KINGSTON PARTNERS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LYNN PLAZA, LLC, Defendant-Appellant (Lynn Plaza, LLC, Plaintiff v. Rodin Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Minuteman Press, an Illinois corporation, and Allan Rodin, individually, Defendants; Allan Rodin, Aviva Rodin, Kingston Partners, LLC, City of Chicago, and Unknown Owners and Non-Record Claimants, Third-Party Respondents).
No. 1-22-0652
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT SECOND DIVISION
March 31, 2023
2023 IL App (1st) 220652-U
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 20 CH 4842, 19 M1 711110 (cons.). The Honorable Allen Price Walker, Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Howse and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Held: Trial court’s entry of summary judgment quieting title in favor of purchaser of property which had not recorded its deed and against judgment creditor of property’s record owner is affirmed. Denial of attorney fees and punitive damages on quiet title claim also affirmed.
¶ 1 This interlocutory cross-appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Kingston Partners, LLC (Kingston), and against the defendant, Lynn Plaza,
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On July 7, 2020, Kingston Partners filed a two-count complaint against Lynn Plaza, which in pertinent part alleged as follows. On October 28, 2019, Kingston Partners purchased the subject property by quitclaim deed from Allan and Aviva Rodin. Thereafter, Kingston Partners spent over $110,000 renovating the property. This renovation work included replacing the entire roof and all of the windows of the house, along with extensive landscaping, re-grading, and drainage work on the subject property. This work required a permit, which was posted on the house throughout the course of the renovation work and identified Kingston Partners as the owner of the subject property. On April 22, 2020, Kingston Partners listed the property for sale through City Habitat Realty LLC (CH Realty). On May 11, 2020, CH Realty received a letter from Rraim Murtishi, an attorney for Lynn Plaza, which stated the subject property and its owner were subject to a judgment in the case of Lynn Plaza LLC v. Rodin Enterprises, Inc., No. 19-M1-711110 (Cit. Ct. Cook County). Attached to that letter was a copy of a memorandum of judgment entered April 27, 2020,
¶ 4 Count I of the complaint sought to quiet title in the subject property through a declaration that Kingston Partners owned it in fee simple, free and clear of the purported claims of Lynn Plaza. Attorney fees, costs, and expenses were also sought under that count. Count II alleged slander of title, alleging that Lynn Plaza had “falsely and maliciously” recorded the memorandum of judgment despite having actual and constructive knowledge of Kingston Partners’ ownership of the subject property. That count sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees, costs, and expenses.
¶ 5 The trial court ultimately consolidated the case with Case No. 19-M1-711110, which originated as a case for forcible entry and detainer and breach of lease and guaranty by Lynn Plaza against Allan Rodin and his company, Rodin Enterprises, Inc. (The subject matter of that case was a commercial property, not the subject property.) The record reflects that on February 25, 2020, the court in that case entered judgment in favor of Lynn Plaza and against Allan Rodin and Rodin Enterprises, jointly and severally, in the amount of $221,303.03, plus costs. However, on July 1, 2020, in that same case, Lynn Plaza had filed a petition to avoid a fraudulent transfer of real property and to quiet title, to foreclose or enforce a judgment lien, and for other relief. That petition, which remains pending in part, named Kingston Partners as a third-party respondent.
¶ 6 On April 20, 2021, Lynn Plaza filed its answer to the complaint by Kingston Partners, which largely denied the material allegations against it. By way of further pleading, it also alleged in its answer that (1) Kingston Partners had never recorded its purported quitclaim deed until May 29, 2020, at 12:41 p.m., which was after Lynn Plaza had recorded its memorandum of judgment; (2) Lynn Plaza had submitted the memorandum of judgment to its third-party recording service on May 6, 2020, and the third-party recording service had electronically submitted it to the Recorder’s office for recording on May 7, 2020; and (3) the reason the memorandum of judgment was not file-stamped for recording until May 29, 2020, was because of a delay in recording by the Recorder’s office at that time due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Attached as exhibits to Lynn Plaza’s answer were: (1) three pages of printouts from Zillow.com and Redfin.com of the listing of the subject property by CH Realty, dated May 6, 2020; (2) a printed confirmation from Simplifile that it had received the memorandum of judgment on May 6, 2020, and submitted it for filing on May 7, 2020; and (3) a copy of its petition in Case No. 19-M1-711110.
¶ 7 The case proceeded to discovery. On November 15, 2021, Kingston Partners filed a motion for summary judgment on the two counts of its complaint against Lynn Plaza. As to count I to quiet title, Kingston Partners argued that Lynn Plaza’s claim arose from a personal judgment against Allan Rodin and was not effective against property that had not been owned by him at any relevant time. It argued that, as a result of the communications from its attorney on May 11, 2020, Lynn Plaza had notice that the Rodins no longer owned the subject property prior to the time it
¶ 8 In support of the motion for summary judgment, Kingston Partners attached the affidavit of Michael Pelech, its managing member. In pertinent part, Pelech’s affidavit stated the following. Kingston Partners is a real estate investment company that specializes in purchasing, rehabilitating, and reselling houses. On October 28, 2019, it purchased the subject property from Allan and Aviva Rodin via a quitclaim deed. Prior to purchasing the property, it searched title to the same and confirmed that there were no existing liens or encumbrances recorded against the subject property’s title. After acquiring it, Kingston Partners began renovating the subject property with the intent of reselling it, spending over $110,000 in renovation costs. The renovations it performed included replacing the entire roof and all exterior windows. It also performed extensive landscaping work on the home’s exterior, including a regrading of the property and significant draining work. Prior to performing these renovations, Kingston Partners obtained a permit from the Village of Northfield, and this permit was posted conspicuously on the exterior of the subject property for several months. The permit showed that Kingston Partners was the owner of the subject property. Upon competition of the renovations, Kingston Partners publicly listed the property for sale through CH Realty.
¶ 9 Pelech’s affidavit went on to state that on May 11, 2020, Kingston Partners learned for the first time, through CH Realty, of a claim by Lynn Plaza against Allan Rodin in the form of the memorandum of judgment. Immediately after learning of this, Kingston Partners instructed its attorney, Tim Asimos, to provide Lynn Plaza’s attorney with evidence that the Rodin’s no longer
¶ 10 In response to the motion for summary judgment, Lynn Plaza argued that under section 30 of the Conveyances Act (
¶ 11 In support, Lynn Plaza attached a joint affidavit by Jeffrey Kolodny and Michael Kolodny, the co-managers of Lynn Plaza. Their affidavit, in part, detailed some of the difficulties that Lynn Plaza had encountered due to the shutdown of government buildings as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic on their efforts to obtain a signed memorandum of judgment from the court and to file
¶ 12 Lynn Plaza also attached the affidavit of Murtishi. In summary, Murtishi’s affidavit detailed the multiple title searches that he had performed on the subject property from April 2019 through May 6, 2020. Each search had revealed that title to the property was held by Allan and Aviva Rodin, as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety. Searches that he performed on the websites of the county treasurer and assessor also indicated that the Rodins were the owners of the subject property. On May 6, 2020, he performed an Internet search of the address of the subject property, which yielded information that the subject property was on the market for sale and was “contingent,” suggesting that an offer to sell and purchase the subject property had been accepted. Murtishi then made inquiries by phone to the broker of record, Richard Cohen, which were not answered. Also on May 6, 2020, he submitted the memorandum of judgment for recording using an e-recording service. After several unsuccessful attempts to reach Cohen, he sent a letter to CH
¶ 13 On April 21, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on Kingston Partners’ motion for summary judgment. No transcript is included in the record on appeal. The trial court’s written order reflects a finding that Lynn Plaza “had either constructive notice or inquiry notice of the change in ownership of the subject property *** prior to the recordation of [Lynn Plaza’s] Memorandum of Judgment, recorded May 29, 2020.” Based upon that finding, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Kingston Partners on count I of its complaint to quiet title in the property. The order declared that memorandum of judgment recorded against the subject property was deemed null and void and removed from its title. The order further stated that the ruling as to count I was final and appealable. The trial court also found that Lynn Plaza did not act with malice in recording its memorandum of judgment against the subject property or in failing to release it. Accordingly, the trial court denied Kingston Partners’ request for attorney fees and punitive damages under count I and denied its motion for summary judgment as to count II.1
¶ 14 Lynn Plaza then filed a timely notice of appeal of the trial court’s granting of summary judgment on count I of the complaint. Kingston Partners also filed a notice of cross-appeal of the portion of the trial court’s order denying its request for attorney fees and punitive damages incurred in prosecuting its action to quiet title in the subject property.
¶ 15 After the parties had filed their briefs, this court entered an order directing them to address a question of jurisdiction. This pertained to the trial court’s finding that its order granting summary judgment in favor of Kingston Partners on count I of its complaint to quiet title was final and
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 A. Lynn Plaza’s Appeal
¶ 18 This appeal involves the trial court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment, which is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 19 The claim on review is an action to quiet title, which is an equitable proceeding wherein a
¶ 20 On appeal, Lynn Plaza argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the memorandum of judgment which it recorded against the subject property was null and void. Lynn Plaza relies on section 30 of the Conveyances Act (
¶ 21 No transcript of the hearing on summary judgment is included in the record on appeal. Thus, our understanding of the trial court’s reasoning for granting summary judgment in favor of Kingston Partners comes exclusively from its written order, where it stated that it found that Lynn Plaza “had either constructive notice or inquiry notice of the change in ownership of the subject property *** prior to the recordation of [its] memorandum of judgment, recorded May 29, 2020.”
¶ 22 Lynn Plaza’s argument implicates section 30 of the Conveyances Act (id.), which is a longstanding statutory exception to the general rule that a judgment lien may only attach to the actual interest that a judgment debtor has in real property at the time the lien is issued. Banco Popular v. Beneficial Systems, Inc., 335 Ill. App. 3d 196, 203 (2002) (citing East St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Schnipper, 310 Ill. 150, 156-57 (1923)). The statute provides:
“All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing which are authorized to be recorded, shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of filing the same for record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice; and all such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice, until the same shall be filed for record.” (Emphases added.)
765 ILCS 5/30 (West 2020).
Under this statute, a judgment creditor will be given priority over an individual who holds an unrecorded conveyance, if the creditor is without notice of the holder’s interest. Banco Popular, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 203 (citing East St. Louis, 310 Ill. at 157); accord United Community Bank v. Prairie State Bank & Trust, 2012 IL App (4th) 110973, ¶¶ 37-39.
¶ 23 In Banco Popular, this court further explained this principle as follows:
“These principles were again affirmed by our supreme court in Echols v. Olsen, 63 Ill. 2d 270, 276 (1976). There, the court stated that a judgment creditor who records his
judgment lien ‘acquires rights superior to those’ of one who failed to record an interest obtained before the creditor received the judgment lien. Echols, 63 Ill. 2d at 276. As a result, then, this preference, which comes by virtue of section 30 only, allows the creditor to ‘prevail over the holder of a prior but unrecorded interest.’ Echols, 63 Ill. 2d at 276, referring to East St. Louis, 310 Ill. at 156. See also Massey v. Westcott, 40 Ill. 160, 163 (1866) (‘it is the settled law’ of Illinois that ‘lien attaches to whatever interest in real estate the records disclose in the judgment debtor, in the absence of notice); Bauman v. Schoaff, 331 Ill. App. 38, 43-44 (1947) (pursuant to section 30 of Act, ‘a judgment becomes a lien on all real estate of the judgment debtor appearing of record free from the claims of all other persons of which the judgment creditor had no notice, either actual or constructive’); Commercial Trust & Savings Bank of Springfield, Illinois v. Murray, 246 Ill. App. 355, 359 (1927) (creditor’s ‘lien will not be affected by the subsequent recording’ of deed of prior holder in interest if creditor had no notice of the unrecorded deed).” Banco Popular, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 203-04.
¶ 24 Section 30 ostensibly comes into play in this case, because it is undisputed that the Recorder’s office file-stamped Lynn Plaza’s memorandum of judgment for recording prior to the time it file-stamped Kingston Partners’ quitclaim deed. Both were file-stamped for recording on May 29, 2020, with the memorandum of judgment being recorded at 9:49 a.m. and the quit claim deed being recorded at 12:41 p.m. However, it is also undisputed that by May 29, Lynn Plaza had received actual notice of Kingston Partners’ interest in the subject property. This actual notice came in the form of the e-mail on May 11 from Kingston Partners’ attorney to Lynn Plaza’s attorney, attaching its quitclaim deed. Thus, if May 29 were the operative date for determining notice, Lynn Plaza clearly would not then qualify as a creditor “without notice” of a prior
¶ 25 Section 30, however, states that legal instruments take effect from the time of “filing” them for record, not when they are actually recorded.
¶ 26 Lynn Plaza relies upon the principles set forth in the preceding paragraph to argue that May 7 must be considered the date of “filing” the memorandum of judgment and therefore the operative date for determining notice, since this is the date as shown by the evidence when its third-party electronic filing agent submitted the memorandum of judgment to the Recorder’s office for filing. This argument is well-taken. The problem, however, is that the record before us does not show
¶ 27 As the appellant, Lynn Plaza had the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record to enable this court to determine whether the error claimed actually occurred. People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 19 (citing In re Marriage of Gulla, 234 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2009)). Any doubts which arise as a result of the absence of a complete record on appeal will be resolved against the appellant, and it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with the law and had sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). This principle applies in cases involving summary judgment, where the record lacks a transcript or certified bystander’s report of the hearing and the written order does not indicate that the argument urged for reversal was one that actually formed the basis of the trial court’s ruling. Urban Sites of Chicago, LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 2012 IL App (1st) 111880, ¶ 21. However, we may also affirm a trial court’s
¶ 28 We conclude that an adequate basis exists in the record upon which to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, particularly in light of its findings that Lynn Plaza had either “constructive” or “inquiry” notice prior to recording its memorandum of judgment. It is the law of this state that, notwithstanding a party’s failure to record a deed, a judgment creditor is deemed to have constructive notice of an earlier conveyance by the fact that real estate is in the “possession” of a person other than the record owner; where that is the case, the law imposes on the creditor a duty to inquire of the person in possession as to the right or interest by which he holds the property, and the creditor takes only subject to what that right or interest may be. Banco Popular, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 211 (citing Union Bank of Chicago v. Gallup, 317 Ill. 184, 188-89 (1925), and Burnex Oil Co. v. Floyd, 106 Ill. App. 2d 16, 22-24 (1969)). Such “possession” is the legal equivalent to the recording of a deed as to a judgment creditor who claims an interest in the property of which another has possession at the time the creditor secures the judgment. Banco Popular, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 210 (citing Beals v. Cryer, 99 Ill. App. 3d 842, 844 (1981), and Miller v. Bullington, 381 Ill. 238, 243 (1942)). This is a longstanding and well-settled principle of Illinois law. See German-American National Bank of Lincoln v. Martin, 277 Ill. 629, 648-49 (1917).
¶ 29 In Banco Popular, this court explained the scope of this rule as follows:
“What constitutes ‘possession’ in this respect will depend on the facts of each case, and thus, becomes an open question of fact. [Citations.] It has been established that one need not live or reside on the property in order to be in possession. See Carnes v. Whitfield, 352 Ill. 84, 390 (1933) (actual residence not required for possession); Beals, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 844. The ‘possession’ must simply ‘provide some measure of notice to the outside world
of the possessor’s interest in the’ property. See Beals, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 844; see also Atwood v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 313 Ill. 59, 62 (1924) (as long as possession is not occasional or temporary, it amounts to constructive notice, viable against the world, of any rights person in that possession may have). This may include improvements on the property, signs posted thereon, or possession by a tenant of the person claiming possession. See Carnes, 352 Ill. at 390 (possession of tenant is constructive notice of rights of landlord in property, even if legal title to property indicates another); Dana Point Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Keystone Service Co., 141 Ill. App. 3d 916, 922-23 (1986) (signs and stickers placed on property sufficient to indicate possession); Beals, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 844-45 (‘[i]mprovements or acts of dominion over’ property may be sufficient to constitute possession). Whatever the actions, they are sufficient to constitute possession if they provide notice of who has control of the property. See Beals, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 844. That is, as long the holder of a prior unrecorded deed is in ‘possession’ of the property that is ‘actual, open and visible,’ his interest will be given priority to a judgment creditor who obtained a lien from a judgment entered subsequent to the deed. See Adam v. Tolman, 77 Ill. App. 179, 182-83 (1898); see also Brainard v. Hudson, 103 Ill. 218, 222 (1881) (‘[w]here a person is in the possession of a tract of land under an unrecorded deed, that possession is notice to all subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers of whatever title is held by the person in possession, and a subsequently acquired title, although first on record, will be held subject to the title which the person in possession may have to the property’). This is because the creditor, who had been placed on constructive notice by this possession, is bound to inquire of the person in possession what right or interest he holds, and takes subject to what the right or interest may be. See Union Bank of Chicago v. Gallup, 317 Ill. 184, 188-89 (1925); Burnex Oil Co. v. Floyd, 106 Ill. App. 2d 16, 22-24 (1969) (creditor cannot claim innocent status once he is bound to inquire; for he is ‘chargeable with knowledge of facts which are inconsistent with the claims of ownership by the record owner’).” Banco Popular, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 211.
See also US Bank National Ass’n v. Villasenor, 2012 IL App (1st) 120061, ¶¶ 61-71.
¶ 30 The argument for the application of this principle was clearly put at issue in this case and argued in the trial court. For example, the complaint alleges in count I to quiet title that, “[a]s a result of Kingston’s actual, open, and visible possession of the Property, including the Renovation Work, the posted Permit, and the public Listing, any reasonable investigation by Lynn Plaza would have revealed that Kingston had purchased the Property from the Rodins, and was the new owner of the Property, long before May 29, 2020.” In its motion for summary judgment, Kingston Partners argued that its “ownership of the Property was open and notorious” due to its extensive renovations performed on the property’s exterior between October 2019 and March 2020. Pelech’s affidavit in support of the motion, the facts of which were uncontradicted and therefore must be accepted as true (see Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241 (1986)), established that Kingston Partners spent over $110,000 in renovation costs, which included its replacing of the entire roof and all exterior windows of the subject property, along with extensive landscaping work that included regrading of the property and significant drainage work. Pelech’s affidavit further established that a permit obtained from the Village of Northfield for the renovation work was posted conspicuously on the exterior of the subject property for several months and identified Kingston Partners, not the Rodins, as the owner of the subject property.
¶ 31 Lynn Plaza’s response to the motion for summary judgment in the trial court argued that open and obvious renovation of the subject property was irrelevant and did not indicate new ownership,
¶ 32 We hold that the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record demonstrate that Kingston Partners had, prior to May 7, 2020, asserted the requisite level of actual, open, and visible possession of the subject property to be legally equivalent to the recording of a deed and to provide Lynn Plaza, as a judgment creditor of the record owner, with constructive notice of its interest in the property notwithstanding its failure to record the deed until May 29, 2020. See Banco Popular, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 210-11. As the above-quoted passage from Banco Popular makes clear, it is not necessary that someone from Kingston Partners actually lived in or resided on the subject property to sufficiently constitute possession. Rather, the substantial exterior improvements it made to the house and land on the property by that time and its posting of a sign or permit there that identified Kingston Partners as its owner are sufficient. See id. at 211. Such possession by someone other than Allan or Aviva Rodin was sufficient to place Lynn Plaza, as a judgment creditor of Allan Rodin, on constructive notice of a possible change in ownership, to impose on Lynn Plaza a duty to inquire of Kingston Partners as to the right or title by which it had possession of the property, and to take its interest only subject to that right or title. Id.
¶ 33 Furthermore, the existence of constructive notice by possession is not defeated by any argument that Lynn Plaza did not acquire actual knowledge of that possession prior to May 7,
¶ 34 Based on our holding that the undisputed facts demonstrate that constructive notice or inquiry notice existed by virtue of possession prior to May 7, 2020, we conclude that Lynn Plaza was not a creditor “without notice” of Kingston Partners’ interest in the subject property, even assuming that May 7 is the date of “filing” its memorandum of judgment. See
¶ 35 B. Kingston Partners’ Cross-Appeal
¶ 36 In its cross-appeal, Kingston Partners argues that the trial court erred by denying its request
¶ 37 We reject Kingston Partners’ argument that it has established an entitlement to recover punitive damages or attorney fees as an aspect of its claim to quiet title. As support for its argument that it is entitled to recoup its attorney fees incurred in quieting title to the property, Kingston Partners relies upon Home Investment Fund v. Robertson, 10 Ill. App. 3d 840, 844 (1973). The appeal in that case involved a slander of title action, in which the court agreed with the defendant’s argument that the trial court had allowed the plaintiff to recover losses that were not attributable to the defendant’s slander of title but to other circumstances, such as a default on a separate contract by a different party. Id. at 843. The court, after reiterating the general rule that a party may not recover the ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation, recognized that attorney fees may be recoverable when they are incurred as a result of malicious acts and that a prevailing party in an action for slander of title can recover attorney fees because malice is an element of a slander of title claim. Id. at 844. The court then held that, in the case before it, the plaintiff was “entitled to recover those costs and attorneys’ fees directly relating to the quieting of his title and to those damages directly relating to a slander of his title, i.e., loss of vendibility, etc.” Id.
¶ 38 We do not interpret Home Investment Fund to stand for the proposition that attorney fees are recoverable in an action to quiet title where the plaintiff has not proven a corresponding claim for slander of title, a tort claim which requires establishing malice. See Bozek v. Bank of America, N.A., 2021 IL App (1st) 191978, ¶ 87 (slander of title requires proof of (1) a false and malicious
¶ 39 We will not consider any arguments made in the context of the slander of title count, because the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on that count is not before us on this interlocutory appeal. The only counts properly before us are the parties’ respective claims to quiet title. In the order on appeal of April 21, 2022, the only ruling which the trial court found final and appealable was to quiet title in the subject property. It denied summary judgment on the count of Kingston Partners’ complaint for slander of title, and it properly avoided making any finding that such denial of summary judgment was final or appealable. See Clark v. Children’s Memorial Hospital, 2011 IL 108656, ¶ 119 (denial of summary judgment is a non-appealable, interlocutory order).
¶ 40 After this appeal was fully briefed (limited to the counts to quiet title), Kingston Partners attempted to belatedly obtain a Rule 304(a) finding as to the denial of summary judgment on the slander of title count, by including this in the order obtained from the trial court on February 8, 2023. However, we declined to allow Kingston Partners to amend its brief to seek reversal of the denial of summary judgment on the slander of title claim. In addition to the untimeliness of this request, it is well-established that, unless a cross-motion for summary judgment has been granted, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order and cannot be made appealable even where the trial court has made a finding under Rule 304(a). Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, Limited Partnership v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, 2018 IL App (1st) 171316, ¶ 65; Fogt v. 1-800-Pack-Rat, LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 150383, ¶ 95; Eakins v. Hanna Cylinders, LLC, 2015 IL App (2d) 140944, ¶ 36.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Kingston Partners and against Lynn Plaza on count I of Kingston Partners’ complaint and count II of Lynn Plaza’s petition, quieting title in the subject property. We further affirm the trial court’s denial of Kingston Partners’ request for attorney fees or punitive damages as to those counts.
¶ 43 Affirmed.