97 A.D.2d 364 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1983
Lead Opinion
Order and judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Richard L. Price, J.), entered on July 9, 1982, which granted the motion by petitioner William C. Kingsley to confirm the arbitration award, denied the cross motion by respondent Redevco Corporation to vacate the arbitration award and adjudged petitioner entitled to recover $187,500 plus interest upon said award, is affirmed, with costs and disbursements. Whether or not it would have been better practice for the arbitrators to interpret the rules of the American Arbitration Association in such a manner as to require that they reschedule the arbitration on five days’ written notice, the law is well established that an arbitration award will not generally be vacated because arbitrators may have made a mistake of law or fact. (Matter of Langston Enterprises [Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills], 95 AD2d 740; see, also, Matter of Raisler Corp. [New York City Housing Auth.], 32 NY2d 274.) When the arbitrators reach a just result, the courts should not intervene merely because of a possible technical violation. (Matter of Raisler Corp. [New York City Housing Auth.], supra; Matter of Langston Enterprises [Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills], supra.) Moreover, where the arbitration agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, compliance with such conditions precedent as notice
Dissenting Opinion
dissents in a memorandum as follows: On June 3, 1981, petitioner William C. Kingsley demanded arbitration against respondent Redevco Corporation. In an order, entered July 16,1981, Justice Smith denied Redevco’s application for an order staying arbitration, with leave to renew upon proper papers. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), in a notice dated August 26, 1981, scheduled the arbitration for 9:30 a.m. on October 2, 1981 in Manhattan. In an order to show cause dated September 14,1981 and returnable September 23, 1981, Redevco again sought to stay arbitration permanently. This order to show cause, signed by Justice Smith, staved all arbitration hearings until the application was heard. On the return date, the application was not argued; it was submitted to Justice Helman by the answering service. In a letter dated September 25, 1981, the AAA informed Redevco that the arbitration would proceed on schedule because the application to stay the proceeding had been denied. The AAA sent a second letter, dated September 30,1981, in which it stated that the stay had not been denied but had expired. Each of these letters had issued after Kingsley’s attorney had contacted the AAA. A dispute arose between the parties as to whether the interim stay was still in force. Redevco, in order to protect itself, obtained an order to show cause, dated September 30,1981 and returnable October 6,1981. This order to show cause, signed by Justice Williams, stayed the arbitration proceedings. Kingsley’s attorney was served with this order to show cause on October 1, 1981. At the request of Kingsley’s attorney, the clerk of Special Term, Part II, scheduled a conference before Justice Williams on the morning of October 2, 1981. Justice Williams struck the stay from his order to show cause and he directed the parties to appear immediately at another conference before Justice Helman. The attorneys for each side submitted conflicting affidavits as to what occurred before Justice Helman. According to Redevco’s attorney, Justice Helman did not have the original application papers before him. The Justice purportedly made the observation that the arbitration clause seemed to cover all disputes. When apprised of the fact that Kingsley was in default in answering the petition for a stay, Justice Helman informed Redevco’s attorney that he had his remedy. Redevco’s attorney interpreted Justice Helman’s remark to mean that a default should be sought. Thereafter, Redevco’s attorney withdrew the motion brought on by the order to show cause dated September 30, 1981. As the parties departed from Justice Helman’s chambers at 11:00 a.m., Kingsley’s attorney allegedly stated that they were going to arbitration. Kingsley’s attorney then called an AAA administrator who, in turn, called Redevco’s attorney at about 12:00 p.m. The administrator informed Redevco’s attorney that the arbitration would go forward that same day at 2:00 p.m. Redevco did not appear at the arbitration because its witnesses were in Florida. Kingsley’s attorney presented a different version of the conference before Justice Helman. He stated that Justice Helman reviewed the entire matter and denied Redevco’s application for a permanent stay of arbitration. Since no stay was then in effect, Justice Helman then advised the parties to proceed to arbitration. Upon hearing Justice Helman’s decision, Redevco’s attorney withdrew the motion brought on by the order to show
