2 course of and art. 1 Turner, Hall, system). The district court Timothy Hughes Jim cient school L. & Luce, Austin, is a “fundamental Independent for Eanes concluded that education School Dist., right”; “suspect et al. that wealth is a classifica context; Luna, Luna,
Robert E.
tion” in the school finance
Earl
Mary Mil-
ford, Dallas,
existing funding
scheme is unconstitu
Andrews Independent
Dist.,
“inefficient”;
tionally
School
et
and that the Texas
al.
Brown,
F.
Robert
Hutchinson, Price,
neutrality”
“fiscal
Constitution demands
Boyle Brooks,
&
Dallas,
i.e.,
funding,
James
ex
W.
school
the level of
Deather-
age, Power, Deatherage, Tharp
penditures
per pupil
&
not
Blanken-
ship, Irving, for Irving Independent
according
property
vary
wealth of
School
Dist.
Finally,
that district.
the district court en
Mattox,
Gen.,
Atty.
joined
Kevin T.
state officials from en
Jim
O’Han-
relevant
Gen., Austin,
lon,
Atty.
forcing
challenged statutes
Asst.
for William
but
existing
Appellants
Accordingly,
are the Commissioner of Edu-
the issue of whether the
1.
cation,
Education,
State Board of
State
funding
other
scheme violates the due course
a number
school districts.
officials and
provision
a basis for the district
of law
is not
judgment
is also not before this
court’s
2. There is no mention of the due course
law
Court.
pleadings
or conclusions of
law,
and such claim was
tried
consent.
injunction
September
dents at least a basic education. Under the
“stayed” the
until
of state aid received
program,
the amount
by any given
“equalized”
district is
accord-
many findings of
The district court filed
formula,
prop-
ing
complex
to a
so that low
fact,
There
a distillation of which follows.
generally
erty wealth districts
receive sub-
1,061
school districts in Texas with
high
stantially more state aid than do the
about three million students
attendance.
districts.
wealth
existing
system,
finance
Under the
*3
the school districts share the
error,
the state and
points
appellants
By several
operations
not the cost of
cost of school
but
challenge the district court’s overall conclu-
facilities,
entirely by
which is borne
the
funding
sion that the
scheme
State’s
Const,
costs,
districts. Of total education
the
I,
is in violation of Tex.
3.§
approximately forty-two per-
provides
State
I,
provides
pertinent part:
Article
cent,
fif-
approximately
the school districts
men,
All free
when
form a social
(derived
ty percent
property
from local
tax-
compact,
equal rights....
have
es),
coming
with the remainder
from vari-
specifically, appellants
More
dis-
attack the
sources, including
Be-
ous
federal funds.
application
trict court’s
of the “strict scruti-
cause taxable
wealth varies from ny”
evaluating
standard in
the school fi-
district,
district to
school districts’ abilities
because,
assert,
appellants
nance
and,
generate
vary
revenues
as one
right”
education is not a “fundamental
and
expect,
disparities
would
there are
“suspect
not a
wealth is
classification.”
expenditures per
level of
student between
equal protection
equal rights
In an
wealthy
wealthy
the
and the less
court,
analysis,
appellate
necessity,
the
districts. Wealthier school districts are
begin
recognizing
applicable
must
provide
physi-
able to
their students better
judicial
ques
standard of
If the
review.3
facilities,
curriculum,
cal
more extensive
infringes upon
tioned statute
a “fundamen
larger libraries and better trained teachers
right”
inherently “suspect
tal
or creates an
wealthy
than are the less
districts.
classification,”
subjected
the statute will be
The local school district tax rates also
judicial scrutiny.
scrutiny
to strict
Such
vary widely from district to district. The
requires
compelling
the state to
establish
wealthy
frequently
less
districts
must set a
discharge
interest
in its enactment. To
higher
average
than
tax rate to achieve the
such a burden the state must demonstrate
necessary revenue to meet minimum edu-
purpose
that its
or interest is both constitu
cational standards.
tionally permissible
compelling,
and
State, through
that its use of the classification is neces
its Foundation School
Program,
sary
accomplishment
purpose.
to the
of its
degree
inability
offsets to a
Stamos, 695
wealthy
gen- Spring
of the less
Branch I.S.D. v.
S.W.
school districts to
(Tex.1985);
purpose
pro-
erate revenues. The
2d 556
Hernandez v. Houston
District,
gram
Independent
is to insure that each
has the
558 S.W.2d
district
School
n.r.e.).4
necessary
provide
(Tex.Civ.App.1977,
funds to
ref’d
each of its stu-
writ
out,
Appellees point
correctly,
subject
upon
urge
appellees
that
do not hesitate to seize
well,
precedent.
meeting
equal protection
to federal standards as
the courts
federal
liberty
of this State are at
to fashion their own
important,
opinions
More
in several
our courts
to determine
statute is
tests
whether a Texas
employed
equal protection
the federal
valid under the Texas constitution. Whitworth
analysis
considering
"equal rights” provi
(Tex.1985).Ap-
Bynum,
pe
699 S.W.2d
Spring Branch
sion of the Texas Constitution.
urge
disregard
then
this Court to
federal
Stamos,
(Tex. 1985);
S.W.2d 556
I.S.D. v.
llees
precedent
resolving
Appellees’
appeal.
this
Independent School Dis
v. Houston
Hernandez
position ignores the fact
this cause was
that
trict,
(Tex.Civ.App.1977,
sion
fundamental
ber
rights.
Indeed,
purposes
equal protection analysis,
fundamental
(1)
appellees
premises
many provi-
ed-
contains
advance
Texas Constitution
(2)
important
usually
subject
legis-
that are
vitally
ucation
edu-
sions
example,
to in the Con-
lation. For
specifically
cation
referred
Constitution
*4
Const,
Texas,
county poor
for the
particularly
stitution of
Tex.
vides
establishment
XVI,
VII,
one,
farms,
8;
course, disputes
art.
1. No
houses
art.
defines
§
§
XVI,
11;
impor- usury,
provides
that
art.
for local
appellees’ premise
education is
§
XVI,
elections,
20;
public
long
option
provides
has
art.
tant and that
education
§
XVI,
liens,
mechanic
art.
and for
commanded a central role in the affairs of
for
§
storage facilities,
Ill,
art.
49-d.
Importance
this State.
of a state service water
§
however,
affairs,
Yet,
seriously propose
and its
in state
is not
no one
that
role
would
right,
funda-
controlling
ascertaining
example,
in
whether
a
one has
fundamental
for
rights
storage facility
mental
are involved.
or mechanics
constitutional
to a water
Independent
although
Dist.
Antonio
School
v.
for each finds
San
lien
the
1, 30-31,
Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
93 S.Ct.
This
place
the Texas Constitution.
its
Court,
course,
36 L.Ed.2d
suggest
does not
that
footing
provisions
equal
on an
these
premise
grounded
Appellees’ second
is
provisions
edu-
those
which concern
with
upon
Indepen-
statement
San Antonio
cation,
placement
but the
the Constitu-
supra,
v.
to
Rodriguez,
dent School Dist.
legislative-type provisions
of such
tion
purposes
for
of federal
the effect
that
appellees’ argu-
points up the weakness
protection analysis
deter-
one should
i.e.,
ment,
is con-
subject
that because
is a right
mine
there
to education
“whether
in the
Constitution it must be
tained
Texas
guaranteed by
explicitly
implicitly
the
right.
a fundamental
is
Constitution.” Because
education
Constitution, appel-
in the Texas
mentioned
out,
point
however,
Appellees
right
lees
an education is
insist that
to
only
refers to edu-
Texas Constitution
ap-
right.
specifically,
More
a fundamental
cation,
states that education
but also
Const,
pellees rely upon Tex.
§
preservation
of the liber-
“essential
provides:
rights
people.” Because
ties and
of the
sys-
Support
and maintenance
Texas Constitution states
free
tem of
schools.
liberties, appellees
“essential” to the basic
argue
knowl-
education must be
fundamental
general
diffusion of
Sec. 1.
education, ap-
right.
system of
edge
preservation
Without a
being essential
reason,
people
not be
rights
people, pellees
would
liberties
meaningfully exercise
duty
Legislature
able to
liberties
it shall
be
right
and the
to vote.5
speech
as freedom
make suitable
the State
establish and
Doe,
meaningfully
his
exercise
72 L.Ed.2d
cation sufficient
457 U.S.
S.Ct.
Instead,
court found
the district
basic liberties.
many
inferior
because of
that in
resources,
fails
5. We
not understand that the district court
educational
do
many
"adequate”
an
edu-
vide
children with
concluded that
educational
"adequate
court defined an
basic edu-
cation. The district
fails to
each child with a
law, however,
Appellees’ analysis
termed
rect.
In
the term
has been
“funda-
narrow,
theory
legal writings.
“nexus”
right”
special,
mental
has a
techni-
Court,
course,
meaning.
cal
This
must
Supreme
Court of the United States
legal meaning.
employ the term’s
concluded that education is not a funda-
right
though
provision by
narrow,
mental
even
discussing
technical mean
necessary
the state
be
for its citizens
ing,
Supreme
plain
Court of
has
meaningfully
to exercise
their basic liber-
ly
stated that “fundamental
ties.
Independent
San Antonio
School
genesis
express
implied
their
Rodriguez, supra.
Dist. v.
The Court rea- protections
personal
recognized
liberty
analysis
log-
soned that the “nexus”
lacked
in federal and state constitutions” such as
limitation;
example,
ical
that there is
right
speech
to free
or free exercise of
no fundamental
to food and shelter
religion.
Stamos,
Spring Branch
I.S.D.
although the existence of each is essential
(Emphasis
gram
guarantees
type
op-
available to ... the
in the
stitution
this
of educational
students
portunity
state’s wealthiest school districts.” The district
to each child.
that the
impor- We thus conclude
erroneously elevated the
trict court
disadvan-
operate
peculiar
does not
financing
interest of
educational
tant state
tage
any suspect class.
protected right on the
opportunity into a
long rec-
ancient liberties
same level with
at 1293.
Rodriguez,
jority
qualified
property taxpay-
meaning
language
of the constitu
ing voters
voting
at an
plain,
tional
given
it must be
election to be held
purpose,
regard
effect without
consequences.
shall vote such tax not to
exceed in
*7
A Id.
presumed
statute is
constitutional
year
($1.00)
one
one
dollar on the one
and will not be declared unconstitutional
hundred dollars valuation
prop-
the
of
unless some
of the constitution
erty subject to
district,
taxation in such
plainly
can
showing
invalidity.
be cited
but the
upon
limitation
the amount of
McGraw,
Tex.
Armory
Nat. Guard
Bd. v.
school district
tax herein authorized
(1939).
132 Tex.
634
apply
shall not
incorporated
cities
then,
duty,
Our
is to examine the
of
words
or towns constituting separate and in-
the constitution and intent of the voters to
dependent
districts,
school
nor to inde-
determine whether a reason exists to de
pendent or common school districts
presumption
validity.
feat the statute’s
of
by
created
general
special
law.
Cox,
McGraw,
supra;
supra.
(Emphasis
See also Tex. Const.
XI,
(repealed 1969);
Shepherd v.
One need not
history
§
be a student of
Dist.,
San Jacinto Jr. Coll.
leading
powered place legislature in act economy, if ey to the extreme of close repugnant school affairs. Id. One feature Middleton, penuriousness.” Terrell most of one Texans was district tax (Tex.Civ.App.1916, S.W. 367 writ ref’d at percent building maintaining and school 1138). 108 Tex. S.W. district, 163; houses in the Id. at the tax by appointed was levied five citizens economy” In the “close and in exercise of district directors. at 160-161. board of Id. excesses, response to Reconstruction did not drafters the 1876 Constitution Opposition system to the new school was By provide for local taxation schools. immediate, vigorous, widespread. For 1880, however, change pub- was a there example, taxpayers’ convention convened support lic sentiment in education. proclamation in Austin resulted in a advis- Eby, supra, support 193. Such was at ing pay the citizens not to the tax. Id. at adoption reflected of the role, pay 163. The people had no “but to adop- 3. By amendment to art. taxes for the of the tion amendment voters evidenced obediently to send their children to school their intent that the initiative for the for- foreign more ... to the senti- people ments of Texas could not mation maintenance school districts Texans, directly have been Id. 161. most devised.” at be vested those affected: large, ignored citizenry. new school laws. the local was empowered to the method for the establish majority After a en- people were districts creation so that regained franchised and of state control might organized need for new government, a convention was assembled limitations, districts arose. Within in 1875 No to draft new constitution. property-owning voters within the subject ag- at the convention created more impose upon an ad valo- could themselves itation than that education. Id. at help rem tax to maintain the schools in the provisions reaction to the education taxing pow- district. limitation on the laws, the Reconstruction Constitution and however, imposed, upon er was not opposition there was considerable incorporated constituting cities towns form. convention to separate independent debate, adopted After much the convention *8 thereby permitting op- those districts the the article on education “fell far which sup- meeting greater of the of the tion to raise revenue for the short real needs port times. In its intense hatred of the radical of their schools.6 times, early permitted 6. From the in Texas were The towns to vote taxes for the towns were granted by legislature buildings. special privileges the for construction and maintenance of management They independently state the conduct and of their schools. formed districts GAMMAGE,Justice, dissenting. summary, people the intended up system retaining signifi set a school a I respectfully dissent. degree cant of local control. The scheme imposes The Constitution on the wholly of financing evolved is not of for suitably providing State the burden goal irrelevant to the of local control. imple- of purposes education. For The also the district court concluded that mentation, and as an to a uni- alternative present system school was “inefficient” system, fied and centralized the Constitu- Const, 1. violation of Tex. permits the tion to create dis- support tricts allows local taxation course, does, provision That of re Nowhere, of the schools within a district. quire “efficient,” system that the school be however, permit does the the Constitution provides guidance but the adoption any system creation or of school this other how court arrive other one which is than efficient which of at a determination what is efficient or comports requirements with the of complexi inefficient. the enormous Given adequacy under the law. of The ty of a mil system educating school three in competitive, child’s education free-mar- children, lion this Court concludes political system ket economic and such as not, is, essentially or is “efficient” is relative; ours is it is of a function what political question judicial suitable for program are getting. other children A review. instruction available to child one cannot “patched-up rather and overly cob- truly adequate be deemed or efficient if 7 system bled” fi- administration and other children are better afforded a edu- nance for education has evolved program thereby cational and are consist- past years. this state the one over hundred advantaged lifelong ently competi- The does not edu- an ideal status, money, tion political influ- cation for all completely students nor a fair ence.
distribution of tax benefits and burdens among patrons. all of school Neverthe- I less, system government, under our ef- fact, findings The court’s trial and the forts to those ideals achieve come from sufficiency supporting the evidence people through constitutional amendments them, undisputed. Among the many are legislative through enactments and not findings by majority not articulated judgments of courts. following: opinion judgment The Court this in Texas wealthiest should not as an be viewed affirmation that $14,000,000 property has over wealth present financing system is de- student, per poorest while the district has it sirable or that should continue without $20,000 approximately property wealth change; rather, solely our conclusion is per The one million students in student. that the is not in violation upper range prop- at school districts Constitution of Texas. erty have more than two and one- wealth judgment judgment reversed and half times as much taxable wealth appellees is here noth- their do the one rendered take schools than ing. poorer million districts. students rules, managed by city while at the same time received the should council or per capita state allotment for appointed purpose. their children. for that board of trustees privileges
These reaffirmed Consti- were great rapidity the towns availed them- With by subsequent tution of 1876 and porated Incor- laws. privileges, especially selves after 1880. of these privilege voting on towns had Eby, supra, at 178. assuming question control own of their ques- independent schools as districts and the quoted phrase has borrowed 7. This Court pay large people a tax tion of how desired opinion Shepherd from Norvell’s Justice They purpose. for this could also choose Dist., at San Jr. Coll. Jacinto government, form of whether the schools *9 300,000 Program in not students the lowest-wealth The Foundation School does
The percent of guarantee eligible have less than three in- schools student basic each property support to their edu- State wealth program his or her structional suitable to 300,000 cation, in while the students needs, in low educational and students twenty- highest-wealth over schools have equal oppor- do have an wealth districts not percent property to five State wealth tunity to instruction under obtain support their education. requirements. State’s year, great In the due to 1985-86 school poorer districts cannot to and afford wealth, disparities district in high quality do as facilities as dis- spending per student varied between districts, negatively affecting the wealthier $2,112 $19,333. 600,000 tricts from to opportunity in the educational of children two- students in the wealthiest districts had those districts. spent thirds on their education than more heavy pattern is a concentration There 600,000 poorest in dis- students poverty poor- in the of families below level tricts. compared er districts as to the wealthier Because of the variations in school wide districts, greater even concentration wealth, vastly differing are district there of both low-incomefamilies and students imposed upon taxpayers burdens district Furthermore, very poorest districts. districts, In the support poorest education. percent of the twenty-one while in 1980 twenty taxpayers pay must more than Mexican-American, population was State’s per one dollars valuation to cents hundred percent population eighty-four student; per raise one hundred dollars Mexican-American; poorest districts was taxpayers pay the wealthiest districts need significantly expensive more and it per less than two cents one hundred dollars provide equal opportunity to educational per raise hundred dollars valuation to one minority low-income and children than student. higher non-minority educate income and support financial enables Greater children. wealthy provide much school districts to experiences broader educational and better Forty-five percent Hispanic ninth students, including things for their drop grade students out school before facilities, more extensive curricula better graduation, thirty-four percent of while activities, more co-curricular enhanced twenty-seven percent of Whites Blacks and through training materi- additional Hispanic dropouts Nearly do so. half of li- technology, als and better libraries and complete grade less than ninth when professionals, curriculum- brary additional schooling, compared eigh- discontinue staff-development specialists dropouts. Black and White percent teen aides, counseling teacher more extensive finance The Texas school services, drop- special programs to combat negative impact on continues to have outs, parenting programs to involve the of students low wealth dis- experi- family in educational the student’s learn, ability to tricts in terms of their ratios, ence, pupil-teacher and the lower skills, skills, acquire master basic salable ability to retain better teachers attract and quality of life. their and administrators. development of In the creation and one- preparation The educational over boundaries, population inade- third of the State’s or articulated did not follow rational the school districts do quate. One-third of creation nor policy. Neither their standards for maxi- not meet the State’s effort made perpetuation their has an been size, great majority and the mum class local tax bases. equalize the districts’ great are low wealth districts. The these underlying is no rationale in the There fully accred- majority of school districts not many inability to stan- boundaries meet State ited because many pure tax havens. are dards low wealth districts.
«69 ties, II Legislature and the shall be autho- pass rized to laws the assessment Const, for I, provides: Texas art. 3§ and collection taxes in all said dis- of men, free All when form a social management tricts and and for compact, rights, have and public control school or schools of districts, man, men, or set is entitled to exclu- of such whether such districts of emoluments, separate public sive or composed territory wholly within a privileges, public but in consideration of county parts inor of two or more coun- services, (emphasis added) ties, Legislature and the may authorize Const, I, Texas provides: art. 3a§ an additional ad valorem tax to be lev- Equality under the law shall not be de- ied and collected within all school dis- abridged sex, race, nied or because of tricts heretofore formed or hereafter color, creed, origin. or national This formed, the further maintenance of self-operative. amendment is schools, public free and for the erection Const, VII, provides: art. 1§ equipment and buildings school general knowledge diffusion of being therein; provided that majority of the preservation essential to the the lib- qualified property taxpaying voters of rights erties people, it shall voting the district at an election to be be the duty Legislature purpose, held for that shall vote such tax State to establish and make suitable ($1.00) any year not to exceed in one one support visions for the and maintenance dollar on the one hundred dollars valua- of an schools, public free efficient subject tion of to taxation in added) (emphasis district, upon but the limitation Const, provides: amount of school district tax herein au- One-fourth of the revenue derived from apply incorporated thorized shall not occupation the State taxes poll tax of constituting separate cities or towns every one dollar on inhabitant of the independent school nor to inde- State, ages between the twenty-one pendent or common school districts cre- sixty years, apart shall be set annu- by general special (empha- ated or law. ally public for the benefit of the free added) sis schools; thereto, and in addition there The district court held that education is a shall levied and collected an annual ad right” necessitating ju- “fundamental strict valorem State tax of such an amount not dicial scrutiny funding scheme under thirty-five to exceed cents on the one I, 3a; article 3 that wealth is a §§ ($100.00) valuation, hundred dollars “suspect classification” in the fi- school arising with the available school fund context, necessitating nance also strict sources, from all other will be sufficient I, scrutiny; 3a, that article 3 and de- §§ public to maintain and neutrality” funding mands “fiscal period schools of this State for a of not (expenditures per pupil for instruction and less than six months in each year, and it may facilities in not be a func- duty shall be the of the State Board tion of wealth other than the wealth of the Education to set aside a sufficient whole); existing State as a and that the provide amount of the said tax to free funding unconstitutionally scheme is “inef- text books for the use of children attend- ficient.” ing State; free schools of this however, provided, that should the limit Ill of taxation herein named be insufficient is, course, the deficit free to de- may by appropriation be met “methods, restrictions, general from the termine funds of the State and Legislature regulations” necessary may also to administer long schools “so as that determination is districts] formation of law; general arbitrary and all such school districts not so as to violate the constitu- parts embrace Spring two more coun- tional of Texas’ citizens.” Stamos, though guaranteed, expressly
Branch
I.S.D.
(Tex.1985).
recognized
indispensable
been
... as
enjoyment
rights explicitly
defined.”
majority opinion
in its
is correct
ob-
Newspapers,
Virginia,
Richmond
Inc. v.
the United
servation that
States Constitu-
*11
2814,
555, 579-80,
448
100
U.S.
S.Ct.
2828-
different,
tion and
of Texas
that
are
that
29,
(1980).
L.Ed.2d
65
973
Courts
the Texas charter
a number
addresses
repeatedly protected
fundamental in
normally-legislative matters of a non-fun-
despite
specific
lack of
terests
their
textual
nature,
opinion
fails
damental
but
to
See, e.g.,
bases in our State Constitution.
per-
none of
is
observe that
these matters
Emp.
Dept.
Texas State
Union v. Tex.
ceived,
education,
“being
as is
essential
Retardation,
Health Mental
746
Mental
&
preservation
to the
of the
and
liberties
(Tex.1987) (right
privacy);
203
S.W.2d
to
rights
people,”
nor are
couched
(Tex.1985)
Smith,
Holick v.
tures for education both
our
(1982),
demonstrate
L.Ed.2d 786
S.Ct.
wherein
recognition
the importance
of
of edu-
Texas’ denial
access to
that Court held
of
society.
cation to our democratic
It is
illegal
free
schools
the children
required
performance
in the
our most
guar-
aliens violated
constitutional
federal
public responsibilities,
basic
even service
antees,
though
pro-
even
that Constitution
in
very
the armed forces.
It is the
foun-
right
vides
fundamental
to education.
good
dation of
citizenship. Today it is a
in Plyler
The Court reasoned
principal
awakening
instrument
in
[pjublic
“right” grant-
is
education
not a
values,
child to
preparing
cultural
in
him
by
ed
individuals
Constitution.
[U.S.]
adjust normally
to his environment.
merely
governmen-
But neither
it
is
some
In
days
any
these
it is doubtful that
child
indistinguishable
tal “benefit”
from oth-
may reasonably
expected
be
to succeed
legislation.
er forms of social welfare
in life if
opportunity
he is denied the
importance
Both the
education
an
opportunity,
education. Such an
institutions,
maintaining
basic
our
pro-
where the
has
state
undertaken
lasting impact
deprivation
of its
on
it,
right
vide
is a
must made
child,
the life
mark
distinc-
available to
on
all
terms.
addition,
provides
tion. ...
In
483, 493,
686, 691,
347 U.S.
74 S.Ct.
by
the basic tools
which individuals
(1954) (emphasis
L.Ed. 873
might
economically productive
lead
lives
tion,
Hernandez
1.S.D.,
this
Rodriguez
ing
1.S.D.
explicit
of error to our
cation
stitution.
writ
federal constitutional
cided
The majority opinion correctly notes that
education,
the existence of a constitutional
ref 'd
nor was the
Court,
without
equal rights provision
is a
provisions
Rodriguez,
n.r.e.), relying
Moreover,
deals
petitioners’ application for writ
fundamental
in Hernandez v. Houston
separate
but
Supreme
only
fails
question
121 (Tex.Civ.App.1977,
C
with the federal Con
analysis
Hernandez
supra, adopted
consideration
again
Court.
on San Antonio
Texas
whether edu
raised
to note that
in determin
under the
Constitu
was de
ques
right
the values and skills
tion. ...
We cannot
maintaining the
groups
smallest
tions,
them for the rest of their lives.
ty
within the
cation has a
social order rests....
denying
cation,
costs borne
... The
the benefit
[******]
and foreclose
are denied
we
way
stigma
these
structure
ignore
deny them
by
will
of us
our Nation when select
children a basic edu-
fundamental
fabric of
contribute in even the
any
progress of our Na-
illiteracy
of our civic institu-
all.
means
significant
realistic
upon which
ability
our
sum,
will mark
to absorb
possibili-
role
society.
to live
social
edu-
our
By
tion was not before
Supreme
[*]
[*]
[*]
[*]
[*]
[*]
desired
deprivation of the
bene-
precisely
absolute
... It
difficult to understand
the Minimum
Texas asserts that
hopes
fit....
what
State
achieve
Program provides an “ade-
Foundation
moting
perpetuation
the creation
all children in the
quate” education for
our bound-
subclass
illiterates within
repeatedly
asserted
State....
State
aries,
problems
surely adding to the
it has
in its briefs
this Court that
welfare,
unemployment,
costs
it
and that
now as-
fulfilled this desire
crime.
It
thus clear that whatever
“every
every
child in
sures
denying
savings might
be achieved
adequate
proof
No
was
education.”
education,
they are
these children an
persuasively discrediting
at trial
light
wholly
insubstantial
offered
or
refuting
the State’s assertion.
children,
costs involved to these
furthers
est.
must be
residing
If
of
cation that it
State,
the State is to
innocent
No
and the Nation.
justified by
within
some substantial
children the
showing
offers
deny a discrete
borders,
free
was made here.
showing that it
other children
state inter-
that denial
group
edu-
For these two reasons—the absence
the absolute
of identification
gory
discriminates
any
disadvantaged class is not
[*]
evidence
“poor” people
sje
deprivation of education—
against
that the
[*]
in traditional terms.
[*]
financing system
definable cate-
it results in
sjc
susceptible
[*]
221-23,
hardly need add that this Court’s
at
873 Schneider, interpretation. Koy v. economy,” exercise “close did 110 479, schools, 369, (1920). for local taxation for but Tex. 218 481 If the vide after S.W. subsequent change ambiguous, try text is to ascertain sentiment we first meaning examining parts its by 3 other amendment article was Robison, the Constitution. Coxv. adopted permitting financing 105 Tex. with the 426, 1149, (1912). 150 S.W. 1151 up system retaining intent to set significant control; degree presum- of local provisions be inter- Constitutional must ably authorizing present sys- finance give preted every a manner effect tem, all. I disagree. warts and document; phrase ordi- another, narily duplicates provisions primary interpretation rule of our interpreted ascertain, should not be so as be ren- possi- State Constitution if ble, the Interest Mc- meaningless. dered give effect to the intent of the Lean, (Tex.1987); Hanson 696 adopted it gave voters who it life. Jordan, Castleman, v. 320, 262, 145 Tex. 198 S.W.2d Williams Tex. (1946). State, Smissen S.W.
Tex. 9 S.W. part qualify One another so as to restrict it operation, apply For as the or other- constitution does not derive its framed, force wise than the natural from the construction would convention which itself; require if it, part but from it stood one people but who ratified another, is not to be allowed to intent to be arrived at if is that defeat people, any reasonable construction the supposed and it not to two can they together. be made stand have looked for dark ab- meaning struse employed, the words Cooley, supra 1 T. at In other 127-129. but they accepted rather that them words, parts all Constitution must be in the sense most obvious to the common interpreted, if possible, so that are in understanding, and ratified instru- State, Clapp v. harmony. ment in the belief that the sense was 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). *14 designed conveyed. to be If, examining document, after the entire 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations meaning are of we still unsure the of a (8th 1927) (emphasis added); 143 ed. see may consider, particular provision, then we also C. Antieau, Constitutional Construc- circumspection, with hesitation and such (1982). tion § 3.01 politi as and extraneous factors the social intent, In original existing adop cal conditions at of determining we the time look tion, apparent first to the the text of evil to be remedied or provision literal the achieved, question attempt purpose (as a and and last re determine how it sort) have of the would been understood a voter statements drafters. by of Marrs, 383, Mumme v. 120 40 ordinary intelligence Tex. S.W.2d at the time .of 31, (1931); supra v. adoption. Cooley, 35 T. at 141- Sheppard, Cramer 140 1 Tex. 271, 167 147, 152 142, 171; C.J.S., Constitutional Law (1943). 16 S.W.2d Where the (1984). provision 30 clear, of If a constitutional terms that which § finally open interpreta more meaning words than one declare tion, interpreted equitably it provision, must be so as interpreta unless a literal absurdity unjust not to lead to or discrimi by tion would lead to result not intended supra, Sheppard, Cramer v. nation. C.J.S., 167 See Constitutional the voters. 16 Sargeant Sargeant, 155; Antineau, supra, Law 23 at 82 (1984); S.W.2d at 118 C. § 343, (1929). 2.04; Black, Tex. 15 589 Construction and Inter H. § pretation Laws (1896). 15 When determining interpreta a certain whether terms, VII, 3, given language By
tion should be its literal article as § permits provision, proper subsequently, it is to consider whether amended 1883 adopted it have in the voters who would to establish a dual involving consequences funding tended the which must follow of State and dis- 874 poten- the minimum costs with supplemented in rural and urban areas with
tricts
raising
tax
comparatively little effort
tially
tax rates. But nowhere
different
slightly.
rates
repeal
provision explicitly
does
rights provision
respect
with
The Incom
Note: Texas School Finance:
finance,
implied repeal
of an
school
patability
Property Taxation and
provision especially provision
Education,
253,
earlier
L.Rev.
Quality
56 Texas
—
Rights
inferred
(1978).
the Bill of
to be
254
—is
Allred,
lightly. Collingsworth County v.
period
of that
had no cause
The voters
13,
473,
(1931) and
120 Tex.
15
3,
VII,
permit-
article
while
believe that
§
29, 40
C.J.S.
Law
16
Constitutional
§§
separate
ting cities and towns
constitute
(1984).
great dis-
authorized the
existing
property
parities
today
article
Would the voters who amended
to raise
of the districts
wealth
abilities
VII,
interpreted
their action as an
§
Furthermore, although
money per pupil.
provi-
repeal
equal rights
implicit
VII,
3 limited
the 1883 version
article
§
finance,
so as to
respect
sion with
by rural school dis-
the tax rate allowed
highly inequitable system
exist-
allow
tricts,
was removed
limitation
ing today? The answer must be “no.”
(ed.),
in 1920.
G. Braden
amendment
See
Texas;
The Constitution
State of
B
Comparative Analysis
Annotated and
An
century, our
In the late nineteenth
1883,
was no
By
“[education
“population
property
wealth
State’s
private char-
longer regarded
as a
spread relatively evenly across the
were
govern-
function of
ity
necessary
but
7-8,
Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at
state.”
every
and the natural
ment
no great
There were
875 development rights” an “efficient” of the “fundamental “suitable” “suspect hardly argued system; doctrine or the but it can be classification” analysis, “patched-up overly cobbled” recognized requirement system, fully protection compulsory which denies one- equal “all” education—that substantially its third of students of a permitted must be “treated alike”—but dis- time, opportunity educational to attain parity, at that under the “rational test, required even the basic inapplicable is here. minimum stan- basis” imposes, is Marrs, supra, dards it “efficient.” What Mumme v. at S.W.2d subject proper legisla- be is a “suitable” 36-7. decision; political tive debate and but the D system resulting process from that must be enough protected preserve “efficient” majority opinion implies, The rea- by its rights in constitutional accordance with soning, that the places Texas Constitution necessary, manageable discernible and le- limit power whatsoever on the Marrs, gal supra, standards. Mumme v. to establish school district at S.W.2d 36-37. reasoning dangerously boundaries. Such methods, legislative determination precious erodes that political most restrictions, final, regulations is ex- rights right respect to be treated with —the cept so arbitrary when as be violative equality by government, right the constitutional of the citi- full participating citizenship in zen. ... I, 3a, legis- state. Article 3 and forbids §§ lation that degrades or stigmatizes through [*] [*] [*] ‡ # $ Meskill, Branch I.S.D. v. participation in today’s society; as a consti- al ing maintained as tutional open political system and labor market. deprived 559. Education is critical to an individual’s tution or attain a compelling State participation whether the use of seriously impairs individual “fundamental,” unless the state can show relatively equal scheme are not present disparities legislation 172 Conn. explicitly present not—that “suspect classifications,” control. it is easily opportunity society basis with hollow its system. mentioned in the Consti- Stamos, absolutely necessary necessary in an are so Local in the school financ- 376 A.2d as to be deemed if interest. equitable control See Horton v. critical to full others to the surviv- pursue possessor interests— Spring can in our 375-6 it on at Judicial nance would Id. S.Ct. ture. legal policymaking Upholding That cient, relationship educational government. are lation is not es.... treated ... (emphasis arbitrary n statutes Equal protection See tend brought Litigation ... there Control 7 L.Ed.2d alike in the Baker v. frustrate or to make [*] appropriations the trial court’s do not can open opportunities exercise of It is well settled that under [*] be no doubt. function in State Carr, our subject subject of laws objection embarrass the non- same circumstanc- Purse-School (1962); [*] influence of equalizing have a U.S. is Courts, [*] powers more effi- if secured if judgment individual all who legisla- Note, state, legis- [*] real Fi- *16 Wayne L.Rev. 1410-15
VI discussed, regard to the I With matters Finally, majority opinion concludes judgment would affirm the of the trial that, while 1 requires article court. system provided “efficient,” it guidance provides no for this ar- Court to at a
rive determination of what is efficient Clearly,
or inefficient. it is dis- within the legislature,
cretion the exercise duty,
its constitutional determine what
