Lead Opinion
OPINION
delivered the opinion of the Court,
The employer discharged the employee three days after he rejected an offer to settle his workers’ compensation claim, and the employee brought a retaliatory discharge action against the employer. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
Defendant Berkline, LLC (Berkline) employed Gerry G. Kinsler as a “maintenance multicraftsman.” His duties as a multicraftsman included servicing and repairing machines and equipment in Berk-line’s furniture manufacturing plant and maintaining the plant, building, and grounds. A job description established by Berkline in 1992 for multicraftsmen states that one physical requirement is the occasional lifting of up to seventy-five pounds.
On June 9, 2005, Mr. Kinsler was injured when another multicraftsman dropped a motor that he and Mr. Kinsler were lifting. The injury required medical treatment, during which time Berkline placed Mr. Kinsler on modified/restricted duty repairing air tools in the maintenance shop. Mr. Kinsler reached maximum medical improvement in September 2005. Relying on a “functional capacity evaluation study” conducted on September 25, 2005, Mr. Kinsler’s treating physician imposed a permanent lifting restriction of nо more than thirty pounds. Berkline returned Mr. Kinsler to the maintenance department at the same hourly rate of pay he earned prior to his injury but with limited duties, including repairing air tools, cleaning the shop, and answering the phone. These tasks previously had been performed by all multicraftsmen and not assigned to a particular employee.
Mr. Kinsler repeatedly told his supervisors that he wanted to resume his pre-injury responsibilities. Mr. Kinsler asserted that he could perfоrm the essential duties of a multicraftsman while remaining within his lifting restriction because multi-craftsmen helped each other and used equipment when heavy lifting was required. Berkline commissioned a job site
Mr. Smith delivered a job site evaluation report to Berkline on January 5, 2006. It stated, “There are situations that occur throughout the workday that require[ ] the lifting, carrying, or positioning of materials/equipmenVparts that could weigh over fifty pounds.” Mr. Smith compared this information to Mr. Kinsler’s performance on the functional capacity evaluation study and concluded that “Mr. Kinsler presently does not have the functional capacities or capabilities to perform all of the essential duties or meet all of the physical demand requirements of a Maintenance Multi-craftsman.”
Contemporaneous with Mr. Kinsler’s request to resume his pre-injury responsibilities, Berkline’s workers’ compensation administrator discussed with Mr. Kinsler settling any workers’ compensation claims arising from the June 9, 2005 injury. Mr. Kinsler agreed to a settlement amount, and the administrator scheduled a settlement approval hearing on January 9, 2006. At that meeting, however, a Department of Labor representative suggested that Mr. Kinsler complete a scheduled medical evaluation of his shoulder prior to settling his case, and Mr. Kinsler rejected Berk-line’s settlement offer.
At some point in time between January 9 and 12, 2006, Mr. Kinsler’s supervisors reviewed Mr. Smith’s job site evaluation report. They met with Mr. Kinsler concerning the report on January 12, 2006, and Bеrkline discharged Mr. Kinsler during that meeting.
Mr. Kinsler filed a retaliatory discharge claim alleging that Berkline terminated his employment because he refused its offer to settle his workers’ compensation claim. Berkline moved for summary judgment. It alleged that Mr. Kinsler could not prove that his rejection of Berkline’s settlement offer was a substantial factor in its motivation to terminate Mr. Kinsler’s employment. Berkline alleged that it discharged Mr. Kinsler for the legitimate reason that Mr. Kinsler cоuld not perform all of the responsibilities of a maintenance multi-craftsman with his lifting restriction.
The trial court granted summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Berkline’s actual motivation for discharging Mr. Kinsler. We granted Berkline’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case.
Analysis
The granting or denying of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of lаw, and our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Blair v. W. Town Mall,
For common law retaliatory discharge cases such as the one before us, the employee has the burden of proving the four elements of the claim:
(1) that an employment-at-will relationship existed;
(2) that the employee was discharged;
(3) that the reason for the discharge was that the employee attempted to exercise a statutory or constitutional right, or for any other reason which violates a clear public policy evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision; and
(4) that a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to discharge the employee was the employee’s exercise of protected rights or compliance with clear public policy.
Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc.,
To show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, Berkline must either produce or identify evidence “that affirmatively negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or shows that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” See Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
Berkline contends that Mr. Kinsler cannot establish that his rejection of the settlement offer constituted a substantial factor in Berkline’s decision to discharge him. In support of its argument, Berkline has presented evidence that it discharged Mr. Kinsler solely because his permanent lifting restriction prevented him from performing the responsibilities of a maintenance multicraftsman. Berkline points to Mr. Kinsler’s deposition and reports from Mr. Kinsler’s treating physician to show that Mr. Kinsler has a permanent lifting restriction оf no more than thirty pounds. It has produced a 1992 job description stating that one physical requirement of a maintenance multicraftsman is the lifting of up to seventy-five pounds. Berkline also has produced a job site evaluation report stating that parts and equipment Mr. Kinsler may be required to handle “could weigh over fifty pounds” and concluding that Mr. Kinsler could not perform all the responsibilities of a maintenance multicraftsman with his lifting restriction. Finally, Berkline has pointеd to statements from Mr. Kinsler’s deposition in which Mr. Kinsler admits that the maintenance multicraftsman position requires lifting beyond his restriction approximately five times per year.
As we stated in Mills, determining whether the evidence identified by Berk-line is sufficient to satisfy its burden of production is unnecessary if Mr. Kinsler “has clearly stated a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.”
To determine whether the facts identified by Mr. Kinsler create a genuine issue of material fact, we “must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence.” Blair,
From our review of the record, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Berkline discharged Mr. Kin-sler for the reasons Berkline stated or because Mr. Kinsler rejected its settlement offer. Taking the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of Mr. Kinsler, allowing all reasonable inferences in his favor, and discarding all countervailing evidence, the record shows thаt Berk-line did not enforce the lifting restrictions for the maintenance multicraftsman position as to Mr. Kinsler until three days after he rejected its settlement offer. Based on these facts, a reasonable person could reach more than one conclusion as to whether Mr. Kinsler’s rejection of the settlement offer was a substantial factor in Berkline’s decision to discharge him. This genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment. See Mills,
Because this genuine issue of material fact is easily ascertainable and dis-positive of summary judgment, conducting the burden-shifting analysis described in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.,
Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, we hold that summary judgment was improperly granted in Mr. Kinsler’s common law retaliatory discharge action against Berk-
CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J., not participating.
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals because genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment for the employer. I write separately to reiterate my belief, set forth in my partial concurrence and dissent in Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co.,
Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, a moving party obtains summary judgment by “show[ing] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” As interpreted in Hannan, a party moving for summary judgment аnd “seek[ing] to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must either: (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.”
Less than three years ago, we explained how the McDonnell Douglas framework operatеs at the summary judgment stage in an opinion involving a retaliation case brought pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”):
After an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation [including causation], the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the materially adverse action. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the employee, who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the process, must present evidence demonstrating that the articulated reason is pretextual and that the defendant’s action was actually motivated by a desire to retaliate against the employee.
Allen v. McPhee,
Here, the employer, Berkline LLC (“Berkline”), challenges the ability of the
As proof of its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Kinsler’s discharge, Berkline presents evidence that Kinsler’s discharge on January 12, 2006, was based solely on the just-received job sitе evaluation which showed that Kinsler could not perform the job duties of his old position and had nothing to do with the failed January 9 workers’ compensation settlement agreement. Specifically, Berkline provided evidence that Kinsler’s original 1992 job description stated a lifting requirement of up to seventy-five (75) pounds. Berkline also produced the re-suits of a “functional capacity evaluation study” conducted on September 25, 2005, after which Kinsler’s treating physiсian imposed a permanent lifting restriction of no more than thirty (30) pounds. Finally, Berkline introduced the job site evaluation conducted on September 21, 2005, by Andrew Smith, a physical therapist. Smith had used information provided by Kinsler, his supervisor, and Berkline’s workers’ compensation . administrator concerning the description of the maintenance multi-craftsman position. Smith delivered his evaluation report to Berkline on January 5, 2006. As noted by the lead opinion, this evaluation report concluded that “Mr. Kin-sler presently does not have the functional capacities or capabilities to perform all of the essential duties or meet all of the physical demand requirements of a Maintenance Multicraftsman.” Berkline contends that it was the opportunity to review this report, which merely coincided in time with the failed workers’ compensation settlement proceeding, that resulted in the determination to discharge Kinsler. Furthermore, Kinsler concedes in his deposition that the position requires lifting beyond his restriction, and no fact dispute exists about the timing of the receipt of the report. The foregoing evidence is sufficient under McDonnell Douglas to shift the burden of production to Kinsler to show that Berkline’s reason for discharging him was pretextual. '
To satisfy this burden, Kinsler maintains that the lifting limits set forth in the written job description did not reflect the actual requirements of the job.
Kinsler also points to the example of his immediate supervisor, James Gann, whom Berkline retained even though his lifting restrictions fell below the requirements of the written job description. In his position as a maintenance facilitatоr, Gann supervised all multicraftsmen at Berkline’s facility in Morristown. Gann testified that he also performed the work of a multi-craftsman, sometimes working alongside other multicraftsmen on a daily basis. After a surgically repaired injury to his right shoulder in 2004, Gann was subject to restrictions of occasional lifting of fifty pounds up to waist level and occasional lifting of thirty-five pounds from waist level to overhead height. The written description of the maintenance facilitator position, howеver, required frequent lifting of up to fifty pounds, and, as mentioned above, multicraftsmen were required to perform occasional lifting of up to seventy-five pounds. Kinsler points out, however, that Berkline did not terminate Gann in 2004 after these lifting restrictions had been imposed, even though he immediately became unable to fulfill the written lifting job requirements. While Berkline contends that Gann’s employment in a different position with different lifting requirements is not relevant to Kinsler’s termination, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence.
As additional support for pretext, Kin-sler offers evidence that his lifting restrictions predate this injury but were never previously made an issue before he declined to settle the workers’ compensation case. A March 1984 inter-office memorandum prepared by Ruby Glasscock on Berk-line stationery indicates that Kinsler declined to return from a layoff to a position as a final trim trainee because, following a motоrcycle accident several years prior, his doctor had instructed him never to lift more than forty pounds continually. Berkline contends that no medical docu
In summary, as explained in my partial concurrence and dissent in Gossett, dispensing with the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment phase in all employment discrimination and retaliation cases is unnecessary. As the foregoing analysis illustrates, the McDonnell Douglas framework enables an orderly analysis of the evidence and operates consistently with our law on summary judgment. We should adhere to that framework. Nonetheless, because there is adequate evidence of pretext to establish a genuine issue of material fact, I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Court of the Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Justice KOCH concurs in this opinion.
Notes
. As the opinions in Gossett acknowledge, in the context of a summary judgment motion on a common-law claim for retaliatory discharge, we have never confronted the question of what the employee must do after the employer has proffered a legitimate reason for the discharge. Nothing in our law would preclude us, however, from importing the pretext analysis that we have developed in the THRA context, based on corresponding federal causes of action.
. Indeed, Kinsler testified that, although the job description was originally prepared in 1992, he did not receive a copy of that de
. Issues regarding the qualifications for a particular job must be addressed with care. Defining the nature of thе work and the qualifications and duties of the jobs to be performed are the employer's prerogatives, not the employee's. In Tennessee, employers have long had the right to make independent assessments of the needs of their businesses and of their employees’ performance. Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co.,
. When an employee bases a claim of retaliation or discrimination on the argument that other employees received different treatment, it is, of course, appropriate, to require that the other employees were working at jobs that are substantially similar to the plaintiff's position. When an employee relies upon the employer’s treatment of other employees to counter an еmployer’s legitimate, non-retaliatory or nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the job duties of the other employee(s) need not be identical but should at least be similar. Cf. Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co.,