This is a taxpayers’ action for declaratory judgment and injunction, involving the Mill Creek Valley Redevelopment Plan (hereinafter called “Plan”) of the City of St. Louis (hereinafter called “City”) and its Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (hereinafter called “Authority”) and particularly the sale of land therein to St. Louis University (hereinafter called “University”). The trial court refused to make the declarations sought by plaintiffs, declaring the sale illegal and void, and refused to enjoin the sale; but instead entered a decree with declarations in favor of defendants’ contentions, denying an injunction, and finding all issues in favor of defendants.
Plaintiffs’ claims of error amount to two main contentions, namely: that the sale constituted an unconstitutional use of public power and public funds in aid of a private sectarian school controlled by a religious denomination; and that the sale constituted an unconstitutional taking of private and public property for private use and an abuse of the power of eminent domain.
These contentions are based on the following claims which plaintiffs say the evidence clearly showed and the court should have found:
“a. that the Authority designated and limited the use of said land for the University prior to approval of the Redevelopment Plan and prior to the necessary statutory public advertisements;
“b. that the Authority considered and accepted the redevelopment proposal of the University prior to the acquisition and clearance of the land;
“c. that the Authority failed to properly and legally advertise for other proposals and that such advertisements were necessary for the exercise of Authority’s power; and
“d. that the Authority failed to give bona fide consideration to other proposals as required by law and discouraged and misinformed other redevelopers and potential redevelopers by publication of the Redevelopment Plan and other maps showing said exclusive designation and limitation, and by information furnished to interested parties.”
Plaintiffs also say that the sale was not made at fair value because the value fixed by the authority was not in accordance with a standard authorized by law; and that the vacation of a certain public plaza, in the tract conveyed to University, by ordinance of City, constituted a direct, illegal and unconstitutional contribution of public lands to University. Plaintiffs point out that this is an appeal from a judgment and decree in equity and should be heard and considered de novo, citing McCarty v. McCarty, Mo.Sup.,
The facts hereinafter stated appear from the testimony and exhibits in the record. By ordinance of City in 1952 existence of blighted areas was found and Authority was established. In 1954, the Mill Creek area of about 460 acres, west of the central business district was declared blighted and planning by Authority authorized by ordinance, with necessary findings for assistance by the federal government. The first redevelopment project had been on the Plaza from the Union Station to the east. The Mill Creek project was from the Union Station to the west. A special election, on May 26, 1955, provided for bonds to pay City’s share of the Mill Creek project. On December 27, 1955, City and Authority made a contract providing for certain services to be rendered by City in connection with the Mill Creek project and on March 26, 1958, City approved by ordinance the Redevelopment Plan and ordered execution of a cooperation agreement defining City’s obligations. In Sep *698 tember 1957, Authority advertised generally for proposals for development and a public hearing was held on the redevelopment plan on March 17, 1958, at which proposals were invited. There were other advertisements in March 1959 requesting proposals on the land herein involved and other land.
The north boundary of the Mill Creek project was Olive Street and Lindell Boulevard from 20th Street to Grand Boulevard, which was its west boundary. In developing its Plan, Authority had studied land uses for a distance of one mile beyond these boundaries. St. Louis University, founded in 1818, by the Jesuit Order of the Catholic Church, chartered as a nonprofit educational corporation, had its main campus on the west side of Grand south of Lindell and needed land for expansion. University was interested in the land on the east side of Grand and before the Mill Creek project was commenced, it already had about one acre east of Grand on which there was a building called Champlin Hall. In 1953, it had a New York firm make a study of its needs and later of its financial possibilities. In 1954, after City by ordinance found the Mill Creek area blighted, University’s architects began studies of land use, which included the land herein involved. Soon after the bonds were voted in 1955, University prepared a brochure indicating its future plans including the land in the Mill Creek area in which it was interested. However, its statement only expressed hope of acquiring land in the Mill Creek area. Articles about these plans appeared in St. Louis newspapers. Authority began negotiations with private redevelopers during that year. In 1956, Authority issued Land Use Plans, Preliminary Project Report and maps of the area, in which some land was designated as “Public or Semi-Public,” and University’s proposed campus addition was listed under that heading. The words “St. Louis University” appeared across that designated area on maps. Later maps had the words “University expansion” on that area. The first re-use appraisals were made during that year. In 1957, there was-correspondence between University and Authority officers which resulted in a “letter of intent” being sent by University to-Authority. (Defendants’ explanation of a letter of intent was that it was intended to-demonstrate to the federal agency, furnishing two-thirds of the cost, the interest of a. possible redeveloper and that it did not obligate anyone.) In June 1958, the Loan and Grant Contract between Authority and the-federal agency was executed and Authority began its purchase of land. In December 1958, University received a gift of sufficient amount to purchase the land in which it was interested, which it claimed for the first time gave it sufficient finances to participate. After the March 1959 advertising by Authority, University submitted a proposal to purchase, which was approved by the federal agency in July 1959. This suit was filed in August 1959 and the purchase contract between University and Authority was executed in'January 1960.
Plaintiffs and others were members of organizations opposing the sale of land by Authority to sectarian institutions. Representatives of these organizations conferred with officers of Authority in December 1957.-Their testimony was they were told that the land involved was to be used to expand St. Louis University; that no one else would have a chance to acquire that tract; that giving other institutions a chance to acquire it would be “spinning their wheels”; and that St. Louis University was considered a public institution in the same category as the University of Missouri. These statements were denied by Authority’s officers. These representatives, of the organizations, with which plaintiffs are affiliated, attended the public hearing on the plan on March 17, 1958, and stated their opposition to any sale to University. Plaintiffs also had testimony of a representative of Gulf Oil Company that he was told land acquired by that company could not be kept by it because Authority would develop the whole area and the tract in which he was interested *699 ■would be used for University or institutional uses. (He was not sure which term was used.) Authority’s version was that he was told it would he subject to the land use provided in the final Redevelopment Plan.
Defendants’ evidence was that the maps, ■charts and correspondence between University and Authority offered by plaintiffs showed only tentative planning, subject to negotiation with any interested redevelop-■ers. Most of the 21 ½ acre tract later purchased by University was designated “public and semi-public with residential permitted as an alternate use”; and the rest was designated as “public and semi-public with commercial permitted as an alternate ~use.” Re-use valuations were based on these alternate uses. These designations were used for churches, the Y.M.C.A., schools and public buildings, in the Mill Creek area, •and had been used in the Plaza area. In that project a Methodist Church and Catholic Church had been sold adjoining land for expansion. It was shown that the words “semi-public” are words of art used by planners (including the City Plan Commission and the writers of the Federal Manual used in redevelopment projects) to indicate such uses as hospitals, schools, churches and other institutions not publicly owned but which serve the public. University is open to all qualified students without restrictions of race, color or creed. Defendants’ evidence was that University’s plans were only tentative at all times before its 1959 proposal to purchase and that Authority made no commitment or decision that the land would be sold to University for educational purposes instead of being sold for its alternate uses until after that time. Other facts will be hereinafter stated.
The trial court made the following findings (among others) in its decree, namely, that defendants did not set aside the land involved as a site for the University’s campus; that defendants’ actions did not deprive others of the right to bid for said land and did not limit the sale thereof to University; that the price'to be paid by University was not less than the fair value of the land; that there was no advantage given to University in the sale of the land; that the Redevelopment Plan did not limit the use of the land to University; that the sale was made by Authority pursuant to due observance of all applicable requirements of law, without fraud, bad faith, caprice or misconduct of Authority or University and involved no preference or favoritism; and that failure to recognize the purchase contract would amount to discrimination against University.
Plaintiffs make no claim that the Redevelopment Law (Chap. 99 RSMo, V. A.M.S.) is unconstitutional, and this eliminates any issue as to public purpose of the project. See State on Inf. of Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas City, Missouri,
The New York Court of Appeals ruled a similar situation in 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of New York,
Plaintiffs say the New York cases are not controlling because of the requirement in the New York law for a public auction, saying of the Fordham University case, “such prior contacts and negotiations as may have existed between the redevelopment authorities and the University were rendered largely insignificant by the auction requirement.” However, the bidding at such auctions is on a very restricted basis. In that case Fordham was the only bidder and by pre-auction contract it was required to agree to bid a stated minimum price, redevelop as required by the plan, clearing the site and relocating prior occupants. Our law (Sec. 99.450) authorizes sale by negotiation at fair value for uses in accordance with the redevelopment plan giving consideration to the uses and purposes required, the restrictions upon and the covenants, conditions and obligations assumed by the redeveloper, after inviting proposals by newspaper notices. The Authority is also given discretion to dispose of property “under such reasonable competitive bidding procedures as it may prescribe.” It was shown that Authority tried competitive *701 bidding in the Plaza project but received only one bid which it rejected and thereafter made a sale by negotiation for almost double the amount of that bid. In view of the findings of the trial court on the fact issues, which we accept as correct from our review of the record, plaintiffs’ contention of illegal designation and subsidy from public funds cannot be sustained.
Likewise, since we cannot accept as the true facts the factual basis on which plaintiffs’ claim of abuse of eminent domain, by taking private property for private use, is founded, we cannot sustain that contention. Plaintiffs rely on Sec. 28, Art. I, Const, of Mo., which of course prevents private property from being taken under the guise of a pretended public use when in fact it is only for the convenience of private persons as held in State ex rel. United Railways Co. v. Wiethaupt,
Plaintiffs cite the following statement from our Kansas City Redevelopment case (270 S.W.2d loc. cit. 51): “Under the Redevelopment Law, private owners come into the picture only after the land has been acquired and cleared.” However, that does not mean, as plaintiffs seem to contend, that prior to acquisition and clearing there can be no planning for use, search for redevelopers, efforts to interest them in the project or tentative negotiations to find out what commitments they would be willing to make. It is clear from the evidence in this case that this must be done before there can be sufficient information for approval by the federal agency which provides two-thirds of the project costs. In fact Sec. 99.430(7) requires statements by the Authority to the governing body of the city, before it approves the plan, both of estimated cost of acquisition and preparation for redevelopment and of estimated proceeds or revenues from its disposal to redevelopers. Certainly there could be no substantial basis for the latter estimate without some preliminary tentative negotiations to find that there were interested re-developers and what they were willing to do.
In the Kansas City case, we said: “We hold that Article I, § 28, and Article VI, § 21, considered together and in the light of the above cited cases, mean that final determination of the question whether the contemplated use of any property sought to be taken under the Law here in question is public rests upon the courts, but that a legislative finding under said law that a blighted or insanitary area exists and that the legislative agency proposes to take the property therein under the processes of eminent domain for the purpose of clearance and improvement and subsequent sale upon such terms and restrictions as it may deem in the public interest will be accepted by the
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courts as conclusive evidence that the contemplated use thereof is public, unless it further appears upon allegation and clear proof that the legislative finding was arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith.” As noted, the trial court has found against plaintiffs’ claim of fraud, collusion or bad faith and we have accepted such findings as correct. Authority’s policy was that it would not seek to acquire property of religious or educational institutions already in the area and that it would accept them as redevelopers if they desired to expand. In the Mill Creek project this was done with churches, Y.M.C.A., and the Christian Board of Publication, which made a considerable expansion of its properties. The United States Supreme Court recognized this policy as proper in Berman v. Parker,
In Bleecker Luncheonette v. Wagner, Sup.,
Plaintiffs’ contention as to failure to legally advertise is based on its interpretation of our statement in the Kansas City case (270 S.W.2d loc. cit. SI) that the private redeveloper comes into the picture only after the land has been acquired and cleared; and also on their claim that University was designated to get the tract involved before Authority advertised for re-developers and before City adopted its ordinance approving the Redevelopment Plan. As to this we adopt the view of the trial court, stated as follows: “In their briefs plaintiffs lay great stress on the provision of the statute that no redevelopment proposal may be considered before publication of the advertisement required by the statute; and they insist that any tentative reference to University expansion on various plats and charts was a violation of fhe statute. [Sec. 99.450(2) requires publication of notice “prior to the consideration of any redevelopment contract proposal.”] We think that the vice in this argument is that it gives an improper and inaccurate meaning to the word ‘consider’. As used in the statute, the word must connote a formal consideration of a formal proposal (which would come after the advertising). It would be an extreme interpretation of the statutory language to hold that the Legislature meant that interested people and the Authority through its commissioners and officers could do no thinking previous to the advertising. There was some thinking, some recognition of possibilities and probabilities, but there was no agreement or contract in advance of proper time.” Since there were published notices, both in 1957 and 1958, before any contract was made with University, our view is that the trial court’s finding should be accepted and plaintiffs’ contentions decided against them.
We also find plaintiffs’ other claims (sale not made at fair value and donation of a public plaza) to be without merit. As to fair value, plaintiffs say, “Authority’s power, however, can only come from Chapter 99 which requires sale at ‘fair value’ and does not contain any such classification or procedure as was used by Authority.” (Plaintiffs cite Sec. 99.450(1) as controlling but it does not specify classification of uses to be made. It states: “In determining the fair value of real property for uses in accordance with the redevelopment plan, an authority shall take into account and give consideration to the uses and purposes required by such plan; the restrictions upon, and the covenants, conditions and obligations assumed by the redeveloper of such property; the objectives of the redevelopment plans for the prevention of the recurrence of blighted, or unsanitary area; and such other matters as the authority shall specify as being appropriate.” The appraisals of the tract involved were shown to have been made ,on the most likely alternative private use without regard for social or community goals and without any purpose of aiding education or welfare. University paid as high a price per square foot as other redevelopers of adjoining land and higher than the appraisals. In addition to the price fixed, University was required to clear the land it owned in the area of the building known as Champlin Hall. (It was shown that this saved $100,000.00 for Authority over purchase, clearing and resale at appraised re-use value.) Like all buyers, University was required to continue its designated use for 25 years and during that period was not permitted to sell land purchased without permission of Authority. There is no evidence that anyone else ever made an offer for the tract' involved; and it is significant that other redevelopers (including the two largest who are developing adjoining tracts) have intervened asking that the sale to University be approved ior the benefit of the whole project and the success of their own redevelopments, which *704 are both residential and commercial. We find the evidence fully supports the finding of the trial court as to fair value.
The public plaza involved was a small area near Grand known as Camp Jackson Plaza. Plaintiffs’ contention about this also depends on their claim of a prior agreement for the eventual use of the land by University. The Plaza had been established and named prior to 1926 and a private society given permission to erect there a statue of General Nathaniel Lyon. After the Redevelopment Plan and cooperation agreement was approved by ordinance, City by ordinances vacated the Plaza and streets composing it, repealed the ordinance authorizing the erection of the statue and granted permission to place the statue in another place designated as Lyon Park. Several miles of other streets and alleys in the Mill Creek area also were vacated in accordance with the Plan. These streets went to the Authority which sold them with the other land going to redevelopers. City, which was obligated by the cooperation agreement to pay one-third of the project’s cost, benefited to the extent of one-third of the difference between the Authority’s cost and its selling price of these street areas. In this case, Authority’s total acquisition cost of the Camp Jackson area (by purchase and condemnation) was shown as $17.00; while the sales price received for it from University was $29,801.75.
Our conclusion on the whole case is that since the trial court found the essential fact issues against plaintiffs and we conclude that we should accept these findings as proper and correct, plaintiffs’ contentions on this appeal cannot be sustained. Because of the view we take it is not necessary to consider defendants’ affirmative defenses of laches and estoppel.
The judgment is affirmed.